Iran-Syria relations

After having lost swathes of territory in the key regions of Aleppo and Damascus during the first half of the civil war, the Syrian Regime has been able to regain these areas in 2018 only after highly-destructive military incursions resulting in thousands of civilian casualties, and still only with ground and air support from Iran-backed militias and the Russian Air Force, respectively. While these successes are taken as evidence that the " regime forces " are set to be the victors of the 7-years-running Syrian Civil War, severe losses and erosion incurred by regime forces have raised legitimate doubts of its sustainability. Iranian support after 2013 in the face of rising regime losses as well as the introduction of Russian air support after the 2015 loss of Idlib has afforded the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) enough breathing room to recuperate and reclaim some of the territory it had lost. Despite this, there have been arguments that SAA is no longer a serious military force by itself, lacking the capacity to wrest control of the rest of the country in its entirety with its allies unwilling to incur the high cost of committing to this goal.

تبرز أهمية هذا الإصدار في أنه يركز على الأدوات التي تحقق الانتشار الأفقي لهذا المشروع عبر بثه لدى مختلف شرائح المجتمع، أبرزها: الشباب والأطفال وبعض أصحاب التأثير. فإذا كان منبع خطورة الأدوات الدينية من أنها تستهدف الجانب العقدي والأيديولوجي لدى السوريين، فإن خطورة الأدوات التعليمية والتربوية تتجلى في استهدافها لشريحتي الأطفال والشباب بما يمثلون من مستقبل الوطن الممتد، وخطورة الأدوات الاجتماعية والمدنية في توظيفها لخلخلة البنية المجتمعية السورية، بدلاً من أن تكون -كما هو دورها المفترض- أدوات لتعزيز المجتمع المدني السوري.

“Carnivalesque” is perhaps the best, if not the only way to describe what was going on at the Bab al-Saghir Cemetery that hot summer afternoon in 2008.  In front of the graves of the Prophet’s wives, Shi‘i pilgrims could buy Viagra, sex-enhancement creams, and massage oils.  Sexual mores were normally strictly guarded in Syria and medicines were usually available only at pharmacies.  Yet, there in one of the most historically and religiously significant cemeteries in Damascus, makeshift vendors sold an array of sex-related items.  In order to analyze this phenomenon, this article draws on Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the “carnivalesque.”  First, it provides a short background of Twelver Shi‘ism in Syria and explains how Shi‘i religious tourism encouraged the development of black markets.  Then, it examines how Shi‘i pilgrimage, which occurred all year around, but peaked during Muharram, fostered an attitude that liberated Shi‘is from prevalent social norms and emphasized “grotesque” imagery and practices, including blood, death, and sex.  In short, it follows Michael Taussig’s call for anthropologists to attend to the transgressive aspects of religious ritual.

Arap baharı ile başlayan toplumsal ve siyasal değişim süreci Ortadoğu’da egemen olan siyasal rejimlerin kimi yerlerde devrilmesine, kimi yerlerde de sarsılmasına neden olmuştur. Bu sürecin tetiklediği halk isyanları kısa süre içerisinde Suriye’ye de yayılmış ve bu ülkede hakim olan Baas rejimini tehdit etmiştir. Fakat Baas rejimi değişim talebiyle ortaya çıkan isyana karşı şiddet kullanarak mücadele etmek yoluna gitmiş ve bu yolda en büyük siyasi desteği İran’dan almıştır.

Yıllardır bölgede statükoya karşı çıkan ve bu nedenle “İslami uyanış” addettiği Arap baharını destekleyen İran yönetimi Suriye söz konusu olunca “statükonun” sürdürülmesinden yana tavır almıştır. İran’ın bu tavrı kimi çevrelerde mezhep ekseninde siyaset izlemesiyle izah edilmeye çalışılırken İran makamları tarafından İsrail’e ve ABD’ye karşı duran sözde direniş hattının müdafaası şeklinde savunulmuştur.

Farklı ideolojik boyutlarına karşın gerek mezhepçi yaklaşım, gerekse direniş hattı söylemi İran’ın bazı jeopolitik kaygılarına işaret etmektedir. Arap baharının tetiklediği değişim süreci bölgenin jeopolitik yapısında köklü değişikliklere yol açmış, dolayısıyla bölgesel ve küresel aktörlerin Ortadoğu politikalarını yeniden değerlendirmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu değişim süreci bölgedeki tek müttefiki olan Suriye’ye gelene kadar İran jeopolitik çıkarlarına hizmet ederken Suriye’deki muhtemel bir değişim İran’ın jeopolitik çıkarlarını tehdit etmektedir. Bu nedenle İran, Arap baharı Suriye’ye geldiğinde farklı bir tavır almıştır.

İran’ın bölgeye yönelik jeopolitik kaygıları ise ideolojik ve stratejik faktörler tarafından belirlenmektedir. İran’ın devrimci/ideolojik duruşu onun İsrail’i, ABD’yi ve bölgedeki Amerikan müttefiklerini “düşman” olarak görmesine neden olmaktadır. İran devriminden bu yana sözde düşmanları ile İran arasında ortaya çıkan gerginlikler ve çatışmalar, taraflar arasındaki karşılıklı husumet ilişkisine tarihsel bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Bu minval üzere son on yılda Ortadoğu’da İran ve müttefikleri ile Suudi Arabistan, Körfez ülkeleri, Mısır, Ürdün gibi İran karşıtları arasında kamplaşma ve soğuk savaş ortaya çıkmıştır. Böyle bir ortamda İran’ın savunma stratejisinde Suriye ve Hizbullah ile geliştirdiği ittifak ilişkisi önemli bir yer edinmiştir. İran’ın savunma stratejisinde kritik öneme haiz olan Suriye’de ortaya çıkan isyanın İran’ın dostu Esad yönetiminin devrilmesini talep etmesi ve bölgedeki karşıtlarının da isyancılara destek vermesi İran yönetiminin isyancılara karşı Esad’a destek vermesine neden olmuştur.

This paper is an effort to understand the sources of societal rage and the circumstances that make the disenfranchised resort to the use of extreme force. The Lebanese civil war is one of the most vicious in modern history and its onset can be seen as a key factor in driving the Lebanese Shi’a towards movements which advocated the use of violence, having initially attempted political participation. This paper argues that their path to violence developed from a voicelessness that had existed prior to the beginning of Lebanon’s internecine hostilities. The creation of Lebanese Shi’i political bodies and their subsequent failure to address the socio-economic and security concerns of the whole community pushed them towards despair. Syria and Iran channelled this dissatisfaction to meet their own agendas. The Lebanese civil war saw countless state and non-state actors take part and can be used as an example of the unpredictability that results from foreign military intervention. In Lebanon’s case, it was the collapse of the political institutions that exacerbated the already harsh conditions of the Lebanese Shi’a, in turn leaving no option but violence to voice their discontent.

The alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah is central to Middle East security yet we know surprisingly little about what makes it possible. Existing accounts concentrate on material or ideational incentives to explain this alliance, without however offering a systematic explanation for its rise and endurance. Most strikingly , these accounts fail to acknowledge how different these actors are from one another, and how unlikely it is for them to form an alliance-let alone a stable one. This article traces the genealogy of this curious form of cooperation in order to shed light on the sources of converge that are strong enough to overcome their manifold divergences. It finds that shared memory of humiliation and betrayal at the hands of the US and the West more generally is the main reason for the rise and endurance of this alliance. It is an alliance that defends an absolutist conception of self-determination in order to resist US hegemony in the region, even it violates the individual self-determination of the people under their authority. Overall, the article shows that neither materialist nor ideational approaches get to the bottom of why states cooperate amongst themselves and with nonstate actors to form counter -hegemonic alliances, such as the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis-a form of counter-hegemonic non-hegemonic cooperation.

Russia and Iran, the two main military allies and enablers of the Syrian regime, are engaged in competition over access to the Syrian economy, with a particular focus on opportunities to obtain reconstruction contracts.
In addition to lines of credit and the supply of vital strategic products, Russia and Iran are pursuing a larger role in the Syrian economy by agreeing investment contracts for their major companies and conglomerates.
Moscow and Tehran seek partial compensation for their military interventions in Syria, and both adopt an opportunity-based approach to the Syrian market.
Russia demands unconditional international support for the reconstruction of Syria to stabilize the security of the country and to allow the return of refugees. Moscow also perceives reconstruction as an opportunity to facilitate the international and regional rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad.
Russia and Iran have built up alliances with local businessmen in Syria, and each country has established a business council to support and boost these relationships. The key sectors targeted by Russian and Iranian companies include oil and gas, electricity, agriculture, tourism and real estate.
Assad constantly seeks to enlarge his own margin for manoeuvre by manipulating the interests of his allies. In addition to his ongoing efforts to re-establish his authority, Assad also astutely manages Syria’s economic interests on a case-by-case basis to maximize revenues.
Contracting Russian private companies comes at a lower political cost to Syria than allowing Tehran to further expand in key sectors of the Syrian economy. However, Iran will remain influential in the foreseeable future as it is an important trade partner with Syria and an essential provider of oil refined products.
US and EU economic sanctions on key sectors of the Syrian economy and individuals have impeded the regime’s capacity to initiate and push the reconstruction phase of its recovery. Moreover, these sanctions have also discouraged major foreign companies from investing in Syria. However, they can only be truly effective as part of a comprehensive framework to assist Syria in a meaningful and credible political transition.

When it comes to Russia’s agenda in Syria, both Ankara and Tehran have their own fears as they are concerned that Moscow might exploit them at some point to achieve its own goals.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/11/turkey-iran-russia-trilateral-distrust-in-syria.html

As Iran seeks “constructive engagement” with neighbors and the world at large under the Rouhani administration, Iran-GCC relations once again prove to be a critical test case for the success of Iran’s prudent diplomatic endeavor. Indeed, echoing Iran’s previous attempts at moderation and détente with the Gulf states during the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, the recent impetus to mend fences starts from the very neighborhood that Iran holds vested strategic and economic interests. Whether the new era under Hassan Rouhani’s presidency will mark a qualitative shift in relations that have been troubled by rising concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and hegemonic aspirations in the region is yet to be seen. In this regard, Iran’s assertive nuclear diplomacy and the signing of the Geneva Deal as a prelude to a long-term solution to the nuclear crisis definitely bring a new dynamic that should be addressed. However, the prospects of Iran-GCC relations are also tied to regional developments at large, particularly the crisis in the Levant. The ongoing civil war in Syria and growing destabilization of Lebanon attest to the perils of sectarianism and intensified regional competition over the future of these states and societies. This paper aims to address the role of the Levant in Iran-GCC relations which has become an integral part of the politics of the Persian Gulf increasingly so in last few years with the advent of the Arab uprisings. It will argue that any prospect for positive change in Iran-GCC relations, especially Iran-Saudi Arabia relations will also depend on how they manage their countervailing positions on the future of Syria alongside other issues pertaining to the security of the Persian Gulf. In this regard, the paper will focus on Iran's recent attempts under Rouhani administration, fostered by its quest for moderation, progress in nuclear talks, growing political, economic and ideological costs of the Syrian turmoil as well as the rising threat of extremism in the region with ISIS. It will assess the domestic, regional and international developments which offer prospects for cooperation, if only Iran and Saudi Arabia choose to do so.
Keywords: Iran-GCC relations; Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations; the Syrian Uprising; “Constructive Engagement”; Iran’s regional policy under President Rouhani

"The prospects of 'constructive engagement' in Iran-GCC Relations:The Levant Dimension" in Warnaar, Zaccara and Aarts (eds), Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry (Berlin: Gerlach Press, September 2016). (Forthcoming) (ISBN: 978-395-9940-04-7)

http://www.gerlach-books.de/attachment/INFO%20Gerlach%20Press_Iran-GCC%20Relations_Aug2016.pdf

Για πρώτη φορά από την έναρξη του εμφυλίου, στις 17.3.2017 το καθεστώς Άσαντ ανταπάντησε στρατιωτικά στους επανειλημμένους ισραηλινούς βομβαρδισμούς κατά στόχων ιρανικού ενδιαφέροντος εντός του συριακού εδάφους. Παρά το ότι η κίνηση αυτή είχε άμεσο αποδέκτη το Ισραήλ, η Δαμασκός στέλνει ποικίλα μηνύματα σε Μόσχα, Ουάσινγκτον και Τεχεράνη.
For the first time since the beginning of the civila war, the Syrian regime retaliated on March 17, 2017 following Israeli airstrikes against military targets of Iranian interest. With this development, and despite the fact that the Syrian retaliation was aiming Israel, Damascus has sent various clear messages to multiple recipients, including Moscow, Washington and Teheran
לראשונה מתחילת מלחמת האזרחים בסוריה, השלטון הסורי מגיב לתקיפות האוויריות של צה"ל נגד מטרות צבאיות המחיוסות לאינטרסים אירניים בתוך סוריה
למרות שהתגובה הסורית מיועדת בראש ובראשונה אל ישראל, ההתפתחות הזאת שולחת מסרים לגורמים נוספים באיזור כגון: מוסקבה, וושינגטון וטהרן