The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of the ways in which immigrants resist... more The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of the ways in which immigrants resist immigration detention. After having outlined (in Section 2) some general features that make immigration detention a rather abnormal condition for human beings to be kept in, I distinguish three main forms of resistance to it: institutionalized, non-institutionalized, and anti-institutional. I first spell out, in Section 3, some individual characteristics of these forms of resistance. Then (in Sections 4 and 5), using Italy as my test case, I suggest, for each of these forms, an interpretation of their normative meaning (that is, their meaning according to both the relevant legal rules and their underlying social values): under this perspective, I argue that they represent one of the few ways irregular immigrants have to try to assert their existence and to negotiate some space within our societies. I conclude the article by presenting some comments on the effectiveness of the immigrants’ resistance to detention (Section 6).
SOMMARIO: 1. Surrogazione di maternità: struttura e soggetti. Il problema della doppia incriminaz... more SOMMARIO: 1. Surrogazione di maternità: struttura e soggetti. Il problema della doppia incriminazione; 2. Alterazione di stato e questioni di diritto internazionale privato; 3. Falsità inoffensive; 4. Simpatia umana e non punibilità.
The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalizat... more The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalization, the legitimacy of making irregular immigration (IM) a crime. In order to do this, I identify three main ways in which the political decision to introduce a crime of IM may be defended: according to the first, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of states’ territorial sovereignty; according to the second, IM is a justified malum prohibitum the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of a justified immigration regulation; according to the third, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its harmful consequences for receiving states’ citizens. My thesis is that none of these arguments succeeds in providing us with sufficiently good reasons to justify the use of criminal punishment to enforce the closure of state borders. As regards the first, I argue that it relies on a misleading conception of what is entailed by states’ territorial sovereignty, and that therefore it is unsound as an argument for the state’s right to control immigration (even though, were it sound, it would show IM to be a public malum in se, and thus a potential candidate for criminalization). With regard to the second, I argue that, be they legitimate or not, immigration regulations enacted by states cannot provide those would-be immigrants they aim to exclude with content-independent reasons to comply with them; and this is a necessary pre-condition to conclude that IM is a justified malum prohibitum. As regards harm-based approaches, I argue that the notions they rely on (such as collective/cultural harmfulness and precautionary responsibility) are completely unfit as criteria for criminalization. This leads me to the conclusion that, unless other more convincing arguments are provided for, IM should not be criminalized
The aim of this article is to show that criminal paternalism is not an autonomous principle of cr... more The aim of this article is to show that criminal paternalism is not an autonomous principle of criminalization. Upon making a distinction between tutelary and despotic paternalism, it shows that the former is a manifestation of the principle of harm, while the latter is only apparently opposed to liberalism. Indeed, the criminal norms that are usually seen as despoticly paternalistic are instead expressions of either legal moralism (and should be dealt with as such) or (as is the case with tutelary paternalism) of the principle of harm. In the latter cases, the problem is that the principle of harm itself offers a far less stable ground for criminalization than anti-paternalists seem to believe. The article also provides a critical account of the anti-paternalists’ view on consent. The conclusion is drawn that what the debate on criminal paternalism actually calls for is a thorough discussion on whether individuals have a “right to make mistakes” (even when such “mistakes” consist in self-harm).
In this paper I am specifically concerned with a normative assessment, from the perspective of a ... more In this paper I am specifically concerned with a normative assessment, from the perspective of a principled criminal law theory, of norms criminalizing illegal immigration. The overarching question I will dwell on is one specifically regarding the way of using criminal law which is implied in the enactment of such kinds of norms. My thesis will essentially be that it constitutes a veritable abuse of criminal law. In two senses at least: first, in the sense that by criminalizing illegal immigration criminal law puts a ban on (certain categories of) persons, rather than on their actions/omissions, in a way in which a principled criminal law should not do; and—second—in the sense that the criminalization of illegal immigrants represents a perversion of the criminal law, being a case in which criminal norms are (unjustifiably) used as means to attain extrapenal aims.
In this paper I describe some difficulties raised by the so-called thesis of the protective perim... more In this paper I describe some difficulties raised by the so-called thesis of the protective perimeter of liberties (ToPP). According to this thesis, a privilege does not necessarily involve a claim to non-interference, and a claim to non-interference does not necessarily presuppose a privilege. I argue that the first part of this thesis relies on a misunderstanding of ‘interference with a liberty’ (a misunderstanding that surfaces in the examples to which the thesis is applied) and that the second part of this thesis contains a misleading description of what is involved in having a claim to non-interference.
The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of the ways in which immigrants resist... more The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of the ways in which immigrants resist immigration detention. After having outlined (in Section 2) some general features that make immigration detention a rather abnormal condition for human beings to be kept in, I distinguish three main forms of resistance to it: institutionalized, non-institutionalized, and anti-institutional. I first spell out, in Section 3, some individual characteristics of these forms of resistance. Then (in Sections 4 and 5), using Italy as my test case, I suggest, for each of these forms, an interpretation of their normative meaning (that is, their meaning according to both the relevant legal rules and their underlying social values): under this perspective, I argue that they represent one of the few ways irregular immigrants have to try to assert their existence and to negotiate some space within our societies. I conclude the article by presenting some comments on the effectiveness of the immigrants’ resistance to detention (Section 6).
SOMMARIO: 1. Surrogazione di maternità: struttura e soggetti. Il problema della doppia incriminaz... more SOMMARIO: 1. Surrogazione di maternità: struttura e soggetti. Il problema della doppia incriminazione; 2. Alterazione di stato e questioni di diritto internazionale privato; 3. Falsità inoffensive; 4. Simpatia umana e non punibilità.
The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalizat... more The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalization, the legitimacy of making irregular immigration (IM) a crime. In order to do this, I identify three main ways in which the political decision to introduce a crime of IM may be defended: according to the first, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of states’ territorial sovereignty; according to the second, IM is a justified malum prohibitum the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of a justified immigration regulation; according to the third, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its harmful consequences for receiving states’ citizens. My thesis is that none of these arguments succeeds in providing us with sufficiently good reasons to justify the use of criminal punishment to enforce the closure of state borders. As regards the first, I argue that it relies on a misleading conception of what is entailed by states’ territorial sovereignty, and that therefore it is unsound as an argument for the state’s right to control immigration (even though, were it sound, it would show IM to be a public malum in se, and thus a potential candidate for criminalization). With regard to the second, I argue that, be they legitimate or not, immigration regulations enacted by states cannot provide those would-be immigrants they aim to exclude with content-independent reasons to comply with them; and this is a necessary pre-condition to conclude that IM is a justified malum prohibitum. As regards harm-based approaches, I argue that the notions they rely on (such as collective/cultural harmfulness and precautionary responsibility) are completely unfit as criteria for criminalization. This leads me to the conclusion that, unless other more convincing arguments are provided for, IM should not be criminalized
The aim of this article is to show that criminal paternalism is not an autonomous principle of cr... more The aim of this article is to show that criminal paternalism is not an autonomous principle of criminalization. Upon making a distinction between tutelary and despotic paternalism, it shows that the former is a manifestation of the principle of harm, while the latter is only apparently opposed to liberalism. Indeed, the criminal norms that are usually seen as despoticly paternalistic are instead expressions of either legal moralism (and should be dealt with as such) or (as is the case with tutelary paternalism) of the principle of harm. In the latter cases, the problem is that the principle of harm itself offers a far less stable ground for criminalization than anti-paternalists seem to believe. The article also provides a critical account of the anti-paternalists’ view on consent. The conclusion is drawn that what the debate on criminal paternalism actually calls for is a thorough discussion on whether individuals have a “right to make mistakes” (even when such “mistakes” consist in self-harm).
In this paper I am specifically concerned with a normative assessment, from the perspective of a ... more In this paper I am specifically concerned with a normative assessment, from the perspective of a principled criminal law theory, of norms criminalizing illegal immigration. The overarching question I will dwell on is one specifically regarding the way of using criminal law which is implied in the enactment of such kinds of norms. My thesis will essentially be that it constitutes a veritable abuse of criminal law. In two senses at least: first, in the sense that by criminalizing illegal immigration criminal law puts a ban on (certain categories of) persons, rather than on their actions/omissions, in a way in which a principled criminal law should not do; and—second—in the sense that the criminalization of illegal immigrants represents a perversion of the criminal law, being a case in which criminal norms are (unjustifiably) used as means to attain extrapenal aims.
In this paper I describe some difficulties raised by the so-called thesis of the protective perim... more In this paper I describe some difficulties raised by the so-called thesis of the protective perimeter of liberties (ToPP). According to this thesis, a privilege does not necessarily involve a claim to non-interference, and a claim to non-interference does not necessarily presuppose a privilege. I argue that the first part of this thesis relies on a misunderstanding of ‘interference with a liberty’ (a misunderstanding that surfaces in the examples to which the thesis is applied) and that the second part of this thesis contains a misleading description of what is involved in having a claim to non-interference.
Temi di diritto penale dell'economia e dell'ambiente, Jan 1, 2009
In this paper I raise a variety of (moral and legal) doubts on the opportunity to criminalize pri... more In this paper I raise a variety of (moral and legal) doubts on the opportunity to criminalize private bribery (i.e., bribery in the private sector).
Borsa di studio post-lauream di 12 mesi (€ 21.791,97) per ricerca dal titolo “Analisi del fenomen... more Borsa di studio post-lauream di 12 mesi (€ 21.791,97) per ricerca dal titolo “Analisi del fenomeno giuridico del contrabbando di merci nell'area mediterranea ed europea, con specifico riferimento allo studio delle relazioni tra le politiche doganali dell'Unione e l'espansione del mercato nero nel Mediterraneo”. Progetto di ricerca PMI Impact "The new era of smuggling in the Mediterranean sea", Responsabile Scientifico: Prof. Vincenzo Militello
Introduction to the EJML's special issue on "Crimmigration and Human Rights in Europe: Exclusion,... more Introduction to the EJML's special issue on "Crimmigration and Human Rights in Europe: Exclusion, Alternatives and Resistance"
El Programa de Doctorado en “Pluralismi giuridici: prospettive antiche e attuali” de la Universid... more El Programa de Doctorado en “Pluralismi giuridici: prospettive antiche e attuali” de la Universidad de Palermo organiza el Congreso “Seguridad y libertad: nuevas paradojas democráticas en la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional” que tendrá lugar el próximo 26 y 27 de septiembre de 2016 en la Facultad de Derecho de Universidad de Palermo. El objetivo del Congreso será la configuración de un espacio de discusión multidisciplinar en torno a la temática central de los trabajos: la paradoja democrática producida a raíz de la adopción de acciones, en pro de la seguridad, en la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional y las limitaciones, como consecuencia de estas acciones de defensa, de derechos y libertades fundamentales. En la actualidad se ha venido recurriendo, con más frecuencia, a la instauración de estados de emergencia, produciéndose una limitación en la tutela y garantía de los derechos fundamentales. Esta circunstancia ha situado a la doctrina especializada ante los siguientes interrogantes: ¿Es posible seguir hablando de un régimen de excepción frente a intervenciones que adquieren, cada vez con más frecuencia, la condición de medidas estructurales y permanentes? ¿Qué tipologías de derogaciones han sido previstas por los ordenamientos constitucionales y cuáles son las fuentes normativas que las disciplinan? ¿Cuál es el nivel de control reciproco entre poderes estatales, necesario para garantizar el respecto del sistema constitucional de derechos individuales? ¿De qué manera es posible asegurar un control eficaz sobre la necesidad y proporcionalidad de las medidas que, como consecuencia de la amenaza actual contra la seguridad doméstica e internacional, inciden sobre las libertades fundamentales? ¿Cuál es la fórmula para establecer un equilibrio entre las exigencias de seguridad y la tutela de los derechos y libertades fundamentales?
The PhD Program " Pluralismi giuridici: prospettive antiche e attuali " of the University of Pale... more The PhD Program " Pluralismi giuridici: prospettive antiche e attuali " of the University of Palermo organizes the workshop "Security and freedom: new democratic paradoxes in the war on terror" which will be held on 26 th and 27 th September 2016, at the Faculty of Law of Palermo. The workshop will be focused on the democratic paradoxes generated by the adoption of the defensive tools corresponding to incisive limitations to the rights and fundamental freedoms in the name of what seems to have become nowadays a key value within constitutional systems, i.e. national security. We are witnessing the establishment of a regime of exception, made of exemptions and suspensions to the standards of protection of freedom and human rights that pose problems not easily solvable: is it still possible to talk about a state of exception when the interventions have the form and the force of the legal rule? What are the derogations to the institutional order provided by the different legal systems and which are the legal sources that regulate its use? What kind of mutual control between powers is necessary in order to protect the constitutional legality and individual rights during emergency situations? How is it possible to ensure the appropriateness and the proportionality of the restrictions of fundamental rights and liberties in respect to the extent of the current threats to international and national security? How can we balance security with individual rights and fundamental freedoms?
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El objetivo del Congreso será la configuración de un espacio de discusión multidisciplinar en torno a la temática central de los trabajos: la paradoja democrática producida a raíz de la adopción de acciones, en pro de la seguridad, en la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional y las limitaciones, como consecuencia de estas acciones de defensa, de derechos y libertades fundamentales.
En la actualidad se ha venido recurriendo, con más frecuencia, a la instauración de estados de emergencia, produciéndose una limitación en la tutela y garantía de los derechos fundamentales. Esta circunstancia ha situado a la doctrina especializada ante los siguientes interrogantes: ¿Es posible seguir hablando de un régimen de excepción frente a intervenciones que adquieren, cada vez con más frecuencia, la condición de medidas estructurales y permanentes? ¿Qué tipologías de derogaciones han sido previstas por los ordenamientos constitucionales y cuáles son las fuentes normativas que las disciplinan? ¿Cuál es el nivel de control reciproco entre poderes estatales, necesario para garantizar el respecto del sistema constitucional de derechos individuales? ¿De qué manera es posible asegurar un control eficaz sobre la necesidad y proporcionalidad de las medidas que, como consecuencia de la amenaza actual contra la seguridad doméstica e internacional, inciden sobre las libertades fundamentales? ¿Cuál es la fórmula para establecer un equilibrio entre las exigencias de seguridad y la tutela de los derechos y libertades fundamentales?