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Party membership and social movement
activism: A macro-micro analysis
Marco Giugni^ and Maria T. Grasso*
^Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva,
Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve 40, Geneva Ch-1211, Switzerland
E-mail: marco.giugni@unige.ch
*Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road,
Sheffield S10 2TU, United Kingdom
E-mail: m.grasso@sheffield.ac.uk
1
Abstract
This paper examines the macro-micro dynamics linking party membership with protest
participation. We theorise that institutional and extra-institutional engagement are mutually
reinforcing and that party membership has a positive effect on party activism. We examine
key ideational and structural factors identified in the literature to analyse the relative
importance of various factors for party members’ involvement. We look at micro-macrolevel linkages by examining macro-level contextual variables as well as the extent to which
these features mediate the individual level effects. Our results suggest that party members
support social movements for a variety of ideational and structural reasons but that strategic
reasons are also important. Moreover, we find that contexts marked by more open political
opportunities close the gap in social movement activism between party members and nonmembers suggesting that contexts with higher public spending as well as crises can be
capitalised on to engage the wider public into political activism.
2
Introduction
The literatures on institutional and movement politics have historically followed different
paths. More recently, however, scholarship has urged for the investigation of the
relationship between these two spheres for understanding the dynamics of participation and
engagement (Císa and Navrátil, 2015, della Porta et al., 2017, Heaney, 2013, Heaney and
Rojas, 2015, Kriesi et al., 2012, Kriesi, 2014, McAdam and Tarrow, 2010, McAdam and
Tarrow, 2013, Norris et al., 2015). While most of this literature to date focuses on
aggregate-level processes of party-movement interaction, in this investigation we aim to
break new ground and turn to examining the macro-micro dynamics linking party
membership to social movement activism. While most scholarship aiming to link electoral
and protest politics to date has focused on movement-party interactions, we aim to bridge
the individual-level and political process perspectives by examining the extent to which
individuals engage in protest and parties and how this is affected by the wider structures of
political opportunities, in particular those opened up by the recent economic crisis and the
austerity policies enacted by European governments. This in turn allows for the paper to
provide important answers for many scholars as the approach allows us to analyse
structural, cultural, and individual factors at the same time. This is of particular relevance
since these factors are interlinked and interact. As such, if we neglect macro-micro linkages
we miss something important about the relationship between party membership and
movement mobilization. In turn, employing this type of analysis allows us to make sense of
various factors at the same time and to more fully understand the democratic underpinnings
of European and other industrial nations.
3
Times of crisis can be seen as times of shifting alignments where parties in
government are particularly under pressure as they navigate the conflicting demands of
being responsive to their core constituencies while at the same time balancing the budget
sheets and fulfilling the expectations of supra-national bodies and financial markets (Giugni
and Grasso 2018). As mainstream parties have increasingly moved to the centre-ground and
espoused centrist policies, this has opened up political space for the populist right and other
types of institutional and extra-institutional challengers. This has changed the relationship
between parties and various movements, both on the Left and on the Right of the political
spectrum. Most importantly, this is likely to have changed the ways in which people relate
to both parties and movements.
In this context, given the lack of attention to macro-micro linkages in the study of
the party-movement nexus, we aim to bridge the study of parties and protest at the
individual and contextual level by analysing the relationship between party membership
and social movement activism in the context of economic crisis and austerity policies. The
broader aim is to address questions pertaining to the linkages between different types of
institutional and extra-institutional forms of activism in Western Europe as well as calls for
studies analysing the links between parties and protest. We apply random intercept models
and control for key socio-demographic characteristics to examine the relative importance of
different types of factors for party members’ participation in social movement activities i.e.
protest. We also control for key features of the political system that vary between countries
as well as analysing the extent to which these features mediate the individual-level effects.
We show that party membership has a positive effect on protest participation. We also
show that individual unemployment has a negative effect on that person’s protest
4
participation, but societal unemployment increases participation in protest. These are
important findings which contribute to the literature linking level institutional and extrainstitutional participation, showing also the impact of macro-level context, with particular
reference to deteriorating economic conditions in times of crisis.
Previous research and hypotheses
Recent scholarship has begun to inquire into complex relationships between social
movements and party politics, but mainly at the macro and meso level. Work on the
relationship between protest and parties has focused on movements and has tended to argue
that if parties articulate a certain discourse then that reduces the political space for
movements and there is less need for mobilisation on a particular issue (Tilly, 1999,
Tarrow, 1996).
The literature has traditionally noted how political space delimits patterns of
mobilisation by different actors. For example, research examining the extreme right has
shown evidence that where established or moderate right-wing parties articulate a radical
agenda, the space for radical parties decreases as potential supporters support the
established party (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004, Koopmans et al., 2005). Research has
further shown that the interaction of party and protest fields needs to be understood in terms
of economic political values but also needs to take into account the importance of
secondary conflict axes over cultural values that are becoming increasingly prominent
(Kitschelt, 1986, Kitschelt, 1988). In the US, McAdam and Tarrow (2013) found that
governments opened up opportunities for their movement allies. On the other hand, for
5
Eastern Europe there is evidence of countervailing tendencies where right-wing
governments stimulate protest but leftist ones do not (Císa and Navrátil, 2015).
Political process theorists, in particular, have historically considered the broader
context of mobilisation central for understanding social movement activism. Factors such
as the degree of openness or closedness of the political system and presence of institutional
allies (Tarrow, 1994, Kriesi et al., 1995) or favourable discursive political opportunity
structures (Koopmans et al., 2005) were seen as central factors for understanding
mobilisation. However, despite these developments with respect to meso- and macro-level
theorising, there has been little examination of the ways in which parties and protest relate
to each other at the individual level including how this is conditioned by the wider political
context and relevant political opportunities available.
One notable exception is in the recent work of Heaney and Rojas (2015), who
examine the macro-micro linkages between parties and movement by looking at individuallevel partisan and movement identities. They argue that partisan identities lead partisans to
support social movements but also to drop movement participation when this no longer
looks to benefit the party. In our investigation, we look at the impact of party membership
on protest participation and how this varies based on different characteristics of the wider
political context. While the individual level political participation literature has tended to
look at institutional participation and protest participation separately, we argue that
institutional engagement (party membership) is related to extra-institutional engagement
(protest). We suggest that institutional activism is actually reinforcing of extra-institutional
participation rather than belonging to a different sphere of action:
H1: Party membership has a positive effect on protest participation.
6
But why does party membership spur protest participation? With respect to political
process, the literature suggests a number of hypotheses linking party and protest activism.
Based on previous research, three types of factors in particular can be understood to explain
the circumstances under which party members might support and/or become involved in
social movement activities (Piccio, 2016). While these types of factors have typically been
examined at the aggregate level and often taken separately, in the first step of our analysis,
we want to test the extent to which they impact on individual-level participation. These can
be summarised in three main strands. For each, we develop a specific hypothesis.
First, party members might protest because they share social movement’s goals and
ideological leanings. In this respect, research has shown that for reasons of identity
coherence individuals will tend to participate in social movement activities only when they
feel a certain affinity with their goals (Kriesi et al., 1992). As such, if party members
participate in protest for purely ideological reasons, we expect that:
H2: The effect party membership on protest participation is no longer significant
when controlling for left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values.
Moreover, party members might participate in protest because they are immersed in
organisational networks which act as catalysts for passing on information about events and
increasing the possibility that members might be asked to participate by other
organisational members. We argue that, since membership in political parties is likely to be
linked to participation in other organisations (Norris, 2002), then party members are more
likely to become involved in social movement activities since they are more likely to find
out about them and get recruited in to them by their wider networks (Schussman and Soule,
7
2005). As such, if party members participate in protest mainly due to network effects, we
expect that:
H3: The effect party membership on protest participation is no longer significant
when controlling for the degree of involvement in other organisations.
Moreover, while the literature has identified both ideational and structural factors
which might explain the link between party membership and protest participation, we
expect that party members also act strategically and support social movements when they
think that this will benefit their parties. Vulnerability in the parties’ electoral environment
has been seen as favouring interaction with social movements since parties are understood
to employ strategies that are beneficial for their organization i.e. electoral support (Kriesi
and Wisler, 1996, Goldstone, 1991). In times of economic crisis and shifting alignments,
strategic reasons might thus become particularly relevant for party members to engage in
protest activism. As such, if party members participate in protest mainly for strategic
reasons, we expect that:
H4: The effect of party membership on protest participation remains significant
even when controlling for ideational, network and when all the other relevant controls
discussed in the literature on protest participation are accounted for.
This hypothesis is based on a process of elimination logic. Once all the other
relevant mechanisms accounting for the link between party membership and protest are
controlled for, any residual effect of party membership on protest participation would
strongly suggest strategic reasons for movement participation by partisans. In terms of the
other relevant controls that need to be accounted for before we can speak of a residual,
strategic effect of party membership in protest, previous research has clearly shown that not
8
all sectors of society engage in social movements and protest activism evenly. Research has
shown that on the whole participants in social movement activities tend to be younger and
male (Schussman and Soule 2005). However, the class bases of protest are understood to
have become increasingly diffuse. While on the one hand early scholarship saw protest as
“weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1976, Tilly, 1978), others have since argued that sociocultural specialist (Kriesi, 1989) should have by now become predominant in this
repertoire. Most recently, Standing (2011) and della Porta (2015) have suggested that the
precariat could potentially form a new class basis for contention in the context of the
current economic crisis. Education is normally understood to play a very important role for
spurring protest, particularly through its cognitive liberation functions (Dalton, 2008).
Moreover, political interest and political efficacy - both internal and external - are all
normally understood as key spurs for protest (Schussman and Soule 2005).
Moreover, our analysis aims to tackle the link between the micro and macro-level,
and the broader context is also understood to have a role to play for protest mobilisation. In
particular, times of crisis and the pressures they put on governments can be understood in
terms of the classical political opportunity structure apparatus as signalling a moment of
shifting alignments where parties might look for new allies, opening up opportunities for
protest (Tarrow, 1994). Moreover, the importance of different types of political issues may
wax and wane due to both more long-term processes (e.g. the rise of a new integrationdemarcation cleavage resulting from globalization) or the emergence of external shocks
(e.g. the current economic crisis). The latter type of event in particular may serve as triggers
for the opening up of political space for new challengers in both the electoral and protest
arena and as such spur activism in society more generally. In particular, major crises are
9
understood to undermine support for mainstream political actors and therefore to open up
the opportunities for protest (Grasso and Giugni, 2016). These types of shocks can be seen
as catalyst events pushing political actors to react to wider circumstances and spurring
wider societal mobilisation. This follows from the idea that crises can provide the space for
party members to mobilise the wider public into protest action. As such we expect that:
H5: The opening up of political opportunities linked to the crisis (i.e. high
unemployment, low GDP growth) will narrow down the gap between party members and
non-members ofparties in terms of their social movement involvement.
At the same time, the way in which these opportunities are exploited will also be
conditioned by the wider context such as economic set ups or national features such as
social-democratic arrangements (Grasso and Giugni, 2016). On this basis, we expect that:
H6: Contexts marked by social-democratic arrangements (e.g. higher social
spending) provide a more open space for mobilising non-party activists.
Data and methods
To test our hypotheses questions, we employ data from an original cross-national survey
(N=18,370) conducted in 2015 in the context of the [REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW].
The survey was conducted in each of the nine European countries included in the project:
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK by a
specialised polling agency -YouGov - using online panels with the methodologies available
in each country and quota balanced in order to match national population statistics in terms
of region, sex, age, and education level (Grasso and Giugni 2016). These countries offer
good variation in terms of political context and in terms of the extent to which they were
10
affected by the economic crisis, allowing for a certain degree of external validity of our
results. We also include macro-level data from 2014 from the World Bank on
unemployment and GDP growth as well as from the OECD on government social spending
and tax wedges. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are available in Table 1. The final
sample is 16,925 (Ns for each country are reported in Table 2), once all missing values are
removed.
INSERT TABLES 1-2
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether someone engaged in
protest in the last 12 months. Studies have shown that protest participation has distinct
features to other types of political action often classed in the “unconventional” realm
(Grasso, 2014) so we do not create scales but chose to focus on this “modal” expression
(Tarrow, 1996) of social movement activism, also as exemplified by the anti-austerity
demonstrations taking place in the wake of the crisis. Additionally, in line with our aim of
wanting to capture the impact of the economic context in 2014 on participation in 2015, we
only look at participation in the last year. The variable for party membership is also a
dummy. Table 2 shows the proportion of individuals that said they protested in the last
twelve months as well as that saying they are members of a party in each country. While
the levels are relatively high, this is likely to be due to the fact that the measure in the
survey asks people if they are members of a party so some individuals are likely to
understand membership in less formalised terms, giving the higher levels (Morales, 2009).
However, this is not effectively an issue for the analysis since we are interested in the
relationship between party membership (even if some individuals might see themselves as
11
members of a party even when they do not have up to date membership cards) and protest
participation.
We include a control for subjective feelings of relative deprivation retrospective to
the last five years that has been shown to be an important determinant of protest
participation in times of crisis (Rüdig and Karyotis, 2013, Bernburg, 2015, Grasso and
Giugni, 2016). The fact that the indicator is retrospective to the last five years is useful so
the deterioration of conditions relative to expectations should have at least begun to occur
prior to protest participation in the last 12 months and as such this means that the timeordering respects the requirements of causality. The question asks respondents whether they
felt that the economic situation of their household was much better or much worse than five
years ago. We dichotomised this measure following previous research (Rüdig and Karyotis,
2013) resulting in a dummy for whether individuals felt their household economic situation
had deteriorated. Table 2 also shows the proportion of individuals who said the economic
situation had deteriorated in each country.
To capture the contextual aspects in our analysis we rely on four measures which
have proved useful in a previous study (Grasso and Giugni 2016). Our macroeconomic
variables aim to examine both negative and positive indicators of economic context. First,
high unemployment levels can be seen as perhaps the most pernicious consequence of the
current economic crisis in Europe. Countries such as Greece and Spain, where
unemployment is highest, are those that have suffered the most. We also examine GDP
growth as perhaps the clearest measure that a country is doing well and emerging from
recession. Both variables are for 2014 to examine conditions prior to participation but not
too long before.
12
On the policy side, we include both government expenses for social policies (as a
percentage of the GDP) and the tax wedge (as a percentage of labour cost). They reflect a
definition of austerity policies as reducing government spending, particularly in the social
realm, and increasing taxation, predominantly on labour. This matters for our analysis since
our survey was conducted in a period of economic crisis and austerity policies in Europe.
These measures are meant to capture the output side of political opportunity structures a
dimension generally neglected in the literature (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004, Meyer, 2004).
Both variables are for 2014.
We also include the usual socio-demographic controls in our models. These include
age, gender, education level (low), occupation (8-categories, see Table 2) and employment
status (whether the respondent is unemployed). We know that being unemployed is an
important variable within biographical availability theories; while some unemployed people
are resource-poor some are more resource-rich (Dunn et al., 2014). We also include
controls for political attitudes and resources that are mainstay in the literature on
participation and protest activism (Schussman and Soule, 2005): political interest, internal
and external political efficacy, left-right values, libertarian-authoritarian values, and
number of organisational memberships (distributions by country are provided in Table 2).
Our dependent variable is measured at the individual level, but we have independent
variables at both the individual and the country level. Moreover, we are interested in the
interactions between these two levels since our argument refers to differences in how
individual level party membership relates to individuals’ protest behaviour according to
country-level economic and political context. For this reason, we specify multilevel models
with random intercepts to take into account the two-level nature of the data (country and
13
individual). This type of model is useful to correct for the within-country dependence of
observations (intraclass correlation). Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we
estimate logistic multilevel models with a Gaussian link function.
Findings
Table 3 shows ten models specified. Model 1 is the empty model. Model 2 includes the
main individual-level independent variable measuring party membership and only the
individual-level control variables. Model 3 includes unemployment rate in 2014; Model 4
GDP growth in 2014; Model 5 social spending in 2014; Model 6 tax wedge in 2014.
Models 7-10 include, in turn, each of the four macro-level variables from Models 3-6 with
the relevant cross-level interaction with party membership.
INSERT TABLE 3
As we can see, model fit improves with the inclusion of the individual level
variables as noted with the reduction in Log Likelihood. Moreover, there is improvement
with the inclusion of the macro-level factors and the cross-level interactions, particularly
unemployment in Model 3 and Model 7. Providing evidence for H1, we can see that across
Models 1-6 (Models 7-10 include cross-level interactions) party membership has a positive
effect on protest participation. Model 2, which includes all the individual level controls,
shows no negative effect for low education level. Fitting in with expectation, relative
deprivation has a significant and positive effect across the models. In terms of social bases,
we find that managers and foremen are significantly less likely relative to socio-cultural
specialists to be involved in social movement activities. On the other hand, unemployed
status has a negative and significant effect across the models. Thus, at the individual level
14
there is little evidence for a rising precariat at least as captured by this potentially narrow
measure and also against the predictions of some biographical availability theories:
unemployment reduces the chances of protest. In line with the resource and civic
voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995), greater political interest, stronger internal and
external efficacy (the scale is negative so the effect of external efficacy is also positive) all
have positive effects. Moreover, for H2, being more left-wing (relative to right-wing) and
also being more libertarian (relative to more authoritarian) all have a significant and
positive effect on protest but the effect of party membership remains significant, suggesting
that party members do not purely engage in protest for ideological reasons. With respect to
H3, we also see that the density of organisational networks also has a strong positive effect,
but the effect of party membership remains strong and significant event when controlling
for all the relevant predictors and particularly network and ideological variables. This
suggests that party members engage in social movement activities for a whole series of
ideational and structural, but also strategic, reasons, which we identified with the residual
effect of party membership on protest once all other variables are controlled for.
Next, we turn to considering the macro-level economic factors. When
unemployment is included in Model 3, there is a positive and significant effect of this
macroeconomic context variable on protest. Individuals in countries with higher
unemployment are more likely to have demonstrated in the last 12 months. However, the
inclusion of this variable in Model 3 does not remove the individual-level effect of party
membership we saw before. Party members are still more likely to become involved in
social movement activities regardless of whether individuals are in countries with higher or
lower levels of unemployment.
15
When including GDP growth in Model 4, there is a negative and significant effect
of this economic context variable on demonstrating. Individuals in countries with lower
GDP growth are more likely to have protested in the last 12 months. The inclusion of this
macro-level variable in Model 4 does not remove the individual-level effect for party
membership found before. Party members are still more likely to protest regardless of GDP
growth levels in the countries.
With respect to the macro-level political factors, a similar pattern as with economic
context is observed. Social spending in Model 5 has a significant positive effect at the 10
percent level on demonstration activities. We interpret this as a sign of more open political
opportunity structures. The inclusion of this macro-level political factor does not remove
the effect of party membership, meaning that the latter still matters regardless of spending
levels in the countries where respondents are living.
When including tax wedge in Model 6 there is also a significant (at the 10 percent
level) effect. This finding supports Bermeo and Bartels’ (2014) hypothesis that people react
to austerity policies rather than directly to the negative effects of the crisis. However, the
inclusion of this macro-level factor also does not change the effect of party membership:
the latter plays a role regardless of this contextual control.
One of the key aims of this this research, developing on previous work, was to
allow us to examine the individual and macro-level perspectives on protest in times of crisis
combined. Models 7-10 include cross-level interactions between each of macro-level
variable and party membership. With respect to H5, Model 7 shows that in countries with
higher unemployment rates, the effect of party membership on protest participation is
greater. Therefore, in worse economic conditions the protest gap between party members
16
and non-members becomes smaller. As such, it seems that more open political
opportunities in the wider national economic context spur the mobilisation of wider
sections of society beyond those individuals that are already committed to political parties.
A negative economic context may thus be understood in terms of increasing the chances
that members of the public will become mobilised to protest. Thus, while party membership
has a positive effect on protest participation regardless of the economic context, at higher
levels of unemployment the effect of being a committed party member is lower relative to
contexts with lower unemployment. This therefore suggests that this type of contextual
factor may serve to politicise individuals that do not participate outside of periods of crisis
and therefore that crises may be seen to open up opportunities for mobilisation.
Supporting H5, the results for GDP growth (Model 8) provide a similar narrative in
that where economic growth is slower, differences between party members and nonmembers become smaller, whereas when GDP growth is higher the gap between party
activists and others is larger.
This conditional effect is also found for the political context with respect to the
political opportunity structure offered by social democracies i.e. welfare states, when
testing for H6 in Model 9. However, the tax wedge (Model 10), while it has a direct effect
on demonstrating, does not condition the effect of party membership.
Moving on we can see from Model 7 with the cross-level interaction for party
membership and unemployment that the coefficient for party membership is 0.79 and
significant. This means that when the unemployment rate is 0 party members are more
likely than non-members to protest. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for
the interaction term between party membership and unemployment (-0.03) furthermore
17
suggests that the gap between non-members and party members becomes smaller as
unemployment goes up. For every percentage point rise in unemployment rate, the gap in
the log-odds of protesting falls by 0.03. The estimates suggest that party members catch up
with party members when unemployment reaches a level of 26.3% (0.79 /-0.03=26.3). As
such, it would seem that particularly negative economic contexts can act to mobilise the
wider members of the public, opening up opportunities for social change.
In Model 8 we can see that the coefficient for party membership suggests that when
GDP growth is 0 there are no differences between party members and non-members in
protesting. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term
between party membership and unemployment (0.30) suggests that the gap between party
members and non-members rises as GDP growth does. For every percentage point increase
in unemployment rate, the gap in the log-odds of protesting rises by 0.30. These estimates
suggest that even very slow economic growth is enough to differentiate the two groups
(0.02/0.30=0.06). Thus, it looks as though improved economic conditions have a
demobilising effect for everyone, but this is particularly true of the wider population
relative to party members. Again, this would support the idea that crises are conducive to
opportunities for social movements to mobilise the wider public.
In Model 9, the coefficient for party membership shows that when social spending
is very low only party members protest. This supports the idea that in contexts with more
closed opportunity structures, only the committed engage. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient for the interaction term between party membership and social
spending (-0.04) suggests that the gap in protesting between members and non-members
falls at higher levels of social spending, where opportunities for protest are presumably
18
perceived as more open, since the wider context is more favourable to demonstrating and
social movements. For every percentage point increase in social spending, the gap in the
log-odds of protesting between the two groups falls by 0.04. We can see that non-members
start protesting at higher levels than party members when social spending is particularly
generous i.e. over 38.25% of GDP (1.53/-0.04=38.25). This shows that party members are
more active than non-members in social movement activities but that more favourable
political contexts can narrow the gap in participation between these groups, once more
suggesting that context can allow for wider opportunities for societal-level mobilisation and
chances of movement success.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the cross-level interaction effects between party membership
and, in turn, unemployment, GDP growth and social spending to allow for visualisation.
The graphs show that the effect of party membership for mobilisation is greater where there
are more closed political opportunities. Political opportunity theory allows us to interpret
these findings. We consider that economic crisis and thus high unemployment or slow GDP
growth open up the political space for social problems to be understood at a more collective
level. In turn we suggest that this can then form the basis for political mobilisation even of
those members of the public that are less politically committed i.e. non-members. We see a
similar process operating for higher social spending in that here we consider these contexts
as more open opportunity structures with respect to protest. Where social spending is lower
we expect there to be greater neoliberal approaches including aspects of individualisation of
poverty being more normalised creating greater barriers to social movement involvement.
INSERT FIGURES 1-3
19
Discussion and conclusion
We hope that our study has served to show how the individual level relationship between
protest and parties is contextualised within wider political opportunities. We show that
party members are more likely to take to the streets even when controlling for relevant
characteristics that would be understood to account for various ideational and structural
factors, suggesting that strategic reasons, which we associate with the residual effect, are
also important. This suggests that party members act strategically and support social
movements where they think that this will benefit their party. This shows that the
institutional and extra-institutional domains are clearly linked and that activists tend to
participate in both. More so, committed institutional activism is found here to be
reinforcing of extra-institutional participation.
Furthermore, in linking the individual level to the wider macro or economic and
political context, we find that not only does party membership have direct effect on the
propensity to have engaged in demonstrations in the last year, but that party members are
also more likely than non-members to engage in social movement activism regardless of
more open or closed political opportunities. More open political opportunities in the context
of the crisis or social-democratic arrangements were further found to narrow the gap
between members and the wider public in their likelihood to protest. We interpreted these
findings with respect to political opportunities for protest. Political opportunity theory tends
to emphasise contextual variables for understanding mobilisation. Our results for the crosslevel interactions between party membership and macro-level factors show that context also
conditions the extent of the effect of party membership on participation. Moreover, strong
commitment to a political cause such as would be signified by party membership was
20
shown to become less determinant of engagement when political opportunities are more
open, allowing for the mobilisation of non-party members.
In this way, we showed that political opportunities are important for our
understanding political action both in terms of their impact on the individual level
mobilisation of party members but also for the wider opportunities for mobilisation beyond
them. We showed how their dynamic interaction can explain differential protest behaviour.
We showed how higher unemployment reduces the gap between party members and nonmembers so that crisis may allow for wider opportunities for mobilisation. We understood
in this respect higher levels of unemployment as providing a context where politicisation
and protest against the government is more likely to occur (Grasso and Giugni 2016).
Unemployment can be seen as a wider social ill affecting society and leading individuals to
see it as a shared collective social problem and thus supporting mobilisation processes. A
similar argument could be made for economic growth in that slower growth contexts have
similar mobilising impacts on non-members. This suggests that the wider environment and
worsening economic contexts could allow for the development of collective action.
We also showed differences in social movement mobilisation between party
members and non-members is reduced where we find greater welfare. We understand these
contexts has having more open political opportunities leading also non-members to engage.
This suggests that party members may suffer from an “optimistic bias” (Gamson and
Meyer, 1996: 286) when it comes to political opportunities where they “just keep trying
and sometimes succeed in engaging a broader public” (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1464). In
the words of Meyer (2004: 104), party members are “consistent champions” whereas the
wider public are more akin to the model of “strategic respondents.”
21
More widely, we have shown how those situated within social democratic
arrangements are more likely to react politically, but that everyone is more likely to engage
in more open opportunity contexts. These results support the idea that welfare state
provisions and citizenship rights can be critical resources for groups organising for
collective action (Grasso and Giugni 2016). Case studies have shown the mechanism
relates to specific movements e.g. unemployed mobilisations are linked to unemployment
benefits (Giugni, 2008), immigrants’ mobilisations are linked to the type and level of
citizenship rights (Giugni and Passy, 2004, Koopmans et al., 2005). Here we can show that
more generally higher levels of social spending, encourage mobilisation.
Finally, our study goes to show that analysing macro-level economic and political
context alongside ideational, structural and strategic factors is important for understanding
the link between party membership and protest. Studies have shown how mobilisation is
more likely when economic conditions deteriorate (Baglioni et al., 2008, Piven and
Cloward, 1977) and we have supported this by showing that moving from lower to higher
levels of GDP growth demobilises non-members at a faster rate than it does for party
members. We also show how in times of crisis, members and non-members becomes more
similar in their protest behaviour, thus suggesting movements should capitalise on these
contexts to aim to mobilise the wider public beyond party activists. We thus show the
extent of mobilisation depends on political membership and commitment but also on the
wider environment and the framing of opportunities (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). We
therefore argue that widening of political opportunities brought about by crisis can mobilise
wider sectors of the public, including those that are not ordinarily members of political
parties.
22
Table 1: Variable descriptive statistics
mean
sd
min
max
Demonstrated
Party membership
Relative Deprivation
Age
Male
Education (low)
0.11
0.12
0.45
45.35
0.48
0.24
0.31
0.33
0.50
14.53
0.50
0.43
0
0
0
18
0
0
1
1
1
88
1
1
Class
Unemployed
Political interest
Internal political efficacy
External political efficacy
Left-right
Libertarian-authoritarian
Memberships
4.00
0.11
0.65
0.50
0.48
5.25
4.47
1.24
2.27
0.31
0.48
0.40
0.36
1.85
1.88
2.35
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
1
1
1
10
10
12
Unemployment
GDP growth
Social Spending
Tax wedge
11.79
1.55
25.14
39.70
7.72
1.12
3.89
8.51
4.5
-0.4
19.4
22.3
26.5
3.4
31.9
49.3
N
16925
23
Table 2: Variable distributions, by country
N
Protest participation (%)
Party membership (%)
Relative deprivation (%)
Age (mean)
Male (%)
Unemployed (%)
Occupation (%)
Socio-cultural specialists
Managers
Clerical
Routine non-manual
Foremen and supervisors
Skilled manual
Semi/Unskilled manual
Other
Education (low) (%)
Political interest (%)
Internal political efficacy 0-1 (mean)
External political efficacy 0-1 (mean)
Left-right values 0-10 (mean)
Libertarian-authoritarian 0-10 (mean)
Organisational memberships (0-12) (mean)
Unemployment rate 2014 (%)
GDP growth 2014 (%)
Social spending 2014 (%)
Tax wedge 2014 (%)
All
16,925
11.1
12.3
45.4
44.8
47.2
11.7
France
1,861
14.2
9.0
52.6
48.7
44.1
9.1
Germany
1,905
8.4
9.3
27.3
44.2
51.9
4.0
Greece
1,916
23.2
14.7
84.6
39.9
46.7
27.5
Italy
1,766
12.0
17.6
55.7
44.2
47.5
17.2
Poland
1,909
6.1
7.0
41.8
41.5
44.5
11.5
Spain
1,852
17.8
11.5
54.3
43.0
50.1
18.8
Sweden
1,869
7.3
16.6
22.5
47.2
46.0
5.4
Switz.
1,936
6.0
11.7
33.0
43.8
47.2
6.5
UK
1,911
4.3
13.8
34.8
51.2
46.8
4.5
16.6
10.8
24.0
14.4
4.6
8.0
12.3
9.4
24.1
64.3
.49
.48
5.2
4.5
1.3
11.8
1.5
25.2
39.8
12.6
8.4
26.4
14.5
7.2
9.4
8.9
12.7
28.9
56.3
.39
.40
5.5
4.8
1.0
10.3
0.2
31.9
48.4
10.6
15.1
30.1
15.2
4.4
7.9
9.3
7.5
17.5
71.0
.59
.48
5.2
4.0
.7
5.0
1.6
25.8
49.3
22.7
10.0
17.6
19.2
3.6
4.7
12.3
10.0
13.4
62.9
.49
.35
4.8
4.7
1.6
26.5
0.8
24
40.4
15.4
6.7
30.7
10.1
3.6
8.8
13.0
11.7
32.8
59.9
.48
.57
5.4
4.8
2.0
12.7
-0.4
28.6
48.2
15.1
7.3
19.9
14.5
6.2
7.1
19.6
10.3
15.0
73.7
.51
.65
5.0
5.4
1.1
9.0
3.4
20.6
35.6
16.2
9.9
25.4
14.1
4.2
9.2
12.5
8.5
38.5
57.7
.45
.49
4.8
3.7
1.2
24.4
1.4
26.8
40.7
18.7
8.6
20.7
14.1
3.9
4.9
19.2
10.0
26.8
63.9
.40
.46
5.5
3.7
1.6
8.0
2.3
28.1
42.5
11.2
13.7
24.9
17.3
5.1
12.9
6.5
8.5
18.2
58.4
.48
.44
5.4
4.5
1.3
4.5
1.9
19.4
22.3
27.1
16.9
20.5
10.6
2.9
6.7
9.7
5.8
25.8
75.5
.66
.49
5.7
4.5
.8
6.1
2.6
21.7
31.1
24
Table 3: Multi-level logistic regression models predicting protest participation (last 12 months)
(2)
0.41***
(0.08)
(3)
0.41***
(0.08)
(4)
0.41***
(0.08)
(5)
0.41***
(0.08)
(6)
0.41***
(0.08)
(7)
0.79***
(0.14)
(8)
0.02
(0.11)
(9)
1.53***
(0.47)
(10)
0.98**
(0.35)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.18**
(0.06)
0.18**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
Age
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
Male
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.00
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
Unemployed
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.08)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
2.Managers
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.22*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
-0.23*
(0.10)
3.Clerical
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.11
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.08)
4.Routine non-manual
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.20*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.20*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
-0.21*
(0.10)
5.Foremen &
supervisors
-0.15
-0.15
-0.15
-0.15
-0.15
-0.14
-0.15
-0.15
-0.15
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
-0.20
-0.19
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
-0.19
-0.19
-0.19
-0.20
Party Membership
Relative Deprivation
1.Socio-cultural
specialists (Ref)
6.Skilled manual
(1)
25
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
7.Semi/unskilled manual
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
0.04
(0.10)
0.04
(0.10)
0.04
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
8.Other
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
-0.11
(0.11)
Education (low)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.07)
Political interest
0.73***
(0.07)
0.73***
(0.07)
0.74***
(0.07)
0.73***
(0.07)
0.73***
(0.07)
0.74***
(0.07)
0.74***
(0.07)
0.74***
(0.07)
0.73***
(0.07)
Internal political
efficacy
0.73***
0.73***
0.73***
0.73***
0.73***
0.73***
0.73***
0.74***
0.73***
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
External political
efficacy
-0.16
-0.16
-0.16
-0.16
-0.16
-0.15
-0.14
-0.15
-0.16
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Left-right
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.17***
(0.02)
Libertarian-authoritarian
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
Memberships
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
0.14***
(0.01)
Unemployment
GDP growth
0.07***
(0.02)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.40**
(0.14)
-0.48***
(0.14)
Social spending
0.09+
(0.05)
26
0.10*
(0.05)
0.04+
(0.02)
Tax wedge
Cross-level interactions
Party membership X
Unemployment
0.04
(0.02)
-0.03***
(0.01)
Party membership X
GDP growth
0.30***
(0.06)
-0.04*
Party membership X
Social spending
(0.02)
-0.01
Party membership X
Tax Wedge
Constant
N
Log lik.
AIC
BIC
Sigma u
Rho
(0.01)
-2.22***
(0.20)
16925
-5599.58
11203.15
11218.62
0.59
0.10
-1.49***
(0.27)
16925
-4861.16
9764.33
9926.79
0.65
0.11
Standard errors in parentheses
+
p ≤ 0.10,* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
-2.28***
(0.30)
16925
-4856.91
9757.83
9928.03
0.40
0.05
-0.87**
(0.31)
16925
-4858.27
9760.55
9930.75
0.47
0.06
-3.76**
(1.22)
16925
-4859.64
9763.28
9933.48
0.55
0.08
27
-3.02**
(0.92)
16925
-4859.88
9763.76
9933.97
0.56
0.09
-2.39***
(0.30)
16925
-4850.98
9747.96
9925.90
0.41
0.05
-0.80*
(0.31)
16925
-4845.64
9737.28
9915.22
0.47
0.06
-4.03**
(1.23)
16925
-4856.65
9759.30
9937.24
0.55
0.08
-3.17***
(0.93)
16925
-4858.53
9763.06
9941.00
0.56
0.09
Figure 1: Plot of the cross-level interaction between party membership and
unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 7)
Predicted Mean, Fixed Portion Only
.05
.1
.15
.2
Adjusted Predictions
4.5
7
9.5
12
14.5
17
unemployment
partym=0
28
19.5
partym=1
22
24.5
Figure 2: Plot of the cross-level interaction between party membership and GDP
growth (adjusted predictions Model 8)
0
Predicted Mean, Fixed Portion Only
.05
.1
.15
Adjusted Predictions
-.4
.1
.6
1.1
1.6
gdpgrowth
partym=0
29
2.1
partym=1
2.6
3.1
Figure 3: Plot of the cross-level interaction between party membership and
social spending (adjusted predictions Model 9)
.04
Predicted Mean, Fixed Portion Only
.06
.08
.1
.12
.14
Adjusted Predictions
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 26
sspending
partym=0
30
27
28
29
partym=1
30
31
32
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