Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (2009) 623–645
brill.nl/ajss
he Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia
Burhanuddin Muhtadi
Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University
Abstract
his article describes the nature of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the post-Suharto era and
its views on the resurrection of the global Islamic caliphate, its opposition to the notions of
democracy and nation-state. In the aftermath of Suharto’s fall in 1998, HTI has seized the
opportunity to promise the establishment of a fair society under a global Islamic caliphate. he
rapid rise of HTI has, more so than most other Islamist groups, been accentuated by the growing
public dissatisfaction with the post-Suharto or reformasi period. here is an increasing perception in larger society that political, economic, and law reforms introduced in the reformasi era
has had no significant impact to improve people’s daily lives. his deteriorating condition under
post-Suharto regimes has successfully justified the HTI’s claims that Indonesia needs a radical
and comprehensive system, or what HTI coined as al-khalifah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic caliphate).
Looking at HTI’s grand narrative of the global Islamic caliphate and its refutation of the ideas of
democracy and nation-state, it is clear that HTI has taken a number of negative steps in the
direction of democratic consolidation in Indonesia.
Keywords
Hizbut Tahrir, Indonesia, Post-Suharto, Islamic caliphate, nation-state, Umma (Islamic community)
Introduction
“he imperialists poisoned society (umma) with nationalism, patriotism,
socialism, as they poisoned them with a narrow concept of regions and territory . . . [within this context] they were poisoned with the illusion that to
establish Dawlah Islāmīya (Islamic state) is unattainable and to achieve unity
within diverse Islamic states with their distinct culture, people, and language
is unfeasible in spite of the fact that they are umma who are tied with Islamic
aqīdah (belief ) from which Islamic order (nizām al Islām) is derived” (AnNabhani, 2002:1, quoted in Salim, 2004:209).
Despite the presence and activities of the Islamic politically radical group
Hizbut Tahrir (HT) having drawn only minimal attention from scholars,
HT is fast becoming a worldwide phenomenon in recent years (Fealy, 2005).
Of the few studies on HT conducted in the last five years, most of them
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009
DOI: 10.1163/156853109X460219
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approach the party by employing security analyses (Fealy, 2005). It is no wonder that some Western analysts who use a security approach to find out about
HT, but are less knowledgeable about Islamic studies, tend to conclude that
HT is a terrorist organisation ‘in the mould of al-Qaeda’ and recommend the
dissolution of the party and a freeze on its assets (Ehrenfeld and Lapen, 2005).
Zeyno Baran (2005:68−78), Director of International Security and Energy
Programs at the Nixon Center, described HT as a ‘conveyor belt for terrorists’
and ‘Islam’s Bolsheviks’. She organised a limited conference dubbed “he
Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology” in September 2004 to bring together experts to eventually make recommendations to the West so that they do not deal with HT from the perspective
of religious freedom.
Similarly, the Community Security Trust’s Whine (2005) believes that ‘members
of HT continue to provide a manpower pool for terrorist recruitment’. Likewise, the Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen (2003:5) labelled HT a ‘totalitarian’ organisation which ‘shares the goals of al-Qaeda and other global jihadi
movements’. he Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies’ Rohan Gunaratna
(2004:124−125), as argued elsewhere, demonstrates the existence of linkages
between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and local HT groups. Unfortunately, most of
those accusers of HT have not provided evidence to support their claims adequately (Fealy, 2005).
Despite lack of evidence in supporting such accusations, particularly
whether the linkages between Al-Qaeda, JI and HT are exist or not, Indonesia
should be more careful of the rapid rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
he resignation of Suharto in 1998 created a window of opportunity for
mushrooming Islamic movements, such as Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia
(MMI) and Fron Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders’ Front, FPI), including HTI. Like other Islamist groups, HTI has exploited the open democratic
space under post-Suharto regimes to develop and express its views. It now
claims hundreds of thousands of active members (usually referred to as
hizbiyyin) and sympathisers. he presence of the politically radical group HTI
had drawn public attention since the international conference on al-khilafah
al-Islamiyyah (Islamic caliphate) attended by hundreds of HTI members and
sympathisers in Jakarta in 2000.
he public has come to know more about HTI’s agenda since 29 February
2004 when more than 50,000 of its members — the men in white, the women
in headscarves — marched through the main streets of Jakarta, Surabaya,
Makassar and other big cities to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the
abolition of the caliphate system.1 HTI’s primary objective is to rebuild a
1
he protesters yelled their condemnation to Kemal Attaturk who was accused of the responsibility for abolishing the Ottoman caliphate in the name of Turkish secularism.
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global Islamic caliphate on the basis of shari〜a (Islamic law).2 On 12 August
2007, HTI hosted an International Caliphate Conference attended by members of HT around the world. More than 100,000 people gathered in Jakarta
for attending the conference. What made them remarkable was not their size,
but their issue. Of the many Islamist political movements in Indonesia inspired
by the influence of the Middle East, “HTI is the only [organisation] which is
controlled by a foreign leadership, which draws its ideology strictly from a
Middle Eastern source, and whose agenda is fundamentally transnational”
(Fealy, 2005).
his essay will examine the nature of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the
post-Suharto era and its ideological framework. It will then investigate how
HTI has, more so than most other Islamist groups, benefited from the collapse
of the regime. here is an increasing perception in larger society that political,
economic and legal reforms introduced in the reformation (reformasi) era have
had no significant impact to improve people’s daily lives. his deteriorating
condition under post-Suharto regimes has successfully justified the claims of
HTI that Indonesia needs a radical and comprehensive system, or what HTI
coined as khilafah al-Islamiyyah (an Islamic caliphate).
In order to understand the mission of HTI, it is necessary to look at its history, ideology and structure. his essay will begin with a brief description of
the party. It will then look at HTI’s ideology to uncover how it responds contemporary issues, such as democracy, the nation-state and nationalism. Following this, it will give special attention to the notion of umma (the Islamic
conception of political community), and the way it contradicts the idea of
nation-state. he discussion of ‘imagined’ umma, as opposed to Benedict
R. O. Anderson’s ‘imagined’ communities, will be developed. Additionally,
the essay will highlight the importance of forming and framing Islamic identity given that this particular identity is contested among Muslims. Finally, the
essay will contend that, based on the explanation of a thoroughly ideological
framework of HTI, most notably its primary objective to rebuild the global
caliphate and its rejection of the idea of nation-state and democracy, the party
has become a hindrance to the development of democratic consolidation in
the post-Suharto era.
2
he term shari〜a is often understood as Islamic law; however, according to Marshal (2005:1),
the term ‘law” is “too restrictive to give a sense of its full scope.” In many instances, the advocates
of shari〜a describe shari〜a comprehensively, in which shari〜a provides rules and guidelines for
religious, political, economic and cultural matters.
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Origins, Leadership and Membership of HTI
An examination of the complete history of the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir
(HT), initially established in the Middle East, is beyond the scope of this
essay. We can only sketch briefly that HT was founded by its ideologue,
Taqiyyudin An-Nabhani in Jerussalem in 1952 (Taji-Farouki, 1996; ICG,
2003). It describes itself as a political party, but it is not involved in formal
electoral politics. Since An-Nabhani was forced to live in exile in the 1950s,
HT generated public support in Jordan, the West Bank and some in Beirut
(ICG, 2003:3). he repression of Middle Eastern regimes against HT members led them to emigrate and set up new branches in Western countries,
including Australia.
In this respect, Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, Palestinian-born activist of HT
who emigrated to Australia in the 1960s and Abdullah bin Nuh, the head of
al-Ghazali Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Bogor, played a vital role in
the dissemination of HT in Indonesia (Salim, 2004; Yusanto, pers. comm.
23 February 2005). Abdullah was an outstanding Islamic teacher and preacher
who was disillusioned with existing Islamic organisations in Indonesia during
the late 1970s. In his search for an alternative model of Islamic thinking and
activism, Abdullah began to be attracted to HT ideas and ideology (Fealy,
2005). During his visits to Sydney, where his son was being educated, Abdullah met with an HT activist, Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi. Interested in the
talent and knowledge of the charismatic and young Al-Baghdadi, Abdullah
invited him to come to Indonesia to spread HT ideology and An-Nabhani’s
ideas to the pesantren’s students.
Since the arrival of Al-Baghdadi in 1982, Abdullah and Al-Baghdadi devised
a more systematic education system to recruit more members outside the
pesantren (Salim, 2004; Fealy, 2005). Not surprisingly then, the pesantren has
become a centre of learning for the ideas of HT. Two methods of intensive
training were introduced: halaqah (study circles) and daurah (training programmes). In early 1984, a number of Islamic student activists from a religious activity unit at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (Institut Pertanian
Bogor, IPB), called the Student Association for Islamic Propagation (Badan
Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa, BKIM), joined the learning circles taught by
Al-Baghdadi himself. hese activists, led by Muhammad Al-Khaththath, subsequently created study groups called halaqah on their own campus to learn
HT ideas and ideology.
In the early years of HTI’s emergence, Abdullah and Al-Baghdadi did not
mention of HT in order to avoid the attention of the Suharto regime’s security
services (Fealy, 2005). However, the key aspects of HT ideology, such as the
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need for a universal Islamic state (caliphate) and the radical and comprehensive implementation of Islamic law, were widely disseminated. In short, like
other groups, the party was maintained as a clandestine organisation due to
Suharto’s repression of political Islam which put Islamist activists at a high
political risk (Salim, 2004). At the same time, the scope and force of Islamic
student activism on campus began to enter a new chapter in the wake of
Suharto’s increasing political repression against student political activities. AlKhaththath, Hafidz Abdurrahman, Ismail Yusanto, Zulia Ilmawati and Fahmi
Amhar, regarded as Al-Baghdadi’s and Nuh’s most favoured early recruits, used
official campus-sponsored religious bodies for recruitment and organisational
purposes (Fealy, 2005). Incidentally, most of them were involved actively in
the Campus Proselytisation Institute (LDK). Subsequently, LDK activists
who were influenced by HT ideas built a broader network of inter-campus
predication by establishing the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication (FSLDK). hrough this network, HT doctrines were then propagated
outside Bogor and began to link up to LDK network in other campus groups,
particularly in the larger state institutions, such as Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada
University (UGM), Depok’s University of Indonesia (UI), and so on.
It is worth noting that LDK alone is hardly homogenous and within this
Islamic student network there are a range of different opinions about strategies
for establishing an Islamic state and the degree of acceptance toward ideas of
democracy and nation-state. As will be explained in the next section, the core
religious convictions of LDK were largely adopted from Ikhwan al-Muslimin
doctrines, such as the idea that Islam is al-diin or a total, comprehensive and
all-encompassing way of life with no separation between aqidah wa shari〜ah
(belief and law) and diin wa dawlah (religion and state). In this regard, there
is no sharp contrast between the Ikhwan-inspired LDK activists and their
HTI counterpart. Both Ikhwan and HT-influenced student activists also used
usrah (family) or halaqah (religious study groups) serving as a pattern to manage and train its followers in a more systematic way.
What makes HTI very different from Ikhwan-influenced LDK activists is
the ideological framework created by its founder, An-Nabhani. Unlike the
mainstream LDK who believe that democracy can provide a way to form an
Islamic state, HTI strongly opposes the idea of democracy and nation-state.
For many young Muslims, this vision is a source of strength. hey were
attracted to HT doctrines by the argument that Islam is no longer a powerful
force in world politics because Muslims have been divided by a nation-state
imposed by the West. Also, some people were buying into HT ideas, such as
its opposition to democracy and the call for a return to a comprehensive
Islamic system, which provides the foundational basis for the reestablishment
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of a transnational Islamic caliphate. hey viewed that HT ideological framework and methods are much more radical, comprehensive and attractive than
other Islamist groups.
In contrast to HTI, critics within Ikhwan-affiliated activists consider the
goals and methods of HTI are unrealistic. Unlike HTI, their approach remains
firmly grounded in political realism and thus they accept Indonesia as the
nation-state and pursue its objectives through the democratic system. Unsurprisingly then, Ikhwan followers, called Tarbiyah, competed with HTI activists to recruit followers on university campuses. When LDK activists who were
closely associated with Ikhwan formed the Muslim Student Action Union
(Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, or KAMMI), HTI-affiliated
activists voiced their rejection. When political control eased in the aftermath
of Suharto’s fall in May 1998, KAMMI leaders established a new political
party, the Justice Party or Partai Keadilan (now Partai Keadilan Sejahtera),
while HT took a more radical position, rejecting democracy as un-Islamic.
In short, the collapse of Suharto in 1998 provided the public space for
Indonesian Muslim activists to operate and expand. Like other newly Islamic
groups, HTI seized the opportunity by emerging into public view. It began
launching its pamphlets for public consumption that bore the attribution
‘Syabab Hizbut Tahrir’ (Hizbut Tahrir Youth) (Salim, 2004:v). he activities
of HTI range from the publication and circulating of various forms of publication, such as books,3 Bulletin al-Islam (Islamic bulletin), and al-Wa〜ie magazine, to public seminars. After organising an international conference in
Jakarta in 2000, Hizbut Tahrir activists formally declared the emergence of its
centralised federal organisation, called Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. As the only
Islamic organisation that is fully controlled by a foreign leadership, HTI is
inter-related and inter-connected with its counterparts elsewhere, including
Hizbut Tahrir in Middle East, Western Europe, Central Asia and Pakistan.
Since 2000, HTI’s structure, membership, and scope of operations have
steadily increased. In terms of structure, HTI follows the pattern used by the
HT internationally (Fealy, 2005). HTI has a pyramidal organisational structure, with administrative organs at three distinct levels. he centralised leadership committee (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP) is at the apex, which coordinate
all local branches from the Province-Level Executive Board (Dewan Pimpinan
Wilayah, DPW) and the District-Level Executive Board (Dewan Pimpinan
Cabang, DPC). he exact number and names of DPP, DPW and DPC are
difficult to ascertain, but information in HTI publications identifies at least
3
Most of its book publications are published by HTI’s affiliated publisher, Pustaka hariqul
Izzah, in Bogor.
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ten personals. Until recently, HTI reached almost all provinces across Indonesia, except Papua. Branches require at least 50 members, 10 of whom must
have sufficient knowledge of An-Nabhani’s doctrines to recruit and supervise
the newer members.
Penetrating HTI’s membership is also difficult. Like its counterparts elsewhere in the world, HTI refuses to release information on the size of its membership (Salim, 2004). Judging by the size of HTI rallies in large cities across
the country and its capacity to organise an international conference in 2007
that drew approximately 100,000 supporters, it is reasonable to assume a
membership of at least several hundred thousand. he party is still largely
campus-based, so the majority of HTI membership comprises tertiary students, particularly from the medical and natural sciences. Its current spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, is a geological engineer graduated from one of
Indonesia’s premier institutions, UGM. Some of them have advanced degrees
from foreign universities. Fahmi Amhar, one of HTI’s leading figures, is a
Ph.D. graduate from Vienna University of Technology in geomatic engineering. HTI has also found acceptance in urban areas. After graduating from
university, HTI members move into professional careers and then try to recruit
newer members in their workplaces and professional associations.
Realising that Indonesia, historically and traditionally, has been dominated
by two large Islamic-based mass-organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah, HTI has tried to nibble at these organisations and their support base. Salim’s (2005) work found that almost all of HTI leaders have an
NU background because most of them come from NU-based villages in East
and Central Java. Muhammad Al-Khaththath, another of HTI’s leading figures, for instance, grew up in NU culture in Pasuruan; a similar case is with
Ismail Yusanto (an NU pesantren graduate in Cilacap) and Hafidz Abdurrahman (raised in pesantren Darul Ulum, Widang). Even though many HTI
activists grew up in an NU culture, they acquired their religious education
primarily from campus dakwah groups (LDK) when they pursued tertiary
education. Hence, LDK became a key institutional focus for the initial engagement of Muslim students from the traditionalist NU or the modernist
Muhammadiyah background to embrace HTI ideas. Since then, those Muslim students were unwilling to identify with a particular group, such as the
traditionalist or modernist Muslims. Instead, they were more likely to call
themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to reproduce the modernist-traditionalist dichotomies, as well as a means of identifying with the wider Muslim community (umma).
Additionally, resulting from the selection during the 2005 Muhammadiyah
Congress of Dien Syamsuddin, an authoritative conservative figure, to lead
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Muhammadiyah, many HTI activists have joined the organisation (Wisnu,
2008). Although both conservative and liberal elements have long been a part
of Muhammadiyah, since Syamsuddin began leading Muhammadiyah, moderate Islamic figures have had a hard time entering the organisation’s leadership structure. HTI leaders have also insinuated their way into the Indonesian
Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI). Notable among these is
Al-Khaththath who holds a key position in the Council.
Ideological Framework
Like its counterparts elsewhere, HTI is distinguished from other Islamist
movements in that its primary goal of the establishment of Islamic superiority,
which includes the resurrection of a global caliphate, the rejection of nationstate, the case against secularism, democracy, globalisation and capitalism. In
other words, HTI declares that “its aim is to resume the Islamic way of life and
convey the Islamic call to the world” (Naumkin, 2005:128). For purposes of
this essay, I will delineate three major arguments highly promoted by the party.
Reestablishment of a Global Caliphate and Shari〜a
Among Islamist groups which share their belief in the concept of khilafah,
HTI is the most vocal group and extensively propagates the necessity of restoring a single and universal khilafah (caliphate) for all Muslims in the world. In
order to achieve that main aim, the party proposes a three-stage process for
what they claim as an ‘Islamic peace revolution’ (An-Nabhani, 2001:33; Baran,
2004:8). he first is the ‘culturing stage’ or ‘ideological stage’ in which the
activists of HTI educate a large section of Muslim society by various means.
his phase is usually called marhalah al-tathqif in which HTI focuses on training and guardianship for its cadres. he second is the ‘interaction stage’ or
marhalah tafa〜ul ma〜a al-naas in which the advocates of HTI infiltrate military, security offices, key political institutions and the like and then agitate
them for revolution by confronting those who oppose it. Finally, when
HTI reaches a momentum, the last stage is the actual revolution or istislam
al-hukmi in which the existing regimes are toppled.4
he restoration of an Islamic caliphate, according to HTI’s spokesperson,
Yusanto (pers. comm. 23 February 2005), is mandatory to every Muslim
4
For an Indonesian account, the leadership of HTI published a book to specifically comment
on these three methods, namely Bagaimana Membangun Kembali Negara Khilafah (published by
Pustaka hariqul Izzah, Bogor, 2004). his book was translated by Ramdhan Adi from Syabab
Hizbut Tahrir (2004).
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because of three arguments: (a) normative, (b) historical, and (c) factual. At
the normative level, as stated by in the Holy Koran and Sunnah, HTI reveals
“that to establish khilafah is compulsory for every Muslim [and] even is considered as the noblest religious duty” (Salim, 2004:212). Meanwhile, the historical arguments refer to events shortly after the death of the Prophet
Mohammad which was followed by a group of caliphs, called Khulafa alrasyidun (‘rightly-guided’ caliphs), to replace the Prophet. HTI also glorifies
other Islamic caliphates, such as Umayyad, Abbasid, and Uthmaniya in Turkey (Salim, 2004:214). he factual level is primarily concerned with Muslims’
pain and misery largely referring to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US
invasion in Iraq and Afghanistan, the suppression against Muslims in Southern hailand, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia and so on (HTI, 2003:3).
HTI repeatedly argues that the Palestine-Israel conflict is simply as a result of
divided Muslim communities (Yusanto, pers. comm. 23 February 2005).
In order to understand the mechanism of the Islamic caliphate, it is necessary to look at the important relationship between shari〜a and the Islamic
state. According to HTI, an Islamic state is understood in the context of the
implementation of shari〜a (HTI, 2002a). here will be no Islamic state without shari〜a (HTI, 2002a). Additionally, shari〜a must be applied completely and
immediately for any state to describe itself Islamic (HTI, 2002a). More importantly, even though an Islamic state and shari〜a have been available, without
the restoration of caliphate that would be useless. In the HTI’s point of view,
dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) — which is always contrasted with dar
al-kufr (the land of unbelievers that is allowed to be attacked) — cannot be
established unless a Muslim Caliph rises to lead the state according to shari〜a
(HTI, 2002b; Salim, 2004:30).
he Islamic State and God’s Sovereignty: A Case against Democracy
he descriptions of what an Islamic state would look like are outlined in a
draft constitution produced by the Central Board of HT, a wide range of the
party’s publications, and the spokesperson of HTI Ismail Yusanto. A caliph
is elected by a Majelis al-Umma or Assembly, in turn elected by the people
(ICG, 2003:4). Yusanto (pers. comm. 23 February 2005) admits that there are
a few similarities between the HT’s system and democracy in that, by procedure, the people are actively involved in that process. Most of all, however,
Yusanto asserts that the election of Majelis is based on the principle of God’s
sovereignty. He said, “Democracy is characterised by a government of the
people, by the people and for the people, while the representatives of the
Majelis who are elected by the people are obliged to ensure the principle of
shari〜a sovereignty” (pers. comm. 23 February 2005). According to HTI, the
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notion of democracy is absolutely human-made; therefore, it should be ranked
below what Al-Mawdudi called the Supreme Law based on the Koran and
Hadith.5 It has been argued that Islam is the antithesis of democracy, because
democracy is not an authentically Islamic concept, and is therefore substantially at odds with Islamic ideology (HTI, 2002b:63−65).
Citing from a range of HTI’s references, Salim’s (2004) explanation on how
HTI’s operational concept of its mechanism of power is descriptively accurate.
Given that the sovereignty, or what Ismail Yusanto called yamlik al-iradah (the
highest will), is embodied in shari〜a, in effect, the process of decision-making
in the Majelis not only entails vox populi or the voice of the majority; rather, it
involves several steps of cautious considerations. Practically speaking, the decision in the al-tashri〜 or legislation process “cannot be predicated upon the
principal of majority and minority; rather it should be grounded upon legal
texts (the Koran and Sunnah), since the only legislator or law-giver (musharri‖)
is Allah SWT [Subhana Wa Ta〜ala], not the people who are created by Him”
(Salim, 2004:206; HTI, 2002a:143−153). In this procedure, a caliph has a
key role to play in what Salim (2004:206) called “an adapter and interpreter
of certain given laws” and thereby does not need to consult the Majelis to
reach a final conclusion.
Meanwhile, the decision-making process in such sectors that require technical solutions or need a range of expertise and professionalism, “is based
solely on validity and precision, not voting which is based on the principle of
popularity or majority” (Salim, 2004:206). In contrast, any decision that does
not require expertise and professionalism, HTI asserts that the principle of
majority prevails (Salim, 2004:206). Aside from that, political parties are
allowed based on shari〜a and within the framework of the Islamic state. It is
worth noting that the Islamic state would not have diplomatic ties with —
what HTI dubbed as — ‘imperialist’ countries, such as the US and Britain
(HTI, 2002b:111−118). HTI regards international organisations, such as the
United Nations, as the puppet of imperialist powers. Accordingly, the Islamic
state, as imagined by HTI, would not join them.
he Case against the Nation-State and Nationalism
HT’s founder, An-Nabhani, states that the broad existence of patriotism and
nationalism is one of major obstacles to the party’s attempt at the establishment of the Caliphate. It has been argued by the activists of HTI that any
5
For clarity, Hadith is generally understood as traditions relating to the sayings and doings of
the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (shahabat). For more information, refer to http://
www.al-islam.or.id.
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forms of nationalistic expressions regarded as tribal fanaticism (‖asabiya) clearly
contradict the ideals of Islam (Yusanto, pers. comm. 23 February 2005). he
term ‖asabiya has its root in the period of the Prophet Muhammad and that
the Prophet was sent to unify Muslim communities from various cultural,
racial, geographic and genetic backgrounds. Prior to the arrival of the Prophet,
most Arab people were segregated by their own ethnic affiliation. According to
HTI, nationalism is a manifestation of the pre-Islamic tribal fanaticism dressed
in modern style and rhetoric (Salim, 2004:208).
Accordingly, people who believe in the notion of nationalism are accused of
being ‘modern jahiliyyah’ and are similar to that age of ignorance or darkness
that preceded the advent of Islamic revelation and are antithetical to Islamic
politico-religious order (Piscatori, 1986:102). HTI, therefore, asserts that
solidarity and brotherhood should not be linked to race, blood, clan, tribe,
birth place, or language as crucial elements of a formation of nationalism.
Instead, HTI believes that Islamic brotherhood is beyond racial and geographic boundaries and genetic ties.
Interestingly, HTI strongly believes in the existence of a Western conspiracy
to undermine the unity of umma. According to HTI, a Western attempt to
weaken the umma can be traced back to when Ernest Renan, a French philosopher, conceptualised nationalism that subsequently led to the emergence
of a nation-state since the Ottoman Empire became a threat to Western countries (Salim, 2004:208). Shortly after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate in the
early twentieth century, the idea of the nation-state was intensified in Muslim
societies. Muslim societies became small nation-states in which the umma
was no longer a foundational basis for the formation of political community.
HTI asserts that the vulnerability of Islamic communities to Western colonialism a few centuries ago had much to do with the presence of nation-state
(HTI, 2003:6−7).
he term umma derived from the Arabic word meaning ‘mother’ (Mandaville, 2001:71), is frequently used to underline the importance of Islamic solidarity among Muslims. It refers to the Islamic conception of political
community. In modern discourse, the notion of umma is seen as a central
normative concept which appeals for unity across the global Islamic community (Mandaville, 2001:71). In the Indonesian context, the term often appears
as a politico-religious calling for unity among Indonesian Muslim factions and
groups to increase their own political and economic significances.6 However,
6
In the wake of the Suharto suppression against political Islam, the leaders of Islamic activists
frequently used the phrase: “Indonesia’s umat was a majority with a minority mentality.” his
phrase was repeated by Muslim political leaders to show the disunity of the umat, particularly in
the political arena.
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HTI does not only link the unity of umma to the Indonesian context, but also
beyond the boundary of the archipelago.
his understanding of umma is not exclusively monopolised by HTI. he
Pakistani Islamic scholar, Abu al-Aʾla al-Maududi, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, were also accused of — borrowing from Piscatori’s words — being “non-conformist thinking” on the nation-state, as
opposed to the conformist intellectuals (Piscatori, 1986:101−109). he conformists are divided into two categories: he first argues that nation-state is a
fact of life. he second is distinguished from the first group by arguing that
“the nation-state is more than an unfortunate fact of life; it is a natural institution and only to be expected in the order of things” (Piscatori, 1986:83).
Regardless of the fact that many intellectuals and Islamic groups had previously voiced the importance of the umma instead of the nation-state, it is
worth noting that HTI is the most vocal proponent of the idea.
“Imagined” Umma
Given that Muslim sentiment and loyalty to the umma has become a key concept of HTI, this section will explore the idea more comprehensively. As indicated, HTI believes that the concept of the nation-state is alien to Muslims
and cannot be institutionalised in the Muslim community because it is antagonistic to the pervasive concept of umma. In order to understand the reasons
behind the HTI’s support for the idea of umma, it would be helpful to apply
Mandaville’s elaboration of the notion of the umma in two historical settings:
the early years of Islam in Medina, and the colonial era of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries (Mandaville, 2001:69−79). It was under the
Prophet Muhammad’s leadership in Medina that the umma was simply represented by a limited number of Muslims (al-Muhajirun and Anshor).
Following the death of the Prophet, the khulafa al-rasyidun (‘rightly-guided’
caliphs) began its phenomenal expansion of Islam. It was under the Islamic
caliphates of Umayyad, Abbasid, and Uthmaniya, that Islam came to claim
territories forming what Gellner (1981) called the “Koran belt” and which is
divided into two main axes; the north-south axis from southern Russia to
Tanzania and the east-west axis from Morocco to Indonesia. he notion of the
umma then spread out following the incredible expansion of Islam. A distinctive characteristic of the umma is its division of the world into two domains,
namely the dar al-Islam (the Islamic realm of peace) and dar al-harb (the realm
of war). he dar al-Islam is under Islamic rule, while the dar al-harb is under
infidel rule and is permitted to be attacked (HTI, 2002b:109−110). he dar
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al-Islam recognises no permanent territorial frontier as Muslims may live in
various societies and nations with different territories (HTI, 2002b).
In this regard, adopting the renowned American Indonesianist Benedict
R. O. Anderson’s (1993:7) definition of the nation, the notion of umma,
according to HTI, is also “an imagined political community [that is] and
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” He says, “It is imagined
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1993:7). For HTI, the umma
is imagined because the notion is not based on quotidian face-to-face interaction between its communities; instead, members hold in their minds the
image of their religious affinity.
Even more so, HTI’s division of the world into dar al-Islam (the abode of
Islam) and dar al-harb or al-kufr (the abode of unbelievers) reflects what may
be called as Islamic territories, or in Gellner’s words, “the Koran belt.” hese
Islamic territories may be more complicated than Anderson’s definition of the
nation that is imagined as limited. He states that, “he nation is imagined as
limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living
human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”
(Anderson, 1993:8). However, at least in the minds of HTI, the boundaries of
an Islamic caliphate are not unlimited or infinite as we have imagined. Furthermore, as stated in HT’s literature, the non-conventional party would
develop such international affairs and diplomatic relations if the caliphate can
be restored.
However, Anderson also tried to explain the concept of nation based on
sovereignty. He said that, “It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was
born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the
legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson,
1993:8). In this respect, HT’s conception of umma is unlikely, as it devotes the
relationship based on a certain religion as opposed to Anderson’s idea of providing “the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between
each faith’s ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being
free, and, if under God, directly so” (Anderson, 1993:8). Finally, Anderson’s
concept of ‘imagined’ representing as a community can also be suited with
the umma. In practice, there has been huge disparity among the umma
membership, but it is always conceived, borrowing Anderson’s words, as
“a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1993:8). Like the nation, the
umma which is further supported by religious propaganda, can make its membership die for such imaginings.
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Framing Islamic Identity
HTI’s challenge to the viability of modern nation-states and democracy
adopted by the state is best interpreted as an attempt to achieve its main goal,
that is, the restoration of an Islamic caliphate. As indicated earlier, both the
nation-state and democracy are perceived as un-Islamic. HTI uses the rhetoric
of bringing society back to genuine Islamic identity (which the introduction
of the notion of umma is a part of socialising an Islamic concept) so that
Islamic interests can be secured. In order to better understand the power of
religious identity relative to other ascriptive identities, such as ethnic and race,
it is useful to cite the renowned Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis (1998:6):
hese are of three kinds. he first is blood, that is to say, in ascending order, the family,
the clan, the tribe, developing into the ethnic nation. he second is by place . . . his
may mean the village or neighbourhood, district or quarter, province or city . . . he
third . . . is the religious community . . . For many, religion is the only loyalty that transcends local and immediate bonds. [Emphasis added]
he Islamic identity, in particular, is more powerful than other identities
largely because it has daily rituals effectively remembering its followers
who form its primary identity. In this regard, religious practices have a crucial
role to play in providing the foundation of a transnational Islamic identity
(Schwedler, 2001:3). Muslims everywhere are united at the very least in their
belief in Allah, His messenger Muhammad, the sanctity of the Koran, and
their practice of the Five Pillars of Islam. Muslims from all over the world, if
possible, are required to go to Mecca, at least once in one’s lifetime symbolising the unity of Islam. Muslims, whatever their nationality, race, ethnic affiliation, and genetic ties, perform, or at least, acknowledge that they are required
to do, prayer five times daily, payment for charitable purposes (zakat), fasting
during the month of Ramadhan, and the like. hese practices thereby lead to
the emergence of a collective identity inspired by Islam which then transcends
geographical boundaries (Schwedler, 2001).
Aware of the importance of Islamic identity, as explained above, the central
leadership of HT takes advantage of the concept of umma embodied in the
long history of Islam as a means of religious propaganda to appeal Muslims
across the world. To solidify the relationship among Muslim countries which
come from different nationalities and races, a religious identity should be
strengthened. In addition, according to HTI, the Muslim world must be
awakened from their long sleep to embrace their most primordial, ethnoreligious and communal identity, that is Islam, in the face of superiority of the
West and its pervading globalisation.
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In practice, however, the Islamic identity has such kinds of contested meanings relying on discrete political, social, and economic contexts in which particular Islamic identities have been forged (Schwedler, 2001:6) For example,
what Islamic identity means in Indonesia’s post-Suharto era is marked by
the mushrooming of Islamic political parties differs from what it meant in the
1979 Iranian revolution, in Southern hailand’s Muslim movement, and the
like. Even each Islamic political party in Indonesia today has a wide range of
meanings of what Islamic identity is. Schwedler (2001:8) says, “he issue is
not if Islamic identity is important, but whose framing of Islamic identity
resonates, and why.” Islamic identity in the hands of HTI’s proponents is obviously different compared to other Islamist groups.
In this regard, Salim’s (2004) work on HTI’s social movements is useful to
uncover how the party has succeeded in gaining popular support by framing
Islamic identity as forms of ‘resistance’ to the viability of nation-state and
democracy adopted by the state. Interestingly, the leadership of HTI creatively
uses multi-dimensional crises that have occurred since the collapse of Suharto
in 1998 as a means of propaganda to justify their claims. It has been argued
that the country’s political instability, moral decay, and economic injustice are
caused by the system of liberal democratic capitalism that is being used by the
regime (Salim, 2004:209−212). It can therefore be said that despite HTI’s
fighting for the dissemination of transnational agenda, they do not fully ignore
local-based contents derived from political, cultural and economic contexts.
his is why HTI has reached remarkable success relative to its counterparts in
Pakistan and Malaysia.
Domestic Politics
As indicated earlier, the rise of HT in Indonesia can be best explained by the
collapse of Suharto’s New Order. he resignation of Suharto in 1998 provided
a large space for various Islamist voices to be aired. In order to give a broader
sense of the relation between the fall of Suharto and the rise of HTI, it is useful to briefly sketch Suharto’s New Order attitudes and approaches towards
political Islam. As widely known, Suharto’s hostility towards political Islam
became apparent shortly after he took power. Suharto’s New Order appeared
to be reluctant to rehabilitate the largest of the pre-New Order Islamic political parties, Masyumi (for Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia), which was
banned by the previous regime and whose primary objective was to establish
an Islamic state. Instead, Suharto formed a new party, the Parmusi (Indonesian Muslims’ Party), to cater to Masyumi’s constituency (Ward, 1970).
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Soon after the 1971 elections, Suharto’s next step towards further mass
depolitisation consisted of a ‘reduction’ of the party system by which all Islamic
parties, including Parmusi, were forced to merge into the United Development Party (PPP). In addition to this, in attempting to secure the ideological
basis of the state, Suharto then required all mass-based organisations, including political parties, to adopt Pancasila as the underlying principles of their
organisations, this was known as the policy of sole basis (asas tunggal ). It then
comes as no surprise that the major opposition to Suharto, who described the
regime’s treatment of Islamic political activists as “kutjing kurap” (cats with
ring-worm), came from those with a background in political Islam.
Given that Suharto’s repression of political Islam put Islamic political activists at a high political risk, many Islamic leaders encouraged the energies of the
umma (Muslim community) to be directed towards cultural, spiritual, educational and social developments.7 Accordingly, in the late 1970s, in many prestigious secular universities, the strict proscription of explicit political Islam
activities led Muslim students to revive their faith by establishing ‘campus
dakwah’. he best examples of the spirit of dakwah among Muslim students
were to be found in the formation of Islamic studies and discussion groups
within campus mosques in many secular universities. At the height of Suharto’s suppression of political Islam, the mosque became what respected Muslim
intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat describes as ‘a sanctuary for the expression of
political dissatisfaction and frustration’ (cited by Schwarz, 1999:172). he
recollections of economist Rizal Ramli (as quoted in Schwarz, 1999:172) support this notion:
When I was at ITB in the late 1970s all student political activity revolved around the
student centre. But ever since the government imposed restrictions on campus politics, the student centre had been dead. All the activity is now funnelled to the mosque.
Young people need an outlet for their political aspirations and they will find it where
they can.
Campus dakwah then metamorphosed into a legalised version of student
extracurricular activity, that is, it became the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or
Campus Proselytisation Institute (LDK). As indicated earlier, the LDK can
generally be divided into two streams which apply different strategies to form
Islamic ideals in the state. he first stream is identified with the activists of
LDK who subsequently established KAMMI which played a key role in the
7
For a detailed account of the social and cultural factors surrounding the establishment of
ICMI, see Ramage (1995).
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resignation of Suharto and the Prosperous Justice Party, formerly the Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan or PK). his group is seen as an offshoot of the Ikhwan
al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) which synthesises Islam and democracy.
he second is Hizbut Tahrir, regarded as more radical in substance, because
of its rejection of the nation-state and democracy. he renewal of the caliphate
as a government for all Muslims has been massively purported by the argument that Islam is no longer a powerful force on the world stage because
Muslims have been divided by the nation-state system imposed by the West
(Yusanto, pers. comm. 23 February 2005). It is worth pointing out that considering the two had such radical visions in the context of Suharto authoritarianism, their activities were mostly focused on moral guidance instead of
political practices.
Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, the emergence of a democratic
transition after the collapse of Suharto in 1998 has created a window of opportunity for the advocates of political Islam. In relation to social movement
theories, the fall of Suharto was perceived as a political opportunity structure
(POS). As theorised by McAdam et al. (1996:10), the POS have four fundamental dimensions: (a) the relative openness or closure of a political system;
(b) the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments; (c) the presence
or absence of elite allies; and (d) the state’s capacity or propensity for repression. he theory claims that the more the political system is opened, the more
opportunities are available for the emergence of a movement. In turn, the
more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is for collective
action. In short, the emergence of the post-Suharto regimes has given the
freedom to HTI to reveal their organisation publicly, to mobilise popular support and to express their grievances (Salim, 2004).
Moreover, the fact that the early years of the reformasi era were marked by a
number of political, economic and social instabilities has contributed to the
rapid increase of HTI. his is partly because there has been a growing perception in larger society that the political and economic reforms introduced after
1998 have had no significant impact to improve their daily lives. It then
exposed the vulnerability of the state to an explosion of Islamist movements,
including HTI. Since the outbreak, the government was regarded as unable to
convince the public that the current system is capable of providing public
goods for all. he deterioration of economic life since the crisis jeopardised the
nature of social gaps perceived as a source of resentment. As argued by Salim
(2004:98), this social ramification then served as an entry point for the activists of HTI to voice the view that there has been evidence of the failure of
secular positive law to bring socio-cultural, legal, and political improvements
for Muslims.
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Accordingly, HTI called for the revival of shari〜a (Islamic law) as the solution. It takes advantage of the multi-dimensional crises that occurred in Indonesia by formulating action frames to articulate its ideologies. HTI asserts that
capitalism was a root cause of Indonesian people becoming increasingly frustrated with miserable socio-economic conditions (Salim, 2004; Yusanto, pers.
comm. 23 February 2005). In short, HTI demands shari〜a as the best option
to deal with the problems. Despite critics finding that the HTI’s solution is
apparently normative, the party still campaigns for the issue under the slogan,
“Selamatkan Indonesia dengan shari〜a dan khilafah” (“Save Indonesia with
shari〜a and khilafah”) (Yusanto, 2003). Referring to An-Nabhani, the founder
of HT, Yusanto (pers. comm. 23 February 2005) argues that dar al-Islam (the
abode of Islam) — which is always confronted with dar al-kufr (the land of
unbelievers whom it is permitted to attack) — cannot be established unless a
Muslim caliph rises to lead the state according to shari‖a.
One should note that HTI is not the only radical Islamist organisation
operating and rising in Indonesia’s post Suharto era by using the growing public dissatisfaction with the reformasi period. here are a number of Islamist
movements that run the gamut from violent to peaceful, from ‘democratic’
to anti-democratic. Among new Islamist groups that use violence to achieve
their goals are the FPI (Islamic Defenders’ Front) and Laskar Jihad (the Jihad
Troops), to mention a few notorious groups. Although MMI (Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia) described itself as a non-violent organisation, the group does not
repudiate the use of force.
However, virtually all Islamist groups are united by the idea that “Islam is
the solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hal ). he economic and social problems in the
post-Suharto regimes as well as the ills of society are attributed to the departure from Islamic ideals, and, in turn, a return to Islamic sources is advocated.
Although this frame is common among Islamist movements in Indonesia,
there are crucial divergences over tactics and strategies. here is no clear agreement over what “Islam is the solution” means and how it provides an answer
to deal with fundamental issues relating to social-political and economic problems that Indonesia faces. here are deep divisions among different streams of
Islamist groups and political rivalries between their leaders (Collins, 2004).
Jamaah Tabligh, for example, focuses on ‘pure dakwah’, dealing with the transformation of individual beliefs with Islamic values, but avoid engaging in
politics. In contrast, HTI is heavily involved in political matters campaigning
for Islam as the only solution for the current human-made system. Meanwhile,
Ikhwan-inspired party, PKS which proclaims itself in its vision and mission statement as “a dakwah party that struggles for Islam as the solution in the life of
the nation and the state” is willing to work within the existing political system.
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641
Despite some differences, sometimes these various streams of Islamist groups
in Indonesia cooperated or join together, at other times they have competed
and opposed each other (Collins, 2004). All Islamist political parties and social
movement groups were behind the campaign against the Ahmadiyah minority
sect, which recognises a prophet in Islam after Muhammad — a belief defying
the mainstream faith. hey were also united in the opposition to the Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine and their strong endorsement of the
anti-pornography bill and the implementation of shari ʾa-based laws in
local governments. Almost all Islamist groups in Indonesia also paid greater
attention to any international events which relate to anti-Israel and America
sentiments.
Nonetheless, HTI has substantial differences in ideological frameworks and
methods which become the major trait distinguishing the party from other
Islamist groups in Indonesia. HTI shares a greater sense of Islamic unity and
solidarity and views Muslims in different parts of the world within the framework of a global Muslim umma than do other Indonesian Islamist movements.
HTI is the most vocal group on the caliphate and continually propagates the
necessity of restoring this form of transnational Islamic government for all
Muslims across the world. More so than most other Islamist groups, HTI
frequently uses the rhetoric of returning society to genuine Islamic ideals and
concepts by its persistent condemnation to Western (un-Islamic) system, i.e.,
democracy, secularism and capitalism. his vision has appealed to a younger
generation of political Islam activists disillusioned with the promise of the
secular nation-state, as well as the promise of the democratic post-Suharto
regimes to bring law and order, political stability, prosperity and greater social
and economic justice.
he Challenge of Democracy and Nation-State
In the light of democratic transition in Indonesia, the rapid growth of HTI
can be seen as a hindrance to the development of a consolidated democracy.
he rapid rise of HT in Indonesia is a wake-up call for the government. here
are a number of reasons why the prevalence of HTI can be seen as being
inimical to an attempt in bringing Indonesian democracy more consolidated
and stable. First, HTI’s strong rejection to the idea of democracy adopted by
the state can lead to the vulnerability of democracy which can thereby lead to
the instability of democracy. Students of democracy assert that democracy will
be consolidated or stable if a democracy, as a system of government, is accepted
by a majority of people in a polity which identifies with three keywords:
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“acceptance,” “justification,” or “legitimacy” (Mujani, 2003:235). Przeworski
(1991:26) says:
Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a
particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine action outside the democratic institutions, when all the loser wants to do is to try
again within the same institutions under which they have just lost. [emphasis added]
his essay has described at length that HTI strongly opposes the idea of
democracy. Instead, the party introduces the superiority of Islam which they
believe to be not only a religious construct, but also a political ideology.
Indeed, HTI does not use violence in propagating its anti-democratic messages, but HTI has clearly benefited from the freedoms it is afforded by the
post-Suharto’s democratic regimes. Additionally, HTI’s goal to re-establish a
global Islamic caliphate can be alarming to the government.
Secondly, HTI is clearly unsuccessful in transforming political loyalty from
the umma to the nation-state. Instead, the party revives the belief in the idea
of umma. his has confirmed Huntington’s assertion that the umma and the
nation-state are antithetical, because the latter requires the subordination of
religious, tribal and other primordial loyalties to it (Huntington, 1997). Huntington revealed that, “. . . the small group and the great faith, the tribe and the
umma, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the
nation-state has been less significant” (Huntington, 1997:174−175). Likewise,
Kedourie (1994) makes virtually the same point concerning the idea of umma
and its contradiction to the nation-state. For Huntington and Kedourie, loyalty to the nation-state is a precondition to the stability of the state which is
an important factor for democratic consolidation. he umma is pervasive and
so strong in the minds of HTI’s activists and potentially destabilises the nationstate building process, as it preaches supra-national Muslim solidarity (Mujani,
2003). As a result, HTI seems to foster the global jihad priority of fighting
against, in Lim’s (2005) words, the ‘far enemy’ rather the relatively ‘near
enemy’. We witness how the relatively far issues, such as the Israeli occupation
of Palestine and the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, become the HTI’s
most favoured issues. he party remains preoccupied with the relatively
distant issues rather than grappling with local issues that correspond with
national interest.
hirdly, HTI’s refutation of the idea of a fixed territory of a nation has
resulted in broader consequences. he two concepts of democracy and nationstate cannot inescapably be separated. he nation-state is a basic element of
modern politics on which democracy is founded (Mujani, 2003). here will
B. Muhtadi / Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (2009) 623–645
643
be no democracy without the nation-state (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Fourthly,
the way HTI reaches its primary objectives can also be alarming to the government. As indicated earlier, HTI has a three-stage ‘hearts and minds’ strategy
that aims to bring about social change for what An-Nabhani (2001) claimed
as a “peaceful” revolution. he first stage is that the HTI’s activists are to educate and socialise people about its ideology. he second stage is when its members are pushed to reach out to the rest of society and infiltrate the centres of
power, particularly military, security and key government institutions. When
the party has reached a momentum, they launch the last stage, that is, the
overthrow of the government in peaceful ways. It is true that the leadership of
HTI expects to undertake each stage peacefully, but it has not ruled out the
use of violence (Baran, 2004). HTI officially describes itself as a non-violent
movement, but it does not repudiate the use of violence to achieve its goal
(Yusanto, pers. comm. 23 February 2005).
Conclusion
To sum up, like its counterparts elsewhere, HTI is committed to the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate (al-khilafat al-Islamiyyah). HTI also
argues that the notion of democracy is absolutely human-made and it is not
an authentically Islamic concept. In addition, HTI also declares its opposition
to the idea of nationalism. It is not simply because the notion contradicts
Islamic norms, but it also contributes to worsening the ideals of HTI’s global
Islamic caliphate. Restoring an Islamic caliphate requires a borderless-Muslim
world, relying heavily upon the spirit of Islamic solidarity which transcends
geographic and racial boundaries, genetic ties, and cultural background.
Most of all, the growing acceptance of HTI’s ideas has been accentuated by
the widespread public dissatisfaction with the reformasi era. he multi-dimensional crises that have occurred in Indonesia since the collapse of Suharto have
played a more important role in the rise of HTI. It argues that the deteriorating economic and social conditions under post-Suharto regimes are caused by
the departure from Islamic ideals, and the dominance of perceived un-Islamic
systems, such as secularism, democracy and capitalism, in the Indonesian
government and bureaucracy, Western cultural influence and the absence of
an Islamic global caliphate.
Ironically, as a vocal proponent of anti-democracy and nationalism sentiments, HTI takes advantage of post-Suharto democratic regimes in which
religious freedom and freedom of expression are also awarded to a group which
clearly aims to overthrow the regime of democracy. Looking at HTI’s grand
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narrative of the global Islamic caliphate and its refutation of the notion of
democracy and nation-state, it is clear that HTI has taken a number of negative steps in the direction of democratic consolidation in the country.
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