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Elections in Indonesia
Personality Cult and Majoritarian Conservatism
DIAS PABYANTARA, RADITYO DHARMAPUTRA
Vol. 54, Issue No. 36, 07 Sep, 2019
Dias Pabyantara (diaspabyantara@gmail.com) teaches international relations and gender
studies at the Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur. Radityo
Dharmaputra (radityo.dharmaputra@fisip.unair.ac.id) teaches international relations and
foreign policy analysis at the Universitas Airlangga.
The organisation of political discourse and the citizen’s imagination around the personality
cults of leaders and ascendant majoritarianism in Indonesia raises concerns about the
health of democracy.
The 2019 election has proven to be the most complicated election in the history of
Indonesia. Held on 17 April 2019, two contestants were competing for the presidency, and
more than 2,45,000 candidates were contesting for the 20,000 seats in both national and
local parliaments. Involving approximately 193 million registered voters spread out among
17,000 islands, and around 8,00,000 voting booths managed by more than 6 million election
workers, the five ballots were cast in a single day and then counted manually at each level
(from districts to cities, provinces, and the national level). Many argued that this was the
biggest direct election in the world, judging by the complicated process, the humongous
scale, and the logistical challenge (Bland 2019). Not to mention, by the end of the process,
more than 550 election workers, police officers, and the election watcher have died (Sitepu
2019).
After a long and complicated process, the General Elections Commission (KPU) announced
the final result on 21 May. Joko Widodo (Jokowi) won the second term of the presidency by a
10% margin (Tehusijarana et al 2019). As many had predicted, the result sparked a chain of
protests up in the Jakarta. People who rejected the decision swarmed around the Election
Watch Office (Bawaslu) and demanded them to change the official result. Riots broke in the
capital city of Jakarta on 21–22 May, with eight people killed, more than 700 protesters
injured, social media limitations, the arrest of around 400 people, including former military
officer and politicians, and the police’s claim that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
was behind the riots (Tehusijarana and Valentina 2019; Human Rights Watch 2019; South
China Morning Post 2019).
This Indonesian election is vital in several ways. Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority
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country in the world (almost 90% of the population identified themselves as Muslim,
according to the National Statistics Bureau). While gradually democratising since 1998
(after 32 years under authoritarian/military rule) and being portrayed (and promoted) as the
poster child of democracy and Islam going hand-in-hand, the recent global wave of populism
and the rise of the right-wing conservative groups proved to be a challenge to the fragile
democracy in Indonesia.
Context of the Election
Indonesia has a long-standing history of military and Islam being influential factors within a
democracy. Issues around these are articulated in every election that has been held in
Indonesia. The 2019 election was no exception. Both presidential contestants have been
adversaries since the 2014 election. Jokowi, who is the incumbent, has a track record as the
mayor of Solo and the governor of Jakarta. He also owns a company that focuses on the
furniture business. The challenger, Prabowo Subianto (Prabowo), a former special
forces/military general, is also the son-in-law of the leader of New Order, Suharto. His
career in the military was over after he was accused of human rights violations during the
1998 political conflict that brought down his father-in-law’s regime. In a sense, this was a
battle between a civilian against a military leader, highlighting the ongoing importance of
the military in Indonesian politics.
To complicate the situation further, Jokowi teamed up with Ma’ruf Amin, a prominent
Islamic cleric who is currently the chairman of Indonesia Islamic Cleric Organisation
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia). Jokowi–Ma’ruf are constructing their images as populist
technocrats, to use Mietzenr’s (2015) terminology, who are part of moderate Islamic
majority. That image was constantly maintained since the 2014 election. Instead of being a
nationalist–populist who appealed to the differences against the outsider, Jokowi was
portrayed as an ordinary citizen who could change the system by being inclusive. Along with
that, Ma’ruf Amin is symbolising an ordinary cleric who has no relationship with the ruling
family. Both were substantially creating a religious–technocrat image that became
mainstream among Indonesian voters.
The Jokowi–Ma’ruf coalition consisted of 10 political parties, which mostly have a
nationalistic point of view. Only two out of the 10 are Islamic parties. The fact that Ma’ruf
Amin was chosen seconds before declarations indicates that Jokowi coalition was eager to
obtain Islamic voters. Before declaring Ma’ruf Amin as the vice-presidential candidate, there
was a widespread rumour that Mahfud MD (a former chairman of Constitutional Court and
an Islamic scholar) would fill up the post. It turns out Ma’ruf Amin was chosen, despite his
more conservative views compared to Mahfud MD. This decision is another sign that Islam,
especially the more conservative faction, is gaining ground in Indonesian politics.
On the other hand, Prabowo chose to team up with Sandiaga Uno, a young billionaire who
became a symbol for a successful millennial leader. As an ex-military general, he built his
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character as an assertive, decisive and nationalistic persona, which is a normal populist
stance. In his campaign, he often emphasised ultranationalist economic rhetoric that would
be beneficial to the deprived while shutting the door for foreigners. Supported by his vicepresidential candidate who had an entrepreneurial background, this was his primary
campaign nationwide.
According to Arifianto (2019a), what made Prabowo a strong contender was that his
ultranationalistic view, to some extent, met the interest of the conservative-religious
section. Even though none of them have a strong religious background, they still managed
to gain conservative Islamic acceptance from the groups such as the Islamic Defenders
Front (FPI) and GNpF Ulama that later would become their core supporters. Finally,
Prabowo gained the support of many retired military generals. This cooperation was a
unique situation where the military and conservative Islamic groups joined nationalistpopulist rhetoric against Jokowi who was dubbed as a pro-Chinese, liberal/foreign agent,
and a threat to Indonesia and Islam.
Both groups dwell in the realm of intersection between nationalism and Islam. They have
proved that in the last two elections, Islam has become substantially crucial for political
purposes. This notion is what set up the election to be a sharply polarising one.
Populist–Personality Cult
Indonesian politics in the post-Suharto period has turned into a charisma-based exercise
rather than being focused on the development of the political party’s platform and
programmes (Fionna 2016). The two latest elections confirm this. Jokowi is praised for his
persona, as a down-to-earth ex-carpenter and a capable technocrat, and Prabowo for his
classic anti-foreign rhetoric and neo-authoritarian persona (Mietzner 2015). The two things
are repetitively articulated creating two bases of fanatical supporters, who cynically called
each other as cebong and kampret. Cebong is a term for the tadpole, while Kampret is a
cynical term for bat. The two camps have turned social media into a “holy war zone” to
determine who is going to be the national saviour for the next five years. Most political
elites aggravate this condition. They are no better than the ordinary people in social media
debates; attacking personality and family, amplifying the stigma, and not offering any policy
alternatives. For example, Jokowi was attacked in social media with an accusation of being a
member of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (Jakarta Post 2018). This rumour has
been denied repeatedly by him. Ma’ruf Amin was once rumoured to have been hospitalised,
and so not considered as suitable for the position due to his health condition (Tempo 2019).
On the contrary, both Prabowo and Sandiaga, whose names were in the Panama and
Paradise Papers, were attacked by questioning their morality as leaders (Hariyanto 2019).
Unsubstantiated accusations are an everyday occurrence in people’s social media timeline,
mainstream media reportage, and television broadcast.
The worst part of this personality cult is that for their supporters it is getting personal. The
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political dispute over social media is now penetrating their real lives. Idris, a Sampang
district resident, was shot in the chest after he made a comment confronting a Prabowo
supporter on Facebook (Retaduari 2019). Many couples, family and friends also fought over
who the ideal candidate is to lead Indonesia for the next five years (Putri 2019).
It is sad to watch how hegemonic polarisation between Jokowi and Prabowo has affected
ordinary citizens. It is not a new phenomenon, yet it gained its momentum back in 2014
when the first contest between the two began.
Since 2014, no one in Indonesia has been immune to hoax exposure. Most people have read
these hoaxes primarily through family/friends/workplace WhatsApp groups, or Twitter and
Facebook posts. Jokowi was once accused of being a fake Muslim, a member of the
communist party, and a Chinese descendant with no apparent evidence. Jokowi’s mother
has clarified this message as a hoax (Kami 2018). These types of hoaxes are being spread by
every section of society, including the political elite. Amien Rais, once a prominent reformist
figure and a professor, often made groundless accusations such as the 2019 election being
full of fraud without any further explanation or evidence (Taher 2019).
The rise of fake news, not only in Indonesia, has been a worrying development. Nonetheless,
the Indonesian government’s response by limiting access to social media could also be
considered as a way to suppress the freedom of speech. In doing so, Jokowi’s government is
actually propagating, albeit inadvertently, the narrative produced by his opponents: that he
is against Islam and the welfare of the Indonesian people.
Islamic Conservative Movement
One might trace the roots of sectarianism and racism well before the 2019 election, in the
2014 general election and the Jakarta gubernatorial election of 2017. The 2014 election was
notable for the rise of religious vigilantes like the FPI which rejected secular democracy and
stood up for what it called foundational return to Islam within Indonesian constitutions
(Wilson 2015). Along with the FPI, there was also an organisation called Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI), both close to Prabowo. Later, some political parties were interested in
teaming up with them. The only party to have kept its distance from both these groups is the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the one that supported Jokowi as the
presidential candidate (Wilson 2015).
The HTI and FPI were significant conservative Islamic movements that gained momentum
back in 2014 by playing up sectarian and racist issues. The two of them have a different
approach to democracy. The HTI condemned democracy as sinful and not in accordance
with Islamic values, while the FPI is manoeuvring the dynamics of Indonesia’s decentralised
electoral system for their own cause (Wilson 2015). The two of them were the main actors
back in 2014 in promoting sectarianism and racism in order to gather votes from
conservative Islamist voters.
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Although Jokowi won the 2014 election, the episode carried on to the next major election,
the Jakarta Gubernatorial election in 2017. The incumbent, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok)
and Anies Baswedan (Anies) were competing. Here, racism took over, in addition to blatant
sectarianism. Ahok is the first Chinese and Christian governor who has an image of an anticorruption technocrat, while Anies is a native of Jakarta who has a polite, educated persona.
Ahok was once Jokowi’s vice governor; on the contrary, Anies was removed from Jokowi’s
administration as minister of education. As a Chinese, Christian, and Jokowi’s supporter,
Ahok has faced multiple levels of discrimination in a Muslim-majority Indonesia. He was
once labelled as a kafir (infidel) by most Islamist conservative figures (BBC 2017). They then
rejected him as the governor on the ground of both his ethnicity and religion. In the end, he
was accused of blasphemy after wrongly citing a verse from the Quran during his campaign
and sentenced to two years in prison.
The year 2017 was when Islamist conservatives received all the spotlight. Two months after
Ahok wrongly cited the Quran in 2016, conservative Islamists gathered in Monas,
demanding him to be put on trial. It was known as the 212 movement. After that, they have
regularly assembled in Monas, and have claimed to be the voice of Islam in Indonesia. The
2019 election was no different. Prabowo is still teaming up with the conservative Islamic
groups and playing on sectarian and racist issues while giving the conservatives a stage to
present themselves to the public. As it was reported, the police have claimed that the postelection riot might have some connections to the radical terrorist group in Indonesia (South
China Morning Post 2019).
Conclusions
The first takeaway is the fact that Islam has returned to Indonesian politics. For better or
worse, the current and future President of Indonesia, the political elites, and all members of
society have to realise that it is unlikely that both the moderate and conservative factions of
Islamic movements in Indonesia will withdraw from the political arena. It is part of the
legacy of Yudhoyono’s era when he invited all those forces into his coalition government and
allowed conservative Islamic groups such as the FPI or parties such as the PKS to thrive.
However, even though conservative Islamic parties such as the PKS have gained more votes
(from 6.79% to 8.21%) and seats (an additional 10 seats from 40 to 50), the moderate and
traditional Islamic forces have helped Jokowi’s second victory. Jokowi’s huge victory in
Central and East Java (both are the bases of moderate Islamic movements such as Nadhlatul
Ulama and Muhammadiyah) helped him defeat Prabowo. The moderate Islamic and the
moderate nationalist parties supporting Jokowi also gained more seats in the parliament,
restraining the rise of conservative Islam in Indonesia.
However, this division between conservative and moderate Islam has divided and polarised
Indonesian Muslims and Indonesian people for the foreseeable future (Arifianto 2019b;
Wanto and Sebastian 2019; Sulaiman 2019). Instead of resolution after the election and a
return to normal daily life, people are still talking about politics in a polarised manner. On
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the one hand, it also drove people to the voting booth and raised the turnout to 82%. On the
other hand, as Arifianto (2019b) said, this polarisation might take at least a generation to be
resolved.
The other take is the decline of the political party system and the rise of personality cults in
Indonesian politics. People have been heavily focused on presidential politics while
overlooking the national and local parliamentary elections. The fact that Jokowi’s coalition
parties won almost 55% of the votes and almost 60% of the parliamentary seats is a
disquieting development. Adding to that, the current negotiation with other parties from the
Prabowo camp that could join Jokowi’s coalition can create a super majority (447 seats, 77%
from 575 seats). Meanwhile, people do not really care about the elected legislature that will
have a significant say on several regulations, such as the one regarding LGBT (lesbian gay,
bisexual, and transgender)rights, religious minority rights, or freedom of speech. By
focusing on the personality and forgetting about his policies, Jokowi’s policies on neglecting
minority rights or persecuting the political opposition will not be criticised, which could
hasten the backsliding of democracy in Indonesia.
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