20th Century Continental Philosophy

This article analyses José Ortega y Gasset’s ideas of the tasks of philosophy and the university and how they were related to his diagnosis of the crisis of modern European culture. The texts ’Misión de la universidad’, ’Qué es filosofía?’ and ’La rebelión de las masas’, all written around 1930, are interpreted in light of each other to expose this relationship. Instead of simply declaring tasks for philosophy and the university, Ortega turned these issues into objects of historico-philosophical analysis. The tasks of philosophy and the university were historicized, corresponding to their changing roles in society, and related to the demands of the new situation in the present. The character of the present was not simply determined by applying a ready-made understanding of society, but was itself made an object of historico-philosophical diagnosis. The tasks that Ortega formulated for philosophy (to formulate a new form of reason related to life; to analyse the fundamental structure of ’life’ in the present) and the university ¬(to transmit culture at the level of cultural development; to build a new cultural foundation as a vital system of ideas based on the current level of the disciplines; to act as a cultivating counter-balance to the power of the media) can be seen as part of the solution to the problems diagnosed in La rebelión de las masas: the loss of the former cultural foundation; violence and nihilistic lack of respect for basic norms of civilization; self-righteous presentism and narrow-minded specialization. The final part points to worrying parallels between Ortega’s diagnosis and our contemporary populist condition and raises the question of a future alternative: a philosophical condition with a philosophical democracy based on philosophical citizens. Whether this is possible or not, Ortega’s analysis demonstrates the need to relate the question of the tasks of philosophy and the university to a diagnosis of the present.

We have two ways of knowing. Our mind knows forms, things, both subtle and gross. Faces, hands, buildings, trees, math formulas, mind knows subject and the mind knows otherness. The mind knows dualities, the mind knows me and you, us and them, and this and that. Mind knows time, mind knows the past, the present and the sense of the future. The mind knows things and entities, the mind knows beings, infinite numbers of beings and things. The mind knows difference. The mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through imagery, the mind has sense and the mind has memory. The mind knows dualistically.

FROM THE BACK COVER: What is the essential nature of meaning? . . . . . This book answers by examining interpretive theories from the past and present. It finds that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation, a struggle that reaches crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand, this crisis is mollified by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, which argues that we are always already in a meaningful relationship to the objects of the world. On the other hand, this crisis is exacerbated when phenomenology, structuralism, and aesthetic theory directly make meaning into an object of study. . . . . . . . . These historical developments culminate with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose non-hermeneutical phenomenology delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity. Intriguingly, Lacan's work reveals meaning to be sexual in nature. By integrating his notion of sexual difference with his work in discourse theory and topology, this book demonstrates how the subject's struggle with meaning can be suspended.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Broadly speaking, the majority of books on Jacques Lacan focus on the earlier periods of his career. They also tend to target the psychoanalytic clinical community, or else discuss his work in various political, social, and cultural contexts. But in almost all cases these books refrain from a detailed exegesis of his actual texts. They instead prefer to comment on his theoretical apparatus as a whole before turning to its practical implications. . . . . . This book positions itself against this grain. Firstly, it closely analyzes some half-dozen key Lacanian texts. This analysis is organized under a single thematic – the question of meaning – in order to advance the reader's understanding of the trajectory of Lacan's thought across his entire career, as well as to promote the book's thesis that the field of meaning can be suspended. Accordingly, an initial chapter takes up the hermeneutical tradition from Flacius onward. This is then supplemented by a chapter which surveys phenomenological, structuralist and aesthetic theories of meaning and their differing methods of textual analysis. Together these two chapters provide a unique context for the sustained analysis of Lacan's texts which begins in the third chapter, an analysis that forms the bulk of the book's content. This contextualization potentially widens the book's appeal to any scholar wishing to explore his relationship to those textual objects he interacts with on a daily basis. And because this book assumes the reader has little to no familiarity with Lacan, the reader will find patient explanations of the basics of his theories before slowly being led up to the more difficult theories of his late years. Again the argument is that Lacan has something to offer all scholars. His work is not just reserved for psychoanalysts. . . . . . It is with his late theories that the serious student of Lacan will find the book's most original contribution. For in the fourth chapter a detailed account is provided of how Lacan derived his infamous formulae of sexuation from Aristotelian logic. These formulae are then extensively discussed against the backdrop of interpretive theory and textual analysis, showing how these formulae capture much more than just the difference between the sexes. Strikingly, this difference is also found to run through meaning itself, something the final chapter aims to demonstrate. It does this by amalgamating three key components of late-Lacan: sexuation, discourse theory and his use of topological spaces. This amalgamation is a first in the literature. But this amalgamation is not just useful in demonstrating the book's thesis. It further suggests how seemingly divergent aspects of late-Lacanian theory can be made to work together.

Timeless awareness is the essence of Dzogchen. Time experienced within timeless awareness is also an expression of the essence of Dzogchen. Dzogchen is an ancient form of Tibetan mystic humanism. Dzogchen makes the essential distinction between mind and awareness. A person can be located in mind alone and locked in time. As a person shifts from being located in mind alone (mindfulness) and goes beyond mind alone (mindfulness), one becomes aware of their own awareness. As we focus our awareness on our own innermost awareness, vast dimensions of awareness begin to open and self-reveal its nature to us. Awareness is a multidimensional experience and this awareness is infinite in its horizons. The innate qualities of awareness are spaciousness or openness or emptiness. Another quality of our awareness is luminous radiance and still another is awareness as energy. Awareness is alive and is both vast stillness and unceasing movement. The Union of Mind and Awareness When a person is able to experience the union of their mind and their awareness, then the person has a simultaneous experience of being in time and in timeless awareness. The mind is the place of thinking, feeling, sensation, memory and imagination and the mind is the mode of knowing singularity and difference in the world. This is the realm of ordinary knowingness and this is the realm of duality. Our mind is the realm of time. This time bound knowing is the knowing of you and I, us and them, this or that in time and place.

In the summer of 2013 at the Tibetan Center in Poolesville, Maryland the great Lama YangThang Rinpoche gave instruction on the practice of the great compassion, or as he described the practice, as being the practice of Absolute Compassion. The instruction was to extend the light of awareness into the world and into the cosmos. Extending the light of awareness into the present moment of a person, extending the light of awareness into the past time of the person and extending the light of awareness into the future time of the person. This truly is the great practice of the great compassion and everyone can practice this extension of the light of awareness. This very proactive praxis brings forth the light within us and fills us with the light of the field of awareness. It is great to practice this vast practice. Of course it takes a boldness of intention and passion of heart. Extending the light of our innermost awareness into the present of those we love, and into the past of those we love, and then extending the light into their future of those we love is self-liberating. The light of awareness illuminates experience, metabolizes experience, opens us into un-bound awareness, undoes fixated-ness, and brings forth luminous intensity. The light of awareness is pure potentiality. The same practice can be used with those whom we hate or dislike or whom disgust us. This practice of extending the light of awareness deepens our own experience of becoming aware of awareness. As we practice extending the light of awareness, awareness itself completely opens up for us and deepens our experience in depth and breath. In time we begin to experience the true secret of this praxis. Timeless awareness begins to be experienced by us and sustained by us. Timeless awareness is the

It may seem odd that the relationship between Leo Strauss and Walter Benjamin has been almost entirely disregarded. Upon a closer look, however, this is little surprising, for the two figures do not even have a common readership. Benjamin, the icon of critical theory and proponent of a playful political radicalism, and Strauss, the vanguard of an untimely return to the classics of political philosophy, appeal to largely different segments of academic readers. The shared intellectual provenience from the German-Jewish world of the interwar period seems to create as little connection as the common fate of expulsion and exile. This article explores the non-dialogue between Strauss and Benjamin from their writings and corrspondences. It shows that Strauss and Benjamin had a fascination for each another from afar, but the philosophical templates of their thought were too different to allow for any significant point of convergence of their respective projects. The two figures of interwar German-Jewish thought represent two different ways of conceptualizing the dialectics of modernity and premodernity, two models of viewing society and culture from outside, and two different foundations for the understanding of the political in its relation to culture.

From Edward S. Casey, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Stony Brook University:
"This singular book puts a number of leading figures in philosophy into conversation with each other -- and with the author himself, who manages skillfully to create a true theatricum philosophicum in which complex ideas come alive and enter into intense dialogue. . . . Altared Ground is an extended meditation on the ground of ethics and (by implication and sometimes expressly) politics" (from "The Ethics of the Face to Face Encounter: Schroeder, Levinas, and the Glance," The Pluralist [Spring 2006]: 73-97).


From Kelly Oliver, W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University:
"Schroeder not only elaborates on the relationship between Levinas's thought and the writings of other philosophers, but also powerfully rereads the history of Western philosophy. Beautifully combining scholarship and creativity, Schroeder goes beyond Levinas's alternatives to traditional theories of the self to suggest a notion of subjectivity that is not grounded in violence. His analysis of intersubjective violence is sustained and intricate, and provides a significant contribution to Continental ethics."

The third chapter of Altared Ground: Levinas History, and Violence (Routledge, 1996), "HelioGround" focuses on Plato's "idea of the Good beyond being," which plays a pivotal role in determining Levinas’ understanding of the ethical transcendence of alterity. The radical exteriority of the Good and the One, vital for Levinas’ conception of the Infinite, is examined with an eye to  Gadamer’s interpretation of transcendence via the form of the beautiful. The tension between whether justice (Levinas) or beauty (Gadamer) as that which makes accessible the Good, underscores the movement of this chapter.

Recent years have seen a resurgence in work on Edith Stein’s theory of empathy (Jardine 2015; Moran 2004; Szanto 2015; Taipale 2015; Vendrell Ferran 2015; Zahavi 2010) and of community and collective intentionality (Burns 2015; Caminada 2015; Calcagno 2014). Notably absent, however, is an account of the relationship between empathy and community. This chapter begins the work of making this relationship explicit. This can be of at least two-fold service to future research. First, it will show the conceptual richness and complexity of Stein’s theory of empathy, demonstrating that it cannot be confined to the theory-of-mind debate between simulation theorists, theory-theorists, and advocates of a direct perception model. Second, it may also serve to orient future research into collective intentionality by elucidating her original theory of communal experience. After establishing Steinian accounts of empathy and communal experience, I argue that empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for community.

A prominent theme of Jacques Derrida's recent work has been that of responsibility. He has attempted to approach moral issues and philosophy without abandoning his philosophical project of deconstruction, a project that in the past has seemed critical if not outright hostile to moral philosophy.

Moral and philosophical reflection is situated, and by the time one can even start posing questions, one is already embroiled for better or for worse, in a moral situation for which one bears some responsibility, and which also involve a responsibility of reflection as well as action. Adopting a
confessedly conservative reading of Derrida, I argue that his recent philosophy does allow for the possibility of morality to be realized through philosophical and moral projects, and that the everpresent possibility of these lapsing into irresponsibility does not undermine the positive, though contingent and gratuitous, achievement of responsibility when it does take place.

The relation between the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions is "the great problem" of Western philosophy, according to Emmanuel Levinas. This volume addresses the relationship between Levinas and the world of ancient thought. In addition to philosophy, themes touching on religion, mythology, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and politics are also explored. The volume as a whole provides a unified and extended discussion of how an engagement between Levinas and thinkers from the ancient tradition works to enrich understandings of both. This book opens new pathways in ancient and modern philosophical studies as it illuminates new interpretations of Levinas' ethics and his social and political philosophy.

Edited version of published paper presented at 'Is Black and Red Dead?' Conference, Centre for the Study of Social and Global and Justice (CSSGJ) University of Nottingham, 7-8 September, 2009

https://socialhistoryportal.org/news/articles/110943

For much of my personal and professional life I have had an enduring interest in the distinction between mind and awareness. As my education unfolded over these many years, I have been happy to recognize that this distinction between mind and awareness is of serious consideration in continental phenomenology, in forms of psychoanalytic understanding such as the object relations work of Donald Winnicott, as well as in many forms of the experiential psychotherapies such as Gestalt, experiential focusing, in Ericksonian hypnosis, structural family therapy, archetypal psychotherapy, existential psychotherapy, existential psychoanalysis to name a few. When I began to extend my interest based on continental phenomenology into the eastern wisdom traditions, I found the same distinction within the Hindu Tantric tradition of Kashmir Shavism. Later in my life I found the same distinction within the Tibetan non-dual Nyingma tradition of Dzogchen. In my study of the Qi Gong tradition, I had the good fortune of being able to study for a number of years with Dr. Yan Xin who is a most remarkable healer and who has this same distinction of mind and awareness in his form of Daoist Qi Gong. From an historical view point, this distinction of mind and awareness was central in gnostic philosophy and gnostic theology. In contemporary Jungian archetypal psychology there is a similar distinction between the knowing of mind of ordinary life world of lived experience and the knowing of the archetypal dimension of lived experience, as well as the knowing of the primordial awareness dimension of pure potentiality. I have also had this interest in and through the phenomena of my own knowingness, the knowing of self, the knowing of others and of knowing of the encompassing nature of Existential Being. I have had for as long as I can remember, the sense of the explicit experience of my mind as explicit thoughts, and explicit feelings and explicit sensations and explicit imaginative imagery, and at the same time a subtle sense of tacit or implicate or implicit sense of intuitive knowing. In this way I have always felt I had two ways of knowing.