APCOF Policy Paper
16
February 2017
Strengthening the independence of the
Independent Police Investigative Directorate
David Bruce1
Introduction
This policy paper has been written following the judgment of the Constitutional Court on 6 September
2016 in the matter of McBride v Minister of Police and Another.2 The case involved an application
by Robert McBride, the Executive Director of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID),
to have his suspension and disciplinary action against him by the Minister of Police set aside on the
basis of constitutional invalidity. The case was first heard in the Gauteng Division of the High Court.
The High Court issued judgment in McBride’s favour in December 2015.3 Owing to the fact that the
High Court found certain legislative provisions to be unconstitutional, the case was referred to the
Constitutional Court for ‘confirmation’.4 The case is above all concerned with the independence of the
IPID in view of the fact that section 206(6) of the Constitution requires that the IPID be independent.
The Constitutional Court judgment declared certain sections of the Independent Police Investigative
Directorate Act (‘the IPID Act’), Public Service Act and the IPID Regulations to be invalid ‘to the
extent that they authorise the Minister of Police to suspend, take any disciplinary steps pursuant
to suspension, or remove from office the Executive Director of the Independent Police Investigative
Directorate’. The Constitutional Court instructed that Parliament ‘cure the defects in the legislation’
within 24 months (i.e. by 5 September 2018).
The judgment makes extensive reference to two previous Constitutional Court judgments pertaining
to the independence of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).
This policy paper is intended to inform debate, by parliamentarians and others, about the legislative
amendments that are required. The policy paper discusses the following:
•
•
The general purpose of independent civilian oversight bodies (ICOBs);
The relevance of independence to ICOBs;
•
•
•
•
•
The history of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) and the IPID;
Key differences between the ICD and the IPID;
The debate about the IPID’s independence prior to the McBride judgment;
Constraints on the IPID’s independence; and
Key aspects of the High Court and Constitutional Court judgments.
In the conclusion, the policy paper raises questions about the comparison between the DPCI and
the IPID in relation to the issue of ‘an adequate level of structural and operational autonomy’ that is
foregrounded in the Constitutional Court Glenister judgment on the DPCI and the McBride judgment
on the IPID.5 The paper notes that, unlike the DPCI, the IPID is institutionally separate from the South
African Police Service (SAPS) and, therefore, is ‘structurally’ more independent. However, as discussed
in the section on constraints on the IPID’s independence, the IPID does not enjoy a high level of
‘operational autonomy’ from the SAPS. The independence of the IPID Executive Director is therefore
fundamental to the ability of the IPID to assert itself as an independent body.
Terminology and abbreviations
The general term that the policy paper uses for agencies like the ICD and the IPID is independent
civilian oversight bodies (ICOBs). The paper also refers to specialised anti-corruption agencies (ACAs)
like the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) (the Hawks).
The general purpose of independent civilian oversight bodies (ICOBs)
The establishment of ICOBs is an international trend that has emerged since the 1970s. ICOBs have
been established in many ‘developed’ countries, but also in ‘developing countries’ such as Brazil,
Kenya, Lesotho6 and Sierra Leone.7 An ICOB is typically one of a number of bodies responsible for
oversight of the police in the country or other jurisdiction in which it operates. A useful (though not
watertight) way of distinguishing the role of the IPID from other agencies within the ‘architecture
of police accountability’ is that the IPID, like other ICOBs, is responsible for the accountability of
‘individual policing agents’, whilst many of the other components of the architecture of accountability
focus more on accountability at an organisational level.8 In this respect, the functions of ICOBs overlap
with those of police managers, who are also responsible for ensuring that individual members of the
police are held accountable.9
In general terms, the key purpose of ICOBs is:
•
•
To ensure that investigations into the police are carried out effectively, thereby making certain
that cases in which it is alleged or possible10 that there has been criminality on the part of the
police are investigated properly (the ‘effectiveness function’); and
To create greater public confidence that investigations against the police are carried out properly
(the ‘legitimacy function’).
As indicated, one purpose of ICOBs is to reassure members of the public that investigations against
the police are carried out properly (the ‘legitimacy function’). There is a tendency for members of the
public to suspect that investigations carried out by police agencies into their own members are not
necessarily carried out vigorously or impartially. This suspicion is not without basis, as police throughout
the world have been known to protect their colleagues from being held accountable under the law.
ICOBs are therefore a vehicle for creating greater public confidence that investigations against the
police are carried out properly.
However, caution needs to be exercised in relation to this issue. Most ICOBs do not investigate all
complaints against the police, and this appears to be the preferable position.11 The ‘ideal’ position
is that police organisations have effective internal systems and that the ICOB serves as independent
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
2
verification that these systems are operating effectively, thereby contributing to trust in, and the
legitimacy of, the police. Where police organisations are effective in regulating themselves, this is done,
inter alia, through: promoting the awareness of laws and adherence to codes of conduct; the system
of recruitment; training; and command and control. Where there is effective internal regulation, the
internal disciplinary system serves as a fallback for the management system in addressing disciplinary
problems. ‘Internal affairs’ investigation units may also be a component of effective self-regulation.
An ICOB cannot be the main mechanism for ensuring that the police comply with the law and adhere
to principles of discipline. Rather, it should be seen as part of the overall system for ensuring that police
officers adhere to the required standards of conduct. ICOBs of necessity therefore exist in a dynamic
relationship with police organisations. According to Jones:
Over-reliance on external controls may actually be counterproductive if they foster
indifference or resistance within policing organisations and weaken internal monitoring
systems… . [I]t is clear that [external controls] can only be effective if they complement
well-developed internal forms of control.12
Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states:
It is crucial that the external body does not become a tool for the police that absolves
them of responsibility for their own force: an external mechanism cannot and must not
replace internal mechanisms. Care should be taken to avoid placing all responsibility
for police conduct outside the police.13
The task of ‘ensuring proper police conduct’14 should be seen as primarily the task of police
management. But this is not an argument for limiting the powers or independence of the ICOB. In
order to play their roles effectively, ICOBs must have the power, resources and independence to enable
them to subject the police to adequate scrutiny. If they do not, the consequences may be not only a
loss of trust in the ICOB, but also a loss of trust in the police.
The independence of independent civilian oversight bodies (ICOBs)
Both the legitimacy and effectiveness of an ICOB hinge partly on its independence. Public confidence
in the independence of the ICOB is necessary for it to be legitimate. Otherwise, cases that it deals with
will not be regarded as having been dealt with impartially. However, independence is not ‘sufficient’
on its own. In addition, for the ICOB to be legitimate, it must also be effective – for instance, it has to
have sufficient expertise and resources to do its work. The ICOB’s independence and effectiveness are
interrelated. However, its ability to be effective is dependent not only on factors such as expertise and
resources, but also on its credibility as an independent body. If it is not seen as independent, members
of the public will not report cases to it.
The creation of ICOBs often provokes hostility and distrust on the part of police personnel.15 Part
of the ICOB’s ability to do its work effectively is also its ability to present itself to the police as acting
independently and impartially. To be effective, it must therefore not simply be independent of the police
but independent in the sense of being ‘neutral’ and trusted by the police to deal with cases in an
impartial manner.16
As will be discussed, ICOBs typically have to work to establish trust on the part of the police corps
itself. This enables them to avoid being identified as ‘out to get’ the police and allows them to secure
greater cooperation and assistance from the police. As discussed further in the sections that follow,
ICOBs depend extensively on cooperation and assistance from the police in order to be effective.
However, the manner in which they pursue police cooperation may compromise their work. Ideally,
such cooperation should be achieved through projecting themselves as a neutral agency that is solely
committed to establishing the truth and not as one that is biased towards or against the police.17
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
3
Brief history of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) and the
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)
During the apartheid years, the police in South Africa came to be seen as brutal both in their response
to political protest and resistance and in their dealings with (black) civilians more broadly. During
the transition to democracy, one of the key concerns was to ensure that the police in democratic
South Africa would serve the people of South Africa and operate in a manner consistent with human
rights principles. One of the steps taken to address these concerns was the creation of an ICOB in
South Africa.
South Africa’s first ICOB was the ICD. The creation of the ICD was first provided for in section 222
of the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), which stated:
There shall be established and regulated by an Act of Parliament an independent
mechanism under civilian control, with the object of ensuring that complaints in
respect of offences and misconduct allegedly committed by members of the [South
African Police] Service are investigated in an effective and efficient manner.
Section 222 of the Interim Constitution was put into effect through Chapter 10 of the South African
Police Service Act (‘the SAPS Act’) 68 of 1995, which established the ICD. In 1996, the year after
the passing of the SAPS Act, South Africa adopted the ‘new’ Constitution, which now provided for
‘an independent police complaints body’ in terms of section 206(6).
However, it became apparent in 2005 that there was some level of dissatisfaction about the functioning
of the ICD. After a series of hearings on the issue, the Portfolio Committee on Police compiled a
report which suggested that there was a need for the ICD, as well as the Civilian Secretariat for
Police, to be restructured and for the mandate of the ICD to be reconsidered.18 A 2009 review by
the Portfolio Committee also made various recommendations relating to the ICD, including a
recommendation that the ICD should be removed from the SAPS Act.19
A Bill providing for the creation of the IPID was initially tabled by the Minister of Police in 2010.20
After public hearings, including amendments to the Bill, the IPID Act was passed as Act 1 of 2011.
On 1 April 2012, the Act came into operation and the ICD became the IPID.
Key differences between the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)
and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)
There are a number of changes brought about by the IPID Act. Some of the key differences between
the provisions governing the ICD and those contained in the IPID Act are the following.
Investigative mandate
Although the ICD was designated as a ‘complaints directorate’, its mandate was not restricted to
complaints. Most notably, its mandate included responsibility for investigating ‘deaths in police custody
or as a result of police action’. The ICD was required to investigate all of these deaths itself, irrespective
of whether these deaths were the focus of a complaint or not.21 However, the ICD could refer the
investigation of other matters to the police for them to investigate.22
The vast majority of cases that the ICD received were complaints from members of the public about
police service delivery. A substantial minority were concerned with complaints of criminal conduct
by the police. However, a very large proportion of the time of ICD investigators was dedicated to the
investigation of deaths linked to the large number of these cases and the fact that the ICD was by
law required to investigate all of these cases.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
4
The legislation creating the IPID23 was developed at the same time as the legislation governing the
Civilian Secretariat for Police.24 These two legislative instruments did the following:
•
•
Changed the designation of the directorate from that of a ‘complaints directorate’ to that of an
‘investigative directorate’ and required the IPID to investigate a wider range of serious offences
(as listed in section 28) and not only deaths in custody or as a result of police action; and
Transferred responsibility for monitoring other complaints (not falling within section 28 of the
IPID Act) to the Civilian Secretariat for Police.25
By comparison with the ICD legislation, the IPID legislation therefore expands the range of alleged or
possible criminal offences that South Africa’s ICOB must investigate. Alleged criminal offences that are
not covered by section 28 are to be investigated by the police internally, though, in terms of section
28(1)(h), the IPID Executive Director may also refer other matters to the IPID at his/her discretion or
‘if so requested by the Minister, an MEC or the Secretary’. Other (non-criminal) complaints against
the police are also investigated internally by the police. The investigation of some complaints may be
monitored by the Secretariat.26
Through the IPID legislation, Parliament has therefore prioritised certain categories of alleged or
possible offences for investigation by the IPID. This is presumably because Parliament identifies these
types of offences as the most serious offences in which the police are likely to be involved. It seems
reasonable to assume that part of the motivation for allotting the investigation of these cases to the
IPID was that, because of its independence, the IPID would be able to investigate these cases
effectively, thereby contributing to ensuring more effective deterrence in respect of violations of the
law by the police.
Mandatory notifications
One consequence of the extension of the investigative mandate of the IPID was that the mandatory
reporting requirements were also expanded. The SAPS were only obliged to report deaths in custody
or as a result of police action to the ICD.27 Mandatory reporting now applies to all of the categories of
alleged or possible offences referred to in section 28(1)(a) to (f) of the IPID Act.28
Compliance with IPID recommendations
Another important change is that the IPID Act confers greater powers on the IPID in some respects
than were conferred on the ICD. In terms of section 30 of the IPID Act, the SAPS is required to comply
with IPID recommendations for disciplinary proceedings to be implemented.
Cooperation with the IPID
The IPID Act also strengthened provisions requiring cooperation by SAPS and municipal police
members with the Directorate. For instance, in terms of section 29(2)(a), the members of the SAPS
or municipal police services must arrange for an identification parade within 48 hours of the request
made by the Directorate.
Significance of change for the independence of the IPID
One of the consequences of the IPID Act was also that the IPID was now governed by a separate
legislative instrument. Prior to this, the ICD had been governed by section 10 of the SAPS Act,
though this provided that the ICD ‘shall function independently from the service’.29 However, though
the change has symbolic significance, it does not translate into greater structural or operational
independence. For instance, the arrangement with relation to the budgetary allocation to the ICD and
the IPID has remained unchanged. The ICD received its budget in the same way as the IPID, that is,
as a separate allocation from that awarded to the SAPS. For instance, in 2011, the ICD received its
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
5
budget in terms of Budget Vote 23,30 while the SAPS received its budget in terms of Budget Vote 25.31
In 2015, the IPID received its budget in terms of Budget Vote 20,32 while the SAPS received its budget
in terms of Budget Vote 23.33 This arrangement goes back at least as far as the 1999 Budget.
Essentially, the IPID enjoys the same degree of independence or lack thereof as was enjoyed by
the ICD, except in respect of the following:
•
•
The ICD Executive Director could be ‘removed from his or her office under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed by the Minister in consultation with the Parliamentary Committees’;
and34
The Minister may remove the Executive Director of the IPID from office ‘on account of
(a) misconduct; (b) ill health; or (c) inability to perform the duties of that office effectively’.35
The IPID Act is therefore both more and less restrictive in terms of the provisions governing the removal
from office of the Executive Director. While, on the one hand, it restricts the grounds on which the
Executive Director may be removed, the Minister is no longer required to consult the Parliamentary
Committee about the manner of removal.
As indicated above, the legislation expanded the IPID’s investigative mandate and expanded police
obligations for cooperation with the IPID, but it had no substantial consequences in enhancing the
independence of the IPID.
The debate about independence prior to the McBride matter
The UNODC handbook, Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity, states explicitly that oversight
mechanisms like the IPID ‘should have full operational and hierarchical independence from the police
and be free from executive or political influence’.36
In South Africa, various commentators and analysts have raised concerns about the independence
of the ICD and the IPID.37 Thus, for instance, in 1996 an early commentary on the provisions of the
SAPS Act pertaining to the ICD, stated:
Although it is clearly essential that the ICD keep the ministry closely informed about its
findings, it should be and be seen to be absolutely independent of the ministry, and
not only of the police command structure, in its structure and operations. … Even
greater independence would be achieved if the ICD became a free-standing unit in
the manner of the Human Rights Commission or Public Protector (or Queensland’s
Criminal Justice Commission), accountable to parliament rather than the executive.
Procedures for appointment and removal of the director, which should be independent
of the Minister of Safety and Security,38 should be set out in the Act itself, and it should
be specified that the director may not be a current or former police officer. 39
Some of these issues were raised by Moshesh and Dintwe in their 2010 submission on the IPID Bill:
Although the establishment of the IPID is through an Act of Parliament, an ideal
situation would have been an establishment of an institution very similar to the
Chapter nine institutions such as the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission
and others. The latter institutions are more able to exercise independence because
their heads are appointed by the Portfolio Committee as opposed to the proposed
Bill. The provision of Section 5(1) that the Minister must appoint the Executive Director
(ED) is not a best scenario. In the current Bill, the political independence of the ED
cannot be guaranteed. … [T]he same Minister is responsible for the police institution
of the country which literally means that both the head of the Police and that of the
IPID will be answerable to the same Minister.40
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
6
Similarly, in 2013, Vawda and Mtshali argued:
Ultimately, it would be beneficial for the IPID to ‘maintain an arms-length relationship’
with the Minister of Police. It would also be desirable if the IPID was, instead of being
a part of the Ministry of Police, housed in another ministry, such as Justice and
Constitutional Development – as is the case with the public protector. Such a change
would do much to alter the public’s perceptions regarding the independence of IPID.41
As reflected in the quotations above, the concerns that have been raised have tended to focus on the
following overlapping issues:
•
•
The level of influence of the Minister of Police over the Directorate, including the Minister’s role in
appointing and dismissing the Executive Director of the Directorate and in determining the budget
of the Directorate; and
The location of the Directorate in the Ministry of Police (until 2009, this was known as the Ministry
of Safety and Security) and the related fact that the Directorate is accountable to the Minister.
In addition, writing about the ICD, Manby raised the issue of the appointment and dismissal of the
Executive Director, in the process arguing that the Director should not be a current or former police
officer.
Constraints on the Independent Police Investigative Directorate’s (IPID)
independence
This policy paper discusses two broad categories of constraints on, or ‘risks’ to, the independence
of the IPID:
•
•
Vulnerability of the IPID Executive Director to interference or pressure from the Minister of Police
and the National Commissioner of Police; and
Vulnerability of the IPID to ‘regulatory capture’.
Vulnerability of the Executive Director to interference by the Minister of Police
and the National Commissioner of Police
The need for the independence of specialised anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) like the DPCI partly
relates to the fact that their investigations may involve focusing on the political elite and on powerful,
‘politically connected’ individuals. ICOB investigations may also focus on senior police officers who are
‘politically connected’. For instance, two former national commissioners, Jackie Selebi and Bheki Cele,
have been prominent members of the ruling party. Jackie Selebi was the subject of investigation by the
ICD. Though the ICD’s investigation did not confirm the validity of the allegations against him, he was
later found guilty of corruption. Where senior SAPS officials are subject to investigation by the IPID,
there may be efforts to protect them from investigation, particularly where they are politically connected.
Owing to the importance of the police organisation in the overall process of governing the country,
there is often a very close relationship between the senior political official responsible for the police
(the Minister of Police) and the police chief or Commissioner. While this relationship is supposed to be
governed by certain principles regarding the respective powers of these two officials, in practice it does
not always work this way. Thus, in 2011, a police commissioner in Victoria, Australia, resigned after it
was found that he had ‘released misleading crime statistics which were favourable to the government
immediately before an election’.42 Questions about the influence of the Minister of Police over the
National Commissioner were also prominent before the Marikana Commission, which found that the
Minister of Police may have influenced the decision to launch the police operation on 16 August 2012
at Marikana.43
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
7
The nature of the relationship between the two does not only mean that the police chief may do
‘favours’ for his/her political heads, but also that the police chief often has a lot of influence with the
Minister. The police chief has to try to secure cooperation from rank-and-file personnel. Depending on
qualities such as his/her own temperament, values, and understanding of police work, this may involve
some orientation towards condoning or ‘turning a blind eye’ to certain types of abuses by the police.
This means that it is not only when the police chief himself/herself, or his/her closest colleagues, are
the subject of investigation that the police chief may have an interest in securing ‘lenient’ treatment
for the police. The police chief may also try to interfere with investigations against lower-ranking police
officials. This may be to protect his/her own reputation, because he/she condones their behaviour,
or it may be a means of maintaining his/her credibility with rank-and-file police members. The police
commissioner may try to exert pressure on the head of the ICOB, and also use his/her access to the
Minister to secure the support of the Minister in exerting pressure on the ICOB head. The potential for
this is enhanced by the fact that the police commissioner typically enjoys greater formal status and
informal power than the ICOB Executive Director and also typically has greater access to the Minister
of Police.
Vulnerability of the ICOB to ‘regulatory capture’
‘Regulatory capture’ occurs when a group being regulated (in this case the police) subverts the
impartiality and zealousness of the regulator (in this case the ICOB). In relation to ICOBs, regulatory
capture may manifest itself in various ways, including ‘sympathy [by ICOB personnel] with the
particular problems that (the police) confront in meeting standards’, resulting in an inclination to
excuse breaches of standards and an ‘absence of toughness’.44
According to Savage, ‘regulatory capture is the ever-present potential with which independent
investigation has to come to terms and which must be constantly addressed’.45 Factors that
contribute to the vulnerability of ICOBs to regulatory capture include:
•
•
Their reliance on police cooperation, resources and personnel; and
The tendency for a significant proportion of ICOB personnel to be former police officers.
Reliance on police cooperation, resources and personnel
As indicated above, the creation of ICOBs often provokes hostility and distrust on the part of police
personnel. At the same time, ICOBs are reliant on police cooperation in order to do their work
effectively. To do so, they need to overcome this distrust and hostility.
Although ICOB investigations may focus on senior police personnel, the role of an ICOB is mostly to
focus on rank-and-file police officers. For investigative purposes (or for monitoring, if this is their role),
ICOB personnel consistently have to interact not only with these individual officers who are the subject
of investigation (‘subject officers’), but also with their colleagues and superiors.
Thus, in any investigation into an allegation against a police officer, some or all of the witnesses are
likely to be other police officers. It may also be necessary to obtain the assistance of superiors or
others in the police department to obtain access to documents such as custody registers or data
from vehicle tracking systems.
While legislation requires police to cooperate with the IPID,46 the quality of the cooperation that IPID
personnel receive is obviously qualitatively different if it is given willingly rather than unwillingly. As with
other ICOBs, the ability of the IPID personnel to do their work can be undermined by the police using
strategies such as deliberate delays, failing to return telephone calls, or claims that documents have
been lost.
Based on interviews with personnel from the three main ICOBs in England, Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland, Savage states that many interviewees from these bodies indicated that the ICOBs:
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
8
have tended to be ‘over cautious’ in their dealings with the police bodies under
investigation, often linked to a concern to maintain good working relationships with
them. This might be reflected in, say, a reluctance within the complaints organisation
to seize an officer’s notebook for investigation, or filing an investigative report on police
failings which ‘pulls punches’ rather than boldly stating the case.47
A similar issue is that ICOBs are typically dependent on police resources and personnel to carry out
certain specialist functions. For instance, ICOBs frequently do not have the capability to carry out
ballistic tests. They may also depend on other specialist capabilities within the police. The IPID (this
also applied previously to the ICD) uses the services of experts from the SAPS Local Criminal Records
Centre (LCRC) at crime scenes where people have been shot by the police. This includes the use of
general crime scene experts, who collect evidence at crime scenes and document the layout of the
scene by means of photographs and sketches, as well as ballistics experts.48 LCRC units function
to some degree separately from crime prevention49 and (to a lesser degree) detective units. But there
are often both formal and informal links between personnel in these different units.
Even in ‘developed’ countries where ICOBs may be better resourced, there is a similar dependence.
With regard to the United Kingdom and Ireland, for instance, Savage states:
[ICOB] investigations frequently require access to specialist forensic services and
technical expertise which are not available as in-house facilities – for example,
ballistics expertise, traffic collision expertise, and so on. This can mean that
complaints bodies are forced to turn to their local police organisation, with its much
more comprehensive range of support facilities, for those analytical services.50
The support that ICOBs depend on the police for comprises not only technical support. Owing to the
fact that police personnel far outnumber those of ICOBs, they (ICOBs) also rely on police support for
guarding crime scenes, even after ICOB investigators reach the scene. This is a feature of the work of
ICOBs in South Africa,51 the United Kingdom and Ireland.52
The implication of this is that there is continuous informal pressure on investigative personnel to treat
the police leniently, for instance by conducting interviews in a superficial way rather than pursuing
questions in order to ensure that the police answer them in a full and satisfactory way. As Savage puts
it, investigators ‘sometimes … do not feel they can use the full range of powers actually open to them
because of an organizational concern to maintain good relationships with police bodies’.53
As a result, ICOB investigative personnel have to walk a fine line in order to do their jobs effectively.
Their work continually involves ‘negotiating’ with the police about the extent of their power to scrutinise
police actions. To motivate police to cooperate with them, they use strategies such as referring to their
formal powers, emphasising that they are fair and impartial, and taking great trouble to present
themselves as ‘reasonable’ in relation to their approach to the work of the police.
The reliance of ICOB personnel on police cooperation and support is therefore one factor that contributes
to the risk of regulatory capture (one of the characteristics of which is ‘an absence of toughness’). ICOB
personnel face continual pressure to be lenient and run the risk that, if they investigate the police in a
thorough and vigorous way, they will pay the price for this in the form of non-cooperation on the part
of the police.
The fact that the ICD and thus IPID personnel have to perform a ‘balancing act’ in order to maintain
police goodwill was reflected in interviews with ICD investigators carried out in 2010. For instance,
the ICD investigators indicated that, among the challenges that they face in investigating the police
are that:
•
ICD personnel frequently have to appeal for the intervention of senior police (at station
commander or even provincial commissioner level) in order to secure cooperation by the police;54
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
9
•
•
•
It is not easy to investigate the police and one has to be careful about how one approaches
them;55
Though the ICD receives good assistance from LCRC personnel (responsible for documenting
evidence at crime scenes), if ICD personnel are asked for more than a routine procedure, they
(the LCRC personnel) may become more difficult; and56
The ICD also relies on the police to carry out arrests on their behalf.57
ICOB personnel
There is a consistent pattern whereby ICOB personnel, particularly ICOB investigators, are drawn
from the ranks of police officers. The primary reason for this is that the biggest pool of people with the
appropriate skills to do investigative work is to be found among current and former police personnel.
For instance, a review of ICOBs in the United States of America (USA) states that investigators in many
jurisdictions have a law enforcement background.58
It is likely that as many as 30 to 40% of ICD investigators, and possibly more, were former police
officers.59 Owing to the fact that there has been a high level of continuity in the transition from the
ICD to IPID, the profile of staff is likely to be very similar. The fact that former SAPS personnel are a
prominent component of the IPID is reflected in a report that appeared in the press in July 2015. This
indicated that the Gauteng head of the IPID had previously been a brigadier in the SAPS. The report
stated that two job candidates whose job applications she was involved in considering had also been
with her in the SAPS.60 The current IPID Executive Director, Robert McBride, is himself also a former
police officer, having served as head of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department.
Employing former police officers has certain benefits for ICOBs. The employment of former police
detectives ‘may have its advantages not only because they understand the investigative process but
because they have insiders’ knowledge of other practises and procedures, such as the details of
different kinds of registers, within the police’.61
According to one former police officer working for an ICOB in the USA, ‘knowing proper police
procedure saves me a lot of time’.62 Another benefit may be that ‘the investigators’ previous experience
as police officers helps address police union and subject officers’ concerns that [the ICOB] does not
understand police work or is biased against officers’.63
On the other hand, there are clearly substantial risks involved in the employment of former police
personnel. One of these is that, if a police agency is known to employ former police personnel, the
public may question whether it is genuinely independent.64 Another risk here is that ‘former police officers
will still be aligned with negative aspects of the organisational culture of the police. They may for
instance be inclined to excuse human rights violations as justified and necessary in “fighting crime”.’65
The fact that ICOBs employ a significant number of former police also increases their vulnerability
to ‘regulatory capture’ due to ICOB officials’ ‘sympathy with the particular problems that (the police)
confront in meeting standards, resulting in an inclination to excuse breaches of standards and an
“absence of toughness”’.66
Key aspects of the High Court and Constitutional Court judgments
This section of the paper highlights some key aspects of the High Court and Constitutional Court
judgments, but should not be seen as a detailed summary of either judgment.
Both the High Court and Constitutional Court judgments emphasise questions about the comparison
between the IPID and the DPCI. Related to this, the Glenister judgment is a key source of reference for
both. The High Court found that the independence of the IPID is expressly guaranteed and protected
under section 206(6) of the Constitution67 and that ‘the effect of the constitutional entrenchment of the
independence of IPID is that the operational and structural independence of IPID must be at least as
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
10
strongly protected as that of the DPCI’.68 Similarly, the Constitutional Court found that ‘the threshold
for satisfying independence in respect of IPID is arguably more stringent [than for the DPCI] given that
the Constitution expressly demands its independence’.69
A further issue highlighted by the High Court was the fact that the DPCI is situated in the SAPS70 and
that, as a result, the IPID is also responsible for investigating cases against DPCI members. It would
therefore make little sense if the IPID was less independent than the DPCI.
As IPID has oversight and accountability responsibilities over the DPCI, affording the
DPCI adequate independence without doing the same for IPID appears to be selfdefeating. In this regard, the High Court held that IPID’s oversight role over the DPCI
would be compromised and might create room for political interference to seep
through and render the DPCI’s independence nugatory.71
The critical issue that the courts had to decide on concerned the Minister’s powers in relation to
the suspension, discipline or removal of the IPID Executive Director. The High Court found that ‘this
amounts to inadequate security of tenure for a national head of an independent body investigating
police misconduct, including corruption’.72 Speaking on behalf of a unanimous Constitutional Court,
Acting Justice Bosielo confirmed this view. The judgment states that Section 6 of the IPID Act:
gives the Minister enormous political powers and control over the Executive Director
of IPID. It gives the Minister the power to remove the Executive Director of IPID from
his office without parliamentary oversight. This is antithetical to the entrenched
independence of IPID envisaged by the Constitution as it is tantamount to impermissible
political management of IPID by the Minister. To my mind, this state of affairs creates
room for the Minister to invoke partisan political influence to appoint someone who is
likely to pander to his whims or who is sympathetic to the Minister’s political orientation.
This might lead to IPID becoming politicised and being manipulated. Is this compatible
with IPID’s independence as demanded by the Constitution and the IPID Act?
Certainly not.73
A key point that the Constitutional Court emphasises is that strengthening the independence of the
IPID does not undermine the principle that the IPID should be accountable. The Constitutional Court
notes various sections of the IPID Act that require reporting by the Executive Director to the Minister.74
The Constitutional Court then states:
The fact that IPID is required by both the Constitution and the IPID Act to be independent
does not mean that it cannot be held accountable. Like all other organs of state, IPID
must be accountable for its actions. To be insulated from undue political interference
or control does not mean that IPID should be insulated from political accountability.75
Conclusion
In Glenister, the Constitutional Court recognised that it is necessary for specialised anti-corruption
agencies (ACAs) to enjoy sufficient independence to prevent undue political interference and noted that
this requires their ‘de-politicisation’.76 At the same time, the Court found that specialised ACAs cannot
have ‘full’ or ‘absolute’ independence. As the Court stated: ‘In light of international standards, one of
the prominent and mandatory features of specialised institutions is not full independence but rather
an adequate level of structural and operational autonomy’.77
In the McBride case, the Constitutional Court found that the principles applying to the independence
of the IPID are similar to those that apply to the DPCI.78 The IPID, unlike the DPCI, is not part of the
SAPS, though it falls under the same Minister as the SAPS and the DPCI. But, though the IPID has
some level of structural autonomy, the operational independence that it enjoys is far more ambiguous.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
11
As this policy paper shows, the IPID is in many ways dependent on the SAPS and depends on
cooperation from SAPS members in order to carry out its functions effectively. Former SAPS members
also make up a significant proportion of IPID personnel.
The IPID therefore occupies a position of vulnerability in which the ability and willingness of IPID
personnel to act ‘without fear or favour’ in investigating the police cannot be taken for granted. The
ability of the Executive Director to affirm the independence of the IPID is therefore pivotal to whether
or not ICD personnel are able to assert themselves as representatives of an independent body. As the
High Court judgment indicates: ‘The Executive Director is at the very heart of IPID’s ability to function
effectively to fulfil its constitutional mandate, and is critical to ensuring the proper conduct of
investigations by IPID.’79
By giving effect to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, Parliament will therefore strengthen the
Executive Director’s protection against being dismissed for arbitrary reasons. In so doing, Parliament
will be strengthening the ability of the IPID Executive Director to act independently and will therefore
contribute to the overall ability of the IPID to assert itself as an independent entity. This will hopefully
contribute to greater public trust in the IPID.
Taking into account the centrality of the Executive Director to the status and independence of the IPID,
Parliament should also consider reviewing the provisions of the IPID Act in relation to the appointment of
the Director. The 2012 National Development Plan recommends that the SAPS National Commissioner
should be appointed on a competitive basis,80 and therefore it also seems reasonable for this to be
considered in relation to the IPID Executive Director. It may also be worthwhile for Parliament to consider
whether it is appropriate for current or former police officers to be eligible for appointment as Director
of the IPID.
At the same time, one of the ongoing challenges facing the IPID is that of resources. Related to this
is the fact that IPID struggles to maintain the capacity to carry out its functions effectively. In a context
of resource constraints, a body like the IPID can never be resourced at the ‘ideal’ level. But the issue
of adequate resourcing of the IPID should itself be recognised as integral to establishing the IPID as a
body with the authority to act with confidence in its own independence.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
12
Endnotes
1
This policy paper is based in part on two affidavits made by the author in 2015 on behalf of the Council for the
Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC). The affidavits were prepared in support of CASAC’s
submissions to the High Court after CASAC was admitted as an amicus curiae in the McBride case. Certain
passages from the original affidavits are quoted or referred to in the High Court judgment (see, for instance, paras
25 to 27 and 30 to 33). The arguments put forward in this policy paper are similar to, and consistent with, those in
the original affidavits. A number of the passages from the affidavits have been reworked and restructured for the
purpose of producing this policy paper. (CASAC was an amicus when the case was heard in the High Court but
was not an amicus in the Constitutional Court case.)
2
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] ZACC 30 (6 September 2016); available at:
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/30.pdf.
3
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] ZAGPPHC 830; [2016] 1 All SA 811 (GP); 2016 (4) BCLR 539 (GP)
at para 17.
4
In terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution.
5
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para 121; McBride v
Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) (note 2 above) at para 8.
6
Dissel, Masuku, Tshelo & Tait ‘The police as friend and helper to the people: Assessing the Lesotho Mounted
Police Service performance in terms of the South African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO)
Code of Conduct’ on pages 8 and 12; available at: http://www.apcof.org/files/APCOF%20Lesotho%20
Indicators%20Final%20Web.pdf.
7
The IPCB website is: http://ipcb.gov.sl/.
8
Trevor Jones ‘The governance and accountability of policing’ in Tim Newburn (ed.) Handbook of Policing, 603-627
Cullompton, Devon, UK: Willan Publishing 2003 at 605.
9
Where cases against the police are investigated (whether by the IPID or internally) and are referred for prosecution,
the National Prosecuting Authority and the courts also become involved in the process of holding individual policing
agents accountable.
10
At various points, the policy paper refers to ‘alleged or possible’ offences. Cases dealt with by the IPID, or its
predecessor, the ICD, include cases where there are allegations that the police have been involved in wrongdoing
as well as cases that are referred to them (the IPID or the ICD) in terms of ‘mandatory reporting’ requirements. For
instance, deaths in police custody or as a result of police action are referred to the IPID (and were referred to the
ICD) irrespective of whether or not they were alleged to have been ‘offences’. The reason for reporting the cases
to the ICD/IPID can be assumed to be related to the fact that they are possible offences.
11
The only exception to this is Northern Ireland where the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland
(OPONI) has responsibility for investigating all complaints against the police.
12
Jones (note 8 above) at 605.
13
UNOCD Handbook on Police, Accountability, Oversight and Integrity 2011 at 56; available at: http://www.unodc.org/
documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/PoliceAccountability_Oversight_and_Integrity_10-57991_
Ebook.pdf.
14
This was the mission statement of the ICD.
15
See, for instance, the case of the New York Civilian Complaint Review Board in UNOCD Handbook on Police,
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (note 13 above) at 57.
16
S Savage ‘Thinking independence: Calling the police to account through the independent investigation of police
complaints’ British Journal of Criminology (2013) 53, 94-112 at 101.
17
Office of the Police Ombudsman in Northern Ireland (OPONI) ‘The police complaints system in Northern Ireland’
2014; available at: http://www.policeombudsman.org/PONI/files/f2/f27a5142-0c57-4d30-af26-ea963dfa43a7.PDF
at 8.
18
See the ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security on the Independent Complaints Directorate’
24 August 2005.
19
M Mpisi & P Whittle ‘Review of the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security, 2004-2009, Parliamentary Research
Unit, 7 July 2009 as quoted in APCOF ‘Submission on the Independent Police Investigative Directorate Bill’ 26 July
2010 at 4; available at: http://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2010-APCOF-Submission-on-IPID-Bill-.pdf.
20
The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Bill 15 of 2010.
21
In terms of section 53(2)(b) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (prior to amendment by Act 1
of 2011).
22
South African Police Service (SAPS) Act, section 52(2)(a).
23
Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011.
24
Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act 2 of 2011.
25
Section 6(1)(j) of the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act 2 of 2011 requires the Secretariats to ‘assess
and monitor the police service’s ability to receive and deal with complaints against its members’.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
13
26
Section 6(1)(j) of the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act 2 of 2011.
27
Section 53(8) of the SAPS Act prior to amendment by the IPID Act.
28
In terms of section 29(1)(a) of the IPID Act.
29
SAPS Act 68 of 1995, section 50(2).
30
National Treasury ‘Republic of South Africa estimates of national expenditure 2011: Vote 23 – Independent
Complaints Directorate’ 2011; available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/
enebooklets/Vote%2023%20Independent%20Complaints%20Directorate.pdf.
31
National Treasury ‘Republic of South Africa estimates of national expenditure 2011: Vote 25 – South African Police
Service’ 2011; available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/enebooklets/Vote%20
25%20Police.pdf.
32
National Treasury ‘Republic of South Africa estimates of national expenditure 2015: Vote 20 – Independent Police
Investigative Directorate’ 2015; available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/
enebooklets/Vote%2020%20Independent%20Police%20Investigative%20Directorate.pdf.
33
National Treasury ‘Republic of South Africa estimates of national expenditure 2015: Vote 23 – South African Police
Service’ 2015; available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/enebooklets/Vote%20
23%20Police.pdf.
34
Section 51(4) of the SAPS Act.
35
Section 6(6) of the IPID Act.
36
UNOCD Handbook on Police, Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (note 13 above) at 70.
37
B Manby ‘The Independent Complaints Directorate: An opportunity wasted?’ South African Journal of Human
Rights (1996) 12(1), 419-451; M Montesh & S Dintwe ‘How independent is South Africa’s Independent Complaint’s
Directorate?’ Act Criminologica (2008) 21(2), 163-175; M Montesh & S Dintwe ‘Submission to Parliament –
Independent Police Investigative Directorate Bill, 2010’ School of Criminal Justice, University of South Africa; Y
Vawda & M Mtshali ‘Who is watching the watchers?: A critical assessment of the Independent Police Investigative
Directorate’s prospects of investigating misconduct in the South African Police Service’ Law, Democracy and
Development (2013) 17, 132-156.
38
This was the name for the Minister of Police until 2009.
39
B Manby ‘The Independent Complaints Directorate: An opportunity wasted?’ (note 37 above) at 444.
40
M Montesh & S Dintwe ‘Submission to Parliament – Independent Police Investigative Directorate Bill, 2010’
(note 37 above).
41
Y Vawda & M Mtshali ‘Who is watching the watchers?’ (note 37 above) at 152.
42
Phillip Stenning ‘Governance of the police: Independence, accountability and interference’ Ray Whitrod Memorial
Lecture 2011 at 3.
43
Marikana Commission of Inquiry ‘Report on matters of public, national and international concern arising out of the
tragic incidents at the Lonmin mine in Marikana, in the North West province, 452 at para 74.
44
Based on the abstract from Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite (1992), ‘In and out of the revolving door: Making sense
of regulatory capture’ Journal of Public Policy 12: 61–78; available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAb
stract?fromPage=online&aid=2747524&fileId=S0143814X00005006.
45
S Savage ‘Thinking independence’ (note 16 above) at 109.
46
See section 29(2) of the IPID Act 1 of 2011.
47
S Savage ‘Thinking independence’ (note 16 above) at 104.
48
David Bruce ‘Basic investigation skills for incident investigation’; unpublished report for the African Civilian Oversight
Agency, August 2010.
49
Also sometimes called ‘uniformed’ or ‘visible policing’.
50
S Savage ‘Thinking independence’ (note 16 above) at 107.
51
David Bruce ‘Basic investigation skills’ (note 48 above) at 27.
52
S Savage ‘Thinking independence’ (note 16 above) at 105-106.
53
Ibid. at 104.
54
Interview with ICD investigator, 21 June, Johannesburg.
55
Interview with ICD investigators, 25 June 2010 (Mahikeng) and 28 June (Durban).
56
Interview with ICD investigator, 21 June 2010, Johannesburg.
57
Interview with ICD investigator, 10 June 2010, Pretoria.
58
Peter Finn ‘Citizen review of police: Approaches and implementation’ 2001 National Institute of Justice: Issues and
Practice, 89; available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf.
59
Robert David Bruce, affidavit submitted in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) in the matter
between Robert McBride and the Minister of Police, case no. 6588/15 at 55-56.
60
Setumo Stone & Lerato Motsa ‘Gauteng police watchdog head in nepotism probe’ Business Day, 2 July 2015;
available at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/07/02/gauteng-police-watchdog-head-in-nepotism-probe.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
14
61
David Bruce ‘Basic investigation skills’ (note 48 above) at 2.
62
Peter Finn (note 58 above) at 89.
63
Ibid. at 89.
64
Ibid.
65
David Bruce (note 48 above) at 1-2.
66
Based on the abstract for Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite ‘In and out of the revolving door: Making sense of
regulatory capture’ Journal of Public Policy (1992) 12; available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstra
ct?fromPage=online&aid=2747524&fileId=S0143814X00005006 at 61-78.
67
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] (note 3 above) at paras 15-16.
68
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] (note 3 above) at para 17.
69
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 37.
70
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] (note 3 above) at para 21. See also Constitutional Court judgment
at para 16.
71
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] (note 3 above) at para 24. See also Constitutional Court judgment
at para 16.
72
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 17, quoting High Court at
para 46.
73
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 17.
74
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 27.
75
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 28.
76
Glenister (note 5 above) at para 121.
77
Glenister (note 5 above) at para 121. This passages is quoted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), ‘Specialised anti-corruption institutions: Review of models’ (2008) at 17 (OECD report).
78
McBride v Minister of Police and Another (CCT255/15) [2016] (note 2 above) at para 36–37.
79
McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2015] (note 3 above) at para 51.
80
National Planning Commission ‘Our future, make it work – National Development Plan 2030’, 2012 at 354.
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
15
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
xxxxxxx
ABOUT APCOF
The African Policing and Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) is a network of African policing practitioners
from state and non-state institutions. It is active in promoting police reform through strengthening
civilian oversight over the police in Africa. APCOF believes that strong and effective civilian oversight
assists in restoring public confidence in the police; promotes a culture of human rights, integrity and
transparency within the police; and strengthens working relationships between the police and the
community.
APCOF achieves its goals through undertaking research and providing technical support and capacity
building to state and non-state actors including civil society organisations, the police and new and
emerging oversight bodies in Africa.
APCOF was established in 2004, and its Secretariat is based in Cape Town, South Africa.
CONTACT APCOF
African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum
Suite 103–105A, Building 17
Waverley Business Park
Wyecroft Road
Mowbray 7925
South Africa
Tel:
+27 21 447 1818
Fax: +27 21 447 0373
Email: info@apcof.org.za
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily relect those of the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum
(APCOF). Authors contribute to the APCOF Policy Papers series in their personal capacity.
© APCOF 2017
Designed and typeset by COMPRESS.dsl
www.apcof.org.za
APCOF Policy Paper No. 16
16