International Journa l of Multidisciplinary Research and Develo pment
Volume: 2, Issue: 7, 343-353
July 2015
www.allsubjectjournal.com
e-ISSN: 2349-4182
p-ISSN: 2349-5979
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B.A. Amujiri
Department of Public
Administration and Local
Government, University of
Nigeria Nsukka
S. U. AGU
Department of Public
Administration and Local
Government, University of
Nigeria Nsukka
Onodugo Ifeanyi Chris
Department of Public
Administration and Local
Government, University of
Nigeria Nsukka
Correspondence:
B.A. Amujiri
Department of Public
Administration and Local
Government, University of
Nigeria Nsukka
Is Nigeria’s claim of leadership role in Africa a myth or
reality?
B.A. Amujiri, S. U. AGU, Onodugo Ifeanyi Chris
Abstract
This study examined Nigeria’s claim of leadership in Africa in order to find out if it is a myth or reality.
Our design is an ex post factor descriptive and historical research. In order to analyze the data collected,
we used content analysis approach. We adopted realism as our theoretical framework for the study. Our
choice is based on the fact that realism remains one of the most important theories of international
relations. Realism explains the vital need for power in international relations and sees power as the most
needed “commodity” in the international arena. The study discovered among other things that Nigeria
has yet to establish a sound economic, military, technological base for playing any effective leadership
role in Africa. Based on the findings, the study made a lot of recommendations which include the need
for the charity of Nigeria leaders to begin at home; minimization of corrupt practices by the leaders and
curbing of religious violence.
Keywords: Nigeria, Leadership role, Africa, Myth, Reality, Constraints.
1. Introduction
The political leadership of every sovereign state makes foreign policies that are expected to
protect its sovereignty, economy and people. Palmer and Perkings (2005: 640) explain that the
foreign policy of any state is largely determined by factors such as geography, history, sociopolitical system, economic and military strength, relative power position, global environment
and the policies of other states. Obi (2006:109) [36] posits that “international relations are the
expression of foreign policy of nations”. In his further assertion, he states that the success or
failure of states depends to a large extent on their foreign policies. He argues that the fall of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Iraq can be traced to the aggressive foreign
policy of the two nations, while American’s apparent greatness is largely due to her foreign
policy of “containment”.
It is remarkable that despite the number of phases through which the Nigerian foreign policy
has passed since the attainment of independence in 1960, the conceptual basis underlying its
formulation has scarcely changed. As Onwunwa (1988:1) [51] argued, in varying degrees, it has
remained committed to the principles and interests which express our conviction that our
destiny lies in our role in Africa and which necessitates a coordinated strategy for maintaining
the African Milieu for the pursuit of those interests. Consequently, Fawole (2003:202) [21]
contends that based on the history of colonization and other imperatives, nigeira, from Sir
Abubaka Tafawa Balewa to Obasanjo civilian regime, maintained Afro centric foreign policy
thrust. This fact, according to Garba (1987:32) explains why successive Nigerian governments
have made Africa the central focus of their foreign policy. This policy thrust has Africa as the
Centre-piece of Nigeria foreign policy and the West Africa sub-region as her “activity area”.
The Implication of Afro-centrism, in the opinion of Fawole (2003:204) [21], is that the “well
being of Nigerians and Nigerian economy, lie on a highly defended African continent with
emphasis on the west African sub-region.
Nigeria has done, much and has continued to do more in the pursuit of her foreign policy
objectives and Afro-centrism. In the spirit of Afro-centrism, Nigeria has intervened in several
crises between African countries (Obi, 2006:237) [36]. According to Obi, Nigeria operated a
policy of decolonization in southern African to Liberate African sister states, intervened in
Liberia, Serial Leone, Ivory coast, and other African countries. She (Nigeria) is currently
involved in peace keeping mission in Sudan, Somalia, Mal and Congo under the African
Union (Au).
Notwithstanding the active role Nigeria played in the creation of the then Organization of
African Unity in 1963, scholars of international relations like Dudley (1982:16) [16] Hositi
(1983:28) Aluko (1981:40) [10] Sagah (1981:18) [57] Ogwu (1986:53) [28] Onwunwa (1988:4) [51]
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
among others are unanimous in branding Nigeria’s foreign
policy after independence as extremely pro-British- a more
drift with events according to the dictates of the British
Government, which relegated African affairs to the
background in favour of Commonwealth affairs. As Ajayi
(2004:66) [7] and Eybu (2005:18) in Ucluma (2006:39) noted,
it was, no doubt, the exigencies of the Nigerian civil war
(1967-1970) which compelled the Nigerian Federal
government to re-appraise its stand on African affairs and that
was because it needed to win the support of African states or
at least, be assured of their neutrality. The end of the war did
not immediately usher in an era of significant policy moves to
put Nigeria in the limelight of African politics, hence as
Wayas (1979:46) observed:
From the civilian administration of Balewa to the military
regime of Gowon, Nigeria played an unenviable role that is
often interpreted, if not as outright leadership amnesias, then
certainly as passivity.
As Akinyemi (1974:69) [9] and Onwunwa, (1988:6) [51]
scholarly noted, not until the short-lived Balewa
administration become positively conscious of the fact that
Africa, with its great concentration of mineral resources,
should have a tremendous bargaining power with the rest of
the world, and so should be given an effective leadership.
That Nigeria woke up from her slumber to start playing
leadership position in Africa after her independence. This
probably explains the reason why Nelson Mandela told
Abdusalami Abubakar, the former Nigerian Head of State that
African nations and indeed the entire world is waiting for
Nigeria to come out of her dictatorial system to assume her
position of leadership within the comity of nations.
But does this mantle of effective leadership really fall on
Nigeria? This question is necessary because according to
Duru (2006) [20] in Onwunwa (1988:9) [51] it has become
fashionable for Nigerian leaders to make such a claim which
does not appear to be the result of an objective analysis of the
implications of continental leadership or a relatively accurate
estimate of the power relations existing among the different
African states. Yet the more the policy of African Leadership
is pursued, the more our human and material resources are
unreservedly committed to it at the expense of urgent
domestic needs. This made Agbo (2012:61) to assert that
Nigerian foreign policy fails to provide enough protections to
national economy, security and general well being of
Nigerians. In view of the fore-going that this paper intends to
ascertain if Nigeria’s claim of leadership role in Africa is
myth or reality.
2. Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of the study is to ascertain if Nigeria’s
claim of leadership role in Africa is myth or reality.
The specific objectives are:
1. To verify major elements of Nigeria’s national power
2. To examine the impact of Afro Centric Foreign Policy of
Nigeria on her claim of leadership role in Africa.
3. To do a critical analysis of Nigeria’s role in Africa in
order to ascertain if her leadership claim in Africa is a
myth or reality.
4. To examine her major constraints towards this claim of
leadership role in Africa.
2.1. Methodology
This work is predicated on historical research design/desktop
research. In terms of data collection, we used extraction
(abstraction) from secondary data which entails teasing the
research data from other forms of recorded and stored
information (Obikeze 1990:18). Consequently, the researcher
relied mainly on secondary sources of information especially
by eminent scholars, institutional and official documents from
Nigerian institute of international Affairs Lagos; Federal
Ministry of foreign Affairs Abuja; Official gazettes of the
African Union etc.
As a result, we used descriptive and historical analysis which
seeks for an in-depth and insightful understanding of the
social phenomenon being studied by indentifying and
analyzing social forces and processes that brought it into
being or shaped or directed its subsequent development and
evolution to the present time. Therefore, given the ex post
facto nature of this study, we adopted the one-short case
study. This is because we are more concerned with
discovering whether Nigeria’s claim of leadership in Africa is
actually a myth or reality.
In order to analyze the data collected, we used the content
analysis approach which involves a systematic transformation
of quantitative data to qualitative data with a view to situate
patterns of events in their historical context and establish their
subsequent development.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Realism is the theoretical framework for this study. As a
political theory, realism can trace its intellectual roots to an
ancient Greek historian (Thucydides) and his account of the
Peoplennesian wars between Athens and Sparta-431-404 B.Cand especially the sixteenth century English Philosopher,
Thomas Hobbes (Kegley Jnr, 2007:29). However, the three
thinkers commonly invoked as realism’s foremost proponents
are: Thomas Hobbes, Jean- Jacques Rousseau and Hans
Morgenthau (Williams, 2005:1). Realism became the
dominant, if not sole approach to the subject of international
relations with the growth in the academic study of the field of
international relations, after the Second World War. It
possessed a powerful and comprehensive explanation of
international relations and conflict (Halliday, 1994:11). As
Halliday further contends realism remains one of the most
important theories of international relations, despite others
that aim at hacking away at its power-hungry core, with no
real success. In support of this view, James (2009:47) has
opined that realism should not be equated to amoral
tendencies, as indeed, Morgenthau, the grandee of realism has
argued that the highest moral duty of the state is to do good
for its citizens (James, 2009:47).
Realism or power theory of international relations was
propounded by members of a school of thought known as
realists to explain the conflict-ridden nature of the
international society. Some of the prominent members of the
realist school of thought include, H. Morgenthau, J. Spanner
and G. Schwarzenegger. The realists ascribed a position of
primary to sovereign state as an actor in international relations
and view power politics as a constant feature of international
relations. In the view of Spannier, quoted in Asogwa
(1999:63) [13], “co-operation is possible in international
politics but only when it serves the national interest defined in
terms of power’. Morgenthau in Ayah (1998), explains power
as the motivation of nation-states in their relations with one
another, pointing out that politics, whether at domestic or
international level, is marked by a struggle for power.
Schwarzenberger (1964:171), maintains that “power politics
has been a recalling feature of international relations
throughout the age”.
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
The position of the realists is that, international society
constitutes the activity area of nation-states; hence states
require power and applications of power to remain afloat. To
realist theorists, the state is the only effective basis of analysis
in international relations because the other actors in
international relations are mere components of the state or
may be regarded as the environment with in which the
national interests of states. In the light of such prevailing
circumstance at the international society, and in addition to
the absence of a central authority, the survival f state in their
external relations depends on her national power. Realism
explains that vital need for power in international relations
and sees power as the most need “commodity’ in the
international arena. In the realist’s perceptions Might is
always right in the international society, hence national
interests of states should be defined in terms of power. This
theory says also that international law, international moralism
and international organizations processes cannot produce a
peaceful and secured global society. Rather, it recommended a
mechanism known as “balance of power’.
According to realist explanation, “balance of power’ is an
approach or mechanism in international relations by which
efforts are made by states to ensure that no one states achieve
preponderance of power over the rest states, this approach
maintains peace and order by ensuring that increase in the
national power of one state is counter balanced by
arrangement of alliances. Sola (2000:138) argue that “the
mechanism of balance of power is responsible for global
peace as currently obtained.
2.2.1. Tenets of the Theory
The major tenets of the realist theory of international relations
include the following:
Centrality of State-Actors: According to Bakut
(2006:18), for the Realists, the only actors in international
relations are states whose decision-making units operate
to advance its interests. Thus, Realism views the state,
which should answer to no higher political authority, as
the most important actor on the world state (Kegley Jnr,
2007:29).
Definition of National Interest in Terms of Power:
Granted that national interest influences the behavior of
states in international relations, in realist categorization,
this national interest is defined in terms of power (Ofuebe
and Anierobi, 2005:16) thus, in realist configurations,
when the goals and interests of states conflict in
international relations, they struggle to determine whose
interest will prevail. The resolution rests frequently on
who has the most power (Rourke, 1999:259).
Rationality of State Actors; A major tenet of the realist
theory of international relations is that all states are
rational actors. In this regard, grant (2008:1), has posited
that its premise (realism) is that all states are rational
actors and their main goal is to attain power to survive.
Centrality of Power: The realist theory of international
relations is about the centrality of power, in international
relations. Thus, there is one dominant way of analyzing
relations between states for quite a long time and that is
the realist conception of power (Echezona, 1993:141).
Realism has thus, come to enjoy a privileged position in the
field of international relations. From a social scientific view
point however, the most fundamental reasons is that it remains
the only clearly articulated theoretical approach (often termed
a “paradigm” in the field of international relations
(Moravcsik, 1992:1). Critics of realism although would still
disagree with this position, by contending that theoretical
priority does not necessarily imply greater empirical power
(Moravcsik, 1992:38).
It is within these Realist theoretical contexts that the study
continues with the remainder of its tasks.
2.2.2. The Application of Realism to the Study
At independence in 1960, Nigeria demonstrated her new
status by ending all unequally treaties she had with Great
Britain which include Anglo-Nigerian Defenses pact, among
others. Nigeria also declared her opposition to be a party to
the cold war between the West under the United States of
America and East led by the defunct Union of Soviet
Socialists Republics (USSR). She rather joined the nonaligned movement. Nigeria is also a member of the United
Nations for reasons of the protection of her sovereignty.
Nigerian foreign policy is Afro-centric. This is reflected in
making Africa her “activity area” and the proclamation of
Africa as the centre peace of Nigerian foreign policy. This
foreign policy thrust tantamount to leadership claim over the
entire Africa. And such imperialist-like policies that form part
of Nigerian national interests can only be explained in terms
of national power.
Afro-centric policy declaration is also known as “Obasanjo
Doctrine’ and compares favourably with Monroe Doctrine in
purpose, in that it is intended to restrict and prevent further
interference by outside powers in the affairs of Africa.
According to Ayah (1998) it aims also at the preservation of
the sovereignty of African states, the revival of those virtues
for which Africans should be proud to be associated with and
the restoration of the dignity of Africans and black world
over.
Nigeria has successfully kept a leading role in African affairs
by ensuring the establishment of organization of African
Unity, now African Union as against United States of Africa
as demanded by the like of Nkruma of blessed memory.
African Union (Au) as loses body enables unity, free
interactions without fear of domination, intimidation or
absorption by any member state. The foreign policy thrust of
“Africa as the centre-piece” of Nigerian foreign policy
enabled Nigeria to be in the fore-front in emancipation
struggle of the apartheid era.
Nigeria has indeed applied “power theory” to her advantage in
international relations by master minding the establishment
and functioning of Economic Community of West African
Military wing known as ECOMOG are in line with the
“balance of power” and mechanism. The existence of such a
military alliance of sub-regional level must have forestalled
direct intervention of by and powerful nations in crisis
involving countries of the sub-region of West African without
request.
From the foregoing, one cannot but agree that Nigeria has
been using power theory in her foreign policy practices
through membership of organizations and alliances that
promote her national power and her quest for continental
leadership
2.2.3. Impact of Afro-Centric Foreign Policy of Nigeria in
Her Claim of Leadership Role in Africa
Maduka (2004:164) [31] argues that Nigeria has continued to
make enormous commitment in both human and material
resources in conflict resolutions and peace-keeping operations
across Africa. The records, according to him, form long list of
cases. Some of the cases listed include; the Congo Crisis in
1960, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast,
Uganda and Sudan.
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
Though Nigeria intervened in some of those conflicts/crises
under auspices of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group)
or UNO (United Nations Organization) joint operations, she
has always taken the Lion-share in personnel contributions
and funding. It should be noted that Nigeria’s major
justification for involvement in those conflicts has been the
pursuit of her foreign policy thrust, which has Africa as the
centre piece of her foreign policy.
Fawole (2003:227) [21] contends that the resources in human
and material terms, which Nigeria has committed in African
States since independence, are incalculable. Fawole reports
that Nigeria spent more than sixty million dollars in cash and
tangible gifts while playing support to MPLA Movement. She
lost many of her citizens in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in
addition to huge expenditure. She made during liberation era
in Southern Africa and recorded successes in conflict
resolutions, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In fact,
Nigerians lost sleepless nights and resources, but earned her
special position in comity of nations.
An insight of Nigeria’s resources commitment in Sierra Leone
under President Olusegun Obasanjo was given by Asobie.
Asobie (2005:33) [12] reports that Nigeria, in 2000 entered into
a military co-operation agreement with the United States of
America (USA). Under the Scheme, known as military
Professional Resources Initiative (MPRI) USA. Undertook to
send its military personnel to reactivate Nigeria’s military
institutions and help Nigeria to procure military aids. The
same agreement provided for the USA government to assist
Nigeria in retraining and re-equipping of Nigerian soldiers to
enable them perform their peace-keeping role in Sierra Leone
more efficiently and effectively. That Military pact was seen
by Nigeria as useful in many regards particularly in giving
Nigeria the military capability as a regional actor, to provide
effective peace-keeping operations in African conflict areas,
such as those of Sierra Leone and Congo. Besides, President
Obasanjo’s civilian regime needed to be secured and to stand
out as a major force (outside South Africa) for stability in
Africa. However, by that military pact, Nigeria has granted
the US access to her military installations and defense secrets.
The agreement allows the US military undue advantage over
Nigeria military in event of any conflict in the future. We feel
that the resource expended in that Nigeria-US military pact
designed with the intent to save Sierra Leone and for the
protection of African continent as a whole should have been
used to address the poor condition of services in the Nigeria
military-better and enhance remunerations, provision of
training and education of Nigerian military personnel for role
understanding/proficiency and infrastructural welfare
provisions for members of the armed forces and their
dependants.
Apart from the US military agreement with Nigeria, Obi
(2006:233) [36] notes that in the same 2000, the sum of N1.8
billion was approved for contract to supply equipment in
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while
only the sum of N0.95 billion was proposed by the Federal
Ministry of Finance for all the Nigerian Armed Forces. The
Civilian regime of President Obasanjo had peace-keeper sent
to many conflict nations including-Sierra Leone, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, etc either as a member of
UN, African Union (AU) or ECOWAS, all in the name of
implementing her foreign policy of Africa.
While Nigeria under President Obasanjo civilian regime
recorded successes in resolution of conflicts in Africa and
generally in global security, it must be pointed out that those
achievements were made at the expense of Nigerians who
share in either lose of their relations in those peace-keeping
missions or national wealth. Political Watchdog, vol. 16, no
30 of 2007 reported that members of the Nigerian Armed
Forces have been dying unreported. The journal added that
those Nigerians sacrificed their lives for the defense of unity
of other nations. The question one is forced to ask is; what
becomes the fate of families of the bread winners that lost
their lives in settling those in disputes in other nations?
The standard of living of Nigerians during the period under
evaluation was quite low. According to the United Nations
Human Development Index (HDI) in 2004, Nigeria has less
than 44 years life expectancy, consequent upon poverty and
low standard of living. Nigeria’s experience in maintaining
Africa as the centre-piece of her foreign policy could be better
channeled
to
infrastructural
provision,
tackling
unemployment, crime, health-care, poverty and many other
problems confronting Nigeria as a nation. Afro-centric foreign
policy of Nigeria obviously impacts adversely on national
economy. It makes much in-road into Nigeria resources by
causing death of some of Nigerian military personnel and
huge material resources that could serve alternative uses in
national development.
2.2.4. The Major Elements of Nigeria’s National Power
Scholars like Morgenthan (1975:18) [25] Okolo (1978:32),
Gambari (1980:64) [23], Fawole (2003:29) [21], Onwunwa
(1988:10) [51] Frankel (1963:41) Ogwu (1986:22) [28] among
others argued that the role which any sovereign state plays in
international politics is a function of the amount of power and
influence which it wields on the international scene. Fawole
(2003:29) [21] in particular pointed out that power and
influence results from a number of factors: the geographical
position and size of the state; the size and quality of its
population; its reserve of national resources; its industrial and
military capacity; the quality of the diplomacy and the degree
of its national cohesion. We shall briefly examine these
factors as they affect Nigeria.
2.2.5. Geographical Size
Nigeria’s territorial expanse of 923, 773 sq.km is, by all
standards, impressive, provided its security is maintained. It is
a great advantage, although Charles and Said (1993:17) has
argued in line with Hosit, (1983:95) that the role of a state in
international politics is not necessarily a reflection of its
geographical size, it cannot be denied that, in the final
analysis, territorial vastness counts for something and that it
has some bearing on a state’s status. As Ogwu (1986:46) [28]
argues, Nigeria’s territorial vastness has some emotional and
psychological appeal. Nwachukwu (1989:57) [34] seems to
agree completely with Ogwu (1986:44) [28] when he posits that
the prestige enjoyed by Nigeria in Africa and the world over
is, to a certain extent, attributable to its geographical size as
compared to that of the other states on the African continent.
Nigeria’s population according to recent National population
census is about 162 million. Nigeria is the most populous
nation in Africa. Even though Anifomoshe and Enemuo
(1999:31) [55] argues that one should not consider a country to
be very powerful because its population is large, but it is
important to note that a country with a small population rarely
plays an effective leadership role in international politics.
Morgenthau (1975) [25] proved this point when he showed the
plight of France in 1940 with only 5 million men fit for
military service whereas Germany, its enemy, had 15 million
men at its disposal. It is, therefore, proper to take Nigeria’s
huge population into account in any assessment of its national
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
power because it represents an enormous reserve of power
which, fortunately, is reasonably acceptable in many respects
in international politics.
2.2.6. Natural Resources
Nigeria is blessed with mineral resources. For example, apart
from the crude oil which has remained an invaluable asset, she
also has about 32 other important minerals which makes her
economy one of the most sought for within the African
continent. As one of the world’s largest exporters of crude oil,
it is a source of supply of strategic significance, the control of
which is a crucial stake in world politics, because most
European states can still say, as did Georges Clemenceau of
France during the first world war, that one drop of oil is worth
one drop of their soldier’s blood.
2.2.7. Military Capacity
Kolawole (2004) [7, 29] in Ogunsanwo (1986) [40] posits that
since the civil war, Nigeria’s military capacity has increased
considerably. Similarly, Nwachukwu (1989:39) [34] despite the
demobilization shortly after peace was restored, Nigeria’s
military strength stands at about 195, 000 and it is highly
intimidating. As Okereke (2005:46) [41] noted, this human
force is backed up with an immensely increased fire power.
The size of Nigeria’s army according to aduku (2006:27) [3]
looks impressive when compared to that of the following
neighbouring African states: Cameroon, 16, 000; Chad, 21,
000; Equtorial Guinea 2, 400; and Ghana 21, 000. other states
like Libya and south Africa have an army of approximately
85, 000 respectively, but the latter (south Africa) has a
substantial reserve force and an Air force which has a striking
power that is, by African standard, second only to that of
Egypt. All these elements of national power, which we have
outlined, account for Nigeria’s leadership pretensions in
Africa.
2.2.8. Nigeria’s Role in Africa
It is necessary to give a brief view of the role played by
Nigeria in Africa because, as Morgenthau (1975) [25]
remarked:
The character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only
through the examination of the political acts performed.
For clarity and preciseness, we shall examine this under the
following rubrics: Nigeria’s contribution to the quest for
political cooperation in Africa; its concern for peace in Africa;
the liberation of Africa from colonial rule, the struggle against
south Africa’s apartheid policy and Nigeria’s aids to other
African states.
a. The Quest for Political Co-operation: Maduka (2004:19)
[31]
argued that Nigeria has never supported the idea of an
African continental government. Rather she has always
entertained fears regarding its feasibility. This was clearly
demonstrated by late Sir Tafawa Belewa in his policy
statement of October 1960. He made it clear that his
government would give its support only to inter-state
cooperation resulting from closer economic and cultural
relations of African states. That statement notwithstanding,
Balogun (2006:41) [14] noted, Nigeria contributed to the
creation of the Organization of African Unity now African
Union in 1963. And as Alhaji Inua Wada Nigeria’s First
Defence Minister remarked, the seven points of the principles
of O.A.U as contained in the section 3 of the O.A.U. charter
were the brain child of Nigeria. The late Defence minister
went forward to claim that the charter of the O.A.U was
drafted by Dr. T Elias who was then Nigeria’s AttorneyGeneral. What this shows in the words of Ajayi (2000:101) [6]
is the amount of influence which Nigeria exercised on the
other African countries. Nigeria has helped to sustain peace in
Africa through its numerous financial contributions as well as
its diplomatic ingenuity.
Garba (1987:22) in agreement with Wayas (1979:17) pointed
out that in 1982, the problem of Western Sahara paralyzed the
19th summit of the O.A.U because more than 18 member
states which were in sympathy with Morocco, refused to
attend in protest against the then Secretary-General’s
announcement of the admission of the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic as the 51st member of the O.A.U. not
until two years later when Nigeria recognized the SADR, did
the representatives of the new Republic effectively take their
seats in the organization. It was thereafter, that many
supporters of Morocco decided to co-operate with the
organization.
b. Nigeria’s Efforts at Ensuring Peace in Africa
Onuorah (2001:9) in line with Olutoye’s (1997:12) line of
thought remarked that Nigeria’s concern for peace in Africa
was demonstrated in her maiden international engagement in
the Congo (now Zaire) during that country’s crisis in 1962.
According to them, Nigeria sent troops to serve with the
United Nation Forces and also sent 400 officers and men of
the Nigeria Police Force to help restore peace and order.
Nigeria bore its own part of the enormous cost of the
operations and even contributed to the U.N bonds issued to
help defray the debts accruing from the operations. Nigeria
headed reconciliation movement of warring factions in Chad
Republic and even wrote off N90 million which she spent in
her peace keeping mission in Chad.
There can be no better demonstration of Nigeria’s desire for
peace in Africa than the decision of Ex-president Shagaria’s
government to resolve Nigeria’s border dispute with the
Republic of Cameroon through peaceful negotiation inspite of
the later’s provocations. Nigeria’s role in the formation of
ECOMOG and consequent restoration of peace in Liberia
speaks volume. Recently, Nigeria sent 900 military officers to
Mali and went ahead to contribute Five million dollars for
Mali Liberation. Inter-state conflicts in Africa have continued,
though, and Nigeria has been intimately connected with
efforts at resolving crisis in Somalia; Rewanda; Libya;
Sundan; coted’ivore and Democratic Republic of Congo
among others.
c. Nigeria and the Colonial Liberation of Africa
Scholars like Akinyemi (1974:18) [9], Shaw (1979:28) Obiozor
(1985:16), Olu (2000:33) Umar (2000:10) among others have
consistently argued that Nigeria has always emphasized its
commitment to the total liberation of Africa from colonial
domination. Umar (2000:10) asserted that concrete action
towards achieving this was a bit long in coming. For instance,
he argued when Rhodesia unilaterally declared its
independence from Great Britain in 1965, Nigeria, unlike
Tanzania, did not break diplomatic relations with Great
Britain for imposing just “limited sanctions” on the Ian Smith
Government. Obiozor (1985:106) observed that if that Lapses
led Britain to think that Nigeria would support its installing a
puppet government in Zimbabwe, the reaction of the then
Obasanjo Administration left it in no doubt as to the
commitment of Nigeria to colonial emancipation. As Umar
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
(2000:15) pointed out, Nigeria in 1979 rejected the AngloAmerican peace proposals for Zimbabwe and later denounced
the election that brought Bishop Abel Muzorewa to power.
According to Akinyemi (1974:93) [9], Nigeria argued that
bishop Muzorewa’s party-the African National Congress-was
in alliance with Ian Smith’s Rhodesian front, and that the
decision of the British governments to go ahead with the
elections when the rules for conducting them had not been
accepted by all the parties concerned is to say the least illconceived, dictatorial and highly undemocratic. According to
Olu (2000:66), Nigeria argued that it was an attempt to
impose Bishop Muzorewa’s government on the people of
Zimbabwe.
As Garba (1987) posit, intensified diplomatic, financial and
material support for the patriotic front parties of Jomo
Kenyetta and Robert Mugabe, was made by Nigeria and when
it was revealed that the shell BP (Nigeria) Limited had broken
the oil embargo on Rhodesia, the then Obasanjo
administration nationalized it. Olusanya and Akindele (1986)
argued that Nigeria’s action had the effect of making Britain
with-hold its recognition of the Muzorewa’s government.
Another colonial territory which engaged the attention of
Nigeria was Anglola. Before the turning point in Portugal’s
colonial history in 1974, Offiong (1980:66) noted, Nigeria had
championed the condemnation of Portuguese resistance to
decolonization in Africa. Retired General Garba, then
Nigeria’s External Affairs Minister, recalled that when South
Africa moved into Angola to forcibiliy put in power Jonas
Savimbi of the UNITA who was in collusion with the racist
regime, Nigeria, under the late Gen. Murtala Mohammed,
surprised the world by resisting American pressure and
recognizing the government of Augustino Neto of the MPLA.
According to Oshodin (1997:91) and Gambanm (1980:18)
that action gave Nigeria’s foreign policy an unprecedented
international prominence. Nigeria followed it up with a gift of
N20 million cash, in addition to military hardware from rifles
to MIGs and from supplies of clothing to composite rises
which were sent in ever-increasing quantities.
Nigeria equally played a prominent role in Namibian
independence. She gave South West Africa People’s
Organization (SWAPO) financial, material and moral support.
Nigeria initiated action and supported U.N security council
and the then O.A.U. in asking for the withdrawal of South
Africa’s administration from the territory and its granting of
independence.
d. The Struggle against Apartheid
There is hardly any state in Africa, even in the world today
that demonstrated its opposition to South Africa’s racial
policy by then more than Nigeria. According to Nwachukwu
(1989:63) [34], the recognition of that fact was demonstrated in
the election of former Nigeria’s representative at the United
Nations, Late Major-General Joseph Garba, as the chairman
of the U.N. Anti-apartheid committee.
Cenvenda (1980:33) in the same line of thought with Arikpo
(1980:17) argued that South Africa was the only state in
whose internal affairs Nigeria arrogates to itself the right to
interfere. This according to Wayas (1979:19), Oyediran
(1978:12) and Onwunwa (1988:7) [51] was on the ground that
the policy of apartheid pursued by the then Pretoria
government constituted a threat to world peace.
Nigeria’s attitude towards South Africa was non-fraternization
with the Pretoria government then in power. Nigeria even
sponsored several motions both at the United Nations and the
then OAU calling for majority rule in South Africa. The then
Head of state, General Obasanjo criticized all the multinational corporations which were contributing to the
perpetuation of apartheid. In an address on the liquidation of
apartheid, he declared: (1977:4)
In the pursuit of this objective, we shall not consider any
sacrifices as too great or any weapon too mean to hasten the
end of all oppression and injustice in South Africa and to
ensure the total Liquidation of apartheid.
It is on record that in 1986, Nigeria Championed the boycott
of the 13th Commonwealth Games in Scotland in protest
against Britain’s refusal to impose economic sanctions on
Pretoria. In fact, Nigeria contributed immensely to the
dismantlement of apartheid, eradication of colonialism,
liberation movements, and conflict resolutions in Africa. She
displayed her might and courage in restoring peace in SierraLeone Liberia, Chad, Somalia, and Rwanda in particular and
other African nations in particular.
e. Aids
Garba (1991:81) asserted that from the sustained financial and
material assistance to African Liberation movements, Nigeria
has given all kinds of Aid to many African countries which
have experienced one type of disaster or another. In 1980s,
African states benefited from what Onwunwa (1988:11) [51]
called Nigeria’s “Donatus principle” which included the
following; The Republic of Cameroon which was dispatched
food and other materials immediately after the Lake Nyos
disaster; the Equatorial Guinea which was given vehicles and
other equipment; the drought-stricken cape Verde and
Namibia which were sent food (the latter, for its refuge in
Angola) and Burkina Faso which received a donation of 40
light trucks.
To complement this gesture of random aids, the then
Babangida administration created a Technical Aid Corps
Scheme (TACS), under which Nigeria professionals in
various discipline are sent to work in any African country that
needs them, at no cost to the recipient. Apart from that, the
human and material losses which Nigeria suffered during the
Liberian crises amounted to about 9 billion dollars; Chad 6
Billion dollars; mal 8 million dollars etc.
3. Constraints to Nigeria’s Leadership Attempt in Africa:
An Analysis
1) The Nature and Characteristics of Conflict in Africa:
African conflicts are spread all over the continent and there
are no regions without conflict. As Sani (2014:13) asserts, the
nature of African conflicts creates a big problem for Nigeria.
The characteristic and the nature of conflicts in Africa require
special attention as well as military requirements. According
to Ngugbu (2013:18), conflicts in Africa are intra state;
international, transnational, inter-state or a mixture and
external. Players traditionally try to influence areas of interest
and regional organizations as well as state aspirations for
regional hegemony are setting the environment. Boarders in
Africa are in many cases artificial. Artificial borders can cause
internal conflicts where two or more nations are living within
one state. Artificial borders can likewise create both intrastate
conflicts, interstate conflicts transnational conflicts, and
international conflicts.
As Dersso (2012:47) [19] noted, an effective conflict resolution
mechanism, therefore, has to be capable of conducting
operations in both civil wars, transnational and international
conflicts. Nigeria is yet to develop such capabilities. She is
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
not capable of conducting peace support operations in a multi
conflict scenario, with several parties with different interests
as seen in Sudan, Rewanda, Somalia, Coted’ ivorire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya etc. As Sidibe
(2012:27) pointed out, independence left many African
countries weak, and with states characterized by social
instability, lack of health services and education, and lack of
security and widespread kleptomama, an extensive number of
military coups and poverty. Best (2009:42) [15] argues that and
collapsing states are characterized by loss of state, control
over the political and economic space and the collapse often
takes place in a cyclic downfall which can be diverted when
nations are in crisis. Nigeria do not have effective peace
support that is capable of providing or assisting the buildup of
the three basic services in a state: authority, institutions and
security.
Cold wars among warring factions and proliferation of small
arms, post-colonial era’s spheres of influence of the former
colonial powers who try to maintain the causes of conflict
pose considerable constraints to Nigeria. Besides that, Africa
is divided into five regions namely North Africa; West Africa;
East Africa; Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Each of the
regions has a regional organization traditionally established to
evolve economic development, security and general
development. All these tries to checkmate Nigeria’s
leadership attempt in Africa.
i. Administrative Constraints/Bureaucratic Gaps
Effective peacemaking and peace keeping initiatives require
efficient management and bureaucratic structures in the field
to provide strategic vision and support senior mission
leadership terms. At present, however, Nigeria still lacks the
institutional capacity and human resources to conduct
effective peacemaking initiatives and complex peace
operations in Africa.
As Agbode (2013:11) noted, Nigeria suffers from weak
bureaucratic processes and management systems, poor
information technologies; inadequate physical infrastructure; a
lack of professional and motivated personnel; weak strategic
initiative and inadequate sources of funds. At present, the
Nigeria peace keeping operation remains severely underfunded. In fact, peacekeeping operation in Africa poses
particular institutional challenge.
ii. Operational Efficacy of National Armies
Nigeria consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military
personnel and range of military assets needed for complex
peace operations, such as the situation in Somalia, Sudan,
Mali, Liberia etc. among the assets in highest demand in
difficult African theaters of war such as Mali, Sudan, Somalia
etc are helicopters (utility and attack), armored personnel
carriers; communication and intelligence equipment;
unmanned aerial vehicles; night vision goggles and bottle
tanks etc. Nigeria also lacks a sophisticated mortar radar
system, which could have helped to reduce levels of civilian
casualties in troubled African states.
As for military personnel, Nigeria’s greatest deficits are
specialists with niche skills including medicine, engineering
and intelligence gathering. Okoknwo (2012:20) argues that to
fill these gaps, Nigeria peace keepers have to rely on external
donors to provide training, equipment directly to troop and
sometimes money.
iii. The State of the Economy
The first problem that faces Nigeria in resolving conflicts in
Africa as well as aspiring for leadership position is lack of
adequate finance. Have Nigeria been able to generate enough
financial resources in implementing its intricate security
management system? The most important factor on the future
of peace keeping in Africa and leadership position in the
continent is finance. The Nigeria government is quite aware of
this potential problem despite her leadership claim. This
affects adversely her strategic operation and even tactical
aspects of peace operations it may wish to undertake.
Nigeria was described in early 70s as Black Africa’s richest
and most populous nation, with a gross national product of
$276 billion, which was greater than that of all the other Black
African States put together. Agbode (2013:63) noted that it
was the period of the oil boom. Even though the country’s per
capita income was below that of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, etc., Nigeria was relatively rich.
But we know that most of that wealth was squandered on
irrational power play instead of its being invested in the
expansion of the productive capacity of our economy. We all
know also that what was left of it was drained dry by the
Shagari and Babangida regimes which witnessed an
unprecedented level of corruption in Nigeria’s history.
In an attempt to grapple with the economic problem thus
created, there was, as from 1983, a clamp-down on “illegal
aliens.” In effect, thousands of Africans who had sought
refuge in Nigeria were expelled. They included some refugees
of the Chadian civil war who had to move to Ghana where
they were received, in keeping with Ghana’s support for the
ECOWAS protocol on free movement of citizens of its
member-states, which include Nigeria. For about 16 months
starting from April 1984, the Buhari administration closed
Nigeria borders to the so-called illegal immigrants to the
dismay of some ECOWAS member-states. Yet ECOWAS has
been identified as one medium through which Nigeria intends
to project its leadership image.
In any case, Nigeria’s economy is still in a terribly bad state of
rehabilitation, with the burden of a staggering internal and an
external. This is not surprising because Nigeria accounts for
half of the total external commercial debts owed by subSaharan Africa and, so, it has to bear a good part of the $1
billion which is estimated to be the additional annual charges
on rescheduling the debts.
Evidently, Nigeria’s economic situation is now worse than in
early 80s and 90s when one American dollar exchanged for 70
kobo as against the current exchange rate oscillating between
N160 to N165 to the dollar. It is true that Nigeria’s natural
resources are still in good supply but it is deficient in
industrial establishments for using them to foster rapid
economic recovery. It is pertinent to emphasize that economic
growth is an indispensable prerequisite of status in the
international society. Nigeria has vast mineral deposits but
does not have enough infrastructure for putting them into
industrial and other uses, to remain important in international
politics from the viewpoint of military strategy but its power
vis-à-vis other states will not change much. By implication,
Nigeria cannot lead other African states with a battered
economy. Garba (1977:2) was so conscious of this fact that in
an address at the University of Ibadan as far back as in
February 1977, when Nigeria’s economy was still buoyant,
told his audience as follows:
“No nation can effectively pursue a dynamic and independent
foreign policy with a weak and dependent economy…. Indeed,
I would go as far as to declare that Nigeria’s ability to
succeed in her diplomatic endeavours will, to a large extent,
depend on her economic strength.”
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
Whether this fact should make Nigerian leaders unmindful of
the contradiction between their words and their actions as far
as her relationship with foreign nations especially France is
concerned is another matter. As Director-General of the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Prof. Bolaji
Akinyemi, who later became Nigeria’s External Affairs
Minister, described France as Africa’s enemy of the first order
because of its support for the then apartheid regime in South
Africa. In those days all the public declarations of the
Nigerian Government condemn those European countries
helping to sustain apartheid economically and diplomatically,
including France. How does Nigeria expect to be taken
seriously when it’s economic relations then with the so-called
No. I enemy of Africa is, paradoxically, on the increase? For
example, there were only 15 French companies actively
engaged in Nigeria in 1975. Today, notwithstanding the
economic contretemps, they are about 130 French Companies
in Nigeria. Obviously pleased with this development, A
French consular official in Lagos once declared:
“Our establishment in this ‘giant’ of Africa is more far
reaching than one can imagine. Our interests in West Africa
may depend heavily on the consolidation or weakening of our
position in Nigeria.”
It is believed that the volume of trade between Nigeria and
France exceeds that between Nigeria and all the francophone
African countries put together. According to the observation
of Roland Dumas in 1987, France and Nigeria have, in the
space of one generation, become partners of prime importance
to each other in the economic sphere. Nigeria is the second
largest oil supplier to France and France is its biggest buyer of
crude oil. As far as investment in Nigeria is concerned, France
ranks second only to Great Britain.
African countries know that Nigeria has yet to establish a
sound economic base for playing any effective leadership role.
If Nigeria always succeeds in forming a diplomatic coalition
of African states in troubled African nations, it is not because
they see it as a leadership role but because they all agreed, in
principle, on the need for peace in Africa and can afford, in
practice, to take such symbolic measures in support of the
principle as would not jeopardize their own national interest.
vi. The Level of Internal Cohesion and National Morale
The morale of the average Nigerian has been on the
downward trend since the country’s economy are being ruined
by their leaders. Between October and December 1985, we
debated and rejected the IMF loan and its conditionalities only
to be committed by the Babangida administration to a N4.3b
loan from the World Bank, which is largely responsible for
the introduction of Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment
Programme in July 1986. Although it is appreciated that SAP
is aimed at creating a better tomorrow after the suffering of
today, the scourge of today is too much to bear till tomorrow.
As a result of introduction of the programma, industries were
closed down; several workers in both private and public
sectors retrenched. Malnutrition once again reared its ugly
head with its attendant health consequences, as prices of
essential commodities soar. There was devaluation of Naira
policy introduced by her leaders. Yet the much anticipated
infusion of foreign investments which the devaluation of the
Naira should attract did not seem to materialize. One has
every reason to be apprehensive of the future because
according to Prof. Onimode, “as long as there is FEM and
SAP and the debt service ratio hovers around 30 percent…
there can be no change.”
Many a Nigerian is not elated by the flattery that the success
of the SAP, which earned President Babangida the 1987
International Strategic Studies Association Award, has done
much “to prepare the foundation for a sound economic
growth. The World Bank Report late in 1987 showed that its
practical effects on gross domestic product, exports, savings,
investment, unemployment and inflation were far below
expectation. Suffering has engulfed the country since 1983;
life is insecure. The future of the youths hang in the balance.
Infact, as one observer remarked:
“So long as an army of unemployed youths, hungry and very
angry, is allowed to exist in the country, so long will violence
and chaos be a constant threat”.
Is it any wonder, therefore, that the victims of the economic
crisis do not understand why the Nigeria leadership should be
so charitable abroad when its own house is not in order?
If the objective of the aids which Nigeria gives to other
African countries is to impress the recipient States with its
economic power, then it is a corruption of the policy of
prestige because it does not reflect the true state of our
economy. The beneficiaries know this. They assess Nigeria’s
leadership quality on how well it caters for its own people. If,
on the other hand, the aids are meant to serve as a technique
of influence, then the policy defaults in its optimism of the
preferred behaviour of the recipients. Most African nations
accepts aids from Nigeria but does not show commensurate
gratitude for them because it perceives Nigeria as a country
whose leaders do not know what they are doing with their
nation’s wealth. In fact, many African nations spurns at the
leadership pretensions of Nigeria in Africa.
v. Religious Conflicts
Incidents of religious fanaticism are a common feature in
Nigeria. But since the second Republic they have been
assuming an alarming dimension. It is not so much the spate
of disturbances provoked by the Maitatsine and its rival sects
that sap internal cohesion as the controversy generated by
Nigeria’s membership of the Organization of the Islamic
conference as well as the recent Boko Haram heartless
destruction of lives and properties of Nigerians. Babangida
administration in 1987 dragged Nigeria into membership of
OIC. The suspicion is strong in Christian communities that it
is a step towards making Nigeria an Islamic state. This
suspicion was not even removed by the setting up in June
1987 of a 24-member Advisory Council on Religious Affairs
which is expected to “provide a permanent forum for mutual
interaction among the various religious groups” and to serve
as a means of fostering harmony. What buttresses this fact is
the withdrawal from the Council of a Christian member,
former Ambassador Tanko Yusuf, on the ground that certain
utterances of some Muslim members of the Council
confirmed the fear that some people were bent on making
Nigeria an Islamic country. The activities of Boko Haram
sects seem to confirm such fear. This particular religious
conflict knocks Nigeria out from playing an effective
leadership role in Africa. This is unfortunate because one of
the basic requirements for achieving foreign policy goals is
that the state concerned must have a supportive domestic
environment. We lack such in Nigeria today because of
activities of Boko Haram Insurgents.
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
vi. The Level of Nigeria’s Military Power
The importance of a formidable military force to a continental
leader or aspirant cannot be over-estimated. Singer (2009:13)
rightly pointed out, the scarcest commodity in international
relations is security, because the gross inadequacy of ethical,
political, (and we might add, legal) restraints make violence
accepted and anticipated. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary
that a policy of regional leadership should be backed up with a
military force that is capable not only of safeguarding national
security but also of serving as an effective prop to diplomacy.
This is so because as long as force remains the final arbiter of
rivalries among nations, the comparative strengths of military
establishments will continue to set limits to actions in foreign
affairs.
We have already observed that in relation to many African
states, Nigeria has a military might that is impressive but
whether it can place Nigeria at the peak of the hierarchy of
power in Africa is quite another matter. Leadership in the
international political context is not just leading a diplomatic
coalition which African countries readily constitute on issues
pertaining to the continents trouble states policy. It is much
more than that. It has to do with the capacity of achieving a
desired goal by the use of military force when diplomacy fails.
Generally speaking, diplomacy has so far failed in the struggle
to ensure peace in Africa. African States do not have any
alternative to the use of force. Has Nigeria, therefore, the
military capacity to lead the other African countries to a
successful war against Africa nations that are always at
internal war? No. in the words of Gordon Idang: (2003:47).
“Nigeria and other independent African States are likely to
face an indefinite period of frustration in their relations with
South Africa because militarily south Africa has the best
equipped and disciplined Army, Navy and Air Force on the
African continent and it is doubtful whether even the
combined forces of independent African States can match this
fighting power.”
In any case, it is not comforting to assert that Nigeria depends
greatly on external suppliers for almost all its military vehicles
and hardware because such dependence is a source of
weakness. If, as Gen. Babangida felt in 1985, Nigeria’s
military responsibilities in the West African sub-region in
particular and in Africa as a whole, will continue to grow,
then Nigeria must develop its defence industry to the extent of
being able to manufacture most of its military needs in
equipment. The Nigerian Defence Industrial Corporation
which was established in 1964 produces only light arms,
ammunition, explosives and spare parts, and although since
1981 Nigeria has been licensed to manufacture armored
personnel carriers and transport vehicles, the plant set up in
Bauchi has not taken shape because of lack of funds.
Now this question of low level of national morale which
weakens our national power. “Military power”, as Macridis
(1999:14) noted, “is like the fist whose force depends on the
health and vitality of the body politic and the whole society;
troops are an important determinant of a successful foreign
policy but without other foundations, they will not suffice.”
One of such foundations is national morale which is
deplorably low in Nigeria for reasons which we have already
discussed. Indeed, the spirit of many Nigerians may be willing
to embrace any leadership role Nigeria can play in Africa but
their flesh is certainly too weak to give such a policy the
desired support.
vii. The Dependence Syndrome in Africa
African states are among the third world countries which are
characterized by a high rate of illiteracy, a high population
growth, and shortage of capital, low agricultural and industrial
productivity and other traits of under-development. Their
most urgent need is the capital for a rapid economic growth.
Invariably, African States depend on the advanced nations of
the world for both the capital and the model of development.
They borrow money from international financial consortia or
from their erstwhile colonial masters. Then begins the loss of
their independence of action as the creditors are assured
handsome rewards for their loan by way of profits as well as
of participation in the formulation of the economic policies of
the states concerned. One should not be surprised to learn that
most of the Nigerian Budgets had to be endorsed by the World
Bank before it was broadcast to the Nigerian public. This has
been the practice from Tafawa Belewa regime to this present
GoodLuck Jonathan regime.
Apart from the area of economy, African States also depend
on foreign powers for ensuring their security. This is why
France, for example, has military base in a number of
francophone African states. Most of her military hardware are
imported, all things considered, therefore, African countries,
including Nigeria, are controlled in their policies and actions
by powers outside the continent. In fact, the involvement of
foreign powers like the United States of America, the defunct
Soviet Union, France and Great Britain is indispensable to the
settlement of most, if not all, the problems confronting Africa.
Because by the instrumentality of financial and military aid,
they control the economic and political livewire of African
States. It stands to reason, therefore, that the other African
States cannot accept Nigeria’s leadership because they, like
Nigeria, for now depend on foreign powers for survival-and
he who pays the piper dictates the tune.
4. Conclusion
Nigeria right from independence has not been blessed with
good leaders. Starting from Belewa, Nigeria’s first prime
minister down to the current president GoodLuck Ebele
Jonathan, the story is the same. We have produced wasteful,
corrupt and inept leaders who lack the vision and political will
to lead the country successfully. Leaders in our first Republic
and military Era institutionalized corruption stealing, wasteful
culture. Nigeria leaders in second and Third Republics were
even worse than those before them. They siphoned, looted our
National treasury and milked our Nation dry. All of them have
displayed kindergarten administrative behaviour.
They have failed to curb internal local violence in their
country yet they aspire to lead other African countries but
forgot that charity begins at home. The culture of impunity
which is continuing to be prevalent and difficult to overcome
by Nigeria leaders is a serious shortcoming of her pretentious
claim of leadership role in Africa. Due to lack of political will
and inability of Nigeria leaders to curb religious violence in
the country their efforts to assume leadership role in Africa
have largely faltered to date despite the claim of her leaders to
outside world.
Even at the time of the oil boom, experts did stress that
Nigeria would not be able to dominate the affairs of the
continent either politically or militarily because she does not
possess leaders to assume such big role. Additionally, it has
not been possible for Nigerian leaders to create at home the
basis for national cohesion and the reign of social harmony in
order to carry the people with them in their foreign policies.
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International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development
Not until their charity begins at home and not until these
wishes become horses can Nigeria qualify to take up the
challenge of leadership in Africa. In the meantime, our
leadership will do by minimizing corrupt practices and to
commit our resources to over pressing domestic needs instead
of deceiving Nigerians with their psycudo pursuit of
leadership role in Africa.
5.
1.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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10.
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12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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