State University of Moldova Faculty of History and Philosophy Center for the Study of Totalitarianism DY S TOPI A Journal of Totalitarian Ideologies and Regimes Volume I, no. 1-2, 2012 Editors: Igor CAŞU Petru NEGURĂ Carter JOHNSON Mark SANDLE Igor ŞAROV Editorial Board: Jutta SCHERRER (Paris) Lynne VIOLA (Toronto) Michael DAVIDFOX (Washington, D.C.) Kevin MCDERMOTT (Sheffield, UK) Lavinia STAN (Montreal) Vladimir TISMĂNEANU (College Park) Aleksandr STYKALIN (Moscow) Amir WEINER (Stanford) Igor ŞAROV (Chişinău) Mark SANDLE (Edmonton) Dorin DOBRINCU (Iaşi) Smaranda VULTUR (Timişoara) Diana DUMITRU (Chişinău) Irina LIVEZEANU (Pittsburgh) Dennis DELETANT (London & Washington D.C.) Alexandru-Murad MIRONOV (Bucureşti) Ottmar TRAŞCĂ (Cluj-Napoca) Antonio FAUR (Oradea) Sorin RADU (Sibiu) Volodymyr VYATROVYCH (Kiev) Oleg BAZHAN (Kiev) Armand GOŞU (Bucureşti) Adrian CIOROIANU (Bucureşti) Virgil PÂSLARIUC (Chişinău) Cover: Vitalie COROBAN Design/makeup: Iulia VOZIAN Prepress: Editura Cartier Printed at Bons Offices Address: 60 Alexe Mateevici St., State University of Moldova, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Center for the Study of Totalitarianism, MD-2009, tel./fax: 00 373 22 57 78 44, email: igorcasu@gmail.com © 2012, Center for the Study of Totalitarianism ISSN 1857-0909 3 Contents/Cuprins Cuvânt înainte .................................................................................................... 9 Foreword ........................................................................................................... 13 I Articles/Articole ............................................................................................ 17 1 Mihai A. PANU Extreme-right organizations in interwar Romania: the Iron Guard ................... 17 Organizaţii ale extremei drepte în România interbelică: Garda de Fier 2 Nicolae TODERAȘ he distinctiveness of the institutionalization and reinforcement of the Soviet model of higher education in the interwar period. ................................................. 28 Speciicitatea instituţionalizării şi impunerii modelului sovietic în învăţământul superior în perioada interbelică 3 Bogdan-Alexandru SCHIPOR Pierderile teritoriale româneşti din 1940: o perspectivă britanică ....................... 49 Romanian territorial losses in 1940: a British perspective 4 Petru NEGURĂ, Elena POSTICĂ Forme de rezistenţă a populaţiei civile faţă de autorităţile sovietice în RSS Moldovenească (1940-1956) ........................................................................................ 59 Forms of civilian resistance to the Soviet authorities in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940-1956) 5 Igor CAȘU Political repressions in Moldavian SSR ater 1956: towards a typology based on KGB iles ................................................................................................................ 89 Represiuni politice în RSS Moldovenească după 1956: spre o tipologie bazată pe dosare personale de la KGB 6 Александр СТЫКАЛИН ‘Героизм венгерский заслуживает преклонения...’: Венгерские события 1956 г. в откликах двух российских ученых ..................................................... 128 ‘Eroismul maghiar merită plecăciuni...’: Evenimentele din Ungaria din 1956 văzute de către doi cercetători ruşi 7 Каори КИМУРА Венгерско-югославские отношения в 1945–1948 гг. От примирения к новому конфликту ................................................................................................... 147 Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in 1945-1948: from reconciliation to the new conlict 8 Valeriu ANTONOVICI Patriotic education – Totalitarianism vs. National Identity ................................ 158 Educaţie patriotică: Totalitarism vs. Identitate Naţională 4 9 Alina PAVELESCU Discours nationaliste et légitimation politique. La récupération de l’extrême droite d’entre-deux-guerres dans la Roumanie de Ceauşescu ............................. 177 Discurs naţionalist şi legitimare politică. Recuperarea extremei drepte interbelice în România ceauşistă 10 Руслан ШЕВЧЕНКО Молдова между 17 апреля 1990 и 28 мая 1991 гг.: на переломе двух эпох ............................................................................................. 201 Moldova între 17 aprilie 1990 şi 28 mai 1990: la răscrucea a două epoci 11 Раса ЧЕПАЙТЕНЕ Проблемы интерпретации «спорной» памяти в посткоммунистических странах .......................................................................... 243 Interpretări cu privire la moştenirea şi memoria perioadei sovietice pe baza exemplului unor state postcomuniste 12 Evelina TVERDOHLEB he Ideology of the Market Economy and Its Impact on Former Communist Countries ............................................................................................. 257 Ideologia economiei de piaţă şi impactul său asupra fostelor state comuniste II Debates/Dezbateri .............................................................................................. 277 1 Igor CAȘU Was the Soviet Union an Empire? A view from Chişinău.................................... 277 A fost oare Uniunea Sovietică un imperiu? O privire din Chişinău 2 Руслан ШЕВЧЕНКО Загадки кадровой политики в МССР в 1980-е годы: как состоялась карьера Владимира Воронина? ............................................................................. 291 Enigme ale politicii de cadre în RSSM în anii 1980: cine l-a promovat pe Vladimir Voronin? III Totalitarian societies in iction/Societățile totalitare în opere de icțiune ............................................................................................................... 304 1 Cosmin Sebastian CERCEL Unseen Faces of Law: Abortion and Politics of the Body in ‘4 months, 3 weeks and 2 days’ ..................................................................................................... 304 Feţele nevăzute ale legii: avortul şi politicile corpului în ilmul lui Critian Mungiu ‘4 luni, 3 săptămâni şi 2 zile’ 2 Tetyana DZYADEVYCH Child’s Death as a Tool: Pioneer-Heroes in the Soviet Education System ..........316 Moartea copilului ca instrument:eroi pioneri în sistemul educațional sovietic 5 IV Notes from current research projects/Schițe din cercetări în desfășurare.............................................................................................................. 324 1 Daniel BOBOC L’état d’esprit des habitants de la Résidence Royale de la Région Prut en 1939-1940 ................................................................................................................ 324 Starea de spirit a locuitorilor din Ţinutul Prut, 1939-1940 2 Liliana COROBCA Censorship institution under the Communist regime in Romania ................... 330 Consideraţii despre instituţia cenzurii în România comunistă 3 Andrei ȚĂRANU Moarte şi Libertate în Totalitarism .......................................................................... 335 Death and Freedom under Totalitarianism V Oral History/Istorie orală ................................................................................ 338 1 Elena ŞIŞCANU Interviuri cu persoane deportate din fosta RSS Moldovenească (I) ................... 338 Interviews with deported persons from the former Moldavian SSR (I) VI Archival documents/Documente de arhivă inedite............................... 350 1 Igor CAȘU Politica de cadre şi naţional-comunismul în RSS Moldovenească: cazul lui Leonid Matei Cemortan (1967) ................................................................ 350 Cadres’ policy and national-communism in the Moldavian SSR: the case of Leonid Matei Cemortan (1967) VII Book Reviews/Recenzii ................................................................................. 373 1 Andrei CUȘCO Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005, XVIII + 367 p. ....................................................................................... 373 2 Iulian GHERCĂ Costin Feneșan, Sub steag străin: Comuniştii şi Partidul Comunist din România în arhiva Kominternului, 1919-1924, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2011, 1095 p. ...................................................................................... 378 3 Adrian VIȚALARU Armin Heinen, România, Holocaustul şi logica violenţei [Romania, the Holocaust and the Logic of Violence], translated by Ioana Rostoş, preface by Alexandru-Florin Platon, Iaşi, Editura Universităţii „Al. I. Cuza”, 2011, 237 p. ........................................................................................... 382 6 4 Alexandru Leșanu Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: he Last Soviet Generation, Princeton University Press, 2005, 352 p. ............................... 384 5 Marina FABIAN Евфросиния Керсновская, Сколько стоит человек, Москва: РОССПЭН, 2006 ....................................................................................................... 386 6 Lilia CRUDU Марк Меерович, Наказание жилищем: Жилищная политика в СССР как средство управления людьми (1917-1937 гг.), Москва: РОССПЭН, 2008, 304 c................................................. 388 7 Mark SANDLE Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010) p. 235 + xv ................................. 390 8 Sergiu MUSTEAŢĂ Vladimir Tismăneanu, Despre 1989: naufragiul Utopiei, Bucureşti, HUMANITAS, 2009, 240 p. ...................................................................................... 394 9 Vitalie SPRÎNCEANĂ Пасат Валериу, „Православие в Молдавии: власть, церковь, верующие. Сборник документов” (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2009-2010), т. 1-2. ...................................................................................................... 402 10 Igor NICULCEA Забытый агрессор: Румынская оккупации Молдавии и Транснистрии./ Сост. А.Р. Дюков. - Москва: Фонд «Историческая память», 2010. - 168 с. ................................................................. 404 11 Tatiana SÎRBU Achim Viorel, ‘Tentativa romilor din România de a obţine statutul de minoritate naţională în anii 1948-1949’ în revista trimestrială Etudes Tsiganes, nr. 38, 2009, p. 62-82.................................................................................. 410 12 Valeriu TUREA Ellen W. Sapega, Consensus and debate in Salazar‘s Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-1948, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2008, p. 168 + x .......................... 413 13 Diana CAȘU Graţian Cormoş, Romanian Women in communist prisons 1945-1989 [Femeia în infernul concentraţionar din România 1945-1989], Cluj-Napoca, Editura Argonaut, 2010, 194 p. ......................................................... 416 7 14 Dan-Tudor IONESCU Alin Mureşan, Piteşti: Cronica unei Sinucideri Asistate [Piteşti: he Chronicle of an Assisted Suicide], 2nd Edition, Bucureşti, Iaşi, Polirom, 2010 (1st ed. 2007), 256 p. ......................................................................... 418 15 Catherine DURANDIN Petru Negură, Ni héros, ni traîtres. Les écrivains moldaves face au pouvoir soviétique sous Staline, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2009, 420 p. ..................................... 421 16 Virgil PÂSLARIUC Juliette Cadiot, Le laboratoire imperial. Russie - URSS (1870-1940), CNRS Editions, Paris, 2007, 272 p. .......................................................................... 424 17 Alexandru ROITMAN Carol Iancu, Alexandru Şafran şi Şoahul neterminat în România. Culegere de documente (1940-1944), Bucureşti, Hasefer, 2010, 576 p. ................ 427 List of Contributors ..............................................................................................................429 13 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 Foreword he curious reader would be tempted rightly to ask the question: why to publish one more journal and what diference it makes and perspective brings together to the plethora of already existing ones specializing on totalitarian regimes? And, why – Dystopia? In the fall of 2010 I have founded the Center for the Study of Totalitarianism at the State University of Moldova, the institution that is the publisher of this journal. Subsequently, I had been thinking about launching a journal and asked my friends and colleagues to suggest a name for it in order expressing as briely as possible its program. In the end, I have decided to name it Dystopia, as suggested by my friend and colleague Virgil Pâslariuc as it seemed to be the best and most inspired one (the other was Leviathan). I have talked about naming the Center’s journal with Jutta Scherrer from Paris-based l’Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) as she visited Chişinău several times between 2009 and 2012 in the framework of the Academic Fellowship Program. At the beginning Jutta – we became friends – was not very convinced of my choice. But aterwards when I have explained to her what exactly I mean by that, she talked to her friends in France and Germany and they did not have serious objections. hus, the inal choice is Dystopia not only because it is concise and original for a journal in the domain, but also because it expresses – I hope – synthetically, the essence of what strives to become this publication. More exactly, to bring together analyses and original contributions about the Communist political project as well as the Nazi one – or Fascist regimes in the larger sense – speciic to the 20th century, both being inspired by utopian visions that failed in dystopia. he latter meaning, according to Oxford Dictionary online ‘an imagined place or state in which everything is unpleasant or bad, typically a totalitarian or environmentally degraded one; the opposite of Utopia’. Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms refers to dystopia as ‘a modern term invented as the opposite of UTOPIA, and applied to any alarmingly unpleasant imaginary world, usually of the projected future; the term is also used to ictional works depicting such worlds; a signiicance form of science iction and modern satire, dystopian writing is exempliied in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, (1932) George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four (1949) and Russell Hoban’s Ridlley Walker (1980)’. In its turn, Webster-Miriam Dictionary online deines dystopia as ‘an imaginary place where people lead dehumanized and oten fearful lives’. his is the reason Dystopia will have a special rubric on totalitarianism in iction, but literary studies will be not the main focus of the journal. he subtitle – Journal of Totalitarian Ideologies and Regimes – suggests and completes more exactly what kind of texts will be published in the journal. As one can notice, the term totalitarian could seem anachronistic and improper for a balanced 14 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 approach of the Communist and Fascist past, as it has been a creation of the Cold War (Hannah Arendt, he Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951 and especially Carl Friedrich, Zbigniev Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 1957, even though the concept is pre-1940). It is true that the concept of totalitarianism as consecrated by Friedrich-Brzezinski tends to put both communism and fascism on the same level, more exactly stresses the similarities and neglecting or overlooking the speciicities of each regime. he intention was of course not very innocent from (geo) political view: as Nazism was at that time already condemned morally, politically and judicially at the Nuremberg Trials and the Nazi crimes being not under question, association of both Nazism and Communism under the same umbrella of totalitarianism was intended to become a useful instrument for the USA and it’s allies of the Free World in order discrediting and demonizing USSR and its ideology. Nevertheless, the main features of totalitarian regimes as deined by Friedrich-Brzezinski remain still useful: 1. an oicial ideology to which general adherence was demanded, the ideology intended to achieve a ‘perfect inal stage of mankind’; 2. a single mass party, hierarchically organized, closely interwoven with the state bureaucracy and typically led by one man; 3. monopolistic control of the armed forces; 4. a similar monopoly of the means of efective mass communication (censorship); 5. a system of terroristic police control; 6. central control and direction of the entire economy. he concept was contested both during the Cold War, but also – paradoxically – more ater the fall of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe. Paradoxically because the collapse of the Soviet regime and it’s satellites in Europe brought the disclosure of archives of the former communist parties and more importantly, of their political polices that documented without any doubt the scale of the crimes of communism not only in the Leninist and Stalinist periods, but also – even though to a lesser scale – until the end of Communism in the late 1980s. Subsequently, the similarities of Nazism and Communism related to mass crimes became more documented than ever. hus the end of USSR in 1991 made possible to verify documentarily the assumptions of the totalitarian theory. he archives also – more than it was the case before – pointed to the fact that in spite of the common denomination as Communist, the political regimes in Eastern and Central Europe (not to talk about the Asian ones, Chinese and North Korean especially) had a lot of more diferences between them than it was thought or implied by the studies made during the Cold War in the West. he so-called is the most known phenomenon of National-Communism but there are other subproducts created as a result of adding other local icleological ingredients. he concept of totalitarianism has been reinvented in the context when it has been admitted that one needs to understand it in a less rigid manner, in a more pluralistic way. From another point of view, the collapse of Communism validated DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 15 the concept of totalitarianism in the sense that when one of the instruments that guaranteed the monopoly of the party over power – censorship, disappeared slowly during Perestroika – that was the irst break in the system that fall apart entirely shortly aterwards (see Rasma Karklins, ‘Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union’, in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 1994, pp. 29-45). he totalitarian theory of the Cold War is for certain not dominant ater 1991, but still even those authors reluctant toward it do not disqualify it altogether (e.g. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer, Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, 2009). Others consider it useful even though not exactly in the same sociological vein as Hannah Arendt (see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Basic Books, 2010, p. 357-358, 360-361). As a matter of fact the choice on ideologies and regimes in the title of the journal is suggesting that there are ideologies and regimes that at the level of discourse are similar and have the same ideological origins. In the case of Communist regimes speciically, their policies varies accordingly as to the dynamics and criteria of deining who is and who is not the enemy of the regime (especially internal), the scale of terror, elite recruitment criteria, the degree of openness to market economy (Yugoslav, Polish and Hungarian Communism being known as alternatives to the ‘classical’ Soviet model). he focus on ideologies (plural) and not ideology (singular) suggests also that Dystopia will include materials about totalitarian and authoritarian political parties and movements that did not get into power, i.e. did not evolved in regimes, as in the case of Iron Guard in interwar Romania (except the short period between September 1940 and January 1941), Arrow Cross Party in Hungary (except the period between October 1944 and March 1945) and why not, other parties or movement that never get into power, as Action Française in Hexagon etc. hus, Dystopia. Journal of Totalitarian Ideologies and Regimes encourages theoretical approaches based on empirical data and at the same time leaves enough room for peculiarities of the one regime or the other. As the term totalitarian in the title suggests, the journal will publish articles and other materials about repressions, terror and other aspects related to the mass abuses and infringement of human rights – these being the main traits of the totalitarian (and authoritarian) regimes. But at the same time there will be other multiple topics, related to everyday life, cultural life, education, social security etc. In other words, topics that brings somehow the totalitarian and authoritarian regimes closer to the normality of the modern societies, and to some extent to the democratic, Western regimes (see for instance an interesting approach on normalizing the approach related to GDR, in Marry Fulbrook, he People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker, Yale University Press, 2005). To be more precise, even though the totalitarian regimes represented various forms of failed modernity (Radu Preda, Comunismul. O modernitate eşuată, Cluj- 16 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 Napoca, Eikon, 2005) this does not mean that they did not have in mind the desire to modernize their societies and did not succeed to some degree. Besides repressions and other negative aspects, there was a normal life under totalitarian regimes, at least for certain periods of time and at least for certain social classes or national groups, even though it is a matter of dispute in what measure it was a result of the intended policy of the regime to inculcate its habitus (Pierre Bourdieu) and/or it was unintended, achieved in spite of the will of the regime. hese being said, Dystopia wants to become an inclusive, not exclusive, in the sense of being open to the multitude of the theoretical and conceptual approaches both in terms of the topics and subject disciplines. In general, it is about topics on internal evolutions of the totalitarian (and authoritarian) regimes, but also about the relations between them, and between these regimes and the democratic ones. he latter are important in as much as collaboration with democratic regimes inluenced oten the internal evolution of the totalitarian ones and brought an ideological synthesis more or less original and contradictory. Last, but not least, it will be almost redundant to say that Dystopia will strive to become truly interdisciplinary if not transdisciplinary and the representatives of various social sciences and humanities from both East and West are invited to contribute with texts that could reinvent the interest in a past that cannot pass and moreover is reproduced through various forms of nostalgia in spite of the de jure disappearance of these regimes from the world in which we are living in. Igor CAȘU DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 277 II Debates/Dezbateri Was the Soviet Union an Empire? A view from Chişinău1 A fost oare Uniunea Sovietică un imperiu? O privire din Chişinău Igor CAŞU Abstract he article focuses on the concepts of empire, national identity and Soviet nationalities policy in the framework of center-periphery relations in the USSR. he author illustrates through various examples why Soviet policy in general and in particular in the Moldavian SSR resembled the policies pursued by other classical empires in the national peripheries. Special attention is paid to linguistic aspects, Russiication, and the degree of national identity accepted by Moscow in the former Moldavian SSR especially in the context of the Soviet-Romanian dispute over the „Bessarabian question”. As one of the main criteria of measuring discrimination is the percentage of the local population – ethnic Romanians – represented in various domains, the author quotes archival data in this regard. Among the conclusions is that on the economic level and more exactly representation of the ethnic Romanians as top mangers of industrial enterprises, one can conclude that discrimination existed and it speaks of the imperial character of the Soviet Union. Keywords: Empire, Nations, Colonialism, Soviet Moldavia, Soviet nationalities policy, center-periphery relations, political elites, economic elites, Eminescu, Stephen the Great, propaganda, Big brother syndrome, local nationalism, Great Power chauvinism, Russiication, Russia, Ukraine Ideological crisis, economic failure and the nationalities problem are usually invoked as the main causes of the Soviet collapse. here are however scholars, such as Victor Zaslavsky, who argue that the nationalities policies and imperial character of the Soviet state are the main cause of the demise of USSR.2 Other authors distinguish between the systemic crisis of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union and 1 2 A slightly revisited version of this article has been published in Russian in the Moscow-based journal Неприкосновенный Запас, vol. 76, 4/2011. Available at http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/1134 Victor Zaslavsky, „Collapse of Empire – causes: Soviet Union”, in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1997, p. 73-98. 278 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 the crisis of Soviet federalism.3 What is sure however, is that the Soviet collapse was less violent than expected, and especially surprising when compared to the largescale employment of state violence during its history. hat was due to the fact that political secessionism on the part of the national republics coincided with the desire of the leadership of the Russian Republic personiied by Yeltsin to liquidate the Union Center as well as Gorbachev’s unwillingness to use force on a large scale. In 1990-1991, at the level of perceptions, the national republics – to a lesser degree the Central Asian ones – and the Russian Republic felt they were victims of the unjust redistribution of resources and the unequal system of economic exchange. In other words, at the level of perceptions, nobody was satisied with the situation and apparently approved the demise of the Soviet Union. At the level of objective, measurable variables the absolute majority of Russians from Russia and from the non-Russian republics voted for the signing of the new Union Treaty in the federal referendum held in March 1991. On the other hand, the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia decided to boycott the referendum, as it was anticipated that Moscow could use the vote of Russians and Russian speaking minorities as a motive to impose the signing of the new Union Treaty.4 he most authoritative and well documented account of the Soviet Nationalities Policy – albeit covering only the irst two decades of the existence of the USSR – has been written by Terry Martin. Martin’s book stipulates that the Soviet Union was the irst Airmative Action Empire, which codiied and institutionalized ethnicities, consolidating and even inventing in some cases alphabets for certain tribes, promoting ethnic cadres and intelligentsia in their own national territories. his was envisaged as a strategy of Lenin and Stalin to ight against and control a competing political ideology of mass mobilization – nationalism that was viewed as responsible for the liquidation of four empires ater the First World War. In this sense in the 1920s there was promoted the policy of korenizatsia, called by Stalin nationalizatsia, i.e. positive discrimination of non-Russians in order to convince them that in national terms the USSR was not a continuation of the Tsarist Empire. In early 1930s however, with the start of mass industrialization and collectivization and the abandonment of NEP, korenizatsia was relegated to the role of a secondary policy. Instead, one witnesses a slow rehabilitation of Russian Great Power nationalism, to be strengthened on the eve of Second World War and especially during the war.5 3 4 5 Andrea Graziosi, Histoire de l’URSS, Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 2010, p. 500-501; Mark Kramer, „he Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussion within the Soviet Union”, in he Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, p. 178-256; vol. 6. No. 4, 2004, p. 3-64. А. С. Барсенков, А. И. Вдовин, История России, 1938-2002, Москва: Аспект Пресс, 2003, с. 373. David Brandenberger, „…It is imperative to Advance Russian Nationalism as First Priority”: Debates within Stalinist Ideological Establishment, 1941-1945”, in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin (eds.), A State of Nations: Empire of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 275-300. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 279 here is not yet so detailed and documented a study on the Soviet Nationalities Policy ater 1945 as Terry Martin’s book on the interwar period. However, one assumes – and Martin is admitting it implicitly – that till the end of the Soviet Union local nationalism, not Great Russian nationalism was perceived by Moscow as the greatest danger to the cohesion and the very existence of the USSR. Another important theoretical contribution to the study of Soviet Nationalities policy has been made by Rogers Brubaker. His point is that Soviet Union institutionalized nationhood, but at the same time tried to wither away any political content of what „the nation” means, according to Stalin’s adagio „national in form, socialist in content”. Another interesting and useful distinction Brubaker makes is related to the institutionalization of two contradictory paradigms in the Soviet nationalities policy: the irst one based on the collective and territorial principle and the second one on the personal and ethno-cultural one. he former referred to the myriad of Soviet ethnicities that had the opportunity to enjoy national rights such as schools in their language, newspapers, journals etc. only in their own national territory. he latter concerned the Russians who enjoyed access and privilege to Russian schools and all other national rights in all parts of the Soviet Union, not only in the Russian Federation.6 Even though the oicial policy in national Union republics was bilingualism, Russians were not supposed to know the language of the titular nationality. Mark Beissinger, an American researcher on ethnic mass mobilization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s-early 1990s7 mentions in his turn „the pivotal role played by the Soviet state in fuzzing the boundary between state and empire and in pioneering forms of non-consensual control” and deines USSR as „the most striking example of informal empire”. He also insists on the idea that one should understand „empire as claim rather than as things” and even though the Soviet Union did not claim to be an empire, the outcome was rather the contrary and „empire implies today illegitimate and non-consensual rule”8. How do the above mentioned theories of Soviet Union as empire relate to the Moldavian case? What was the character of relations between Moscow and the Chişinău authorities, and to what extent can they be deined as imperial and in what sense is it diicult to do so? It is well known that Soviet historiography and propaganda claimed that Russia and Moldavia had century old relations. It was supposed that at least two medieval 6 7 8 Rogers Brubaker, „Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account”, in heory and Society, vol. 23, no. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 47-78. Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 6. Mark Beissinger, „Rethinking Empire in the Wake of Soviet Collapse”, in Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser, eds., Ethnic Politics and Post-Communism: Theories and Practice, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, p. 25, 32, 19, 21. 280 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 rulers of the Principality of Moldavia9 – Stephen the Great in late 15th century and Dimitrie Cantemir (a personal friend of Peter the Great) in the early 18th century asked to become a part of Russia. his was a biased interpretation of the documents in which Moldavians asked for help in ighting the Ottomans, but it never implied the desire to unite with Russia. In 1812, ater a 6 year old Russian-Turkish war, the Tsarist Empire occupied the Eastern part of the medieval Principality of Moldavia – and renamed it Bessarabia. At that time around 90 % of the local population was ethnic Romanian10, but their proportion dropped to 50 % on the eve of Bolshevik revolution due to mass colonization of the province with Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Germans, and Swiss etc. In March 1918 the local parliament Sfatul Ţării voted for Union with Romania based on the so-called Lenin-Wilson principle of the self-determination of peoples. During the entire interwar period, the Soviet Union did not recognize Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. It had geopolitical reasons to do that – being interested in creating a security zone for its biggest port on the Black Sea, Odessa, situated just 30 km across the frontier. But they could not say explicitly that Bessarabia was part of Russia based on the dynastic, Tsarist invoked legitimation: i.e. that it was conquered by Alexander I in 1812 and that the Soviet Union was explicitly the heir of the Russian Empire. his was especially true in the 1920s when the oicial Soviet paradigm about the Tsarist Empire was very critical about pre-revolutionary Russia and especially its policy toward non-Russians. It was relected in Lenin’s famous postulate that „Tsarist Russia was the prison of peoples” and that is why Moscow promoted in the irst decade ater the revolution the korenizatsia process, i.e. to demonstrate to the non-Russians that the Bolshevik regime was diferent from the ancien régime. he Soviet regime however invented a new formula, an ideological one mixed with an ethnic one, in order to legitimize its pretensions over Bessarabia. Ater several abortive armed attempts to establish control in Bessarabia, Moscow changed its tactics in the mid 1920s by creating a separate Moldavian autonomous republic on the Ukrainian territory. Situated just across the Dniester river and Bessarabia, it comprised some 160, 000 Moldavians, i.e. ethnic Romanians, but their share in the total population of MASSR was only 1/3.11 he goal of establishing 9 10 11 he Principality of Moldavia covered the territories from Carpathian Mountains in the West to Dniester River in the East, and from Black Sea and Danube mouths in the South to Podolia in the North. The terms Moldavian and Bessarabian refers to regional identity, not ethnic. From ethnic point of view historical Bessarabia and present day Republic of Moldova is inhabited by Romanians (one use interchangeably the term Moldavians/Moldovans as the term has been ethnicized in the Soviet period and the majority of them are self identifying as Moldavians/Moldoveni). See more on that Дмитрий Фурман, „Молдавские молдаване и румыские молдаване”, in Прогнозис, no. 1, 2007, с. 278-315, Charles King, Moldovans. Cultural Politics between Romania and Russia, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001. Elena Negru, Politica etnoculturală in RASSM, 1924-1940, Chişinău, Editura Prut Internaţional, 2003, p. 17. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 281 Moldavian autonomy was addressed irst of all for external consumption: to show to the world and to European Communists especially that the USSR was diferent from Tsarist Russia, was not imperialistic, but cared about the supposed injustice done to Bessarabia and its inhabitants by being incorporated into Romania. More exactly, the idea aimed at demonstrating that by doing that, the Bucharest authorities divided a people in two across the Dniester River and in claiming Bessarabia the Soviet Union just wanted to unite a nation – the so-called Moldavian one – that supposedly was subject to the national and social yoke of Romanian „landlords and bourgeoisie”. his was the irst case when there was a direct connection between Soviet foreign policy goals and the creation of a national territory inside the Soviet Union. According to Terry Martin, professor of history at Harvard, one of the most prominent scholars on the subject, it was an exceptional case when „the Piedmont principle was even the primary motivation for the formation of a national republic: Moldavian ASSR”. Or, the Piedmont principle is nothing else than „the belief that cross-border ethnic ties could be exploited to project Soviet inluence into neighboring states”.12 As to Ukraine, it used the Piedmont Principle itself in relation to Poland and even Russia at that moment, but Kharkov [the capital of Ukraine at that time] agreed on the formation of MASSR as long as it remained a territory of Ukraine. he new autonomous republic had its temporary capital established in Balta (1924-1928, Birzula 1928-1929) and since 1929 in Tiraspol. What is more important from the point of view of the perspectives invested by Moscow in this endeavor, the founding document of MASSR (dated from October 12th 1924) mentioned that the western frontier of the new autonomous republic is the Prut River, i.e. included a priori Bessarabia and Chişinău as permanent would-be capital. he MASSR existed from 1924 to 1940 and what happened there is important as the national formation experiment employed there anticipated in great part Moscow’s policy toward post-war Moldavian SSR, established in 1940 ater the occupation of Bessarabia (and Northern Bukovina) by the Red Army. Between 1924 and 1932, the Soviet authorities tried to create a separate Moldavian language based on a local Russiied Romanian vernacular in the Cyrillic alphabet. It has been recognized however as a total failure because the local Moldavians did not perceive it as a literary standard to boast of and from 1932 to 1938 Stalin himself agreed to switch to the Latin alphabet and make local Moldavian as Romanian as possible.13 Among the promoters of Romanian was a Russian Bessarabian, Grigori Staryi, president of 12 13 Terry Martin, he Airmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 19231939, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 274. Charles King, „The Ambivalence of Ethnicity or How the Moldovan Language was made”, in Slavic Review, vol. 58, no. 1, Spring, 1999, p. 117-142. See also his seminal book that includes a detailed analysis of the interwar experiment in MASSR: Moldovans. Cultural Politics between Romania and Russia, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001. 282 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 the Council of Ministers of MASSR, who was shot by Stalin in October 1937 during the Great Terror. Other members of the party and state nomenklatura from the MASSR establishment, writers and journalists have been sent to death as supposed Romanian and sometimes Polish or German spies14. On the 28th of June 1940, the Red Army occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23rd 1939. According to several articles published in the atermath by Pravda, it was envisaged as a union of MASSR and Bessarabia and there were numerous letters including some from ethnic Ukrainians living in the South and North supporting this plan. A Moldavian-Ukrainian frontier commission led by Khrushchev was created, which inally gave one half of MASSR back to Ukraine, but also 1/3 of the territory of Bessarabia in the south and north. he basic idea invoked was that Moldavians/Romanians were not a majority in these areas of Bessarabia. And this was true, but it also was true that the Romanian element was the most important ethnicity in the area, 28 per cent as compared to Ukrainians, who comprised only 25% of the total population. Besides, as various authors reported, including Russians as well as Moldavian Communist authorities in 1946, the majority of local non-Romanian population spoke Romanian, the latter being the language of interethnic communication during the Tsarist period too.15 In this case however Khrushchev used his double hypostasis as irst secretary of CC of Communist (b) Party of Ukraine and secretary of CC of All-Union C (b) PSU to push for more territories for Ukraine. He tried the same with Belorussia in 1939, but the boss of the latter had direct access to Stalin and Ukrainian pretensions had been declared void.16 Authorities of MASSR did not have the same connections with Stalin and lost the case. Anyway, the division of Bessarabia was anticipated and Moscow bears the main responsibility for that because the Soviet ultimatum sent to Bucharest on the 26th of June 1940 mentioned that Bessarabia has been populated since ancient times by a Ukrainian majority.17 hat was not true of course, but the formula was employed deliberately in order to inculcate the idea – especially for Western consumption – that the partition of Bessarabia was a continuation of uniting all Ukrainian inhabited territories in one Ukrainian Soviet state, a process commenced a year before with Polish Galicia. 14 15 16 17 Elena Negru, Politica etnoculturală in RASSM, 1924-1940, p. 115-127. he complete list of the victims of Great Terror in MASSR are to be found in Ion Varta, Tatiana Varta, Igor Şarov [Sharov], eds., Marea Teroare în RASSM. Documente[he Great Terror in MASSR. Documents], Editura ARC, 2010, vol. I, other 4 to be published soon. The Archive of the Social-Social Organizations of Moldova, former Archive of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia (AOSPRM), Fond 51, inv. 4, d. 64, ff. 7-12. В. Ю. Васильев, Р. Ю. Подкур, Х. Куромия, Ю. И. Шаповал, Амир Вейнер, eds., Политическое руководство Украины, 1938-1989, Москва: РОССПЭН, 2006, p. 65-66. Документы внешней политики СССР, том 1, часть 1, Москва: «Международные отношения», 1995, с. 385-386. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 283 What was Moscow’s policy in the province in the atermath? Did it resemble a colonial experiment or was it rather close to the emancipation claim of Soviet Communist propaganda? One should mention that in the irst year of Soviet occupation of Bessarabia – 2/3 of it and half of MASSR forming the Moldavian Union republic in August 1940 – the colonial policy was more evident and brutal than in the following decades. his was true not only in terms of the forceful inclusion of Bessarabia in the Soviet Union and the imposition of Communist ideology and institutions, but also in terms of the linguistic hegemony of Russian and investing loyalty only in cadres from across the Dniester River as well as discriminating against the local ones. In other words, the Soviets did not trust even members of the illegal Bessarabian Communist party group – no matter their ethnic allegiance18 – that were active on the territory of Bessarabia in the interwar years.19 Not to mention all those representing or collaborating in some way or another with the interwar Romanian authorities – they were suspected of being traitors to the Soviet power. his was based on the assumption that the Soviets supposedly took power in Bessarabia in early January 1918 just a few days before the Romanian army arrived on the demand of the local parliament. In other words, according to the Moscow viewpoint – in contradiction to elementary international rules – all the Bessarabian population was Soviet in terms of citizenship ab initio and thus in 1940 they were going to be judged traitors to the Soviet fatherland for paying taxes to the Romanian state, for participating in public life as members of cultural or political organizations and so on and so forth. All these activities were to be coined as counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet.20 Beyond the three mass deportations of mid June 1941, early July 1949 and late May 1951 which saw the forced displacement of 60, 000 persons and between 150,000-200,000 dead in the mass organized famine in 1946/194721, the total number of victims of Moscow’s policy in the Moldavian SSR during the Stalinist period exceeds 300,000 persons (including the victims of the 1930s in the MASSR). As to the ethnic composition of the victims, they were of various ethnic backgrounds and in this sense the Communist authorities did not discriminate against any ethno-national group.22 In the post-Stalinist period however, the great bulk of the repressed persons were ethnic Romanians and only very rarely the representatives of Russians and Russiied minorities. For instance, even though oicially both Russian Great Power chauvinism and local nationalism were considered equal dangers for the 18 19 20 21 22 AOSPRM, F. 51, inv. 6, d. 3, f. 62-74. That was also true of the leaders of the Communist Parties in the Baltic States. See more in Елена Зубкова, Прибалтика и Кремль, 1940-1953, Москва: РОССПЭН, 2008. М. Семиряга, Тайны сталинской дипломатии, Москва, Высшая Школа, 1992, с. 270. See А. Цэрану, И. Шишкану etc. eds., Голод в Молдове, 1946-1947, Кишинев: Штиинца, с. 10. See more in Igor Caşu, „Stalinist Terror in Soviet Moldavia, 1940-1953”, in Kevin McDermott, Matthew Stibbe, eds., Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe. Elite purges and mass repression, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010, p. 39-56. This does not include forced labour mobilization. See more in I.Cașu, Represiuni politice, violență și rezistență, în R(A)SSM, 1924-1989, vol.I, Chișinău, Cartier, 2013, in print. 284 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 friendship of peoples and territorial integrity of the Soviet state, one knows of only one documented case when a Russian was punished for expressing a chauvinistic attitude (the Russian Pyhlov, in Bender, 1967).23 he punishment was however very sot, limited to expulsion from the CPSU, meanwhile similar or almost innocent expressions of national identity – with or without elements of anti-Russian attitudes on the part of ethnic Romanians – were punished severely, usually implying imprisonment, correctional work camp or internment in psychiatric hospital. In economic terms, Soviet Moldavia received usually more than the other European (situated in the European part of USSR) Union republics and the dynamic is increasing according to the oicial igures up until the end of Soviet Union. In this sense, the Moldavian SSR has rather not been discriminated against in contrast to what has been deined as a classical unjust economic relationship between metropolis and colony.24 And it is apparent from this perspective that the imperial paradigm does not apply to post-Stalinist Moldavia, I mean if one looks at the economic, investment rate component as compared to the amount received by other national peripheries of the Soviet Union. And this is also true when speaking about the Baltic republics. heir level of consumption, quality of life and economic development rate was higher than the all-union one, being in the top of all union republics.25 At a closer glance however, the eiciency of central investments in Moldavia were not as impressive as it might seem at irst galance. Moreover, there was a very precise political agenda at work. According to the economist Sergiu Chircă, the overall investments in Soviet Moldavia were rather modest if one takes into account their share of per capita, this being less than the Soviet average.26 In 1965, for instance, the Moldavian SSR was rated 7th among the 15 union republics in terms of economic development27. Twenty ive years latter (1990), it dropped to 9th place, being the least developed of all the European Soviet republics28. Taking into account the higher birth rate among ethnic Romanians and their progressive decrease in the total share of the population inside MSSR, one can conclude – as in the case of other union republics – that the high investments were made in combination with sending more cadres from the center. In other words, more Russians and Ukrainians were sent to the Moldavian SSR in parallel with allotting more money from Moscow for developing the industrial sector. In the meantime, more Moldavians, especially ethnic Romanians were encouraged to work in Russia. 23 24 25 26 27 28 Igor Caşu, „Exilat că cerea să se vorbească în română”, în Adevărul, ediţia de Moldova, 17 noiembrie 2011, p. 6-7. Народное хозяйство Молдавской ССР в 1984, Кишинев, Картя Молдовеняскэ, 1985, p. 15. Основные показатели экономического и социального развития Молдавской ССР и союзных республик в 1988 году, Кишинев, Госдепартамент по статистике, 1989, с. 45. С. Киркэ, Региональные проблемы процесса создания материально-технической базы коммунизма в СССР, Кишинев, Картя Молдовеняскэ, 1979, p. 65. „Вопросы экономики”, nо. 4, 1970, p. 128. Igor Caşu, „Politica naţională” în Moldova Sovietică, 1944-1989, Chişinău: Cartdidact, 2000, p. 95. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 285 he speciicity of Moscow-Chişinău relations could be noticed also in the way the investments from the center were distributed at the regional level. For instance, the present day Transnistrian territory, never ater 1940 being an oicially distinct region, received around 30 per cent of the total investments allotted by Moscow to the Moldavian SSR. And this happened in the situation when that territory comprised less than 10 % of the territory and population of the republic. he districts across the Dniester were inhabited by a Slavic majority – Ukrainians and Russians (more than 50 %), while ethnic Romanians made 40 % and lived mainly in villages. For instance, the largest city in the area – Tiraspol – had only 17% of ethnic Romanians in 198929. Another aspect as to the urban-rural development in Soviet Moldavia relevant for the nationalities policy refers to the evolution of the urbanization rate of ethnic Romanians. According to the last Soviet census of 1989, their share in the total number of urban dwellers was only 25 %. his is to say that two thirds of Romanians lived in the rural areas, i.e. a less developed environment. In the meantime, the share of urbanized Russians was 80% and Ukrainians – 45 %.30 It remains still unclear if that low share in the total urban population was an intended part of centrally planned nationalities policy or just a side efect of the center administered industrial enterprises, which covered about 25 % of the total local industry in comparison with only 10 % in the Baltic republics. But what is sure is that the discrimination of local ethnic Romanian cadres was not only a perception. In the industrial sector for instance at the level of managers of enterprises they made only 2, 3 % in 1964, rising to only 8, 6 % twenty years later, in 1984.31 If in the immediate postwar period the accent on arriving cadres – especially Russians and Ukrainians was somehow justiied – from the Moscow point of view – as the local cadres were lacking or could not be trusted because of their social, ethnic and educational background – that could be hardly the case ater the 1960s. Or, the cadres that were prepared oicially for Moldavia’s need were sent to work in other republics, basically Russia and Ukraine. Another criteria one can verify is the level of Moscow’s control in Soviet Moldavia and its dynamics by looking at how the share of ethnic Romanians evolved in key Communist party and government positions. In the early 1950s the share of ethnic Romanians in the Communist nomenklatura was around 10 %. In 1967 it increased to 42, 5 % and in 1987 – to 54 %.32 At the same time, the share of ethnic Romanians in the total number of Communists was around 8% in 1950, increasing to 29 30 31 32 See more on that in Istoria Transnistriei. De la începuturi până în zilele noastre, Chişinău: Civitas, 2005 (article by Igor Cașu). Current archive of the Department of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, document 07.13. 26 from March 30th 1990. Archival data published by V. Stăvilă in „Evoluţia componenţei naţionale a elitei politico-economice a RSSM”, 1940-1991, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, nr. 4, 1996, p. 39. V. Stăvilă, „Evoluţia componenţei naţionale a elitei politico-economice a RSSM”, 1940-1991, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, nr. 4, 1996, p. 38. 286 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 35 % in 1965 and 49% in 1989.33 At the same time, the same share in the government positions at the republican level increased from 38 % to 49 % in 1984.34 However, if one looks at the key positions in the party and government, the situation is not so impressive. For instance, the irst ethnic Romanian from the Bessarabian part of the former Moldavian SSR to serve as First Secretary of CC of Communist Party of Moldavia was Petru Lucinschi appointed in mid November 1989! Before that, this position was held by Transnistrians – including ethnic Romanians but highly Russiied, some of them talking a very poor Romanian or not talking it at all! Besides, the Second Secretary of the local party organization that controlled as a matter of fact the cadres’ policy at the republican level and other key domains was held always by an ethnic Russian. he irst ethnic Romanian to hold this position was Ion Guţu, appointed in November 1989. his was true also regarding key government positions such as President of the Council of Ministers. he irst ethnic Romanian – born in Northern Bessarabia – to hold this position was Mircea Druc, elected by a democratic Supreme Soviet (parliament) in May 1990. he key ministries such as Ministry of Interior and KGB were always occupied by non-Romanians or ethnic Romanians from across the Dniester, i.e. Russiied ones. he irst ethnic Romanian from the Bessarabian territory to serve as Minister of Interior was Ion Costaş, named in 1990 and in the position of the local chief of the KGB – was Tudor Botnaru, named in the same year, i.e. just on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union. he latter however kept subordination to Moscow up until the oicial end of the Soviet Union in December 1991! Not to mention that as a matter of fact the irst ethnic Romanian born in Bessarabia to become a member of Bureau of CC of PCM was Dumitru Cornovan, in 1961 and the irst minister of MSSR, an ethnic Romanian born in Bessarabia (albeit in the southern part, ceded by Moscow to Ukraine in 1940) was Vasile Russu, named as Minister of Telecommunications in 1966. One can also acknowledge the speciicity of the nationality policy and center-periphery relations in the Moldavian case at the level of other domains, for example linguistic policy or cultural policy more broadly. Oicially there was a permanent increase starting with the 1960s of the total number of books, journals and newspapers published in Romanian in Cyrillic letters. However, one can notice a dramatic decrease in the public use of the Romanian language. hat could be observed especially at the level of higher education institutions, more and more disciplines being every year switched to Russian language of teaching in the oicially Romanian groups. he quality of the spoken language was decreasing as Russian became the main language of the mass media, higher education and academia. Not to mention that all documents in the government and party were only in Russian and this was a permanent reality up until 1989 when the irst oicial documents in Romanian timidly made their way out. Speaking publicly Romanian was oten a sign for Communist 33 34 Ibidem, p. 39. Ibidem, p. 41. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 287 authorities of Moldo-Romanian nationalism especially during the party meetings or meetings held at various education institutions (this was also true of Ukrainian language in Ukraine!).35 he Latin alphabet had been prohibited since 1944 as in the most part of the Tsarist period. It was replaced with the Cyrillic one, envisaged to serve as an identity marker and a communication barrier from the Romanians across the Prut River. hose contesting the appropriateness of employing Russian letters for an East Romance language were severely punished. In the Stalinist period they were arrested and deported to Siberia as Moldo-Romanian nationalists. Ater 1953, they were either socially marginalized or sent to psychiatric hospitals, as was the case of numerous citizens, among them Gheorghe David, sent to Dnepropetrovsk psychiatric hospital under Gorbachev, in 1986. Besides asking to reestablish the Latin script for „Moldavian language”, he also criticized the discrimination of local cadres and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. It is interesting that David sent letters with the same messages to Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, but only under Gorbachev was he sentenced to psychiatric treatment.36 Other symbolic assertions of national identity, in the limits and forms accepted oicially by the regime, were the subject of KGB intervention and treated as disloyal political behavior. For instance, the simple gestures of putting lowers to the statue of the greatest Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu in downtown Chişinău, accepted oicially by Moscow as the greatest Moldavian poet too, were interpreted as a manifestation of nationalism and anti-Russian attitude.37 he same was true of the statue of the greatest Moldavian medieval Prince Stephen the Great. Mihai Moroşanu for instance, a student from the Polytechnic Institute in 1964 initiated among students from various higher education institutions the signing of a letter of protest against the removal of Stephen the Great statue from downtown area to a marginal place. For that he was arrested by the KGB, expelled from the Polytechnic Institute and condemned to two years in a correctional work camp (Исправительно-трудовая колония)38. Romanian identity, called Moldavian in the Soviet period in the Moldavian SSR, was permitted only at the level of folk culture. here were folkloric ensembles, national theater and operas performing in Romanian, but almost all the movies till the late 1980s were broadcasted exclusively in Russian, including those made in Chişinău by the republican movie company, Moldova-ilm. his was also true of almost every TV program and this contradicted blatantly with the oicial pretension that national republics enjoyed equal conditions to develop their own language and culture. 35 36 37 38 А. С. Барсенков, А. И. Вдовин, История России, 1938-2002, Москва, Аспект Пресс, 2003, с. 311, 315. The Archive of Service of Information and Security of the Republic of Moldova, former KGB, ASISRMKGB, David’s file has been published in Basarabia, no. 9, 1990, pp. 140-152 by Nicolae Negru. Interview with Nicolae Cibotaru, Associate Professor in History at Moldova State Pedagogical University, March 11, 2011. Archive of the Polytechnic University (in the Soviet period it was an Institute), personal file of Mihai Moroşan, f. 31. Interview with Mihai Moroşanu, March 2011. 288 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 hose insisting on buying books from Romania, in the Latin alphabet, were having troubles. And those doubting the existence of a „Moldavian nation” in ethnical terms were severely punished. hose that did not question the Communist system, but just proposed the Union of the former Bessarabia and North Bukovina with Romania were condemned as nationalists. his was especially the case of the group called National Patriotic Front led by Alexandru Usatiuc and Gheorghe Ghimpu. Other two leading members were arrested and sent to Gulag plus exile in Siberia for 4 to 13 years.39 Speaking about the short term perspective in center-periphery relations in the late 1980s, it is important to stress several factors that poisoned dramatically the interethnic dialogue and Moldavian-Center relations as a whole. First, there is the role of the language laws adopted in the late 198os in Moldova in unveiling the tensions between Chişinău and Moscow authorities on the one hand, and Romanian speakers and the local Russian speaking community on the other. In others words, even though linguistic laws were among the most liberal as compared to other republics40, the Russian speakers perceived the adoption of language laws establishing the Romanian language in the Latin alphabet as an afront to their previous status. hey claimed that their rights were violated, but as a matter of fact it was about losing a privileged status. Another problem was related to some new industrial projects initiated by Moscow in Chişinău, such as building a huge computer making company of all-Union importance in the late 1980s. his also contributed to the growing tension in the center-periphery relations because it involved a mass arrival of cadres from the Center. his fueled mass mobilization on an ethnic basis, as this was perceived as a threat to local interests in the situation when unemployment in the urban areas, especially in Chişinău, was already rampant. Another problem that was used to mobilize local masses against the Center was the ecological issues, Moldova being one of the renowned places in the Soviet Union for experimenting with new chemicals in agriculture. Out of these problems, the most enduring was the linguistic issue as well as the one related to interpreting the Communist past. Ethnic Romanians tended to blame the local Russians as occupiers and for transplanting Communism into Moldova, the latter saying that they have been also victims of the Communist regime and they did not sufer any less. In this sense, the best answer to this question has been made by a Russian journalist from Moldova in 1989. Addressing her fellow Russians from Moldova, Evghenia Solomonova said: A lot of you would ask me: what is the guilt of the Russian people [in establishing Communism in Moldova], that has been itself a victim of Stalinist repressions and stagnation [referring basically to Brezhnev period]? [You would say that] It is about our common misfortune, not about guilt, isn’t it? Dear fellow citizens! My opinion is that our suferings could not justify us in the face of others whom we forced to share our misfortune. 39 40 ASISRM-KGB, ile Usatiuc – Ghimpu, 11 volumes. See more about that in the other article by I. Cașu in this volume. See for instance Николай Губогло, Языки этнической мобилизации, Москва, 1998. DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 289 And she continues talking about the perceptions and facts of Soviet Nationalities policy in Moldova in order to get to the hearts of her fellow Russians: Under the inluence of Stalinist national policy there was created a stereotype in our thinking (…), namely that we are liberators and protectors of the Moldavian people (…) We are having the psychology of the „Big brother” that should guide, but is not obliged to take in account himself of the opinion of the „Smaller brother”, less to learn his language, history and culture. Such an ideology that saved us from such ‘details’ was convenient for us because it obliged the „Smaller brother” for „a mutual understanding” namely on the level that was suitable for us. he fact that we are asking now for two state languages is a proof in this sense41. Of course, these words were not convincing for all. he refusal of Russian speakers to accept Romanian as the oicial language ignited Transnistrian separatism, which is to be explained in itself primarily as a result of competition between the let bank elites and the Bessarabian ones. he former were losing their special privileged relation with Moscow and thus initiated a strike and then a separatist regime, in 1990, that continues till nowadays and is supported by Russia, including the use of armed forces. Some conclusions: • Moscow did not trust Bessarabians, because they had a national consciousness higher than the Romanians from across the Dniester River; thus, in the key positions both at party and government levels there were promoted almost exclusively non-Bessarabians and oten non-Romanians, usually Russians and Ukrainians; • in economic terms it is apparent that there was no discrimination against Soviet Moldavia from the part of the Center, but the direct implications of the investment lows to Moldavia were accompanied by sending more Russians and Ukrainians to work in the republic at these newly established industrial enterprises; • one can see crystal clear discrimination in the share of ethnic Romanians in the number of industrial managers – only 2,3 % in 1964 and 8,6 % in 1984; • at the cultural and linguistic level, Romanian language, called Moldavian in the Soviet period and switched to Cyrillic alphabet to become an ethnic marker, was admitted in schools, especially in villages dominated numerically by Romanians, but at the higher education institutions and at the public level Russian was the dominant language; • discrimination – one of the keywords related to the imperial paradigm – could be noticed also in regard to the persons in the position of First Secretary, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, President of the Council of Ministers, chief of MVD and KGB; • speaking about imperial type relations in the Soviet period in regard to Mol- 41 Învăţămîntul public, 10 iunie, 1989, p. 2. 290 DYSTOPIA | Nr. 1-2, 2012 davian SSR, one can notice that in some cases besides Moscow the role of the imperial Center was played by Ukraine, especially in the interwar years (MASSR), but also in the crucial moment of 1940 when the frontiers of MSSR were being drawn and well aterwards; • the imperial type relations – divide et impera style – between Moscow and Chişinău became more obvious in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Center encouraged two territorial secessionist movements, a Gagauz and a Transnistrian one in order to discourage Moldova’s striving for independence, and later on from uniting with Romania or willing to become a member of the European Union.