Jhering

Law and legal science have played a significant, but hitherto underestimated role in Weber's life, academic, professional and personal. Trained as a lawyer, he drew upon an existing vocabulary of 19th century German legal scholarship and adapted from it, more or less implicitly a large number of conceptual and methodological tools for his sociological projects. The goal of this paper is to identify and evaluate these complex links between Weberian sociology and contemporary legal scholarship, with special emphasis on Jhering's and Jellinek's theories.

The essay deals with the liability for damages resulting by unfair conduct in the formation of the contract.
The elaboration of this category was conditioned by the texts of the Digest, from which R. von Jhering obtained the rule according to which the party, who had negligently entered into an invalid contract, had to compensate the other of the damage suffered for having innocently confided in his validity.
Precisely because of its origin, however, this rule could not justify compensation for damages that occurred before the conclusion of the contract or regardless of it. These limits were overcome by German and Italian doctrine through the elaboration of the pre-contractual obligation of good faith, that led to the current formulation of the art. 1337 c.c. On the basis of this rule in fact, the negotiation is a source of obligations, and the reliance arising from it constitutes the criterion for determining ex ante the behavior that, according to an ethical evaluation based on the social conscience, each party must observe in order to avoid the specific risks of damage that could occur precisely because of it. Therefore, liability is not based on fault as a subjective requirement of the conduct, but it arises from the objective violation of an obligation of good faith, which precedes both the incorrect behavior and the damage. Ultimately, by placing itself in a pre-existing relationship between two parties, it must be assimilated to non-fulfillment and falls within the scope of art. 1218 c.c.

En este breve ensayo me refiero a Caspar Rudolf von JHERING, uno de los modelos de profesor de jurisprudencia del siglo XIX. Se le tiene arrumbado y se le explica en las aulas cada vez menos. Pero eso es injusto si atendemos a que identificó un notorio defecto en la formación jurídica universitaria: especulación teórica excesiva y pobre o nula práctica.
Me detengo en un hecho: nuestro autor rompe con su venerada jurisprudencia de conceptos y abraza, al final de su vida, la jurisprudencia de intereses. Eso me da pie para ocuparme parcialmente de su elocuente testimonio escrito: Bromas y veras en la ciencia jurídica , un libro de 1884 donde explica su misteriosa resurrección intelectual.

Para el autor es posible la aplicación de los deberes de protección en el ordenamiento jurídico peruano cuyo fundamento es, ante todo, teleológico y no normativo. Asimismo, lamenta que la decisión contenida en la Casación N° 4407-2015-Piura no haya podido resolver el tema sobre la naturaleza de la responsabilidad precontractual. Por otro lado, alude a que si bien el equívoco se da a nivel de primera instancia en la fi jación de hechos controvertidos, el colegiado supremo hubiese podido componer una solución en la medida que hubiese hecho una regresión del proceso hasta la foja que contenía la infrac-ción al principio iuria novit curia.

This paper reviews the traditional distinction between legal norms and legal principles. In relation to the categorical (non-hypothetical) nature of legal principles, I suggest that these standards can be seen as purposive legal prescriptions which, instead of requiring specific behavior, give general direction for the achievement of a particular legal goal. The proposed model for differentiation is analyzed in connection to other uses of the notion "purpose" well-known by the works of Rudolf v. Jhering, Roscoe Pound and Bulgarian legal theorist as Venelin Ganev and Mihaylina Mihaylova.

This paper locates Weber in a series of German constitutional thinkers, beginning with Ihering and ending with Schmitt, and discusses the important concept of intermediary means as a basis for constitutionalism in the face of value conflict with respect to ultimate ends and in relation to "decisionism."

L'articolo di J. Frivaldszky affronta il delicato problema del rapporto fra diritto e forza. Lo fa anzitutto in riferimento alle teorie positivistiche di Jehring e Kelsen che, seppur in modo differente, fanno dipendere i diritti soggettivi dalla loro previsione normativa e quindi dalla possibilità di essere fatti valere con la forza. Esamina poi le teorie di Benjamin, Vattimo e Derrida, per i quali il diritto «non è fondato sulla giustizia, ma sulla forza». Prende in considerazione infine il pensiero giusnaturalistico di Cotta che rovescia quest'ultima soluzione in favore di un diritto che trae «la propria giustificazione dall'oggettiva giustizia dei rapporti intersoggettivi».