Anti Bribery

PENDAHULUAN Suap/ Penyuapan adalah salah satu masalah yang paling kompleks dan dekstruktif di sepanjang hidup kita, dan bagaimanapun pemberantasannya secara nasional & internasional, kegiatan suap tetap menyebar luas. Bank Dunia menaksir sejumlah lebih dari 1 trilyun USD dipergunakan untuk suap pada setiap tahunnya, dengan dampak bala bencana seperti merosotnya stabilitas politik, kenaikan biaya operasional bisnis, dan menyebabkan masyarakat yang miskin. Secara global, suap merupakan penghalang yang signifikan terhadap perdagangan internasional, sementara secara Organisasi, suap memberikan dampak negative intensitas tinggi terhadap moral pegawai. Telah banyak pemerintahan negara-negara yang mengambil tindakan untuk pemberantasan suap melalui hukum negara sebagaimana halnya juga Konvensi PBB dalam melawan korupsi, namun demikian masih terdapat banyak hal yang harus dilakukan sebagaimana mestinya. Perubahan institusional dan budaya anti suap dalam Organisasi dapat secara signifikan berkontribusi dalam pemberantasan suap dan melengkapi tindakan hukum secara nasional dan internasional. Definisi Penyuapan adalah : " MENAWARKAN, MENJANJIKAN, MEMBERIKAN, MENERIMA MAUPUN MEMINTA KEUNTUNGAN YANG TIDAK SEMESTINYA DALAM BENTUK KEUANGAN & PERMODALAN MAUPUN NON KEUANGAN & PERMODALAN SECARA LANGSUNG MAUPUN TIDAK LANGSUNG YANG MELANGGAR PERATURAN PERUNDANGAN SEBAGAI BUJUKAN ATAU HADIAH UNTUK SESEORANG AGAR BERTINDAK MAUPUN MENAHAN TINDAKAN YANG TERKAIT DENGAN KINERJA, TUGAS, SERTA SEGALA SUMBER DAYA YANG DIKLAIM SEBAGAI MILIK MAUPUN DIBAWAH PENGELOLAAN ORANG TERSEBUT. " Root cause penyuapan: 1. Kurangnya kesadaran bahwa perubahan status hak antar pihak hanya dapat terjadi melalui proses jual beli maupun proses hukum yang memiliki legalitas yang terverifikasi valid dan sah.

This paper summarizes the results of 28 studies that were published between 2010 and 2020 on the ethics of bribery. The following 34 political jurisdictions are included: Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, England, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and Uzbekistan. It is part of a much larger project on the ethics of bribery that will be published in 2022.

This study presents the results of an empirical study of attitudes toward bribe taking in three large Latin American Countries – Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. The authors use the Human Beliefs and Values Survey data to examine several demographic variables, including gender, age, ethnicity, religion, education, occupation, social class and confidence in government to determine whether these variables make a difference. Country comparisons are also made. Although opposition to bribery was generally high, accepting a bribe was least acceptable in Argentina and most acceptable in Brazil. Women, housewives, older people, widows, small town people and Caucasians were significantly more opposed to bribery than were other groups. The less religious a person was, the less resistance there was to bribery. Healthy people were less averse to bribery than were unhealthy people. Religion and income level were not significant variables.

In bribery cases, compliance-based defense often implies substantial efforts and costs on the side of corporations for providing enforcement agencies with the facts of the case. In several jurisdictions, corporations and their private sector investigators shape those facts as they lay the ground for a negotiation-based enforcement action ever-more frequently. While public investigators do their own fact-finding missions, the financial consequences and the reputational stigma associated with bribery cases
place corporations with a clear interest in proactive cooperation with the public investigation. At the same time, private entities’ proactive involvement in the fact-finding exercise questions the public


monopoly on the investigative initiatives in criminal matters and, more subtly though, the very idea of State control on the law enforcement process. On several areas, peculiar kinds of public-private partnerships - featured by a hybrid approach to governance with voluntary monitoring activities and investigative strategies based on the acquisition and control of the private entities’ information assets -are gaining ground. However, in some European continental jurisdictions, which are anchored to a neat
distinction between the respective roles of the public authorities and private sector in law enforcement, legislators seem particularly wary of such an equal cooperation in the fact-finding exercise and, occasionally, law enforcement authorities even perceive it as an obstacle to evaluate and evidence allegations.

In this chapter, Simone Lonati and Leonardo Borlini discuss the normative implications and risks of the ‘privatization’ of investigations for bribery cases by analyzing the Italian corporate liability regime, that has not been substantially modified since Legislative Decree 231/01. Such assessment is conducted in the light of the US model, that has enjoyed an unparalleled success in pursuing enforcement actions against multinational firms for corruption and other offenses and whose practices and principles have
already been ‘exported’ in some European jurisdictions. Even if Article 112 of the Italian Constitution, namely the principle of mandatory prosecution, prevents the adoption of negotiated settlements as the U.S. pre-trial diversion agreements, this study analyzes the potential benefits and challenges of the implementation of forms of cooperation between authorities and corporations based on the provisions of Legislative Decree 231/01.

Corruption in state and municipal administration
From the viewpoint of current perception and definition of corruption the first half of the "long" 19th century represents a milestone. In the process of social modernization (bureaucratization, dissolution of corporative structures, spread of literacy etc.) new standards distinguishing between the legitimate co-creation of the public good and the legally and morally disqualifying practices of acquiring personal or group advantages were established. In the Kingdom of Hungary, during 1780 – 1848 those processes were hindered by a systematic refusing of all changes and reforms streaming from Vienna. Very slow pace of decoupling the private and public spheres due to the prevailing position of nobility in the society caused the pre-modern corruption practices and various methods of favouritism were persisting as legitimate even during the period of reforms (1825 – 1848). In certain sectors of the public sphere they ceased to be performed publicly, that is, without the presence of witnesses (e.g. gift-giving to judges).
In the Habsburg monarchy existed in parallel two models of administration – Austrian (modern bureaucratic) and Hungarian (pre-modern municipal) – during that period. In the present study the author makes an inquiry into what role the criticism of corruption in the mutual discrediting and delegitimizing of the two models played and which sectors of public administration were perceived in the contemporary Hungarian discourse as those, where occurrence of various types and forms of corruption behaviour was frequent-most.

La prima fase della XVIII Legislatura si è caratterizzata, per quanto interessa il diritto penale, per un vero e proprio diluvio di leggi di stampo populista, che hanno spaziato dalla riforma della difesa legitti-ma, fino alla soppressione della prescrizione dopo la sentenaa di primo grado (anche se di assoluzione). Vera e propria cartina di tornasole della visione politico criminale dell'esecutivo giallo-verde, che ha guidato il paese fino all'estate del 2019, è stata però la legge Spazzacorrotti (3/2019), con la quale si è compiuto il percorso di assimilazione tra la legislazione in materia di reati contro la Pubblica Ammini-strazione e la disciplina emergenziale antimafia. Queste leggi, tuttavia, non rappresentano una vera e propria innovazione, né una rottura rispetto alla disciplina previgente. Piuttosto, sono il frutto avvelena-to delle convergenze parallele tra due opposte forme di populismo, che affettano questo paese almeno dagli anni '90 del Novecento. Ripercorrendone le tracce, lungo le due direttrici della legislazione anti-mafia e di quella in materia di contrasto ai fenomeni corruttivi, emerge come il modello della perenne emergenza sia ormai la principale fonte di ispirazione di un legislatore, che a dispetto del variare delle maggioranze parlamentari, mantiene una visione uniforme-e illiberale-del ruolo del penale nella democrazia italiana.

Anti-mafia and anti-corruption laws in the era of criminal fury The first phase of the XVIII Legislature was characterized, as far as criminal law is concerned, by the high number of populist-inspired laws. Among these, a major role was played by the l. 3/2019 (so-called "scrubbing", with which the long process of convergence between the system of repression of mafia crime and anti-corruption discipline has been accomplished. These reforms do not represent a real innovation, nor a break with previous legislation; rather, they are the effect of parallel convergences between two different forms of populism, which affect this country at least since the 1990s.

Resumo: O artigo tem o propósito de discutir os impactos da implementação da Lei 12.846/13 ("Lei Anticorrupção"), sob a perspectiva de análise jurídica dos custos de transação, notadamente no que concerne aos instrumentos privados de controle externo (e interno) que estão embutidos nas relações econômicas que permeiam a atividade empresarial, a partir de uma moldura teórica desenvolvida no âmbito da "Transaction Cost Economics" (TCE). Sob este enfoque, realiza-se exame acerca das relações entre governança corporativa, compliance e os mecanismos de controle externo, com vistas a propor uma reflexão a respeito de que possíveis medidas poderiam ser tomadas de modo a evitar, ou mitigar-notadamente a partir da redução dos custos de transação-os possíveis impactos (indesejados) verificados em decorrência da aplicação de mecanismos de combate à corrupção. Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to discuss the impacts of the enforcement of Brazilian Anti-corruption Act, Law n. 12.846/13, in the light of the transaction costs legal analysis-developed by "Transaction Cost Economics" theory (TCE), notably regarding the private mechanisms of external (and internal) control of the economic relations on corporate activities. The article examines the interactions between corporate governance, compliance and external control mechanisms, in order to propose thoughts regarding possible measures to be taken to avoid or to mitigate, by reducing transaction costs, the possible unwitting impacts to be verified as a result of the enforcement of anti-bribery mechanisms.

The paper considers the main problems of application of incentive norms in relation to a briber in the context
of latest legislative changes, the problems of legislative regulation of incentive norms in comatting bribery according to
the draft of a new Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia. The paper provides the scientifically-based recommendations on the improvement of current legislation, official regulatory
legal acts and the practice of applying the incentive norms in relation to the  bribe giver and the mediator in bribery. Based on
the study of both the current Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia and the draft of a new Criminal Code of the Republic
of Armenia, comparative-legal research of criminal legislation of some foreign countries, as well as the theoretical
views on this issue, the author attempted to carry out the comprehensive study of criminal law relations arising when applying
the incentive rules in fight against bribery.