Collusion

The United States acute care hospital (ACH) market provides a unique environment in which to examine questions about market structure and performance.  The ACHs operate in a mature market of health services that is highly regulated and
has one dominant primary consumer of services. The uncharacteristic industry structure offers the opportunity to analyze pervasive agency relationships and capital structure issues in a new setting. In addition, the policies of the U.S. Government have created an environment in which tacit collusion is likely to flourish, which leads to market buyer power (monopsony, or buyers acting as one monopoly buyer). A key
question is the extent to which monopsony and agency affect capital structure decisions. Agency is defined by Ross (1973, p.134) as a relationship formed between a principle and their agents, “when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” This thesis extends the agency framework provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976), along with the econometric understanding of monopsony in healthcare via tacit collusion, as suggested by Pauly (1998) and Sevilla (2005), and the research constraints of monopsony under an all-or-nothing contract, as outlined by Taylor (2003). Using data on ACHs from the period of 1995 to 2007 for approximately 5,000 ACHs, which was derived from the Medicare Cost Report and medical payments for a sub-population of 1,500, this research examines the determinants of capital structure in a distorted market. Building upon this initial analysis, the research seeks to
examine the effects of market distortions upon free cash flow, and ultimately, capital structure. Two theories of distortion are presented that would affect free cash flow: The first is that of the agency cost of free cash flow and signaling, and the second is a theory of monopsony via tacit collusion between buyers.
A model of the agency relationship between ACHs and the U.S. Government is proposed, promoting agency cost (signaling and the agency cost of free cash flows) as a causal relation with free cash flows and capital structure (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Empirical models of agency are constructed, examining the dependence on government business and the relation to the leverage (signaling) and free cash flows (agency cost of free cash flows) for ACHs. In addition, a complementary theory of capital structure determinant via market power
(monopsony) is formulated, suggesting that monopsony conditions within the ACH market affect free cash flows and capital structure. The analysis provides a framework
for understanding the environments in which ACHs operate and the strength of bargaining within the market. The research concludes with a review of the determinants of capital structure in light of the inefficiencies and distortions of the industry and the relationships observed.

This paper addresses the collusive nature of the ‘The Big Four’ which has led to a cartelized market in the auditing industry. They have taken advantage of the market concentration by charging excess auditing fees and making super-normal collusive profits. The paper puts light on the evidence and factors that have led to the sustainability of collusion in the auditing industry, after understanding the market structure of the auditing industry which is found to be Oligopolistic by nature. An analysis of this collusive behavior is understood through the lens of Game theory with the help of the Prisoner’s dilemma. We find that these firms cooperate with each other to raise prices, thereby enjoying the collusive profits amongst themselves. The incentives of the firms participating in a cartel is discussed along with the welfare consequences. We see that these firms in a cartelized market enjoy high profits and the consumer is negatively impacted (as the consumer surplus is reduced considerably compared to that in a perfect competition). In fact, the overall surplus (consumer surplus and producer surplus) is reduced and there is a reduction in the welfare of the society which is termed as ‘Deadweight loss’. This will also lead to reduction in economic efficiency as cartelized market is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, the government must step in and bring about regulations/policies to stop this kind of anti-competitive behavior. Price regulations, Antitrust laws, and Competition policies are recommended for the same.

Keywords: Collusion, The Big Four, Oligopoly, Game Theory, Cartelized market, Incentives, Welfare Consequences, and Policies.

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency.

Polish economy experienced significant changes during the past 30 years. System transformation that be 2004 significantly influenced economic development. Apart from tough history experiences, they formed the shape of national economy which can be observed nowadays. It was a long and difficult process. During political and economic rapid changes greater numbers of price collusions and other illegal practices can be observed than during the stable development of national economy. Authors selected and reviewed the most important anti-competitive cases in the construction industry from the past 30 years in Poland. The review includes not only cases that were officially justified and penalized-like the collusion of portland cement big producers-but also cases of collusion suspicion on highway and express roads that ended with acquittal court verdicts. td. Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the Creative Construction Conference 2018.

Algorithmic collusion is a hot topic within antitrust circles in Europe, US and beyond. But some economists downplay algorithmic collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. This paper responds to these criticisms by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion isn't only possible, but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers.

En la década de 1930 la Iglesia continuó el ambicioso proyecto de la recristianización de la sociedad, que buscaba a influir decididamente en la cultura y la política. La oportunidad de reescribir la Constitución dirigió la Iglesia a no organizar un partido confesional, sino a Liga Católica Electoral, para apoyar los candidatos que se comprometiesen con las demandas católicas, independientemente de sus asociaciones políticas. Esta posición se ha debilitado la capacidad de reaccionar frente del crecimiento exponencial de las extremas políticas. Al principio de 1935, la iglesia se ve ante la necesidad de tener que mantener su apartidismo y, al mismo tiempo, discernir una actitud ante el avanzar de las extremas sobre el clero y los laicos. Entonces permitiendo a la participación política de los que no estaban directamente involucrados en la administración de la Iglesia en el AIB, se ha abierto también la posibilidad del fascismo transformar el catolicismo.

The predominance of oligopolies in Latin American (Latam) markets poses an important challenge for competition authorities (CAs). In the first place, CAs must enforce competition laws in markets where it is difficult to distinguish between conducts

Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain.
The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy.
This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

This article considers the intersection of the themes of female antagonism, internalized dominance-as defined by E.J.R. David and Gail Pheterson-and female collusion with patriarchy in the oppression of incarcerated women in Chacón's La voz dormida (2002). Whereas many previous critics of the novel fittingly underscore the novelist's portrayal of the political and psychological solidarity of the Republican female inmates in the Ventas prison, this paper proposes that the cases of female antipathy among the female characters of Chacón's novel are symptomatic of, and helped contribute to, the Franco regime's widespread oppression of women in the postwar years. By likening her female antagonists to men, Chacón portrays the fascist-sympathizing women of the novel as agents of patriarchy, but more importantly, as accomplices to terror and even genocide. Diverging from the work of previous scholars, the author posits that Chacón highlights the (double) subjugation of all females-Republicans and Nationalists, nuns/wardens, and prisoners, alike-who were expected to comply with orthodox gender roles and male-defined moral codes, or risk being branded as moral transgressors and, in specific cases, losing any semblance of power they thought they had. This article offers new interpretative possibilities for a popular and highly glossed text.

A short few days in September 2020 saw an extraordinary turn of events. The Member States of the European Union used the withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union (EU) as a pretext to dismiss a sitting Advocate General (AG) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) before the expiration of the duration of her mandate provided for in primary law. The Member States replaced her with another nominee in the absence of a vacancy. This occurred in direct violation of EU primary law, including the cardinal principles of security of tenure and judicial independence. The CJEU had the opportunity to prevent this from occurring; yet did absolutely nothing to prevent it. Instead, the CJEU went out of its way to facilitate the appointment of Mr. Athanasios Rantos in place of AG Eleanor Sharpston. The drama in Three Acts, involving numerous elements – hints of lawlessness; signs of complicity between the Member States and the CJEU; confirmation of the lack of structural independence of the CJEU – has ultimately raised doubts whether the CJEU is legally composed. These September 2020 developments resulted in the dismissal of a member of the Court that the Member States did not want, no matter what the law said. In this article, these cumulative events are analyzed systematically through a legal lens, regrettably confirming a startling omission in the EU legal order – that the EU lacks a structurally independent court of law sitting at its apex, and that the EU legal system is not immune to ultra vires Member State interventions. Notwithstanding these developments and a severe pounding to the credibility of the CJEU, there remains a possibility for this deficiency in the EU legal order to be rectified. The CJEU will have to state at some future juncture that decisions within the sphere of Article 253 TFEU are subject to judicial review for procedural irregularities, thus ensuring that the EU is truly a complete system of legal remedies and procedures. In the meantime, questions do linger about the lawful composition of the CJEU with the position of ‘AG’ Rantos in situ, which the CJEU should and must address.

‘System of the heavens’: an examination of the concept of ‘Collusion’ through the case study of the fundation of the AIB’s centre in the city of Natal

This article aims to rework the concept of Collusion through the recovery of its etymological roots and of its use by the astronomy in the early nineteenth century. Our goal is to allow the concept of Collusion can be used to articulate an investigation of Islamic extremism in the transnational level. For this purpose we will test our results through the case study provided by the relationship between Catholicism and fascism in the city of Natal, Brazil, in the interwar period.
-----------
‘System of the heavens’: un análisis del concepto de ‘Colusión’ a través del caso de la creación del centro de la AIB en Natal

Este artículo tiene como objetivo volver a trabajar el concepto de colusión a través de la recuperación de sus raíces etimológicas y su uso en astronomía de principios del siglo XIX. Nuestro objetivo es permitir que el concepto de colusión puede servir a la articulación de un examen del extremismo islámico en el nivel transnacional. Para este fin se pondrá a prueba nuestros resultados a través del estudio de casos proporcionada por la relación entre el catolicismo y el fascismo en Natal, en el período de entreguerras.

Although several works have suggested that interlocking directorates are mechanisms that have the potential to facilitate collusion, few studies have investigated the matter empirically, and none have systematically considered known cartel cases. Taking a European perspective, and focusing on four different time periods, the present work investigates the extent to which companies that are directly and indirectly connected via interlocking directorships simultaneously or subsequently collude. Utilizing network analysis software the study provides a new method for identifying the two forms of business ties and possible overlaps between them. The analysis is based on an original dataset of European Community cartel cases and data on interlocking directorates developed by others. Very few examples are found of colluding companies that were previously directly or indirectly connected via interlocking directorates. This finding suggests that interlocking directorates rarely facilitate collusive activities.

Based on successful international examples of collusion detection, four indicators of the collusion have been chosen and analysed in this paper. The research was done for the majority of tender procedures in the road construction industry, in Poland that was finished in 2016 with the selection of a general contractor. Based on [1, 2, 3] the following four indicators were chosen: the number of offers placed in the tender procedure, the range of bid prices being offered, exactly the same set of offerors in a few tender procedures, repeating ordering the works execution to the same contractor in a given geographical region.

In the last decade, the historians that followed the theory of political religion have sought to overcome the ideologization of historiography to understand the relations between Catholicism and Fascism in the interwar period. Roger Griffin, Emilio Gentile and Renato Moro have sought to establish an analytic based on the idea of the radical incompatibility between christian religion and fascism, but observing the approximations made by catholics and fascists to amalgamate the contents of the religious and the political. This analytic, works around the concept of “collusion”, considers the problem posed by spatiality (the existence of centers of power, nation states, regional issues) and tries to discern the ideas and positions of the political and religious of the “collusive” groups. In this chapter, I will seek to illuminate the ‘collusion’ with the exam of the Brazilian case, showing how christian prayers like the "Apostles’ Creed" and ‘Hail Holy Queen’ were adapted in fascist texts and speeches in an attempt to create a hybrid of catholicism and fascism.

As the contracts in the road construction sector in Poland are usually of extremely high value and financed from the state budget, the tender procedures should not allow for the non-concurrent behaviours of tender participants. Otherwise, the clients' losses will be of high value too. A database comprising hundreds of bidding procedures in the road construction industry in Poland has been developed. It includes the tenders' participants, the locations of the road sections, bids' values, the winners, and the types of roads. Every procedure has been evaluated and assigned to the set with a given level of collusion occurrence probability. The evaluation has required the analysis and the transformation of - described in the literature - collusive types of behaviours to the parameters of procedures that can be shown as numbers or ranks. Four criteria of a collusion threatened contracts have been chosen and applied for evaluation. Then, two methods of machine learning were app...

We propose a political-economics model of decentralization (by the central govern-
ment) and collusion (between the local government and .rms) to explain high death
rates in the coalmine industry in China, where the local government allows the firms
to choose dangerous but profitable modes of production when collusion is feasible. Our model predicts that coalmine death rates are increasing in decentralization and collusion and decreasing in media exposure. We collect a provincial level panel dataset from 1995 to 2005 and compare the decentralization period (1998 to 2000) with the adjacent centralization periods. Consistent with the model, we find that decentralization increases death rates by about 30%. Assuming that the transaction costs of collusion are lower for native Safety governors (the o¢ cials responsible for safety regulations) and using within-governor estimations, we find that the intraction between nativeness and decentralization increases death rates by about 100%. We proxy media exposure by the number of newspaper names and find that it has a negative impact on death rates. In addition, we match the province-level data with the balance-sheet data of coalmine firms between 1998 and 2005 and provide additional evidence using these firm-level data.

The present research is to analyze the impacts generated in the dairy industry, particularly in the segment of whole milk: 1) Acquiring Aeroméxico by LALA 3) Strategies to be implemented by LALA and remain a leader 3) Femsa's foray in the dairy industry with the acquisition of Santa Clara and 4) the assumption of possible collusion with Santa Clara Alpura to address the high level of competition generated by LALA. It is important to know the structure of this market, analyze the system of regulated prices in the milk to understand the changes that will be in the coming years with these three big companies that compete to achieve hegemony in the milk market.

We identify and analyze three distinct effects arising from potentially binding budget constraints in multi-unit ascending auctions. First, binding budgets clearly reduce the level of competition among bidders. Second, budget constraints may at the same time make it difficult to sustain collusive equilibria when bidders lack sufficient resources to punish defectors.Third, the mere possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints can reduce competition substantially because bidders can pretend to be constrained, even if they are not.In this cases, measures restricting the participation of low-budget bidders, e.g. reserve prices, can increase social welfare.

Previously secret British state archives prove "a high-level, coordinated, and sustained plot" by the British Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and Senior Civil Servants to deceive the two Parliaments of Stormont and Westminster about the truth of the McGurk’s Bar Massacre.

This booklet follows years of archival research and information battles against the British state and has lead to a complaint to the British Cabinet Secretary and a request for an immediate investigation.

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has
induced proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions
that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge
from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the
revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP,
used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by
Facebook). We nd that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG
mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency.

Based on successful international examples of collusion detection, four indicators of the collusion have been chosen and analysed in this paper. The research was done for the majority of tender procedures in the road construction industry, in Poland that was finished in 2016 with the selection of a general contractor. Based on [1, 2, 3] the following four indicators were chosen: the number of offers placed in the tender procedure, the range of bid prices being offered, exactly the same set of offerors in a few tender procedures, repeating ordering the works execution to the same contractor in a given geographical region.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the consequences that point score systems in association football may have on potential collusion between teams. The study applies game theory and empirical analysis to derive and test hypotheses. The main findings of the article include Nash equilibria indicating a higher collusion potential associated with the 3-1-0 point score system than with the 2-1-0 system. Of particular interest is the finding that the competitive balance of the league affects collusion, and that (theoretically) high competitive balance in fact makes collusion more probable. Empirically, we are not able to prove that real-world participants do collude, but we provide circumstantial evidence that is consistent with collusion. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 25 European top leagues with 823 played matches in the 2017 and 2016/17 seasons. These data are used to estimate uncertainty of outcome and draw ratio. We apply a standard t-test to test our main hypothesis. The main conclusion of the paper may hence be summed up as advice to reinstall the 2-1-0 point score system in association football.

Cloud computing has become a part of people's lives. However, there are many unresolved problems with security of this technology. According to the assessment of international experts in the field of security, there are risks in the appearance of cloud collusion in uncertain conditions. To mitigate this type of uncertainty, and minimize data redundancy of encryption together with harms caused by cloud collusion, modified threshold Asmuth-Bloom and weighted Mignotte secret sharing schemes are used. We show that if the villains do know the secret parts, and/or do not know the secret key, they cannot recuperate the secret. If the attackers do not know the required number of secret parts but know the secret key, the probability that they obtain the secret depends the size of the machine word in bits that is less than 1/2 ((l-1)). We demonstrate that the proposed scheme ensures security under several types of attacks. We propose four approaches to select weights for secret sharing sc...

Past allocations of coal blocks, in India, being marred with controversies on the grounds of being arbitrary and discretionary led to the de-allotment of 204 coal blocks by the Supreme Court in 2014. Since then, auctions and competitive bidding were introduced in the allocation of coal blocks. Now bidder collusion is a pervasive problem and has been addressed throughout theoretical and empirical academic literature. In auctions, bidders may set up a cartel, or a bidding ring, with the aim of increasing their profit at the expense of the seller and ultimately lower the efficiency of resource allocation. This paper makes theoretical comments on the auction format determined by the Government of India, based on the current regulations and stipulations, regarding it being collusion-proof. It is observed that the prior-allottee (PA) firms face a higher effective entry cost due to the levy component than the new-allottee (NA) firms. This creates a contradictory situation. Without this skewed cost distribution, the PA firms have an incentive to collude against the NA firms whereas with this differential treatment the NA firms have an incentive to collude against the PA firms. This calls for empirical investigation into the optimality of entry costs.

Keywords; coal block auction, collusion in auctions, optimal entry cost, entry deterrence.

Supervisor - Dr. Soumendu Sarkar, Assistant Professor, Department of Policy Studies, TERI University.

As the contracts in the road construction sector in Poland are usually of extremely high value and financed from the state budget, the tender procedures should not allow for the non-concurrent behaviours of tender participants. Otherwise, the clients' losses will be of high value too. A database comprising hundreds of bidding procedures in the road construction industry in Poland has been developed. It includes the tenders' participants, the locations of the road sections, bids' values, the winners, and the types of roads. Every procedure has been evaluated and assigned to the set with a given level of collusion occurrence probability. The evaluation has required the analysis and the transformation of -  described in the literature - collusive types of behaviours to the parameters of procedures that can be shown as numbers or ranks. Four criteria of a collusion threatened contracts have been chosen and applied for evaluation. Then, two methods of machine learning were applied. The first method was to train an artificial neural network (ANN) to classify the procedures to the aforementioned sets. The other method was to utilize artificial neural networks predictive capabilities enriched by the fuzzy sets theory. The multiple output from ANN was defined as membership function values. The use of the fuzzy sets theory - the process of defuzzification - helps to classify the tender procedures to the sets of different level of risk (of collusion appearance). The results achieved in these two separate processes are compared and discussed. The created tool can be applied for the future tender procedures as a pre-test of a collusion appearance.

The paper first briefly reviews the extent to which profit maximising transport firms with identical cost functions and producing identical transport services pass-on output taxes to transport users under perfect competition, under different forms of imperfect competition and when they act as monopolists. Then the analysis is extended to derive the pass-on rates and activity reductions caused by an output tax when firms care both about profit and consumer surplus, produce symmetrically differentiated services and compete simultaneously in quantities and fare and when they collude. The pass-on rates and activity reductions are highest under collusion and lowest under Cournot competition when they produce complementary services. When they produce substitute services, the result is ambiguous and the competitive situation that yields highest pass-on depends on the firms’ objective functions and how fiercely they compete. Two important counterintuitive results are that the more intensely the firms compete and the more weight they put on consumer surplus, the higher the pass-on rates are.

The study presents a survey of research results on the development of cartel
collusion indicators in the framework of public procurement, which are based on the
structural characteristics of the industry and the behavioral traits of economic agents.
An overview of the methods used to identify cartel collusions. The paper shows and
reveals the internal and external factors affecting the behavior of bidders. Methods and
tools for identifying and preventing cartel collusion by participants in public
procurement are suggested

This study concludes that the rise of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad comes from a variety of special terms and is contained in ḥadīth. These emerging terms affect the different usage associations of each term. The method used in this research is analytical and descriptive method. This study uses two approaches. The first approach used in the research is the 'ilm al-Ḥadīth approach. This approach is used to measure ḥadīth-ḥadīth relating to corruption, collusion and nepotism in terms of quality of matan and sanad; and its asbāb al-Wurūd. The second approach is the linguistic approach. This approach is enabled to explore the rationality of corruption, collusion, and nepotism through tradition, systematics, and language tendencies in producing an understanding. This research has several objectives. Firstly, to authenticate corruption, collusion, and nepotism as disciplinary and inconsistent attitudes that can be present in human beings without being limited by the dimension of time and space. Secondly, to verify and measure the existence of cases of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in the time of Mu'ammad ibn 'Abdillāh by analyzing the matan al-Ḥadīth, Sharh al-Ḥadīth, and asbāb al-Wurūd. Thirdly, inventory the terms of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in ḥadīth and map their usage. Keywords: Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism, and Ḥadīth

An Ad hoc Network is a pool of wireless mobile nodes energetically forming a network without the use of any pre-accessible network infrastructure or centralized administrator. These nodes communicate with each other by hop-to-hop communication. This dynamic topology of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) allows nodes to get attached and leave the network at any second of time. Thus MANET can be used in a variety of fields. Current MANETs are designed primary for military utility. This generic characteristic of MANET has rendered its vulnerability to security attacks. Due to which unprotected attacks of the malicious nodes can occur at any time. This paper focuses on one such attack known as " Black hole attack " and the routing protocol being used here is AODV.