Judicial Ethics

There are three approaches to promoting judicial ethics: the code approach, the guidebook approach and the reflective approach. The code approach uses an enforceable code of judicial conduct. The guidebook approach involves explaining the principles of judicial ethics and advising judges to conduct themselves ethically. The reflective approach involves providing judges with lists of questions that allow them to reflect on issues related to judicial ethics and develop their own answers. Mongolia relies on the code approach, but has never used the other two approaches. This paper analyses the advantages and disadvantages of these three approaches, and argues that the Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers could make the judiciary in Mongolia more independent, impartial and fair if it were to incorporate elements from the guidebook and the reflective approaches.

1. Prezentarea proiectului: "Etică, integritate şi transparenţă în sistemul de probaţiune din România" În prezent, Ministerul Justiţiei implementează Strategia Naţională Anticorupţie (numită în continuare SNA) elaborată pentru perioada 2012-2015, document care are ca obiectiv lupta împotriva corupţiei în instituţiile publice, cu accent pe măsurile de prevenţie şi educarea personalului din instituţiile publice. SNA propune o nouă abordare în ceea ce priveşte promovarea integrităţii instituţionale, şi anume trecerea de la nivelul declarativ al principiului "toleranţă zero", la nivelul proactiv, concret al luării unor măsuri ca: implementarea unor coduri de etică, managementul vulnerabilităţilor specifice fiecărei instituţii. Ca urmare a obiectivului general al SNA 4.2. Creşterea nivelului de educaţie în ceea ce priveşte anticorupţia, Ministerul Justiţiei a elaborat un plan sectorial pentru implementarea acestuia la nivel central şi local, care include măsuri precum: • asigurarea participării personalului propriu la sesiuni de training constante, pe teme de etică şi integritate; • elaborarea şi diseminarea unor linii orientative în ceea ce priveşte riscurile şi consecinţele faptelor de corupţie şi incidentelor de integritate. Proiectul derulat de Ministerul Justiţiei, "Etică, integritate şi transparenţă în sistemul de probaţiune din România", funcţionează ca un instrument pentru implementarea măsurilor sus-menţionate. Acest proiect este finanţat în cadrul Programului Fundaţiei Konrad Adenauer "Statul de Drept-Europa de Sud-Est". În ceea ce priveşte scopul proiectului "Etică, integritate şi transparenţă în sistemul de probaţiune din România", acesta urmăreşte consolidarea unor principii etice şi deontologice în cadrul sistemului românesc de probaţiune, prin intermediul atingerii următoarelor obiective: Rule of Law Program South East Europe

This article concerns the possibility of realization of judicial activism as an ethical postulate in the context of polish historical experiences. The concept of judicial activism should not be used only to describe how courts act, but it should be understood as an important postulate of this particular professional ethics. The content of this postulate is an obligation of judges to be cognitively engaged, to hear the party of the proceeding and to be ready to waive from already fixed patterns of institutional behaviour due to individual aspects of decided case. Different obstacles and fostering factors for realizing such understood postulate were discussed and the conclusion was reached, that the former dominates. However, one should strive to take into account this postulate if the judiciary has to have its own identity different form the identities of other branches.

Codification of judicial ethics is taking an increasingly prominent place in the working of the judiciary. It has been observed that ‘[o]ne of the means whereby the links between independence and impartiality can be articulated is in the setting of minimum universal standards to protect judicial independence and thereby preserve judicial impartiality’. While there is no uniformity in the form and content of such judicial codes of conduct, there is at least some commonality in that they tend to prescribe standards of appropriate judicial behaviour while also asserting some features guaranteeing judicial independence. Broadly speaking, judicial codes can serve multiple objectives. Here, we identify four of them. First, a judicial code may serve as rules for a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure that judges comprehend their duties and act ethically (eg rules against conflict of interests and for the avoidance of corrupt practices) (‘self-regulatory function’). Second, a judicial code may serve as a bulwark for the judiciary to assert its independence against the other branches of government (‘assertive function’). Third, a judicial code may serve to communicate to the public the rules of proper conduct that it can and should expect from the judiciary. In this regard, such a code serves an important purpose of empowering the public and enhancing its confidence in the judiciary (‘public confidence function’). Fourth, a judicial code may be used as a way for the rest of government to control judicial conduct (‘governmental control function’).

 These functions are likely to overlap, although each targets a different audience and thus structures a different conversation. In its self-regulatory function, a code’s main target audience is judges. It provides them with a written basis for asserting peer pressure or even internal sanctions on one another. In its assertive function, a code provides judges with a written basis for objecting to real and/or perceived interference and incursions into their independent and impartial conduct of the administration of justice. In its public confidence function, a code provides the framework for the relationship between the judiciary and the public, communicating to the public the type and scope of proper judicial conduct. It thus plays an educative role and also provides the public with a potential basis for requiring compliance by the judiciary. Lastly, a judicial code for governmental control serves as a directive to the judiciary and could be seen as effectively subordinating judicial power to the other branches of government. This last objective must be distinguished from the other three because it has the greatest potential to interfere with judicial independence.

 The type of function that a judicial code of conduct is envisaged to serve within a jurisdiction reflects the values that underpin the judicial system. As Devlin and Dodek point out in the Introduction, the values of the judicial system serve as a foundation for the entire judicial edifice. Employing the regulatory pyramid as proposed by Devlin and Dodek, judicial codes of conduct are part of the processes through which the judiciary is maintained, channelled or restrained. Codes of conduct give form to the core values of the judicial system. While they are not strictly speaking institutional, since not all judicial codes establish bureaucratic forms to address breaches, codes of conduct are crucial in that they help to institutionalize good practices that advance the values of the judicial system. Judicial codes that are most obviously process oriented are those that serve the self-regulatory, assertive and governmental control functions. Interestingly, the public confidence function is oriented towards another wall of the regulatory pyramid, which are the outcomes.

 This chapter examines the use and disuse of judicial codes of conduct by investigating the curious case of Malaysia. Malaysia first prescribed a Judges’ Code of Ethics in 1994, and then replaced it in 2009 with a more extensive code which established a procedure for complaints and investigation beyond the previous procedure. The codes primarily served the objectives of self-regulation and in restoring public confidence. However, because the codes were passed by Parliament in the wake of incidents involving executive incursions and charges of corruption, it is arguable that these codes also serve the purpose of governmental control of the judiciary. In studying the establishment of a judicial code of ethics in Malaysia, this chapter examines the functions codes of ethics can and do have within the country’s broader legal, political and social context. It further analyses the adoption and use of codes of ethics in Malaysia using the regulatory pyramid proposed by the editors. Specifically, it considers the values that are supposedly underpinned by the codes, the role that the codes has played in maintaining the judiciary, and the desired outcomes.

SANCTIONS IN U.S. COURTS AGAINST UNETHICAL ATTORNEYS

The recent changes made in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ( FRCP ) and State Laws now gives the individual the opportunity to have ruthless and unethical Attorneys sanctioned by the Courts.

If in doubt please contact Actions for Justice ( AXJ ) www.axj.com

David Luban, avukatların ahlaken aktivist olmalarını öngören bir avukatlık pratiğinden bahseder. Müvekkilinin ahlaka veya hukuka uygun olmayan amaçlarını gören avukatın, vekillik ilişkisini bitirmek yerine müvekkilini adalete uygun davranmak konusunda ikna etmesi gerektiğini belirtir. Yani avukatların, müvekkillerine taraf olmaktan önce adaletin tarafında yer alarak davranmaları gerektiğinin altını çizer. Acaba hakimler açısından ahlaki aktivist pratik söz konusu olabilir mi? Avukatlardan farklı olarak taraf değil; tarafsız konumda olmaları gereken hakimler ahlaki aktivist pratik için hangi araçlara sahiptir? Bu makalede Ioanna Kuçuradi, Gülriz Uygur ve Ronald Dworkin’in öngördüğü hakimlik pratiklerinin bir sentezi olarak ahlaki aktivizm teorisinin hakimler açısından mümkün olup olmayacağını Ian McEwan’ın Çocuk Yasası kitabındaki Hakim Fiona örneği üzerinden tartışacağım.

In this article, I offer a reading of City of God 19.6 that is consonant with Augustine's message to real judges. Often read as a suggestion that torture and execution are judicially necessary, I argue that 19.6 actually calls such necessities into question, though this is not its primary purpose; first and foremost, 19.6 is an indictment of Stoic apatheia. Situating 19.6 within Augustine's larger polemic against the Stoics, I find that it presents the Stoic judge as a man who lacks fellow feeling, and therefore, has only a parodic happiness, costly to himself and those he judges. A new look at Augustine's letters to judges confirms this reading, and shows that, for Augustine, the man of humanitas is the true model for the good judge, not the man of apatheia.

SPS IS A DEBT COLLECTOR CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. SPS LOSES ANOTHER FIGHT IN A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT IN CALIFORNIA AS THE COURTS RECOGNIZE THE VIOLATION OF THE ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT ( RFDCPA ) INCLUDES AND STATES THAT ALL MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPANIES IN CALIFORNIA ARE DEBT COLLECTORS.

On October 31, 2013—just days before New York City’s mayoral election—three federal appellate judges, José A. Cabranes, John M. Walker, Jr., and Barrington D. Parker, Jr., hastily issued an unusual order staying two major decisions by U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, which held that the New York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” practices involved unconstitutional racial profiling. Acting sua sponte and providing no reasoned explanation, the three judges dismissed Judge Scheindlin from presiding over the stop and frisk cases altogether, summarily concluding that she had “compromised” the “appearance of [im]partiality” surrounding the litigation. Two weeks later, after their order had been widely criticized, the three judges abruptly issued a new opinion casting aside the ostensible basis for their earlier decree in favor of other legal grounds. To support their decision, the three judges relied entirely upon extrajudicial information that—by their own acknowledgment—they “read [in] the newspapers.”

In this Article, I closely examine this episode, which highlights a growing fluidity between adjudication and public discourse. With enormous amounts of news, opinion, and other information instantly available online, it has become trivially easy for judges to independently research matters outside the formal judicial record that they deem relevant to the cases before them. As a result, judges increasingly appear to render decisions based on extrajudicial sources, but without meaningful constraints or norms to guide and limit the practice. The panel’s actions illustrate the hazards in this apparent trend. Throughout the stop and frisk litigation, New York City officials relentlessly attacked Judge Scheindlin in the media for her alleged “bias” against law enforcement, but declined to actually seek her recusal. By validating and giving effect to that campaign—based entirely on what they had read in the newspapers—Judges Cabranes, Walker, and Parker openly permitted the norms of contemporary political discourse embodied in those news stories to displace the norms of reasoned judicial decision making, and unnecessarily inserted themselves into the mayoral election campaign.

Whatever the precise reasons for the conduct of Judges Cabranes, Walker, and Parker, both due process and the quality of their adjudication suffered as a result. And ironically, the three judges also thereby failed to satisfy the very standards to which they sought to hold Judge Scheindlin. The procedurally irregular and substantively deficient nature of their adjudication gave more than ample cause for reasonable observers to question the three judges’ own impartiality and propriety, and undermined the decisional independence that trial judges must enjoy to render fair and impartial decisions that are seen as legitimate across the full spectrum of the public’s diverse litigants and communities.

A look at the history and legacy of the Magna Carta elucidates the many ways in which it shaped American jurisprudence and the law of Texas.  The Magna Carta is held in high regard because the unknown drafters understood the importance of legal principles, fair procedures, proportional punishment, official accountability, and respect for human dignity.  Its unquestionable commitment to the primacy of legal principles and anticipation of the development of judicial ethics significantly influenced and contributed to the construction and content of the Texas Constitution, Bill of Rights, and many Texas cities’ ethics codes.  Although it was intensely focused on the issues of feudal England, the Great Charter set the high expectations that have inspired lawyers and reformers for 800 years.

Үндсэн хуулийн цэцийн гишүүн Д.Сугар их хэмжээний хөрөнгө, орлогоо олон жил худал мэдүүлсэн тухай асуудалд харьцуулсан үндсэн хуулийн эрх зүй болон шүүгчийн ёс зүйн үүднээс анализ хийж, Цэцийн гишүүний ёс зүйн зөрчлийг хянан шийдвэрлэх ажиллагааг боловсронгуй болгох арга замыг тодорхойлно.

The following review explores Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) in terms of comparative philosophy, supporting IIE as the most relevant and significant development of the field of Information Ethics (IE). The focus of the review is threefold. First, it will review the core presumption of the field of IIE, that being the demand for an inter- mission in the pursuit of a founding philosophy for IE in order to first address the philosophical biases of IE by western philosophy. Second, a history of the various philosophical streams of IIE will be outlined, including its literature and pioneering contributors. Lastly, a new synthesis of comparative philosophies in IIE will be offered, looking towards a future evolution of the field. Examining the interchange between contemporary information ethicists regarding the discipline of IIE, the review first outlines the previously established presumptions of the field of IIE that posit the need for an IE as grounded in western sensibilities. The author then addresses the implications of the foregoing presumption from several non-western viewpoints, arguing that IIE does in fact find roots in non-western philosophies as established in the concluding synthesis of western and eastern philosophical traditions.

Pierre Noreau, « Déontologie judiciaire et diversité de contexte, L’activité du Conseil de la Magistrature en contexte de retraite, de démission ou de décès d’un juge visé par une plainte », étude soumise au Conseil de la Magistrature en 2008, dans Pierre Noreau et Emmanuelle Bernheim, La déontologie judiciaire appliquée (3e édition), Montréal, Wilson et Lafleur, 2013, p. 313-333.

Ce texte a été préparé à la demande du Conseil de la Magistrature du Québec. Il vise à faire le point sur la juridiction que peut se reconnaître le Conseil en matière de déontologie, dans les dossiers mettant en cause un juge qui aurait cessé de siéger. Cette situation peut survenir tant du fait du décès du juge visé par la plainte, que dans les cas de démission de retraite prématurée ou attendue du juge. Il s’agit d’une question sur laquelle le Conseil s’est souvent penché, mais qui n’a pas encore connu de solution définitive, encore que certaines orientations aient été définies déjà, sur lesquelles nous reviendrons. L’exposé qui suit ne constitue pas un avis juridique, mais propose, en regard du problème précité, une contribution à la doctrine dans le domaine nouveau de déontologie judiciaire. Il vise essentiellement à rendre compte des orientations graduellement favorisées par le Conseil au cours des trente dernières années et d’en tirer les conséquences pour la suite de ses activités déontologiques.

This paper articulates an egalitarian conception of judicial humility and justifies its value on the grounds that it importantly advances the legal and political ideal of fraternity. This account of the content and value of the virtue of humility stands in sharp contrast with the dominant view of judicial humility as deference or judicial restraint. The paper concludes by discussing some ways in which the account of humility and of its value provided in the paper furthers our understanding of the judicial virtues and of the political implications of giving virtue a role in adjudication.

"...More than four (4) years has passed since Judge Burroughs' recusal and it remains unclear as to what is causing the unnecessary delay for the Court to void all judgements and orders on this related docket. The Court is also aware that this recused judicial officer has continued to issue orders on this very docket without jurisdiction - including unwarranted threats of sanctions against the Plaintiff and ordering the Clerk's office not to accept any more of the Plaintiff's filings. Based on the Plaintiff's interpretation of the law, there are multiple infractions here, including (but not limited to)..."

Whether litigant can seek transfer of case on the ground that Judge is convicting judge?
The apprehension expressed by the petitioner that he would not
get  a  fair  and  impartial  trial  is  on  the  basis  of  the  incident  which
occurred on 30.07.2015 referred to above. According to the petitioner,
he overheard the conversation between the complainant and his son
while  he  was standing  in  the  parking  area that  from  the  next date
onwards,  the  trial  would  commence  and  all  the  accused  would  be
convicted. After the said conversation was overheard by the petitioner
something  transpired  in  the  Court  wherein  in  the  absence  of  the
advocate on that day appearing for the petitioner, all of a sudden, the
date was fixed i.e. 05.08.2015. This incident led the petitioner to believe
that something is wrong and he would not get justice. It appears that
one of the grounds urged in the application filed by the petitioner under
Section  408  is  quite  curious.  It  says  that  the  Presiding  Officer  is  a
convicting Judge and he spares none. As such, the two grounds are quite
conflicting.  It  gives  an  impression  that  the  accused  is  afraid  of  the
Presiding  Officer  being  a  convicting  Judge  and  on  the  other  hand,
indirectly he is trying to convey that the complainant is quite confident
that he would be able to secure conviction at any cost. The petitioner

definitely is in dilemma. Whether to term his apprehension as reasonable
and  not  the  result  of  the  reaction  of  a  hypersensitive  mind  is  the
question.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 4884 of 2015
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 17138 of 2015
In
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4884 of 2015



CHANDRKANTBHAI BHAICHANDBHAI SHARMA....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 08/10/2015

Artykuł dotyczy integralności sędziego ujmowanej w podstawowym znaczeniu, tj. jako zgodność działań z przekonaniami. W pierwszej kolejności dokonana została rekonstrukcja roli przekonań sędziego na gruncie filozofii prawa, co pozwoliło wykazać, że przynajmniej na gruncie teorii tzw. trzeciej drogi traktowane są one jako istotne. Uznanie ich roli niesie jednak ze sobą pytania o zagrożenie instrumentalizacją prawa przez sędziego i sędziego przez prawo. Jako jego rozwiązanie została zinterpretowana filozofia Ronalda Dworkina, szeroko odwołująca się do pojęcia integralności. Następnie zauważono, że ujęcie to jest zbyt wąskie, ponieważ ogranicza ono możliwość uwzględnienia przekonań sędziego w orzekaniu tylko, gdy spełniają one tzw. próg odpowiedniości, a więc w jakiś sposób zawierają się już w treści porządku prawnego. Ponadto tak rozumiana integralność nie obejmuje zachowań pozaorzeczniczych sędziego, których status coraz bardziej wymaga teoretycznego wyjaśnienia i normatywnego zakwalifikowania. W konsekwencji stwierdzono, że z pojęciem integralności łączą się paradoksy. Mimo to została podjęta próba wypracowania bardziej systematycznego ujęcia integralności sędziowskiej w orzekaniu i zachowaniu, zmierzająca do wykazania, że jest ona czymś, o co powinniśmy się troszczyć, a w konsekwencji jej zachowanie uczynić przedmiotem rozwiązań normatywnych i instytucjonalnych. Jednocześnie pojęcie integralności zdaje się mieć większą moc heurystyczną niż normatywną.

In November 2014, the Obama administration announced the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) initiative, which built upon a program instituted two years earlier, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. As mechanisms to channel the government’s scarce resources toward its enforcement priorities more efficiently and effectively, both DACA and DAPA permit certain individuals falling outside those priorities to seek “deferred action,” which provides its recipients with time-limited, nonbinding, and revocable notification that officials have exercised prosecutorial discretion to deprioritize their removal. While deferred action thereby facilitates a highly tenuous form of quasi-legal recognition for its recipients, it does not provide legal immigration status. Accordingly, the two initiatives are not an equivalent substitute for legislative reform proposals that would create a pathway to durable legal status for a much larger number of individuals.

Nevertheless, critics have accused the Obama administration of imposing by decree precisely that which Congress has declined to authorize by statute: namely, legalization of noncitizens who lack lawful immigration status. In this Article, I critically examine those assertions and develop a rationale for the deferred action initiatives, anchored in rule of law values, that has received no meaningful attention in recent debates about DACA and DAPA. As the decision by U.S. District Judge Andrew S. Hanen enjoining those initiatives illustrates, legal discourse has mirrored and reinforced the same incorrect claims about deferred action that circulate in anti-immigration political discourse. Like the Obama administration’s political critics, Judge Hanen repeatedly mischaracterizes the initiatives as providing “legal status” and, on that basis, flays the Obama administration for “total[ly] abdicat[ing]” immigration enforcement. These conclusions ultimately amount to what I describe elsewhere as “judicial truthiness,” highlighting an erosion of the conventional lines between litigation, adjudication, and public discourse in politically salient cases more generally.

The flawed discourse surrounding DACA and DAPA underscores the need for a more careful assessment of the complex relationships between enforcement priorities, prosecutorial discretion, and the rule of law in an era of mass deportation. The blunt and distorted nature of that discourse, however, in turn has distorted the substantive analysis of those relationships. As the scale of the expansive and fragmented immigration enforcement regime has grown to such enormous levels — making the interrelated challenges of ensuring consistent execution of the law and fidelity to enforcement priorities more formidable — the need for effective mechanisms to supervise the discretion exercised by rank-and-file officials has only grown more important. But even as it purports to respect the government’s enforcement priorities, the logic of Judge Hanen’s ruling would largely disable policymaking officials from implementing such mechanisms, requiring them instead to let the vagaries of the bureaucracy reign supreme. The decision therefore not only inhibits the agency’s ability to establish enforcement priorities and manage its scarce resources, but also fails to acknowledge the importance of rule of law values such as consistency, transparency, accountability, and nonarbitrariness in the execution of the immigration laws.

To, co się wydarzyło do tej pory, pozwala mieć nadzieję, że obronimy niezależność sądów. I jeśli tak się stanie, to będziemy przykładem dla świata. Że można, że to naprawdę jest możliwe. Tak jak znana jest historia Solidarności, która obaliła komunizm, tak będzie znana historia sędziów i prawników, którzy obronili niezależność wymiaru sprawiedliwości.
Ale postawy obrońców sądownictwa nie są jedynymi. I choć mogą zaskakiwać skalą, poziomem odwagi, intensywnością, to przynajmniej mnie osobiście zdają się naturalne. Bardziej tajemnicze, intrygujące wydają mi się postawy osób, które w zamachu na sądy biorą udział lub korzystają naprędce z okazji, jaką ten atak stwarza dla indywidualnych
karier. I nie o politykach tu mowa. [...]
Dezaprobata dla zachowań niegodnych czy ostracyzm społeczny mają moim zdaniem dwa wymiary. Jeden to danie do zrozumienia konkretnej osobie, że nie akceptujemy jej wyborów. Chcemy, by poczuła wagę odpowiedzialności za swe czyny, chcemy wzbudzić w niej sumienie, poczucie winy, wolę naprawy. Tu pojawia się zresztą aspekt dodatkowy, dla niektórych wielce kontrowersyjny – dotykania przez takie zachowania także bliskich osoby poddawanej ostracyzmowi. [...]
Ale drugi, równie ważny wymiar to pytanie o ocenę zachowań, czynów przez historię. Nie można przechodzić do porządku dziennego nad zamachem na niezależne sądy, nad wykorzystaniem tej sytuacji przez konkretne osoby. Jaka nauka płynęłaby z tego dla
kolejnych pokoleń? Musi być jasne, że pewnych rzeczy nie wypada.

[What has happened so far allows us to hope that we will defend the independence of the judiciary. And if we do, we will be an example for the world. That it is possible, that it is really possible. Just as the history of 'Solidarność/Solidarity' that overthrew communism is known, so will the history of judges and lawyers who defended the independence of the judiciary.
But the attitudes of the defenders of the judiciary are not the only ones. And although they may surprise you with their scale, level of courage and intensity, at least to me personally they seem natural. The attitudes of people who take part in an attack on the courts, or take advantage of the opportunity this attack creates for individual careers, seem to me to be more mysterious and intriguing. And we are not talking about politicians here. [...]
Disapproval of unworthy behavior or social ostracism, in my opinion, has two dimensions. One is letting a specific person understand that we do not accept their choices. We want her to feel the importance of responsibility for her actions, we want to wake up her conscience, the guilty, and the will to repair. Here, moreover, an additional aspect, highly controversial for some, appears - such behavior also touches the relatives of the ostracized person. [...]
But the second, equally important dimension, is the question of the assessment of behavior and deeds by history. It is impossible to ignore the attack on independent courts and the use of this situation by specific people. What a lesson would there be for
the next generations? It must be clear that certain things are not appropriate.].

Title: So You Want to Sue a Judge? The Philippine New Code of Judicial Conduct of 2004
Author: Judge Eliza B. Yu, LLM, DCL
Publisher: Central Book Supply Inc.
ISBN: 978-621-02-0073-7
No. Of Pages: 335
Size: 6 x 9
Edition: 2016
Binding: Softbound
Price:  ₱590

The article deals with the problem of judicial ethics in the context of the history of Western legal tradition, which is seen as a struggle for the rule of law. A special role in this struggle is given to the judges, which shall have the independence and security so that they can defend the rule of law against the encroachments of those in power. The ideal of the rule of law is regarded by the author as a universal and duty to fight for its implementation rests with the judges everywhere. Judges must be brave and through the interpretation of the right to make unjust legal system fairer, or be «heroes of the rule of law».

Nie ulega wątpliwości, że etyka sędziowska dopuszcza udział sędziów w zgromadzeniach, choć zaleca powściągliwość i nakłada na nich pewne warunki. Do indywidualnej decyzji każdego sędziego należy, czy i w jakiej formie zechce on publicznie wyrazić swoje przekonania.

Here is PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR PROHIBITION
OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF.

The CA 4th District Court of Appeal Division 2 has assigned Case No. E074567 to Case No. , Sergei Vinkov v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside, filed by Sergei Vinkov (Pro Se). The writ seeks enforcement of the trial court compliance to the statutory provisions and ethical principles.

The copies are provided for general information purposes only and do not constitute legal or other professional advice on any subject matter. But they can be useful as a case study material for some classes in Sociology of Law or Social Media Governing. Author of these materials does not accept any responsibility for any loss which may arise from reliance on information contained on these documents.

Recently, it has come to national attention about an undocumented teen immigrant from Honduras who was seeking an abortion in Texas. This battle had many elements to it and ultimately, and unfortunately, she had the abortion. One particular aspect that was not covered much was this teenage girl had to go through Texas’s parental consent for an abortion process. This brief article looks at some of the moral issues surrounding Jane Doe and the judge who issued the bypass.

Court Administrator " D " initiated an administrative complaint against Judge " A " for writing a protest letter about the night court operation in X City questioning its legality, rationality and productivity. Judges, like any other citizen in this country, have the constitutionally-enshrined freedom of speech and expression. However, there is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the dignity of the Court through written or published emotional outbursts and destructive criticisms. From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of a judge, resort to extreme and intemperate language only detracts from the respect due a member of the judiciary and becomes self-destructive. In the letter to Secretary of Tourism, Judge " A " disparaged the establishment of night courts in a manner which is critical, defiant and scathing, fully aware that the order which she is defying is an administrative order issued by no less than the Chief Justice himself. To quote the subject letter of Judge " A " : XXX XXX XXX This Court learned that you requested for the designation of night courts in X City that resulted to the issuance of Administrative Order No. 0-123 (Establishing Night Courts in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of X City and Y City). With due respect, there is insufficient basis for your request. There was no statistical data presented or there was no study conducted by your department recommending the necessity of establishing night courts in X City. For the record, this Court is yet to hear a case involving any tourist. Moreover, the tourists should be advised not to roam around the city at night so as not to be victims of various crimes. Usually, the perception of the tourists who are going around the city at night is negative, for they are likely to be engaging in unlawful nocturnal activities. They are at their own risk at night. There was no prior consultation with the police officers, public attorneys, public prosecutors, judges and their staff before your department requested for the creation of night courts in X City. There are many concerns which your department did not consider.

Scott Stafne's declaration in support of Motion filed in Cervantes' Sanctions Appeal to withdraw Ninth Circuit's unpublished decision in California Coal. for Families and Children v San Diego Bar. Association, 657 Fed.Appx 675 (9th.Cir 2016)