Battle of Issus

The visual devices used by Tony Blair and George Bush to get themselves elected and maintain power, come not from modern times, but a world that is thousands of years old. How Art Made the World ventures back to the creation of Stonehenge and the reign of Alexander the Great to reveal how imagery became an indispensable weapon in every leader's political armoury.

This episode explores how art can be used as a persuasion device by those in power and when did we learn to use images, to create a powerful icon or symbol, this way?

The use of art as a tool for those in power, started at different times, in different cultures. Near Stonehenge the grave of the Amesbury Archer was discovered in 2002, the grave was different to those previously found near the site, as this one was not Roman, but much earlier, dating to when the first sarsen stones were erected. What made him interesting were his gold hair tresses, possibly the oldest dated gold objects in Britain, and the fact that he was a foreigner, from the region that is now Germany / Switzerland. The archer had completed an epic journey for the time, and the treasures in his grave show a man of status. Art for personal adornment, like these hair clasps, elevated him above his peers.

As time progressed, art became a political tool, kings competed for more dazzling adornments. As kingdoms got bigger the kings had to overcome communication issues. Darius the Great of Persia, ruled over 20 nations from Persepolis. As very few people could read, Darius had stone reliefs created that combined styles from all over the empire, the carvings showed each nation bring tributes to their king. This showed respect, and the carvings communicated that Darius admired and respected his people. Darius created a symbol for himself, that of the archer, symbolic to Persians of leadership and wisdom, central to the concept of kingship. Darius embossed this symbol on gold coins, which became the currency to trade within the empire.

Darius’ conqueror, Alexander the Great, took this concept further. From an early age, Alexander’s image was being made for him. In his fathers tomb, an Ivory head recognisable as Alexander’s was found, showing that his image had been made for him in advance of him becoming king. In Pompeii, a copy of an original Macedonian painting, shows Alexander the Great, fearless, fixated on his enemy and leading from the front. He is in the midst of battle with king Darius, shown fearful and panicking. Where Darius had used a symbol to communicate his power, Alexander used his face. On defeating the Persians, Alexander melted down all their coins replacing them with coins bearing his head. Tests have shown that people are more influenced by the image of the head and this technique has endured 2500 years and still used today.

This artistic power can be used for sinister purposes, to persuade us to see things a certain way or even deceive us. The earliest known use of this dates back to the Romans. In 40BC Rome was in crisis, the city state was split between royalists and republicans. You could tell people’s political allegiance by how they dressed. Octavian (Augustus) understood the power of art and used it to his advantage. He needed to persuade his opponents ,and used artists to create a less threatening image, one that won over the republicans. Although the image showed him as a powerful general, it didn’t show any military arms, and his gestures were more about humility than power. His armour breast plates show him accepting surrender of the Parthian Empire, with the gods looking on approvingly. The statue offered reassurance, but it was all a lie. While he portrayed himself as a peace maker, he was getting rid of the opposition; while he was preaching humility, he lived like corrupt royalty and while pretending to hand power to the people he reinstated himself as a king.

The leaders of past used paint and marble, today we use digital manipulation. But as humans we still remain vulnerable to the persuasive power of art.

In this chapter - originally Chapter 3 in my 1980 thesis, I examine Alexander's tactics in the second of his three major battles against the Persians.
In this expanded account I have been able to also look in much more detail at the topography of the battle site and the composition of the Persian army, including a Prosopographic analysis of its known commanders.  I have also included a number of diagrams to illustrate my key points.
Most of the major additions are in blue.

From the time of J. G. Droysen, the prevailing belief in historiography maintained that Darius III was an incapable ruler and a weak military commander. Scholars have made such harsh judgements under the influence of biased sources, which is especially evident if one compares Darius III, who was an “unworthy“ opponent of the Macedonian king, with all other Alexander’s “worthy“ opponents such as Memnon of Rhodes, Mazaeus and Porus. If we, however, assess the events from Darius’ perspective, it appears that the Persian king had a realistic and achievable tactic at the battle of Issus. Our sources intentionally present him in an unfavourable way.

This article deals with the period of Aegean history from 336 BC to 331 BC. At that period the shape of the Aegean was forever changed. During these five years the Macedonians fought over the control of the Aegean basin at first against Persians and later against Spartan king Agis III. Although Alexander himself passed through the Aegean and Asia Minor in 334 BC, the military operations began during the reign of his father, Phillip II in 336 BC, and the victory at the battle of Issus marked their end. Despite being insufficiently described in sources, the Aegean war was an important part of the history of Alexander’s campaign because of the threat that the remaining Persian forces represented.

Овај рад обрађује период егејске историје од 336. г.п.н.е. до 331. г.п.н.е. Тада је, походом Александра Македонског, слика Егеје неповратно измењена. Током ових пет година Македонци су се борили прво са Персијанцима, а касније са спартанским краљем Агидом за контролу над Егејским морем. Иако се сам Александар у Егеји и Малој Азији задржао само током 334. г.п.н.е, ратне операције су започеле још за време владавине његовог оца Филипа II 336. г.п.н.е, а победа у бици код Иса пресудно је утицала на њихов крај. Упркос томе што је слабо осветљен у изворима, Егејски рат представља важну појаву у историји Александровог похода, због претње коју су представљале заостале персијске снаге.

""Knjiga predstavlja jasan i celovit prikaz pohoda Aleksandra Velikog. Pisana je na osnovu sačuvanih izvora, pre svega Arijana, Diodora i Kurcija Rufa, ali i savremenije literature. Autori se nisu ograničili samo na iznošenje činjenica i događaja, te opise bitaka i opsada. Nastojali su da objasne Aleksandrovu taktiku i strategiju, kao i da rasvetle političke i strateške razloge zbog kojih se upuštao u osvajačke pohode. Na taj način su uspeli da osvetle i prikažu i ličnost ovog velikog vladara i vojskovođe.

STRATEGIKA, kratka istorija pohoda Aleksandra Velikog" Aleksandra Savića, Nikole Keravice i Nemanje Kačavende namenjena je pre svega širokoj čitalačkoj publici koja želi da se upozna sa jednim od najvećih vojskovođa antičkog sveta, ali će svako biti korisna i učenicima osnovnih i srednjih škola, kao i studentima istorije i drugih srodnih grupa.

Doc. dr Snežana FERJANČIĆ
Filozofski fakultet Beograd""

The eyewitnesses on campaign with Alexander were inclined to falsely date formative events for portentous effect and edit numbers no-less zealously. The official historian Callisthenes, Chares the royal usher, the future dynast Ptolemy and campaign engineer Aristobulus fall into this categorisation. Prime examples of this deceptive creativity concern battles. We can start at the Granicus River, the first of the three major setpiece battles against the army of Darius III. As fate would have it-if Duris of Samos' calculations were correct-the confrontation in May 334 BC was fought on the anniversary of the sack of Troy 1,000 years before in 1,334 BC.1 Alexander crossed to Asia with approximately 32,000 mixed infantry and 4,500 allied cavalry and these were arrayed in a strategic order.2 It

This short Appendix follows on from discussion on the Academia Session regarding my most recent Thesis Chapter on the Pinarus River to demonstrate how much ancient geography has been obliterated by urban development.  This was the reason I chose not to include a modern map in Chapter 4 of my Thesis.