Nafs

Today, when it comes to soul-body dualism, the view that comes to mind is the substance dualism that Descartes systematized. As the name suggests, this dualism implies that there are two different types of substances. Similarly, although Ibn Sīnā also adopted a kind of substance dualism by stating that the soul is a different type of substance than matter, his dualism differs from Descartes’ in important aspects. It can be said that the most important reason for this difference is that both ideas belong to different traditions. While Ibn Sīnā’s dualism carries the traces of Aristotelian hylomorphism, Cartesian thought is built on the post-Newtonian understanding of the mechanical universe. This significant difference has deeply affected soul-body conception of both philosophers. The aim of this study is to reveal the fundamental differences between the dualistic understandings of these philosophers in the context of soul-body. Thus, it will become clearer where the Avicennian dualism stands in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. In this context, the first question to be addressed here is whether, according to both philosophers, the immaterial part of man means the same thing. The answer to this question is negative. The functions that Ibn Sīnā and Descartes attribute to the immaterial substance are quite different from each other. According to Descartes, it can be said that the soul is actually identical with the mind. Because, he describes the soul as the substance whose essence is to think. Here, Descartes is not only referring to theoretical calculations by thinking. It also includes phenomenal consciousness, that is, conscious phenomena, which is also called qualia in contemporary philosophy of mind. Thus, according to the Cartesian tradition, the fundamental distinction between soul/mind (the immaterial substance) and body is phenomenal consciousness: A thing is a soul only if it can have phenomenal consciousness. Whereas, Ibn Sīnā does not see phenomenal consciousness, which is the most basic function that the present Cartesian dualist tradition attributes to the soul, as the basic function of the immaterial substance. In fact, he does not even see it as a function of the human nafs. In other words, according to him, the main function of the human nafs is not to feel/experience or to have phenomenal consciousness. Such functions can also be performed by animals that do not have an immaterial substance. According to Ibn Sīnā, the main functions of the human soul are theoretical or universal thinking and being self-conscious. One of the places where this distinction can be seen most clearly is their thoughts about animal souls. Both philosophers argue that animals do not have an immaterial substance in addition to their material bodies. However, while this means that animals are unconscious automatons for one philosopher (Descartes), it does not mean anything like that for the other. Because, according to Avicenna, an immaterial substance is not necessary to have consciousness or feeling. However, according to Descartes, for a being to be conscious or sentient requires it to have an immaterial substance. Since animals do not have such (substantial) souls, Descartes saw them as unconscious robots. Another point where the same difference can be observed is an argument put forward by Avicenna to prove this immaterial substance, which he addresses as the human soul. According to Avicenna’s argument, the existence of an immaterial substance is necessary for man’s access to universal knowledge, not for having consciousness. However, according to the argument used in the Cartesian tradition and known as the unity of consciousness argument, the existence of immaterial substance is necessary for the unity of consciousness (not knowledge). The aim of this study is to reveal the basic differences between the dualistic understandings of these philosophers in the context of soul and body. In order to reveal these differences, the following points will be discussed: The question of whether animals are conscious and Avicenna’s argument mentioned above. Because the differences in the handling of these two issues by both philosophers will guide us to reveal the fundamental differences in their dualistic understanding. In this study, it will be argued that the dualistic understanding of Avicenna and Descartes in the context of soul-body are radically different from each other, especially over these two issues.

Respected Chair of conference, members of the organizing committee, participants, ladies and gentlemen! I am extremely grateful and honored by your invitation to give a talk on the occasion of your annual conference on Islamic Psychology. There is growing interest in this emerging field as is evident from increasing literature, research, academic programs, conferences, etc. There are many topics within Islamic psychology to deliberate about and today I would like to talk about the concept of the heart in Islam and its relevance for Islamic Psychology. The concept of the heart is very important for Muslims as this word appears in the Quran in at least 137 places and in various Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH). Both sacred sources mention the word heart or " qalb " in different contexts. The Arabic word qalb is derived from the root word " qalaba " , which means to transform. Thus, the heart refers to something that can transform or change quickly. The Quran refers to the heart in three different contexts, i.e. sadr (chest), fuad (emotions) and lubb (innermost part). The repetitive use of the concept illustrates the centrality of the heart in Islam.

In medieval Sufism, one’s rank as a spiritual master was often measured by the success of one’s pupils.  For that reason among others, Abū al-Jannāb Aḥmad b. ‘Umar, known as Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221), was one of the most highly regarded masters in the medieval Sufi tradition, so much so that he was called “the saint-manufacturer.”  Why was this figure so effective? One reason might lie in his ability to communicate the most effective, and indeed quickest, path to ethical and spiritual success. That path appears in one of his treatises as the path of volitional death, the virtue that underlies all other virtues. This article explores the meaning and implications of volition death in the thought of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and its implications for Islamic ethics and eschatology.

This paper undertakes a comparative study of Imam Al-Ghazālī’s and Sigmund Freud’s conceptions of the self or personality and explores whether, Al-Ghazālī may have influenced Freudian psychoanalysis. An influential 11th-century Persian scholar, Al-Ghazālī remains one of the most widely read Muslim scholars who wrote freely on topics ranging from jurisprudence, logic and ethics to theology and spirituality. A lesser-explored area of his oeuvre is his contribution to psychology, manifested expressively in his monumental Ih_yāʾ ʿulūm Al-Dīn (The Revival of the Religious Sciences). The early 20th century Austrian scholar Sigmund Freud, on the other hand, is revered as the founder of psychoanalysis – the theory and practice associated with the study of mental processes. The methodology adapted for this study is the Variation theory of comparative literature developed by Shunqing Cao. This is because Variation is especially suitable for conducting such cross civilization comparative studies. Through this critical endeavor, the paper aims to investigate the possibility of cross-cultural influence and foreground the potential of a rarely applied non-Western theoretical framework.

The leading idea of the book is to focus on the common roots of Islamic and Western traditions and to increase awareness of the chances of systematic philosophical dispute, with the aim to promote a substantial dialogue on an academic level. Most of the collected papers in this edition are results of contributions to a workshop, organized by the editors of the volume, as an integrated part of a visit to the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (IKERI) of Qom by a delegation of philosophers from the University of Innsbruck in May 2008. The organizational frame of the workshop and also of this edition is the partnership between the IKERI and the University of Innsbruck—the first formal high-level academic partnership between an Iranian Institution and a European University. The contributions in this edition investigate the topic “Soul” in an interdisciplinary and comparative way: Psychologists, Philosophers, and Theologians from both, Islamic and Western traditions, should be brought into dialogue with the focus on the general theme.

In his early works on the soul, the philosopher Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) addresses what he considers insufficiencies in Avicenna's proofs for the eternity (and immateriality) of the rational soul. He argues that these propositions can be established through a demonstrative proof only if such a proof includes the premise that the human soul is eternal a parte ante (pre-eternal). To explain this relatively original position, the paper shows why Ibn Kammūna thought he must reject the consensus of his predecessors and contemporaries, interprets Ibn Kammūna's critique of Avicenna as a continuation of earlier critical approaches, and outlines Ibn Kammūna's proofs for the eternity a parte ante of the soul.

Nefs kavramı İslam dininin temel kaynağı olan Kur’an-ı Kerim’de geçen önemli bir kavramdır. Kuran-ı Kerim’de geçen bu kavramı tasavvuf, kelam ve felsefe de farklı yönleriyle ele almış ve insanı tanımlamada ona farklı anlamlar yüklemişlerdir. Gerek Kur’an-ı Kerim’de gerekse bahsedilen ilim dallarında nefsin birbirinden çok farklı anlamları ifade edecek şekilde kullanıldığı görülmektedir.
Nefs kavramı, insanın mahiyetine dair açıklamalarda elzem olduğu gibi insan ile Allah arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamada da anahtar kavramlardan birisidir. Bu yönüyle nefs kavramının din eğitimi açısından önemli bir kavram olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Diğer taraftan tasavvufi gelenekte “nefis terbiyesi” olarak isimlendirilen anlayış nihayetinde bir “terbiye” konusu olduğu için din eğitiminin ilgi alanına girmektedir. Bu nedenle de din eğitimi disiplininin nefs kavramı hakkında kendi bakış açısını ortaya koyması önem arz etmektedir. Bunu elde etmenin yolu, kavrama yüklenen anlamların ve mertebelendirmelerin din eğitimi bakış açısıyla değerlendirilmesinden geçer.
Bu çalışmada nitel-analitik yöntem esas alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda öncelikle nefs kavramının sözlüklerdeki anlamları, Kur’an-ı Kerim’deki kullanımları verilmiştir. Bazı mutasavvıf ve düşünürlerin bu konudaki görüşleri ele alınmış ve nefisle ilgili yapılan mertebelendirmeye değinilmiştir. Son aşamada ise din eğitimi açısından nefs kavramına nasıl bir anlam çerçevesi çizilmesi gerektiği konusu tartışılmıştır.
İslam dininin temel kaynağı olan Kur’an-ı Kerim’de kavramın kimi zaman kötülüğü emreden olması, kimisinde huzura eren şeklinde nitelenmesi ve birbirine zıt anlamlarda kullanılması nefsin farklı tanımlanıp algılanmasına neden olmuştur. Kur’an’ı- Kerim’deki bu farklı kullanımlar nefsin net bir tanımının yapılamasına fırsat vermese de onun ne olduğuna dair bazı ipuçları vermesi açısından önemlidir.
Nefs kesret içinde vahdeti temsil eden insanoğlunun en güzel özetlerinden birisidir. Çünkü Kur’an'da hem süfli arzuların davetçisi olarak hem de "Ey mutmain olmuş nefis!" "Kendisi razı ve kendisinden razı olarak..." şeklinde rıza-i ilahiyi kazanmış bir varlık olarak hitaba mazhar olmaktadır. Bu da nefsin, insanın hem esfele-s safiline hem de alay-i illiyyine namzet bir varlık olma yönünü temsil ettiğini bize göstermektedir. Bu anlamda nefis insanın çok boyutlu, çok yönlü kabiliyet ve imkânlara sahip bir varlık olduğu gerçeğinin temsilidir.
Din eğitimi açısından insanın Allah’la ilişkisinin mahiyeti önemlidir. Bu bakımdan nefis kavramı din eğitimi açısından büyük öneme sahiptir. Bu kavramın ayrıntılı bir biçimde ele alınması gerekmektedir. Ancak bu yapılırken konu insanın kesret içindeki vahdet yapısını ortaya koyacak şekilde ve bir bütün olarak ele alınmak durumundadır.


Nafs is an important concept in the Qur'anic, the fundamental source of Islamic religion. This concept in Qur'an is treated differently in mysticism, kalam and philosophy and they have different meanings in describing human. It is seen that the nafs is used to express various meanings not only in the Qur’an but also in the branches of the sciences mentioned above.
The concept of self is one of the key concepts in explaining the relationship between man and God as it is essential in the explanations of the nature of man. In this sense, it is possible to say that the concept of nafs is a crucial concept in terms of religious education. On the other hand, the concept called "nafs training" in the mystical tradition is a part of religious education as it is the subject matter of ‘decency’.Therefore, it is significant that the discipline of religious education make a clear definition of the ‘nafs’ with its own perspective. The way to achieve this is through the understanding of the meanings of the concept and the evaluation of the steps of the religion in terms of religious education.
In this study, qualitative-analytical method is taken as basis. In this context, firstly the meanings of the concept of nafs in the dictionaries are given in the Qur'an. Then, the views of some scholars and thinkers in this regard have been evaluated and have been addressed in order to make a mystery. Finally, the question of what kind of frame of meaning should be drawn to the concept of soul in terms of religious education is discussed.
In the Qur'an, which is the main source of Islamic religion, the concept is sometimes ordered to be evil, some are described as being in the form of peace, and their use in the opposite sense leads to the different definition and perception of the nafs. These different uses in the Qur'an are important in terms of giving some clues as to what it is, although it does not allow for a clear description of the nafs.
It is one of the most beautiful summaries of human beings who represent welfare in the ness of discipline. Because both in the Qur'an as the invitation of the sweltering desires and as the "Oh, dear mutmain!" He has become a mazhar as a being who has earned his compassion as "accepting himself and pleading with himself". This shows us that the nafsin represents the direction of being a nominal entity to man's esfah-s safiline as well as mockery. In this sense, nafs is the symbol of a being with a multifaceted ability and possibilities.
In terms of religious education, the nature of man's relation to God is important. In this respect, the nafs concept has great importance in terms of religious education. This concept needs to be studied in detail. However, this should be handled as a whole, in order to reveal the structure of the human being in the discipline (uniqueness in the multitude).

This article discusses the issue of arrangement /ordering of compulsory-comprehensive maqāsid. In this respect, the main purpose is to help clarify the ordering problem. To accomplish this task, the classical and contemporary studies on this subject were reviewed. Within the scope of this research, it has been determined that the universal principles are generally listed in the order of religion, nafs, mind, generation and property. However, alternative orderings can be found where the nafs is placed at the forefront. The focal point of the ordering problem is emerges from the question of whether Allah's rights/otherworldly maqāsid should be priorities or servants' rights/worldly maqāsid. The conflict between religion, which is an otherworldly value, and other principles played an active role in this classification of maqāsid. Many legal scholars who placed religion in the first place in the classical period did not clearly explained the justification of their arrangement. Also, many of today's researchers also stated that religion should come first. The scholars who put both the religion and the nafs in the center have listed many evidence for their preference. The legal scholars who put religion at the center have pointed the verse " I have not created the jinn and men but they may worship Me" as the basis for their views. Accordingly, the main purpose of the creation of human being is to serve Allah. Because the most important right to be fulfilled is the right of Allah religion should take precedence over other virtues in maqasid. Religion is also the only essential way that leads to eternal happiness. According to the legal scholars who put religion into the center, other maqasid principles are secondary. Correlatively, other principles serve religion. The hadith "The debt to Allah is more worthy of being paid." has been made the basis. Since religion constitutes the essence of the maqāsid, it is also a requirement of reason to make religion essential. According to another reason they stated, the obligation of jihad also ensures that religion is at the center. The obligation of jihad causes lives to be sacrificed to protect the religion. This means that religion is superior to the nafs and other principles. Because jihad, which is the order of religion, is fard. The scholars who maintain that the rights of the servants should take precedence over the right of Allah have cited also a lot of evidence. We come across with their views presented as a weak view in the sources or as an answer to a possible question. There is no clear information about to whom these views belong. Therefore, it is stated that no one introduces the nafs to religion. As a matter of fact, it is stated that it is not correct to qualify these views as an independent view defended by scholars. In other words, the view putting the nafs at the center and the evidence to this preference at this point should be regarded as hypothetical. We are of the view that these claims of contemporary writers need to be proven. The basic reason of the views that puts the nafs in the center is based on the pre-acceptance that maslahahs like the nafs are the right of servants while religion is the right of Allah. The given reasons can be addressed under three main headings: punishments, mitigation of prayers, and concern with non-Muslims. In case where the rights of the servant and Allah unite, the rights of the servant should be preferred. Because, the rights of servants are on hardship, and the rights of Allah are on breadth and mercy. On the contrary to the rights of the servants, postponing or neglecting the right of Allah will not harm Allah. It is clear that if the rights of the servants face postponement, they will suffer serious damage. The fact that killing a man who both abandoned his religion and killed someone unfairly, not for his departure from religion, but for retaliation, that is, the right of a servant, is a concrete example of this. The shortening of the prayer during the journey, the patient’s abandoning standing in prayer and the fasting, and other examples also require the human to be in the center. Today, there are researchers who take the nafs to the center. The existence of religion for humans and society reflects the view of these researchers. Because it is clear that religion will remain dysfunctional where there is no human and society. When these evidences are examined carefully, it can be concluded that the opinion that defends the nafs to be at the center of comprehensive maqāsid is preferable