Laura Pepe

Dossier : Avant de devenir la notion clé de la réflexion philosophique, aitia désigne, dans son origine préphilosophique et juridique, la responsabilité et l’accusation. Ce recueil analyse les différentes facettes de la causalité juridique et philosophique ainsi que leur influence réciproque, à travers un dialogue entre juristes, historiens de la philosophie et du droit, spécialistes de la rhétorique et de la tragédie grecques. Varia : Images, narration et dispositif scénique (vase François ; monuments delphiques). Calendrier religieux spartiate. Écriture antique de l'histoire (Hérodote et Thucydide). Position herméneutique et vérité du texte (Bollack). Significations de l'offrande sacrificielle

\uc8 difficile attribuire un significato univoco all\u2019espressione \ua5grafoj n 2moj, che, come la critica ha a pi\uf9 riprese sottolineato, pu\uf2 essere identificato ora con la consuetudine, ora con il complesso delle norme ancestrali che si ritengono avere origine divina, o ancora con la \u2018legge di natura\u2019. Bench\ue9 sia innegabile che questi siano i valori dell\u2019espressione nella maggior parte dei contesti in cui ricorre, credo tuttavia che sia possibile individuare due passi \u2013 peraltro tra i pi\uf9 antichi in cui compare il riferimento alle \u2018leggi non scritte\u2019: Soph., Ant. 454 e ps. Lys., In Andoc. VI.10 \u2013 nei quali il n 2moj \ua5grafoj si presenta con caratteristiche pi\uf9 definite, di \u2018esclusivit\ue0\u2019 e \u2018segretezza\u2019, che lo contrappongono al n 2moj gegramm\u161noj. Il quale n 2moj gegramm\u161noj, a sua volta, non \ue8 semplicemente la \u2018legge affidata alla scrittura\u2019: l\u2019espressione rimanda infatti a un concetto di legge \u2013 pubblicamente approvata, a tutti visibile e a tutti nota \u2013 tipicamente democratico.It is difficult to say exactly, and in an unambiguous way, what \ua5grafoj n 2moj was. Scholars have identified it now with \u2018customs\u2019, now with the complex of ancestral rules of divine origin, now with the law of nature. Even though, as it is undeniable, these are actually the meanings of the phrase in most of the contexts where it appears, I think there are two passages \u2013 among the most ancient in which it occurs: Soph., Ant. 454 e ps. Lys., In Andoc. VI.10 \u2013 where n 2moj \ua5grafoj can be given a more specific definition. In particular, it is an \u2018exclusive\u2019, \u2018secret\u2019 law, hence provided with characters opposite to n 2moj gegramm\u161noj. In turn, n 2moj gegramm\u161noj is not, simply, the \u2018written law\u2019; the phrase implies a typically democratic concept of law \u2013 publicly approved, publicly visible and known to everybody

Did equality exist in archaic Greece? Robert Wallace's challenging paper aims at demonstrating that equality was an idea and a practice already in Homer and in the archaic Greek poets; moreover, the first laws were written down in order to guarantee equal justice for everybody, even for the common people. A more careful analysis of the available sources shows however that the general situation cannot be described always in these terms

How can we use the many definitions of \u201clightness\u201d provided by Italo Calvino in the first of his Six Memos for the Next Millennium to describe ancient law? There are in fact several possible ways to assume that ancient law is \u201clight\u201d. As far as Roman law is concerned, for example, law can be described as \u201clight\u201d both because, in the classical age, it implies a consistent effort of abstraction, and also because, in the archaic period, it shows some clear connections with some \u201clight\u201d social phenomena such as magic and game. In Greek literature, moreover, there is at least one piece of important evidence \u2013 Sophocles\u2019 Antigone \u2013 where divine and unwritten law, ie. law in its highest sense, is associated with lightness, whereas some human written laws are clearly unjust, hence \u201cheavy\u201d

Foreword The topic of abortion in ancient Greece, and particularly in Athens, has been studied at length especially in its medical and social dimensions, but has received less consideration in the more specific legal field. One of the most important contributions in this latter perspective is the paper presented at the 1999 Symposion by Stephen Todd, whose interest was concentrated especially on the difficult and controversial interpretation of the fragments of a lost Lysian speech concerning abortion. The purpose of my paper is to reconsider this issue, obviously taking into account Lysias’ fragments that in fact may represent our main legal source on the topic, and focusing my attention on the possible ways abortion could be handled under a legal perspective. My paper will be structured on three themes: first I will deal with the issue of the general perception of abortion in the Greek poleis, and especially in Athens (§ 1); then, I will attempt an overall interpretation of the fr...

The present article aims to analyze the meaning of the first occurrences of the expressions \u3bd\u3cc\u3bc\u3bf\u3c2 \u3b3\u3b5\u3b3\u3c1\u3b1\u3bc\u3bc\u3ad\u3bd\u3bf\u3c2 and \u3bd\u3cc\u3bc\u3bf\u3c2 \u1f04\u3b3\u3c1\u3b1\u3c6\u3bf\u3c2 in order to demonstrate that both, as they appear, have a specific technical value and a political meaning. On the one hand, the analysis of the famous praise of the written law as guarantor of democratic equality in Euripides\u2bc suppliant Women demonstrates that the expression \u3bd\u3cc\u3bc\u3bf\u3c2 \u3b3\u3b5\u3b3\u3c1\u3b1\u3bc\u3bc\u3ad\u3bd\u3bf\u3c2 is not simply limited to the writing of the law (which in itself does not guarantee de- mocracy), but indicates the law written and made public immediately, that is common property, and therefore able to ensure equal treatment of the people who appear before it. On the contrary, the \u1f04\u3b3\u3c1\u3b1\u3c6\u3bf\u3c2 \u3bd\u3cc\u3bc\u3bf\u3c2, far from expressing \u2014as it will occur at a later time\u2014 the \u201ccustom\u201d, the \u201cdivine law\u201d or the \u201claw of nature\u201d, is principally the law that the \u3b3\u3ad\u3bd\u3b7 pretend to be source of law and integral part of the civic order. The conflict, often without solution, between the two orders of \u3bd\u3cc\u3bc\u3bf\u3b9 is illustrated very well in several works in the change of the last decades of the Vth and the beginning of the IVth centuries B.C.: for instance in Sophocles\u2bc antigone, as well as Andocides\u2bc On the Mysteries and its probable reply, the pseudo-Lysian speech against andocides

Gli antichi Greci non elaborarono mai una “scienza del diritto”, né conobbero figure professionali di “esperti del diritto” in qualche modo paragonabili ai iurisprudentes romani. Questo tuttavia non significa che in Grecia mancò un pensiero giuridico; anzi. Significa soltanto che questo pensiero non venne incentrato su principi astratti; in effetti, esso ebbe come oggetto qualcosa di molto concreto: i nómoi, ossia le leggi. Quelle leggi che, approvate dai cittadini ed esposte nella pubblica piazza, erano parte integrante del tessuto civico e della vita della polis. Quelle leggi, ancora, che – almeno ad Atene, la città che meglio conosciamo – avevano un loro uso pratico nei tribunali, durante i processi, dove esse erano fatte oggetto di analisi, di discussione e di interpretazione nelle molte orazioni pervenuteci. Proprio grazie a queste ultime è possibile osservare e verificare in che modo il diritto veniva applicato, in che modo la legge veniva intesa, quali erano le prassi processuali più tipiche. Dunque, nell’impossibilità di ricostruire un “diritto” sulla base delle categorie a cui la romanistica ci ha abituato, l’esperienza giuridica greca potrà essere osservata da vicino tanto dalle leggi pervenuteci direttamente per via epigrafica, quanto attraverso i discorsi conservati che venivano pronunciati davanti ai giudici in un processo, e che restituiscono un’idea vivida di come i Greci guardavano al diritto, alla legge e alla sua applicazione pratica.

In the Homeric poems \u2013 where also begins to emerge the notion that material and causal responsibility should be separated from moral responsibility \u2013 predominates the idea of a strict liability. This is true also as far as homicide is concerned: when a man is killed, no matter whether the killing is intentional or not, the victim\u2019s relatives react with vengeance. With his law on homicide, towards the end of the seventh century BC, the Athenian legislator Drakon is the first to consider mens rea as a criterion to differentiate the penalties. The debate on criminal and, more generally, moral responsibility becomes urgent in the last years of the fifth century, when finally the idea prevails that a merely material and causal agent cannot be considered neither responsible not, consequently, guilty

Athenian women often used herbs to concoct love potions, whose effects could sometimes be lethal. A notorious case of poisoning is discussed in the first speech of Antiphon, traditionally but maybe erroneously known as \u201cAgainst the stepmother\u201d: a woman, represented in court by his son as his kyrios, is accused of having poisoned his husband, father of the prosecutor, using another woman \u2013 known as \u201cpallake\u300 of Philoneus\u201d \u2013 to administer the drug. The purpose of this paper is to focus on some of the most relevant problems of the speech: what was the charge against the \u2018stepmother\u2019 and, consequently, where did the trial take place? What did the defendant argue against the prosecutor? Is it indeed a weak case for Antipho? What is the relationship between the so called \u2018stepmother\u2019, the victim and the prosecutor? The answers to these questions can also shed some light on the juridical and social position of women in ancient Athens

... Ma nell'epifania del vero significato del sogno anche lo straniero ha rive-lato infine la sua natura reale: egli è stato un liquidatore amaro (crhmatoda…taj pikrÒj, 729 s.), e si è incarnato non già in un individuo, ma nel ferro di Scizia (regione notoriamente ricca di questo metallo ...

... Dinamica dello spazio nella guerra dei Sette contro Tebe. Autores: Laura Pepe; Localización: Acme : annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università degli studi di Milano, ISSN 0001-494X, Vol. 52, Nº 1, 1999 , págs. 181-196. Fundación Dialnet. ...

Questo saggio si propone di indagare il ruolo politico e giuridico degli esegeti nell’Atene tra il V e il IV secolo; dopo una veloce rassegna del dibattito, vivo soprattutto intorno alla meta del secolo scorso, intorno alle origini, al numero e all’identita degli esegeti, esso si concentra soprattutto sulle fonti letterarie disponibili, che permettono di distinguere tra due categorie. Gli esegeti tout court (da identificare con i due gruppi che le testimonianze epigrafi che qualificano come Eupatridi e Pythochrestoi) erano consultati da privati in situazioni particolarmente complicate, e l’applicazione delle leggi di cui essi erano depositari serviva ai loro clienti per dare il corretto impulso a un’eventuale azione processuale. Gli esegeti Eumolpidi, competenti in merito al culto di Eleusi, custodivano antichi e severissimi νόμοι a disciplina della ἀσέβeια commessa in relazione ai Misteri. Le loro pubbliche richieste di applicazione di tali νόμοι, tuttavia, generavano dubbi e contr...

The Athenian law on homicide, enforced by Draco in 621/0 BC., was focused on the distinction between phonos ek pronoias and phonos akousios. Even though it is clear that these expressions designate respectively what we may generally call ‘intentional’ and ‘unintentional’ homicide, the exact meaning of ek pronoias and akousios is debated; whereas some scholars maintain that only murders committed with malice aforethought could be qualified as ek pronoias, others believe instead that pronoia should be identified with a simple ‘harmful intent’.
The aim of this work is to demonstrate that neither opinion is completely correct; a detailed analysis of the most important Greek sources on the topic shows in fact the difficulty of applying the modern categories of mens rea to the Greeks notions underlying the concepts of pronoia, hekousion and akousion.

Abstract. In the Homeric poems – although the notion that material and causal responsibility should be separated from moral responsibility begins to emerge – the principle of strict liability predominates. This is moreover true as far as homicide is concerned; when a man is killed, whether the kill-ing is intentional or not, the victim’s relatives react with vengeance. With his law on homicide, to-wards the end of the VII century BC, the Athenian legislator Drakon was the first to consider mens rea as a criterion to differentiate the penalties. The debate on criminal and, more generally, moral responsibility becomes urgent in the last years of the fifth century, when in the end the idea prevails that a merely material and causal agent can be considered neither responsible nor, consequently, guilty.

Résumé. Dans les poèmes homériques – où commence à émerger la notion que la responsabilité matérielle et causale ne peut pas être séparée de la responsabilité morale – prédomine l’idée d’une responsabilité de type objectif. Cela est vrai aussi en ce qui concerne le meurtre: quand un homme est tué, indépendamment du fait que le meurtre soit volontaire ou non, la famille de la victime réagit en se vengeant. Avec sa loi sur le meurtre, vers la fin du VIIe siècle, le législateur athénien Dracon est le premier à envisager l’élément subjectif comme critère pour différencier la peine. Le débat sur la responsabilité pénale et, plus généralement, morale, devient pressant au cours des dernières années du Ve siècle, quand prévaut l’idée que l’agent matériel et purement causal ne peut pas être tenu responsable, ni, donc, coupable.

Gli antichi Greci non elaborarono mai una “scienza del diritto”, né conobbero figure professionali di “esperti del diritto” in qualche modo paragonabili ai iurisprudentes romani. Questo tuttavia non significa che in Grecia mancò un pensiero giuridico; anzi. Significa soltanto che questo pensiero non venne incentrato su principi astratti; in effetti, esso ebbe come oggetto qualcosa di molto concreto: i nómoi, ossia le leggi. Quelle leggi che, approvate dai cittadini ed esposte nella pubblica piazza, erano parte integrante del tessuto civico e della vita della polis. Quelle leggi, ancora, che – almeno ad Atene, la città che meglio conosciamo – avevano un loro uso pratico nei tribunali, durante i processi, dove esse erano fatte oggetto di analisi, di discussione e di interpretazione nelle molte orazioni pervenuteci. Proprio grazie a queste ultime è possibile osservare e verificare in che modo il diritto veniva applicato, in che modo la legge veniva intesa, quali erano le prassi processuali più tipiche. Dunque, nell’impossibilità di ricostruire un “diritto” sulla base delle categorie a cui la romanistica ci ha abituato, l’esperienza giuridica greca potrà essere osservata da vicino tanto dalle leggi pervenuteci direttamente per via epigrafica, quanto attraverso i discorsi conservati che venivano pronunciati davanti ai giudici in un processo, e che restituiscono un’idea vivida di come i Greci guardavano al diritto, alla legge e alla sua applicazione pratica.

Partendo da un'innovativa interpretazione della legge di Draconte, il volume analizza la disciplina dell'omicidio propria dell'ordinamento giuridico greco di età classica, ripercorrendo la fondamentale tripartizione che distingue tra phonos ek pronoias, phonos akousios e phonos dikaios.