Chapter 5: The Battle of Issus

The Battle Tactics of Alexander the Great Part II: The Main Battles Chapter 5: The Battle of Issus By Kathleen Toohey (The Battle of Issus Mosaic, Naples Archaeological Museum, 2018.) 80 MYRIANDROS Alexander was camped near Myriandros, south of the Pillars of Jonah, when he learnt Darius and the Persian army were behind him.1 Just where Myriandros was is still the subject of some debate.2) Arrian’s account of Alexander sending a ship back suggests it was on or near the coast. It was also clearly south of the Pillars of Jonah, though still close enough for him to march his army back to the top of the pass after the council of war. Arrian does not say how the news was passed to Alexander, but the warning clearly came with advice that Darius had taken Issus. According to both Arrian and Curtius Alexander had left his sick and wounded behind at Issus. When the Persians took the town they “tortured and killed” Alexander's invalids.3 Curtius elaborates on this with a gruesome tale of how the Persians cut the men’s hands off and then sent them chasing after Alexander. According to Curtius it was these men who brought word to Alexander that the Persians were behind him. This almost certainly never happened. Given the condition of the men, and the distance involved, there is no way they could have reached Alexander before Darius overtook them on their march.4 As I suggested in an earlier chapter, the news was probably brought to Alexander by scouts Parmenio had left behind to watch the Amanian Gates.5 If there is any truth at all to Curtius’ tale of the amputees, it is much more likely that it was one or more of Parmenio’s scout’s who encountered them and brought the news of what had happened at Issus back to Alexander. It is also possible Darius kept a number of prisoners alive, mutilated as described. And that he took those men with him as he advanced, to parade ahead of his army if battle looked imminent, as a warning to Alexander’s men of what could happen to them if they were captured. Both Arrian and Curtius tell us that Alexander sent scouts back by sea to confirm the report.6 This is also not without its problems, given the distances involved – a round trip of possibly 60kms or more.7 Casson has calculated an average speed of 4 – 6 knots (7.5 – 11kms per hour) under sail with favourable winds, but down to 2 – 2.5 knots against the wind. Ships under oar might be able to travel faster, but only for short distances.8 And these figures also take no account of the potential effects of the prevailing currents adverse or otherwise. Even allowing for optimal conditions with an average speed of 8kms per hour, to go all the way to Issus and back would probably have taken over seven hours. 1 Arrian. II. 6. 2, 7. 2. For modern views on the location of Myriandros, see Gates, Charles, “Kinet Höyük (Classical Issus): A Harbour Town in Southeast Cilicia during the Persian and Hellenistic Periods”, Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2015, pp. 95, 96 (map), and 103, n. 9. Hereafter cited as Gates, “Kinet Höyük”. And more recently, Olson, Brandon R. , From Issus to Rhosus: an assessment of settlement dynamics in the Hellenistic countryside. Boston University theses and Dissertations, Boston University, 2016, pp. 56 – 64, 151and 309. Hereafter cited as Olson, From Issus to Rhosus. 3 Arrian II. 7. 2. 4 Curtius III. viii. 15 – 16. Arrian makes no mention of the mutilation of Alexander’s men, and says that all the Macedonians left behind were killed. 5 Chapter 3, The Road to Issus – Parmenio’s Mission. 6 By sea, Arrian II. 7. 2. Curtius III. viii. 16, 18. 7 Depending on just where Myriandros was located. See below, and also the maps of Cilicia in the earlier chapters and the discussion on Relative Distances in Chapter 4. 8 Casson, Lionel, “Speed under Sail of Ancient Ships”, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 82 (1951), pp. 138 – 143, 146 – 147. 2 81 While we do not know how long it took to have the news confirmed, we do know Alexander was not hasty in his response. Arrian gives a detailed account of the steps he took to address the problem, starting with a council of war with all his officers.9 The speech included by Arrian with his account of the meeting, reads like a speech to rally the troops. So it is quite possible Alexander addressed the whole army after the council had ended.10 This possibility is supported by the fact that, according to Arrian, Alexander then “told his troops to take their meal”. He then sent some horsemen11 and archers back to the Gates to make sure the road was safe. 12 At nightfall he marched the whole army back to the Gates. The march took until midnight, and at the top of the Jonah Pass he rested the army for what remained of the night, “after carefully setting outposts”.13 The same careful approach we have seen in Alexander’s approach to the Cilician Gates.14 (All of this argues against Brunt’s suggestion that most of Alexander’s army had not reached Myriandros and were still on the northern side of the Pillars of Jonah when Alexander learnt that Darius was behind him and decided to turn back.15 Here, though, given the location, the reference to outposts cannot be limited to just outside the camp perimeter. It must include men sent down to the bottom of the pass to secure the exit to the plains below. And those men most likely will have included the same horsemen and archers previously sent ahead to secure the top of the pass. The presence of such scouts at the bottom of the pass is also affirmed by Curtius. His account of the march back is unclear on specific geographic details, with no reference to Gates or a pass or the narrow defile down which Alexander's army had to descend. Instead, he simply says that when “they came to the narrow place which they had decided to hold. Those who had been sent ahead16 reported that Darius was thirty stadia distant from there”.17 At dawn, Alexander led his army through the Gates. Arrian gives a detailed account of the Macedonian army’s descent onto the plains below. Because of the narrowness of the passage, the army had to descend “in column” through the “defile” – infantry first, and then the cavalry.18 What happened next has been the subject of controversy and debate since ancient times. THE MARCH BACK TO THE PINARUS According to Callisthenes,19 on exiting the Jonah pass and “issuing into the open country”, Alexander reformed his infantry into a phalanx line. He then marched his army in an extended 9 Arrian II. 7. 3. Arrian II. 7. 3 – 7. 11 Probably the same “light-armed Thracians” Alexander had sent ahead in the same role, together with a company of archers, at the Cilician Gates. See Chapter 3 above. 12 Arrian II. 8. 1. Curtius III. viii. 22. Curtius also has Alexander climb a nearby mountain to offer sacrifices to the local gods. This may be just a colourful elaboration by Curtius, though we have seen other instances of Alexander offering such sacrifices since the time of his illness. 13 Arrian II. 8. 2. 14 See the discussion in Chapter 3 above. 15 Brunt 1, Appendix III 3, p. 459. This suggestion was raised to support Brunt’s arguments for identifying the Pinarus with the Deli Chai. See Chapter 4, above. 16 Most likely the same companies of archers and Thracian cavalry. See n. 455 above. 17 Curtius III. viii. 23 – 24. 18 Arrian II. 8. 2 – 3. 19 As related by Polybius. 10 82 line over a distance “of about forty stades” to where the Persians were waiting for him. However, the idea that Alexander would have deployed his army in such a fashion, so soon after descending from the Gates was, to Polybius, both “absurd” and an “impossibility”, given the nature of the terrain given the obstacles in their path.20 According to Callisthenes, the land over which they would have to march was “thickly wooded” and repeatedly cleft by “torrents descending from the mountains”. Such obstacles, in Polybius’ view, would have left Alexander’s line “broken and disunited” in its march, with numerous gaps leaving it vulnerable to attack.21 And “Where”, Polybius demands, “could one find an extent of ground where a phalanx ... could advance for forty stades in a line twenty stades long?”22 The answer is nowhere. But this is only a problem if we accept Polybius’ interpretation that Alexander deployed his army into a sixteen deep line at the very foot of the pass, and advanced in that formation. While the quotes from Callisthenes may be accurate, there can still be misunderstanding and actual bias in his selection of the passages cited, and the interpretations he places on them. They come from part of a book that largely constitutes a diatribe by Polybius against earlier historians and Timaeus in particular. Considering this, some caution is needed in assessing their reliability. With regard to this problem, Arrian provides some useful corroboration and clarification. In his account at dawn, as noted above, Alexander’ army descended in column through the Gates with the infantry in the lead. As discussed above,23 according to Engels at its narrowest “no more than four infantry or two cavalry horses” could pass abreast through the defile at a time. Which was why Engels calculated it would have taken 7½ hours for Alexander’s whole army to march through the pass. But Arrian goes on to note that as the land began to open out onto the still narrow coastal plain, Alexander began to redeploy “his column continuously into a phalanx, bringing up battalion after battalion of hoplites24, on the right up to the ridge, and on the left up to the sea”.25 This is in general agreement with Polybius, but Arrian’s text adds the additional detail that the deployment was continuous as the plain widened. Arrian adds that the “cavalry had so far been ranged behind the infantry”, which suggests he would then describe how the cavalry deployed as the army “moved forward into open ground”. But instead, he gives a detailed account of how Alexander then deployed the infantry into a line of battle order, with no reference to the cavalry beyond noting that Parmenio was given command “of the entire left wing”. 20 Polybius XII. 20. 1 – 4. Polybius XII. 19. 5 – 6; 20. 4 – 8. 22 Polybius XII. 20. 2 – 3, 23 See above under The Pinarus River, Engels point 1. 24 Here used generically to refer to all of Alexander’s heavy infantry including the hypaspists and pezetairoi. My thanks to Dr Andrew Collins of the University of Queensland’s School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, for affirming this usage. Andrew also offered other examples of where the word is used in this way, specifically Arrian, Anab. I. 13. 1, I. 28. 6 – 7; VI. 18. 3. 25 Arrian II. 8. 2. 21 83 Now remember that Engels had calculated it would take 7½ hours for the whole army to march through the pass. And somewhere not far ahead the Persians were waiting, if not already advancing to meet the Macedonian army. Alexander could not afford to have his first units march out to a suitably wide place and wait for the rest of the army to catch up. Instead, I would suggest that as the first company of infantry emerged from the defile, they continued to advance while they each reformed as soon as possible into a thirty-two deep column. Then, as the land widened to accommodate more than one column of that size they continued to advance at a slower, probably half, pace, while at the same time stepping to the right to allow room for the company coming after them to take their place beside them as they continued their slow advance. And this would have continued, unit after unit, until the full front line of infantry was deployed. Figure 5: Alexander’s Initial Infantry Redeployment Model Figure 5, above, is offered as one possible example of how this continuous deployment of the infantry might have been undertaken. Such a deployment is consistent with both Arrian’s account. And it is also consistent with the Polybius/Callisthenes’ claim that, when they reached open ground Alexander, first “reformed his order” into a thirty-two deep phalanx.26 And that he then led the army forward in an extended line,27 if we accept that this was a line of columns marching side by side with gaps between them sufficient to allow them to negotiate any obstacles in their path. Remember, the Pinarus would have been about eleven kilometres from the base of the pass. No army could march such a distance in an extended line. Polybius was right on that. But the march could be done with relative ease in a line of parallel columns. Over that distance, there would have been ample time for the bulk of the army to catch up while the leading columns advanced at half pace. As the plain widened, and the final units of the front line of infantry caught up, the gaps between the companies will also have widened. This would have given them the space to redeploy first into sixteen ranks deep, “and finally as he approached the enemy to eight deep”, as Polybius describes.29 It is at that point, and only then, that the heavy infantry will have redeployed into a continuous battle line, filling the gaps between their units as they did. 28 26 Polybius XII. 19. 6. Polybius XII. 20. 1. 28 See Chapter 4, The Pinarus – Relative Distances, above. 29 Polybius XII. 19. 6. 27 84 Throughout the march, the infantry will again almost certainly have been screened by an advance guard of Thracian cavalry and archers scouting ahead. Throughout, the gaps will have given them space to redeploy into battleline should word come back that the Persians were approaching. While the cavalry deploying behind them could also use the gaps to pass between them should they come under any Persian cavalry attack. In short, the march of Alexander’s army to the Pinarus as described should be seen not as an act of folly that would have left his troops in continual disarray. Rather, it should be seen as a progressive advance carefully planned to address both the delays caused by having to bring the army down through such a narrow pass, and the continued risk that the Persian army was advancing to meet them. As it happened, Darius had halted his advance at the Pinarus, and it was there that he deployed his army for battle. THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD The current course of the river, at least in the 1970’s and ’80’s has already been discussed at length in the previous chapter.30 The river is narrow with banks that are generally much steeper than the Granicus. According to Devine, from the mouth to about 500m upstream the river banks are low enough for a cavalry crossing to be possible but difficult because of the steepness of higher sections of the banks. For the next kilometer, the river banks are too steep for cavalry, although he thought “an infantry crossing was practicable”. After that, he considered the terrain impassable for either infantry or cavalry apart from a narrow ford about 3.5 km from the river mouth.31 One point that Devine fails to dwell on beyond one brief comment,32 is the meandering nature of its course. This can be seen clearly in both Devine’s map of the battle33 and in an examination of the current river course as seen on Google Earth (See photo below). Now, these meanderings are significant. As Hammond notes, for much of its central course “the river enters a channel, cut long ago through the conglomerate rock”.34 On this Devine concurs, although he limits the stretch of conglomerate rock to a mere 300 meters.35 Despite this, given the overall rocky nature of the landscape through which river flows, it is clear that both agree that much of river course will have changed little since Alexander’s day. It is only in the last kilometer as it nears the sea that the land drops away to a more malleable plain. 30 See Chapter 4, The Pinarus – Topology, above. Devine, “Grand Tactics”, pp. 45 – 46. Devine Thesis, pp. 149 – 150. 32 “while its windings permit its course to be accurately described as ἐπιχάρσιος”, Devine, “Grand Tactics”, p. 45. 33 Devine, “Grand Tactics”, p. 58. 34 Hammond, N. G. L., The Genius of Alexander the Great, London, Duckworth, 1997, p. 89. (Hereafter cited as Hammond, Genius of Alexander.) Hammond locates this section of the river between the first and second bridges on his map, p. 88. Looking at the map the first bridge roughly corresponds with the ford identified by Devine, while the second is located about a kilometre from the mouth of the river. This is the point where the river moves away from its rock bound course onto a gravel and sand terrain where the banks are low. Hammond here also makes no comment on the meandering nature of the water course. 35 Devine, “Grand Tactics”, p. 45. 31 85 If you look at the map below you can see that there is a distinct bulge north in the river course just to the west of the ford that only gradually winds back to the final roughly straight flow to the sea. It would have been the same in Alexander’s day. The traditional view of ancient set battles is to have the opposing armies in straight lines of troops facing each other, with in some cases one end or other of the line angled obliquely to cover a possible side attack. That is how the armies are presented in all the ancient accounts of this battle. This means that advancing in line Alexander’s left flank would have been in contact with enemy facing them well before the bulk of his army came in range of their opponents. This is an important factor to bear in mind in any consideration of this battle. Figure 6: The Pinarus River36 36 The map is based on Devine’s map cited above, with some amendments, including a rough approximation of the ridge where Darius stationed some of his men, and marking the river by two parallel lines to include both the water course and the wash to either side. A comparison of this map to the satellite photo shows that the western end of the river now dips south before swinging back in two gentle arcs to the sea. This may be due to a fault in Devine’s map, or to changes in the river course – natural or man-made – since Devine drew his map. Either way, the map is included as a rough guide only. 86 Figure 7: Payas River on Google Earth 1 June 2019 POLYBIUS According to Callisthenes, at the Pinarus river “the distance from the sea to the foot of the hills is not more than fourteen stades” – 2.59 km on Devine’s estimation.37 “The river runs obliquely across this space with gaps in its banks just where it issues from the mountains”, though on its “course through the plain” it passes “between steep hills difficult to climb”.38 In addition, at the end of his excursus on Callisthenes, Polybius cites one further detail from Callisthenes’ description of the terrain, describing the bank of the river, at least on the Persian side, as being “steep and overgrown with brambles”. This last added in a further rhetorical demand to know just how “a phalanx of heavy-armed men” could “manage to mount” such a bank.39 PLUTARCH Plutarch’s account is brief and full of colourful, uncorroborated anecdotes and gross simplifications. But he does corroborate the following key events: That the river Pinarus ran through the site of the battle, with the sea on one side, and mountains on the other, and “broken up in many parts”; (Alex. xx. 3) That Alexander led the attack of his right wing, past the Persian’s left to outflank and rout the barbarians; (Alex. xx. 4) That Alexander was wounded in the thigh in the fighting; (Alex. xx. 4 – 5) 37 Polybius XII. 17. 4. Devine, “Grand Tactics”, p. 43. Polybius XII. 17. 4 – 6. 39 Polybius XII. 22. 3 – 4. 38 87 And that Darius, himself; escaped (Alex. xx. 5 – 6). ARRIAN That across the river on Alexander’s right was a ridge that the Darius had some troops occupy. This ridge “was deeply indented in one part and formed something like a bay as in the sea”. The ridge then bent “outwards again ... on the foothills” to leave the men based there behind the line of Alexander’s army as it advanced.40 The river is described as “in many places precipitous”, though it remained accessible enough in other sections to prompt Darius to build “a stockade” to block access at those points.41 The precipitous parts referred to include that section of the battle lines where the Greek mercenaries on the Persian side faced the Macedonian phalanx. And here, as shall be seen, the effect of that terrain was to break the line of the phalanx as it crossed the river and attempted to climb the opposite bank.42 But to the right of the line, Alexander did find a place to plunge through and cross the river.43 And this must presumably have been at the ford identified by Devine, since from the centre to the right flank this appears from the account to have been the only point where the river was crossable with relative ease. CURTIUS Curtius also refers to both the river and the ridge held by Darius troops,44 but offers no description of the terrain or the impact of the terrain on the course of the battle. Neither Diodorus or Justin offer any description of the terrain, and as previously noted, both fail to make any reference to the river. As a result, Diodorus’ account in particular reads as though the battle was fought across an open plain.45 THE PERSIAN DEPLOYMENT Here it is important to distinguish between the troops Darius assembled and paraded outside Babylon, and those actually present at the battle. Of the former, Curtius gives two lists. The first is an assemblage on “the plains of Mesopotamia ... an all but innumerable mass of cavalry and foot” in which many different army units are detailed.46 The second is a description of Darius’ march out of Babylon, which was led by “silver altars” that carried the sacred and eternal fire, chanting Magi, other show pieces, 10,000 “Immortals”, various other military units, the king’s mother, “a herd of eunuchs” and “365 concubines”.47 The latter was clearly a public display of wealth and power to reassure the onlookers in Babylon. Much of what was on show will have been left behind when the army marched to war. And while some of the units named by Curtius may have been posted behind the Persian front line at Issus, the two lists cannot be used as evidence of the size and composition of the 40 Arrian II. 8. 7, 9. 2, 4. Arrian II. 10. 1. 42 Arrian II. 10. 4 – 6. 43 Arrian II. 10. 5. 44 Curtius III. 8. 26, 27: 9. 10. 45 Diodorus XVII. 33 – 34. 46 Curtius III. 2. 3 – 10. 47 Curtius III. 3. 8 – 25. 41 88 army at that battle. A significant part of the army, including the “Immortals”,48 must have been held back in reserve either at Babylon or Sochi, or both. We know this because of the size of the army Darius was able to assemble at Gaugamela after his defeat at Issus. According to Arrian, Darius advanced to the river Pinarus the day after he had taken Issus 10kms to the south.49 Now, as Engels has noted, “standard march speed for infantry” is 3 miles/4.8kms per hour over open terrain, and 2.5 miles/4kms per hour over difficult terrain.50 This means that it would have taken from two to four hours for the Persian army to reach the Pinarus, depending on the difficulties of the route. And, as Engels makes clear, that only applies to the leading units of the army. Depending on the size of the army, several hours more must then be allowed for the rest of the army to catch up, once the lead ranks have halted.51 Just when the Persian army left Issus is not stated. It is reasonable to assume, however, that scouts were sent out in advance of the army who sent word back to Darius that the Macedonian army were marching down the Jonah Pass, and had started to assemble and advance on the plain below. Whatever its actual size – an issue to be considered shortly - the Persian army was large and cumbersome. Given the subsequent course of events, it is reasonable to conclude that, on receiving that news, Darius decided to stop his advance and assemble his army for battle at the Pinarus. Callisthenes, via Polybius has presented the simplest version of the Persian battle front. From shore to mountains, the Persian line runs as follows, 30,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry (Greek Mercenaries), and from there on, peltasts.52 Figure 8: The Persian deployment according to Callisthenes via Polybius Arrian gives us some more details. As already discussed, Alexander began to deploy the phalanx into battle formation on the march to the Pinarus.53 When Darius heard of Alexander’s approach, he sent a body of 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 light infantry across the river to screen his own deployment along the north side of the river bank.54 The core of the Persian battle line, in Arrian’s account, consisted of a force of 30,000 Greek mercenary hoplites, flanked on either side by units of Cardaces (Persian heavy infantry)55 48 Personally, I am satisfied that the Immortals were not present at Issus, given their absence from any accounts of the battlelines at Issus, or the battle itself, For counter arguments, see Charles, Michael B, “The Persian Καρδακεσ”, J.H.S. 132 (2012) pp. 10 – 13. 49 Arrian II. 7. 1, and Chapter 4 above, Relative Distances. 50 Engels Logistics, pp. 132, n. 40, 154. 51 For a full discussion of these issues, see Engels Logistics, pp. 154 – 156. 52 Polybius XII. 17. 7 – 18. 2. 53 Arrian II. 8. 2 – 5. 54 Arrian II. 8. 5. The question of numbers will be left aside for the present. 55 In this I am essentially following Xenophon’s description of the adult Cardaces who, at the end of years of training, were armed for close combat – cuirass, shield and sword or curved blade, but no spear. Xenophon Cyropaedia I. 2. 13. For a full discussion of the vexed debate over what kind of troops the Cardaces were see 89 together totalling 60,000 men.56 Behind these were massed a body of light and heavy troops that were rendered useless by the very way in which they were deployed.57 20,000 men are also reported to have been posted on a ridge (across the river) against Alexander’s right.58 These are almost certainly to be identified with the 20,000 light infantry in the advance force. No mention is made of them when Arrian’s later reports on Darius’ recall of the cavalry, most of whom were station stationed on the right wing. (Some were sent to the left wing, but most were recalled for lack of space).59 Curtius also recorded that 20,000 men had been sent across the river to “oppose” Alexander and, if unsuccessful, or unable, they were then to retire to the mountains and try to place themselves behind the enemy.60 “Darius himself held the centre of the whole host, the customary position for Persian kings”.61 Probably, we should take it from this that when Darius recalled the cavalry, the infantry with them were told to move instead to the mountains on their flank, in the hope that they would at some time have the opportunity to attack either Alexander’s flank or rear. And even if they were not able to do that, their position would require Alexander to dispatch some of his army to watch them. In this way the forces available to him for his attack would be reduced. Finally, it must be noted that when Alexander launched his attack at the ford he came under fire from archers, suggesting that they had a place at the front of the Persian left wing as well.62 Charles, “The Persian Καρδακεσ”, pp. 7 – 21, and in particular pp. 10 – 14. Charles describes the shield as a “wicker shield” (p. 10), while the reference to wearing a cuirass should not be taken as meaning they wore any form of metal armour. Rather, their cuirass was most probably either hardened or padded linen. (Head, Duncan, The Archaemenid Persian Army, Stockport, Montvert Publications, 1992, p. 27.) Charles also concedes that they need not have been heavily armoured, p. 14. 56 Arrian II. 8. 6. 57 Arrian II. 8. 8. 58 Arrian II. 8. 7. 59 Arrian II. 8. 10 – 11. 60 Curtius III .viii. 28. 61 Arrian II. 8. 11. 62 Arrian II. 10. 3. 90 Figure 9: The Persian deployment according to Arrian Curtius’ account provides more specific details about Darius’ dispositions, but it disagrees with Arrian’s on a number of points. He places cavalry on the right wing, and next to these, 20,000 slingers and archers. Then came the 30,000 Greek mercenaries. On the left wing (in laevo cornu), were 20,000 ‘barbarian’ infantry. Next to them, was Darius himself, with 3,000 elite cavalry. Then, 40,000 infantry, and next to them, were placed the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry. Now the wording here is, I believe, misleading, since we would normally read the deployment of the left wing from left to right, i.e. back to the centre. But that would place Darius on the left side of the army, second in from the ‘barbarian infantry’. This is inconsistent with his role as overall commander, and contrary to Arrian’s claim that Darius was in the very centre of the army. However, Curtius did not divide the Persians into right wing, centre, and left wing, but only right and left, subsuming the centre into the two flanks. Taking that into account, and the fact that Darius rightly belongs in the centre,63 I would argue that the unit placements for each wing should be read from right to left. This would put the ‘barbarian infantry’ just to the left of the Greek mercenaries, then Darius and his elite cavalry, followed by the 40,000 infantry and then the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry. (See diagram below.) Next to these, Curtius were the troops “of the remaining nations, projecting beyond them on the right and on the left”.64 This is quite misleading and confused, and must refer to the massed a body of light and heavy troops Arrian describes as deployed in a useless fashion behind the front line. Finally, Curtius tells us that the army was preceded by 6,000 javelins and slingers.65 Their significance will be addressed in the discussion of the actual battle. 63 A point also affirmed by Callisthenes through Polybius XII. 18. 9. Curtius. III. ix. 1 – 5. 65 Curtius. III. ix. 1 – 5. 64 91 Figure 10: The Persian deployment according to Curtius The conflict that we find in these accounts mean that the Persian battle line can only be very roughly sketched. But when examined carefully there are number of points of concurrence. The right wing was held by a large body of cavalry – up to 30,000 men (Polybius and Arrian). Arrian, Curtius and Callisthenes all agree that there were also 30,000 Greek mercenary hoplites near the centre.66 Most modern scholars shy away from this figure,67 but from references in our sources at least 10,000 seem to have survived the battle.68. So the number of mercenary hoplites was clearly greater than 10,000, and quite possibly, much greater. The 60,000 Cardaces mentioned in Arrian matches the 20,000 ‘barbarian’ plus 40,000 unspecified infantry included in Curtius.69 He may have been unsure how best to translate Cardaces into Latin, which is why he left his designation of them vague. They are clearly the same men, and there is only a minor difference regarding their placement. Arrian placed them either side of the mercenaries, while Curtius placed them next to the mercenaries to either side of Darius. Darius was in the centre, defended by his own elite cavalry.70 Curtius’ placement of the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry is also compatible with Arrian’s statement that when they cavalry sent across the river were recalled, some were sent to the left wing, but most of these were recalled because of lack of space. Both Arrian and Curtius also agree that there were Persian troops left in the hills or ridge on Alexander’s right in the hope of possibly turning his line. These may well be the slingers and archers Curtius placed next to the cavalry, accidentally including them with the cavalry when the advance guard was pulled back across the river. That would mean there was a double up 66 Arrian II. 8. 6. Curtius III. ix. 2. Polybius XII. 18. 2. Delbruck, History of the Art of War. Vol. I. p. 191. Devine Thesis, pp. 156 – 157. Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, p.155. Tarn 1, p. 26. 68 Calculated variously by Hamilton, J.R., Alexander the Great. London, Hutchinson, 1973, p. 69. Fuller, Generalship of Alexander. Tarn 1, p. 26. 69 By chance I had only recently come to that position, when I discovered that Michael Charles had much earlier came to the same conclusion, when I was searching for more information on Cardaces. Charles, Michael B, “The Persian Καρδακεσ”, pp. 13 – 14. 70 Devine in his thesis thought that Darius’ position was unclear; Devine Thesis, p. 159; but I consider that issue now resolved. 67 92 between them and the men sent to the hills to the east in Curtius’ account. Certainly, the numbers (20,000) match. This leaves only the 6,000 slingers and javelin men that Curtius placed in advance of the Persian line, who Arrian could have easily overlooked. They were probably placed along that one kilometre plus stretch of the river where Devine describes the banks as being steep but traversable for infantry, but not cavalry. (See Topology, Chapter 4 above.) This will have been where Darius, as Arrian reports, also erected stockades in those parts which were not precipitous.71 These light troops will have played an important role in the early stages of the battle, as shall be discussed in due course. Finally, in determining the composition of the Persian battlelines, we also have some help from the names of the Persian unit commanders mentioned by Arrian and Curtius, especially in the lists of those who died in the battle.72 Significantly, these include three survivors of the battle of the Granicus River, Arsames, Atizyes and Rheomithres.73 GRANICUS COMMANDERS ARSAMES Arsames is included in Arrian’s list of commanders present at the Persian council of war at Zelia prior to the Granicus battle.74 Arrian does not provide any details of the Persian battlelines at the Granicus, and makes no further mention of Arsames in his account of the battle. Also, in this brief mention, unlike others, Arsames rank is not specified. He is not identified as the satrap of Cilicia or any other province. For Arsames’ place in the Granicus battle, we have to rely on Diodorus. For all his faults,75 Diodorus does provide some details of the Persian battle line. Arsames,76 is a satrap located, together with Memnon of Rhodes – each commanding their own cavalry – on the left of the Persian line, opposite Alexander’s Companion cavalry.77 This placement is affirmed by Arrian who also located Memnon there together with “the flower of the Persian cavalry”.78 After the battle, Arsames, with the survivors of his own cavalry contingent, made his way back to his province of Cilicia, which is where we find him about a year later. But, as argued above,79 prior to Alexander’s entry, Arsames abandoned the province taking much of the 71 Arrian II. 10. 1. Arrian II. 11. 8. Curtius III. 11. 10. Rheomithres is also named as one of the casualties by Diodorus, XII. 19. 4, though the other two slain commanders named, Antixyes and Tasiaces, do not correlate, unless Antixyes can be correlated with Atizyes as Bradford Welles suggests in a note to his translation, Diodorus VIII, p. 213, n. 2. 73 The other commanders named by Arrian (I. 12. 8) before the battle – Petenes, Niphates and Spithridates – all died at the Granicus. Arrian I. 16. 3. Also included among the Persian dead were Mithrobuzanes, the Cappadocian Hipparch, Darius’ son-in-law Mithridates, Arbupales, Pharnaces and Omares, a commander of the mercenaries. 74 Arrian I. 12. 8. 75 See, for example, his placement the battle on the Persian side of the river on an open plain battle, rather than presenting it as fought across the river – Chapter 2, above. 76 Arsamenes as Diodorus names him. 77 Diodorus XVII. 19. 4. 78 Arrian I. 15. 2. If Diodorus’ list is accurate, the Persian cavalry referred to would have also included Paphlagonian horsemen under Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and the Hyrcanian cavalry under Spithrobates , satrap of Ionian. 79 See Chapter 3, above. 72 93 satrapy’s garrison, including a reinforced cavalry contingent, with him. This was most probably done on Darius’ orders, to rendezvous with the rest of the gathering Persian army at Sochi. Cilicia, it should also be noted, had been paying tribute in horses and silver to Persia since the time of Darius I. At that time, the annual tribute was 360 white horses and 500 talents of silver, with 140 talents spent “on the horsemen who were the guard of Cilicia”.80 It is reasonable to conclude that Cilicia continued to be garrisoned by cavalry at the time of Alexander, which was why they were able to quickly withdraw in advance of his approach. ATIZYES Atizyes is named as satrap of Phrygia in Arrian’s account of the exposure of the alleged assassination plot against Alexander III of Lyncestes Alexander, at the behest of Darius. The reference to Atizyes is incidental to the tale, as he is named only in the claimed cover story for the captured Persian agent, Sisines; i.e. Sisines is said to have claimed he was on his way to visit Atizyes, when he was actually, according to the story, going to meet Lyncestes Alexander.81 Atizyes was the satrap of greater Phrygia – a separate province to Hellespontine Phrygia. Greater Phrygia also included Paphlagonia.82 Like Arsames, he had fought at the Granicus, presumably leading his own Phrygian cavalry. Unfortunately, we do not know where they were located in the Persian cavalry line, as Diodorus made no mention of them or their commander in his account. Arrian does the same, and also did not include Atizyes in his list of those present at the council of Zelia, though it is almost certain he would have been there.83 And like Arsames, after the Granicus Atizyes will have retreated first to his own province. Then later, as Alexander advanced into his territory, he will have abandoned the province taking much of the satrapy’s garrison, including a reinforced cavalry contingent, with him.84 This was most probably done on Darius’ orders, to rendezvous with the rest of the gathering Persian army at Sochi. Neither Atizyes or Arsames could have been expected to hold onto their provinces either alone or together in the face of Alexander's army. For that, a much larger, stronger force would be needed. RHEOMITHRES The third of the Persian commanders at the Granicus to die in the battle of Issus was Rheomithres. As Heckel notes, he was a Persian noble whose name meant “to whom Mithra is friendly”.85 Like Arsames, Rheomithres was included in Arrian’s list of commanders present at Zelia, but he is not identified as a satrap either there or in Arrian’s list of Persian casualties at Issus.86 There is also no title mentioned by either Curtius or Diodorus, though Diodorus does tell us that he commanded 2,000 cavalry at the Granicus,87 a figure consistent with the unit sizes for other Persian cavalry, as discussed in Chapter 1, above. There, Diodorus places his companies 80 Herodotus III. 90. At that time Cilicia paid an annual tribute of Arrian I. 25. 3. 82 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 61. 83 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 61. 84 Though in this case we do know he left “a garrison of 1,000 Carians and 100 Greek mercenaries” behind in the Phrygian citadel of Celaenae. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 61. Arrian I. 29. 1. Curtius III. 1. 1, 6 – 8. 85 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 241. 86 Arrian II. 11. 8. 87 See Curtius’ list of casualties at Issus, III. 9. 10, and Diodorus XVII. 19. 4, 34. 5. 81 94 on the right wing between the Medes and the Bactrians. If this is correct, and taking account of his name, it suggests that Rheomithres and his troops may well have come from the very centre of the empire, specially sent along with the Medes and the Bactrians to support the Anatolian provinces. Indeed, as the only named commander on the right flank, Rheomithres may have had overall command of all three units. Such an important command could also help to explain why, after the death of Darius, Alexander decided to appoint Rheomithres’ son, Phrasaortes, satrap of Persia.88 Indeed, the appointment would make more sense if Phrasaortes’ father had held the title before him, though on the available evidence, this can only be speculation. Since, at the Granicus, it was the Persian left wing that broke and turned first, Rheomithres and his command probably withdrew and retreated east largely unscathed, once it was clear the battle was lost. OTHER KNOWN COMMANDERS SATACES Sataces was satrap of Egypt, and died at the battle leading an ‘Egyptian’ contingent.89 His death at Issus is affirmed in three of our sources; Arrian, Curtius and Diodorus.90 None of these accounts gives any details about Sataces place in the Persian lines, or details of the troops under his command. The second reference to Sataces in Curtius, is found in his version of the tale of how Amyntas, see below, attempted to seize control of Egypt for himself, after the battle of Issus. There Amyntas, in a speech to his own men, describes the Persian garrison in Egypt as both “leaderless and weak", while the Egyptians are said to be “always at odds with their governor”.91 Such speeches are a regular literary device in Curtius’ prose, so the comments must be approached with caution. That said, it is probably correct in its differentiation between the Persian garrison and the Egyptian people. These Curtius later describes as “a fickle race", doubtless reflecting the biased views of his own times.92 But it is reasonable to conclude that at that time the Egyptians still resented the yoke of the Persian rule, and were not an integrated part of the Persian empire, as other regions were. From Curtius it appears Amyntas sought to exploit this division to his own advantage.93 From this, it is reasonable to conclude that the contingent Sataces took with him to Issus, were a sizeable part of the Persian garrison in Egypt, although just where they were originally drawn from is difficult to say. Those left behind were neither leaderless nor entirely powerless, because under the leadership of Sataces’ deputy, Mazaces, they did eventually defeat Amyntas and his men. But Sataces departure, together with Amyntas incursion, had taken its toll. So Alexander entered Egypt, Mazaces swiftly surrendered the province.94 88 Arrian III. 18. 11. “Sauaces". Heckel, Prosopography, p. 246. 90 Arrian II. 11. 8. Curtius III. 11. 10; IV. 1. 28. Diodorus XVII. 34. 5. 91 Curtius III. IV. 1. 28. 92 Curtius III. IV. 1. 30. 93 Curtius III. IV. 1. 30 – 33. 94 Arrian presents Mazaces as having to face Alexander “without any Persian force". Arrian III. 1. 2. This is clearly an exaggeration. But it is doubtful Darius would, or could, have sent any reinforcements to Egypt after the 89 95 Sataces was probably among the satraps summoned by Darius to the assembly at Babylon, although he and his men could also, given the distances and time constraints, have been redirected to Sochi en route. NARBARZENES With regard to the battle of Issus, Narbarzanes is mentioned only once, in Curtius’ account of the Persian army’s deployment. There he is said to command the cavalry on the right wing,95 which implies he had overall command of that cavalry, which would have included several different units. (Earlier, Curtius had used the word praetor (of Darius) to designate his rank in Roman terms.96 Rolfe translates this as general, but its use here suggests a subordinate position – a section commander rather than a full army commander in keeping with his place under Darius.) There is no suggestion he was a satrap at this time. Whether Narbarzanes command also included the slingers and archers posted with them, as Heckel suggests,97 is unclear from the text. Thymondas and the 30,000 Greek mercenaries, are said to be on the same side, in eodem.98 They would almost certainly not have been under Narbarzanes’ command. We know Narbarzanes survived the battle of Issus, because he is later to be named as chiliarch of the royal cavalry accompanying Darius after his defeat at Gaugamela. But he is mentioned here only in the context of being one of three commanders who arrested and imprisoned Darius after his defeat at Gaugamela.99 BUBACES An otherwise unknown Persian nobleman. In his list of the Persians killed at Issus, Arrian takes care to distinguish Bubaces from the others he names – Arsames, Rheomithres, Atizyes and Savaces – who were all satraps. Bubaces is just named as one among various Persian nobles killed.100 But the fact that he was the only one named suggests he was prominent among them, and a man of some rank. From what we know of the Persian battle lines, it is reasonable to conclude that Bubaces probably served in the 3,000 elite cavalry Curtius placed with Darius in his account.101 And further to that, he probably commanded at least a company of that cavalry, if not the entire Imperial bodyguard. In which case, he probably died defending Darius from Alexander’s attack. OXATHRES Oxathres was the brother of Darius III, and played a prominent role in the battle of Issus. When directed his attack directly at Darius, Oxathres rushed to lead his own company to battle of Issus. And without them Mazaces would have had insufficient men to both maintain order and defend Egypt from the advancing Macedonian army. 95 Curtius III. 9. 1. 96 Curtius III. 7. 12. 97 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 171. 98 Curtius III. 9. 2. 99 Bessus and Barsaentes were the other two, both satraps. Arrian III. 21.1, and later III. 23.4. See Heckel, Prosopography, p. 171 for more full details of his subsequent career. 100 Arrian II. 11. 8. 101 Curtius III. 9. 4. 96 intercept the Macedonians.102 His actions, and ability to intervene so quickly, argues that Oxathres commanded the elite Persian cavalry in which Bubaces fought, and probably led the first of those companies. Unlike Bubaces, and despite the intensity of the fighting as described by Curtius and Diodorus, Oxathres survived the battle, most likely leading a rearguard action in defence of Darius in the emperor’s flight.103 AMYNTAS We know that Amyntas, son of Antiochus,104 ‘fought’ on the Persian side at the battle of Issus, only from a much later story in Diodorus about Amyntas’ failed attempt to seize control of Egypt after the battle.105 There is no mention of his name or what, if any, role he played in the battle in any of the surviving accounts of the fighting. And considering his history it is quite likely he and his men fled the battle as it became clear the battle was lost; if not before. Amyntas was a Macedonian who fled Macedon shortly after Alexander came to the throne.106 At the time he may have been in his late twenties or very early thirties.107 The reason for his flight is unclear. Curtius claimed “he had been one of Alexander’s generals” before his defection. There is no corroboration of this, though he may have served as an officer under Philip II.108 With regard to Issus, what matters is that it appears he first took refuge with the Persians at Ephesus. But when news of Alexander’s victory at the Granicus reached Ephesus Amyntas fled with the mercenary garrison of the city in two triremes.109 From there, he and his men appear to have made their way to Sochi where they joined the other Greek mercenaries in Darius’ army under the command of Memnon’s nephew, Thymondas.110 When the battle turned, Amyntas and other mercenary commanders, including Thymondas, fled the battlefield and made their way first down to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and from there to Cyprus. It was from there that he launched his failed attempt to conquer Egypt as described above, taking 4,000 or more troops with him.111 102 Curtius III. 11. 8 – 9. Diodorus XVII. 34. 2 – 3. Heckel, Prosopography, ‘Oxyathres’ p. 188. 104 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 23 – 24. 105 Diodorus XVII. 48. 2 – 5. 106 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 23 – 24. Ellis, J. R., “Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great”, JHS Vol. 91 (1971) p. 18. Afterwards cited as Ellis “Amyntas Perdikka”. 107 That is if he and Amyntas Perdiccas were of a comparable age when they were granted Oropian Proxeny. For discussion of the inscriptions from roughly the same time recording the grants, see Ellis “Amyntas Perdikka” pp. 17 – 18. Amyntas Perdiccas was born around 365 and was dead by 335, Heckel, Prosopography, p. 23. 108 Arrian is vague on this. According to his account he fled “to avoid Alexander ... (because) he was disaffected and did not think he deserved to suffer harm at (Alexander’s) hands”. But Arrian is also careful to stress that Amyntas “had not actually suffered at Alexander’s hands”. Arrian I. 17. 9. See also Plutarch Alexander 20. 1; Diodorus XVII. 48. 2; Curtius III. 11. 18. Amyntas probably fled in the turbulent days following Philip’s assassination. During that time Alexander eliminated a number of perceived threats to his claim to the throne, through the execution of the two Lyncestian brothers and the murders of Amyntas Perdiccas and Attalus. (Brunt 1, Introduction 48, p. lxi.) 109 Arrian I. 17. 9. 110 See Thymondas, below. 111 Arrian II. 13. 2. Curtius III. 11. 18. Diodorus XVII. 48. 2 103 97 ARISTOMEDES Aristomedes was a Thessalian commander from Pherae with a long history of service with the Persians going back to about 340 BC, well before Alexander came to the throne.112 At Issus Aristomedes commanded the 20,000 unspecified barbarian infantry on the Persian left wing.113 He was not, like Amyntas, Bianor and Thermondas, a commander of Greek mercenaries, and the fact that he escaped with them probably arose from a decision on his part to take refuge with his Greek compatriots, possibly facilitated by his place on the Persian left flank. BIANOR Bianor is one of the commanders of the Greek mercenaries at Issus who escaped the battlefield with Amyntas and others, first to Tripolis, and after that probably to Cyprus. He is mentioned only by Arrian, who calls him an Acarnanian.114 THYMONDAS As Heckel suggests, Thymondas may well have spent much of his early years at the Persian king’s court.115 His family came from Rhodes, and he was the son of Mentor, the brother of Memnon, who in turn were both the sons-in-law of Artabazus,116 a grandson of Artaxerxes II.117 After Memnon’s death, Darius sent Thymondas to Pharnabazus, Artabazus’ son, with orders for Pharnabazus “to take over Memnon’s command”. On the same authority, Thymondas took command of the foreign soldiers previously under Pharnabazus’ command, with orders “to lead them up-country to Darius – presumably to Sochi, if not Babylon.118 At the battle of Issus he had command of 30,000 Greek mercenary infantry next to the cavalry on the Persian right wing.119 As already discussed, he survived the battle and fled to Tripolis and on to Cyprus along with Amyntas, Bianor and Aristomedes. THE PERSIAN BATTLELINE Taking all the above into account, we can now expand our understanding of the Persian battleline as follows. Narbarzanes commanded the cavalry on the right wing. Under him, and probably in the front line because they did not survive the battle, were Arsames with his Cilician cavalry, Atizyes with his Phrygian cavalry, and Sataces with the cavalry he brought from Egypt. 112 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 47 – 48. For full details see Errington, R. M., “Macedonian ‘Royal Style’ and Its Historical Significance”, JHS Vol. 94 (1974) p.27. Errington’s arguments counter the earlier arguments of Ellis who sought to find a link between Aristomedes, Amyntas, son of Antiochus, and Amyntas Perdiccas. Ellis “Amyntas Perdikka” pp. 19 – 21. See also Bosworth, A. B., A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander: Vol, 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 222. 113 Curtius III. 9. 3. 114 Arrian II. 13. 2 - 3. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 72. 115 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 267. 116 Demosthenes 23. 157. Diodorus XVI. 52. 1 – 8. Arrian II. 2. 1. Curtius III. 3. 1. 117 See Heckel, Prosopography, p. 55 – Artabazus and Artacama, and p. 162 – Memnon [1] for a detailed account of both Artabazus’ own place in the Persian court and his family ties to Memnon and Mentor. 118 Arrian II. 2. 1. Curtius III. 3. 1. 119 Curtius III. 9. 2. 98 Thymondas had overall command of the Greek mercenaries, with Amyntas and Bianor as company commanders under him. Next to them were the first company of Cardaces under Aristomedes. Then Darius in the centre supported by his own elite cavalry under Oxathres and Bubaces. While on the right wing I believe it is reasonable to place Rheomithres in command of the Hyrcanian cavalry. This is in keeping with his placement on the right wing alongside the Medes at the Granicus. And I would suggest that it is quite possible his unnamed cavalry at the Granicus were also Hyrcanian, since that region lies just to the north-east of Media. Arsames, Atizyes and Rheomithres may have been deliberately placed in the front ranks, if not as punishment, then to give them a chance to redeem themselves for their failure at the Granicus. Figure 11, below, is a rough reconstruction of the Persian battlelines may have looked like, including the initial advance infantry and cavalry screen posted across the river, with arrows indicating the cavalry’s recall to behind the river, and the infantry’s move to the ridge. In this map Curtius’ slingers and javelin men and slingers and archers units have been broken up into sub-units to better reflect their role in covering from behind barricades those sections of the river that were accessible to attack. From there, they will have formed lines and harassed Alexander’s men with projectiles as they advanced, giving way to the heavy infantry behind when close combat became imminent. I have also included the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry in the 30,000 cavalry sent across the river. Comparing Callisthenes’ account in Polybius with Arrian it is easy to assume that all the cavalry sent across the river were from the Persian right wing, since the numbers are the same. But Arrian only says that most of the recalled cavalry were posted on the right flank. As shall be discussed shortly when looking at the approach of Alexander’s forces, there are good reasons to conclude that the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry had also been sent forward. Just how large the Persian army was at Issus, is impossible to say. But if you count just the numbers given by Arrian and Curtius for the units they name, you are still looking at an army of more than 120,000 men – almost three times the size of the Macedonians. And that is counting just the front line units. But larger armies can be much harder to manage. And in the case of the Persian army, with contingents drawn from all over the empire, another factor may have also caused problems. Just how many different languages were spoken in that army? And what impact did that have on the chain of command and the communication of orders? 99 Figure 11: The Persian Battleline ALEXANDER’S DEPLOYMENT Alexander’s dispositions are presented in more detail, but there are also problems here. Arrian’s first account of this included only the Macedonian infantry, from the Hypaspist’s Agema under Nicanor “on the right wing towards the mountain ridge” to Amyntas’ taxis near the sea.120 As discussed above, these were initially deployed in parallel marching columns. Then, as the plain widened as they moved north, they in stages redeployed from 32 deep into their normal 8 deep phalanx line. Whether Alexander progressively deployed his cavalry to the flanks at the same time, or only after the phalanx was fully deployed is a moot point. But eventually, though at a time when the Persians were still some way off, the cavalry were added to the infantry line. At that time, according to Arrian, Alexander “brought into line ... the ... Companions, the Thessalians,121 and (in the manuscript) the Macedonians”, this last, as Brunt notes, referring to “some other cavalry ... perhaps Prodromoi”. All of these were on the right wing, with only “the Peloponnesians and other allies” sent to Parmenio on the left. No mention is made in this account of the Agrianians, of any of the archers and other light troops, or of the mercenaries. It is not unreasonable, however, to conjecture that the light infantry had by this time already been placed ahead of the line, while the mercenaries were left in reserve behind the main line. (See Figure 12.) 120 Arrian II. 8. 3 – 4. There are hints of this also in Curtius initial deployment. “Alexander had stationed the phalanx ... in the van. Nicanor ... guarded the right wing; next ... Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemaeus, and Amyntas ... On the left wing ...extended to the sea, were Craterus and Parmenio”. Curtius III. 9. 7 – 8. (In both Arrian and Curtius, Parmenio has command of the whole left wing.) This matches Arrian’s initial deployment, but Curtius here then adds that “cavalry were stationed on both wings”, conflating Arrian’s first and second deployment account. 121 Curtius III. 9. 8, also initially places the Thessalians here. 100 Figure 12: Alexander’s initial deployment. Of particular interest here is the inclusion of the Thessalians in the right wing. This deployment was undertaken while the Persian cavalry, including as I have argued the Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry, were still south of the river screening Darius’ main infantry deployment along the river’s north bank. 30,000 or more cavalry in total with 20,000 infantry in support, as compared to Alexander’s mere 6,000 plus cavalry and perhaps 40,000 plus infantry.122 So why were the Thessalians on the left flank? The answer, I would suggest, was because Alexander had been fooled by the advance Persian cavalry and infantry screen, into thinking that Darius was intending to fight him on the south side of the river. That was a mistake. Now, as previously argued, the Persian cavalry were light cavalry, potentially capable of harassing the Macedonian phalanx but not capable of making a direct assault against them. Based on his earlier experience at the Granicus, Alexander will have concluded that by charging his Companions he could easily break and turn the Persian cavalry line, and then roll them back from east to west with the aid of the Thessalians, and the Prodromoi and the Paeonians. Then the Persian cavalry withdrew, while the infantry supporting them moved to the ridge south of the river – possibly because there was no time to get them back across the river given that the crossing points behind them were limited. In so doing, they revealed how Darius had taken up a defensive position on the north side of the river. In response, Alexander was forced to make some hasty revisions to his battlelines, behind a screen of cavalry and light infantry, just as Darius had done. The Prodromoi and Paeonians were placed in front of the cavalry on the right, and archers were placed in front of the infantry there.123 On the left wing, the Cretan archers and the Thracians under Sitalces were in front, and some cavalry (probably both the Peloponnesians and other allied cavalry) had also been advanced on that wing.124 Then, because most of the Persian cavalry had been transferred to opposite his left wing, Alexander transferred the Thessalians to his left wing out of sight of the enemy behind his Macedonian infantry and allied cavalry.125 (Curtius has this occur much later, when the Persian cavalry charged at Alexander’s left, but both agreed that the transfer was done in secret.)126 122 This is based on Engels’ estimates of the size of the Macedonian army at this time. Engels, Logistics, Appendix 2, p. 132. 123 Arrian II. 9. 2. 124 Arrian II. 9. 3. 125 Arrian II. 9. 1. 126 Curtius III. xi. 3. 101 At the same time, Alexander made two other changes to his battlelines. Firstly, to guard his right flank from any attack by the Persian light infantry posted on the eastern ridge, he posted the Agrianians and the (probably) Macedonian archers at an angle to the right of the Companions. Some unidentified cavalry were posted there as well,127 possibly the Thracian horsemen who had served on the left at the Granicus, since we hear nothing of them in this account. Arrian describes these men as being thrown “back at an angle ... so that on his right wing his line forked into two parts”. One part faced the main Persian army across the river, the other “the force posted in the Macedonian rear in the heights”.128 Given that the army was still advancing at that time, I suspect that the men posted at an angle were actually marching forward in an echelon formation129 in order to keep the right wing together. (See Figure 13, below.) Such a formation would help cover the rest of Alexander’s right flank until the army came close enough for those men to be detached to deal with the enemy on the ridge. To have the Agrianians, archers and accompanying cavalry turn at this point to face the ridge and march forward, would only have created a dangerous gap in the Macedonian line. Figure 13: Alexander’s first redeployment. The transfer of the Thessalians to the left wing had left a whole in Alexander’s right that needed to be quickly filled. Arrian gives the most detail on this, but his account is confused and hard to follow. In seeking to resolve just what happened when, # issues stand out. 1. The Persians on the ridge. Arrian tells us that after moving the Thessalians, Alexander feared his own right wing “did not seem very solid”, and that he feared the Persians could outflank him there.130 This perceived threat must have been from the Persian infantry on the ridge on the south side of the river. As discussed above, on the right flank the Pinarus was only crossable at a single ford. East of that, the river was impassable, and west of the ford the banks were too difficult for cavalry to climb for much of its length. Only the Persian troops on the ridge could attack his flank or get behind him. Alexander’s response was to launch a sortie of Agrianians and archers against the ridge to test their mettle of those men. Both Arrian and Curtius claimed there were 20,000 infantry there. They should have easily overwhelmed the Agrianians and archers, but instead they just turned and fled. And so badly were they broken that Alexander felt it safe to recall his sortie and leave 127 Arrian II. 9. 2. Arrian II. 9. 2. 129 This seems quite reasonable, since, as I have argued, Alexander also used an echelon formation in his attack at the Granicus. See Chapter 2. 130 Arrian II. 3. 128 102 behind just three hundred cavalry,131 most probably the unnamed Thracians to “watch the hilltroops” and keep them in check.132 So why were those troops so easily cowed into submission? The most likely explanation is that they expendable levies – largely untrained and ill-disciplined – who had been sent across the river to enhance the illusion of an assembled army to the cavalry screen. When the cavalry withdrew, Darius abandoned them. They could not retreat. The ford was too narrow, and the lower reaches of the river to which the cavalry had withdrawn, too far away. And they were also probably under orders not to attempt either, but to retreat to the ridge instead, to ensure that there was no risk of them disrupting the Persian defences along the river in their flight. Abandoned, it is no wonder that at the first threat they ran away. 2. The reorganisation of the Companions. At the same time, and for some while after as they advanced, Alexander was restructuring his right wing to address the hole left by the relocated Thessalians. For this, as reported by Arrian, his first move, was to transfer of two squadrons of Companions in secret from the centre to the right.133 Now, I admit that this made little sense to me. That is clear from the ways I sought to rationalise this in my original thesis. That was written when we had little real knowledge about the geography of the battlefield, and I see little value in reiterating and then dismissing those ideas now. What I have since realised, and then only while revising the lead up to this discussion, is that the key to this problem actually lies in where Alexander and the Royal Companion squadron were. And if Alexander had prepared his original battleline for a battle on the plain south of the river, then Alexander would have placed himself at the far right end of his Companions.134 With the cavalry screen gone, he now realised that to attack the Persian left, as he intended, he would have to attack across the river through the narrow gap of the ford – however wide it was at that time. And for that, I think he just wanted squadrons of Companion on both sides of him as he launched his attack. Arrian further reports that, in order to extend his phalanx Alexander “brought over the archers and some of the Agrianians and Greek mercenaries to the front of his right”.135 These, together with the recalled Prodromoi and Paeonians, were probably used to fill the gap left by the Thessalians and the two squadrons of Companion. The Greek mercenaries must have been brought forward from the “foreign mercenaries ... drawn up in support of the whole line”.136 These may have been either hoplites or peltasts. We have little on which to base a choice, though their grouping with the archers and Agrianians suggests they were the latter. The archers will have been the Macedonian archers, brought back with the Agrianians from their sortie against the men on the ridge. Though not mentioned here, Alexander probably kept the remaining Agrianians close to him to cover his right flank. 131 Probably 2 squadrons. Arrian II. 10. 4. 133 Arrian II. 9. 3. 134 That Arrian intended to lead the attack is later affirmed – Arrian II. 10. 3. 135 Arrian II. 9. 3. 136 Arrian II. 9. 3. 132 103 The Cretans archers were still are located in front of the infantry on the left wing, and there may also have been some archers, commanded by Antiochus,137 in front of the infantry on the right.138 As argued above139 that there were only two units of archers in Alexander’s army, one Cretan, one Macedonian. What was the origin of the third unit we find in this battle? Arrian implies that they were just a contingent of the Macedonian archers. But Curtius supplies some clarification. In his account, Alexander’s battle line was screened by a “band of slingers mingled with bowmen”, together with Thracians and Cretans.140 So in this, Arrian’s use of the term archers may be misleading. And the ‘archers’ under Antiochus may be identifiable with the Thracian unit relegated to guard the baggage animals at Gaugamela, discussed above.141 The placement of light infantry between the Hypaspists and the Companions should not be seen as a problem, given the nature of the terrain ahead of them. They were unlikely to be under any threat of attack from the Persians opposite them, and were well placed to support both the phalanx and the Companion cavalry in their attacks. Arrian gives no details of any further changes to the Macedonian left wing, but it is reasonable to conclude that once the Thessalians were in place the Peloponnesian and allied cavalry were probably also drawn back between the Thessalians and the phalanx to strengthen the cavalry line. The remaining light infantry will then have continued to advance ahead of the phalanx until the river crossing points were reached. Alexander then led his newly marshalled line on “for some time with halts” at a leisurely pace, giving his men time to recover from the long march before the battle began.142 The final deployment of Alexander’s front line can then be taken to have been roughly as presented in figure 14 below. Figure 14: Alexander’s final deployment. THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE STAGE 1 – THE CAVALRY BATTLE ON THE LEFT FLANK Curtius made this the very first event in the battle, and gave the Persian’s credit for the initiative.143 Arrian also placed the initiative with the Persians, but his text gives no indication of when the action began, other than to place it after the start of the battle.144 However, when you 137 Arrian II. 9. 2. Arrian II. 9. 3. 139 See Chapter 1, pp. 9 – 10, above. 140 Curtis III. 11. 9. 141 See Chapter 1, p. 10, above. 142 Arrian II. 10. 1. 143 Curtius III. 11. 1. 144 Arrian II. 11. 2. 138 104 look at the terrain it seems clear that, advancing in line it seems clear that the Macedonian left flank would have been the first to make contact with the enemy. Arrian’s account of this part of the battle is brief. Towards the end of the battle,145 as Arrian described it, the Persian cavalry charged across the river to attack the Thessalian squadrons. “There was a desperate fight” between the Persians and the Thessalians, which did not end until Darius had fled and the Mercenaries were defeated. Then, the Persian cavalry also turned and fled. Encumbered by their heavily armour and hampered by the terrain , the Persian cavalry then suffered heavy casualties from the pursuing Thessalians. Referring to this, Arrian says “there was as much slaughter in the cavalry-flight as in the infantry”.146 One point of confusion in Curtius’ account is that he places the transfer of the Thessalians across from the right to the left wing after the Persians launched their attack and in response to that. They are then described as being crowded together, which made the hurling of their weapons (presumably javelins) ineffective. Swords were drawn, and from this point, the account reads more like the description of a clash of hoplite ranks.147 Curtius then seems to shift the focus of his account first, if briefly, to the infantry battle, and then to Alexander’s attack on the right.148 When he returns to the left flank, his account becomes even more confused, especially with regard to chronology. Curtius first speaks of cavalry sent by Parmenio, hard pressing fugitives, and then of Persians making a strong attack on the Thessalian horsemen. (There is no suggestion that the pursued had turned on their pursuers.) “Already”, wrote Curtius, “one squadron had been ridden down”. It may be that what happened was that one attack of the Persians had been beaten off, and had been pursued, unwisely, by at least one squadron. These had, in turn, fallen victim to the next wave of the Persian attack which then continued to advance against the rest of Alexander’s left wing. Regardless of its actual place in the battle, the action that followed provides an account of how the Thessalians fought against heavily armoured Persian cavalry that is of value in itself. From this, it would seem that the Thessalians wheeled their cavalry out of the path of the Persian cavalry, who could not respond properly because of the inertia imposed by the weight of their armour. In trying to respond, the Persians became scattered and disordered, and the Thessalians took advantage of this to swing back into the attack and win the melee.149 Though inadequately reported, this engagement was probably the most prolonged part of the entire battle. STAGE 2 – ALEXANDER’S ATTACK150 As noted above, contrary to Arrian, Alexander’s Companions were not the first units to engage the Persians in battle. Given the nature of the terrain, the only place Alexander could attack the Persians, was at the ford behind which the Medes and Hyrcanians had been stationed. 145 As always, Arrian’s focus was on the role of Alexander, so it should come as no surprise that Arrian would place Alexander’s part in the battle first. 146 Arrian II. 11 .2 – 3. 147 Curtius III. 11. 4. 148 Curtius III. 11. 5 – 12. 149 Curtius III. 11. 11 – 15. 150 This section has been largely rewritten to take account of what we now know about the terrain, and my own recent analysis of the Persian deployment. 105 The ford lay at a point in the river well to the north of its course near the sea, and was flanked by impassable banks to the east, and steep banks that were also unsurmountable to cavalry to the west. (See figures 6 and 11 above.) In his account, Plutarch simply recorded that, leading his own right wing, Alexander extended it “round the enemy’s left, outflanked it, and put the barbarians to flight” – there was no mention of either the ford or the river crossing.151 Curtius also skipped over Alexander’s battle at the ford to jump straight the attack on Darius and his elite cavalry guard led by Darius’ brother, Oxathres.152 So for details on this part of the battle we have to turn to Arrian. His account has Alexander start his part of the battle by charging across the river as soon as he moved into missile range, to both panic the Persians and “reduce losses from the Persian archers”. Arrian then claimed that “The moment battle was joined hand-to-hand, the Persian left gave way”.153 Almost immediately after that, however, Arrian retells the tale. This version puts the battle in a wider context. Here, Arrian refers to both the river crossing, and his then coming “to close quarters with the Persians posted there.” In this account, though, the Persians did not just give way. Instead, Alexander is described as “pushing them back” when the infantry in the Macedonian centre started their attack across the river.154 We do not know how wide the ford was at this time, whether the river was shallow enough for horses to cross on either side of it, or how steep was the climb down to the ford and up again. So we cannot say whether Alexander’s Royal squadron was able to maintain their wedge formation while crossing the ford or not. What is clear is that at the ford Alexander faced two lines of defenders as depicted on my Persian Battlelines map (Figure 11). The first was a line of archers that would have extended along the river banks well to either side of the ford. Alexander clearly saw them as a threat because he raced his men to and across the ford as fast as possible to reduce the casualties to his men from missile fire. And while the archers facing the ford will have slipped aside as soon as Alexander’s men drew close, his own squadron and the ones following it will still have been subject to arrow fire against their flanks from archers to either side of the ford. But Alexander could not afford to worry about the archers. Behind them were drawn up the ranks of Hyrcanian and Medic cavalry – the real defenders of the ford. Now, as I have previously argued (Chapter 1, Part 5), these would not have been heavy cavalry, but light cavalry unprepared for direct attack by an enemy ready to charge straight into them. Given the enemy numbers, Alexander could not afford to wait for the rest of the Companions to cross the river, or even to reform his own squadron if the men had not been able to maintain their wedge formation during the crossing. Arrian tells us almost nothing about what happened here, but the Persian cavalry will almost certainly have begun hurling javelins at Alexander’s men as soon as they crested the river bank. Alexander could only charge on with his men massed around him as best they could, and hope that, as at the Granicus, when faced with cavalry prepared to charge home, the Hyrcanians and Medes would also break and run. Only they did not. While he may have punched a dent into their front ranks, there were too 151 Plutarch Alexander 20. Curtius III. 11. 7 – 11. 153 Arrian II. 10. 3 – 4. 154 Arrian II. 10. 4 – 5. 152 106 many for one squadron alone to have any chance of breaking them. Instead, Alexander’s squadron would have had to keep fighting while they waited for the rest of the Companions, one squadron after another, crossed the ford and climbed the bank. That is why the Companions could only be said to be pushing the Persians back when the Macedonian phalanx began its attack. Nonetheless, the effect of one squadron of Companions after another progressively driving into the Persian cavalry, must have taken its toll because eventually, they did break and run, and in the course of the fighting Rheomithres will have been slain. At the same time, some of the Agrianians, at least, will have probably also crossed the river and driven off the Persian archers flanking the ford before they could do too much more damage. At that point, Alexander probably had the squadrons of Companions reform before launching his attack on the Cardaces to his left who stood between him and Darius. By then he will probably have been joined by at least the Agrianians and perhaps some of his own archers. And it is as this point that he will have been able, as Plutarch says to wheel “round the enemy’s left” and outflank them. The Cardaces, with their own left wing cavalry in flight, appear to have also been quickly broken. STAGE 3 – THE INFANTRY BATTLE The third stage of the battle to be considered, is the infantry battle. Here again it is necessary to rely mainly on Arrian. The initial events are related by Arrian as follows. First, the “Greek mercenaries attacked the Macedonian phalanx, where a gap appeared as it broke formation on the right”. Arrian then comments that “the Macedonian centre did not set to with equal impetus”.155 The fact that the Macedonian phalanx could not maintain their line in order is fully understandable given the nature of the terrain and the weight of their heavy sarissae. Breaks in the Macedonian line were inevitable given that Arrian had described the river banks as “in many places precipitous”, and blocked by stockades wherever it remained accessible.156 Whether the Macedonians were initially fired upon by the archers or slingers mentioned by Curtius, we are not told. The state of our accounts is such that such an omission need not be significant, since many other things have also obviously been left out. But if they were, such an attack can only have contributed to the disorder in the ranks of the Macedonians. And Arrian’s account does otherwise fit into the form of double line defence outlined above with regard to Alexander’s attack. The fact that the Greek mercenaries are described as attacking argues in support of this. To do so, they would have to be advancing, and it is not really credible that they would have begun their attack by advancing from the top of the bank down into the river, disordering themselves, and losing much of their advantage, in the process. They must, therefore, have started from a point somewhere behind the line of the river, and any archers or slingers posted there as the initial line of defence. 155 156 Arrian II. 10. 4 – 6. Arrian II. 10. 1. 107 In the description of the fighting, the Greeks are described as trying to push the Macedonians off into the river.157 This suggests that the fighting was focused on the very crest of the bank, and that the Greek attack made contact only after the Macedonians had scaled to the top of the river bank. Now it is not likely they restricted their attack to specific weak points in the Macedonian line, as that would have left other sections of the Macedonian line free to mount the bank in safety and reform. The statement that they attacked where the line was particularly torn apart, however, may imply that the Macedonian line had been disordered to a much greater degree at one particular point, and that Greek attack was, because of that, more successful there. As well, by attacking when they did the Greeks would have caught the Macedonian phalanx before they were able to form ranks and align their lowered sarissae, thereby depriving the phalanx of its principal defence.158 The battle was clearly not going very well for the Macedonian infantry to this point. Casualties were high.159 But the Greek Mercenaries were not the only infantry facing the Macedonian phalanx. The right of the phalanx, including the hypaspists, will have had the Cardaces whom Arrian describes as “foreign mercenaries” not quite opposite to them. As the Persian left began to break under Alexander’s assault, the right of the phalanx was able to bend “round the foreign mercenaries, where their own (i.e Macedonian infantry) centre was hard pressed” and drive them from the river. In this way, having beaten the Cardaces, they were able to strike the Greeks in the flank, saving their own centre.160 STAGE 4 - DARIUS There is one final element in the extant tradition that may have had a significant place in the battle. Arrian simply presented Darius as fleeing as soon as he saw the left wing break and flee.161 Both Curtius and Diodorus preserved a tradition that presented Alexander as trying to attack Darius himself, only to be prevented by the intervention of the elite cavalry commanded by Darius’ brother, Oxathres. It was during the course of this melee that Darius finally fled the battlefield.162 It is only natural that Alexander, having broken through the Persian line, would then try to force his way down along the Persian line, in the hope of capturing Darius. Consequently, the last units he would encounter before Darius, would be Darius’s own cavalry guard under the commanded of the king’s brother. When that happened, Darius will have known the time had come to flee. Alexander did try to capture Darius, but not straight away. As Arrian relates, at the time when Darius fled Alexander also knew that his phalanx had broken its formation in the river crossing. He knew that battle was still his to lose. He was probably also delayed fighting Darius’s cavalry guard, which was where Bubaces died. But Alexander did not begin his pursuit of Darius until after “he had seen the mercenaries and the Persian cavalry driven back from the 157 Arrian II. 10. 6. See Chapter 1, Pt 2 – Heavy Infantry, above. 159 Arrian II. 10.7. 160 Arrian II. 11. 1. 161 Arrian II. 11. 4. 162 Curtius III. xi. 7 – 12. Diodorus XVII. 33. 5 – 34. 7. 158 108 river.163 This delay is another testament to just how long the cavalry battle between the Thessalians (presumably together with the allied cavalry) and the Persian cavalry went on. CONCLUSIONS Alexander’s generalship in this battle, cannot be regarded as having been flawless. He was clearly misled by the screen of Persian cavalry and infantry that Darius sent across the river. He misread this and deployed his own army accordingly in preparation for battle on the south side of the river. When the Persian cavalry withdrew and he realised mistake, he then had to make a hurried redeployment of his own forces to deal with the actual Persian battle dispositions. On the positive side, he seems to have clearly seen not only where the weakness in the Persian position lay, but also how to exploit it –albeit with difficulty. His charge then became the key to his victory. If it could be shown that the infantry on the right wheeled in response to standing orders, and not on the initiative of their commanders, that would stand even more to his credit. It cannot, however, and that matter must be left open. While Arrian makes no comment on the Macedonian casualties, Curtius and Diodorus agree that 300 infantry and 150 cavalry died in the battle, with 4,500 wounds164 – a casualty count far higher than Alexander had suffered at the Granicus. While still far less than the Persian casualties, however you try to number them, the casualties are consistent with the difficulties the Macedonians experienced in their attacks. By taking a defensive position along the north bank of the Pinarus River, Darius was able to undermine the Macedonian army’s two critical tactical innovations – the capacity of the Companions to charge home, and the capacity of the Macedonian phalanx to drive their opponents back with little risk of having to engage in hand to hand fighting. Without those advantages, Alexander’s army became vulnerable. It is a testament to the prowess of the Companion cavalry that they were able to recover from the limitations the ford crossing imposed upon them so quickly. And it was that capacity, that discipline, that ultimately won the day for Alexander. 163 Arrian II. 11. 7. Curtius III. xi. 16. Curtius III. xi. 27. Diodorus XVII. 36. 4. The numbers are higher – 1,000 infantry and 200 cavalry – in the fragments of a different lost history, POxy. 1798, Col IV. http://www.pothos.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3471 164 109