MÈTIS
MÈTIS
N. S. 13 2015
Anthropologie
des mondes
grecs anciens
Dossier :
Aitia
Causalité juridique, causalité philosophique
Éditions de l’ehess • Daedalus
Paris • Athènes
Laura PePe
Università degli Studi di Milano
SOME REMARKS ON HOMICIDE
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In the second chapter of his well-known book Shame and Necessity,
Bernard Williams argues against the evolutionary and progressive concept
of Greek ethical ideas and of their relationship with ours; in particular,
he challenges the notion that the Greeks had primitive ideas of action,
responsibility, and justice that gradually developed, not only throughout
history till today, but also within their own culture.1 Williams’ criticism is
directed irst of all at Bruno Snell’s theory that at the beginning of their
culture, well represented in the Homeric poems, the Greeks were “childish”,
and that they did not have an overall notion of themselves, since they lacked
both the perception of the body as a unit and the awareness of being the
real doers of their decisions.2 It is beyond any doubt that we should agree
with Williams’ argument that the world Homer describes is not “childish”
at all. In fact, not only is the Homeric man aware of his body as a unit, but
he is also aware of being the author of the decision-making process that
1. WiLLiams [1993] 2007, p. 31 ff.
2. sneLL [1948] 1963, p. 24 ff. (for the idea that in Homer, as well as in coeval art, the
body is conceived of only as a complex of limbs [guia, melea]); p. 28 ff., 36 ff. (Homer
ignores the unity of the soul, and uses at least three different words – psuchê, thumos,
noos – to indicate respectively the vital breath that lies away through the mouth when the
person dies, the organ of emotions and the seat of the intellect); p. 55 ff. (human actions or
decisions are not independent, inasmuch as they are promoted by the gods).
Mètis, N. S. 13, 2015, p. 45-68.
46
LAURA PEPE
leads him to act.3 He knows that the consequences of some of his actions
depend upon his self-determination and that the consequences of some
others do not. What is worth investigating is whether the consciousness of
this distinction has any inluence on his responsibility.
It is well known that Albin Lesky replied in the negative; according to
him, an involuntary action – which in most cases appears to be the result
of divine intervention – did not free the individual from responsibility.4
From this perspective, the Homeric hero is designated as aitios, “guilty”,
because he is “responsible” for having caused, even if only mechanically,
a given action. So, on the basis of this conclusion and with speciic
reference to homicide, Jean Gaudemet maintained: “Par cela seul qu’il
a accompli l’acte, son auteur est tenu pour aitios, que le meurtre ait été
volontaire ou non. Le problème n’est donc pas d’appréciation de la volonté
et de l’intention, ni d’une responsabilité imputable à une intelligence
libre et éclairée. Il est de pure causalité mécanique. Et celle-ci oblige à la
compensation”;5 and, more recently, Edwin Carawan stressed that aitios
is a “causal term [that] carries the clear implication that compensation or
retribution is owed”.6
3. As far as the unity of the body is concerned, WiLLiams [1993] 2007, p. 33 f., recalls
for instance the Iliadic passage (XXIV, 405-423) where Priam, trying to recover from
Achilles the corpse of his son, hopes that it is still intact, as it was when Hector was alive;
this is for him a clear example that the Homeric perception of the integrity of the body as
a unit is possible even when the person lives, and not only – as assumed by Snell – after
his death. Regarding the existence of a Homeric concept of decision, the British scholar
(36 ff.) similarly provides several examples from which the notion of an independent
deliberation clearly emerges; and even if most times in the poems human behavior seems
to be inluenced by divine intervention, nonetheless the very fact that the gods are able to
deliberate shows that the idea of deliberation already existed. For similar observations see
also, e plurimis, DoDDs [1951] 1990, p. 10 note 2 (who, however, partially accepts Snell’s
ideas, cf. p. 26 f.); CantareLLa 2002, p. 177 ff.
4. Lesky 1961, esp. p. 32 ff.; cf. also Lesky 1966.
5. GauDemet 1962, p. 486 f.; cf. also, e plurimis, aDkins 1960, p. 25: “in Homeric
society, then, the belief in non-human causation of human action has practically no effects
on the ascription of responsibility”; GioffreDi 1974, p. 13 f.: “ad esprimere il concetto
della colpevolezza viene usato un termine che indica la semplice causalità, αἴτιος, il
quale designa il responsabile, ma in realtà non signiica altro che “autore” del fatto: si
prescinderebbe insomma da ogni imputazione morale dell’evento”; maCkenzie 1981, p. 81
ff. For a broader deinition of aitios related to homicide and more generally to criminal law
see moreover Gernet 1917, p. 368 f.; Jones 1956, p. 264 f.
6. CaraWan 1998, p. 43.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
47
A more careful analysis, however, shows that these deinitions are not
so decisive. After a more in-depth examination of the topic, in fact, Eva
Cantarella, while recognizing on the one hand that in the Homeric poems
the idea that liability is strict and objective is certainly prevalent, on the
other hand underscored that at the same time different conceptions emerge,
and that it is therefore necessary to make some important distinctions.
Actually, there are some cases where “la responsabilità personale per così
dire materiale […] è […] scissa dalla responsabilità morale. Se, agli effetti
pratici, l’azione è valutata in sé, come puro effetto, sotto il proilo morale
essa è ricollegabile al suo autore solo quando è volontaria”.7 As a matter
of fact, in several Homeric passages the idea begins to appear that one
who performs an “unintentional” action – and we will see later how to
understand the adjective “unintentional” – is not aitios, i.e. he is not guilty.
The most famous passage that conirms this conclusion is without any
doubt Iliad XIX, 86 ff.: while offering Achilles “boundless compensation”
(ἀπερείσι᾽ ἄποινα, v. 138) for the abduction of Briseis, Agamemnon
nonetheless denies being aitios since, when he acted, Zeus, Moira and
Erinys cast upon his soul a ierce blindness (ἄγριον ἄτην, v. 88; cf. v. 137,
μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς). So, the reason that he cannot be considered
aitios is that his behavior, determined by external entities and hence not
under his control, was unintentional. But we may also recall Iliad I, 335,
where the heralds Talthybius and Eurybates, sent by Agamemnon to take
away Briseis, are said by Achilles to be “not at all responsible” (οὔ τί μοι
ὔμμες ἐπαίτιοι) for what they are doing, since they are just executing an
order. Again, in Iliad III, 164 Priam absolves Helen, calling her, again,
“not at all responsible” (οὔ τί μοι αἰτίη ἐσσί); it is true that the Trojan war
was causally triggered by her escape, but it is also true that her escape with
Paris was decided by the gods; hence, the gods are the real and sole aitioi
of what happened (θεοί νύ μοι αἴτιοί εἰσιν).
These few examples are useful to show the dificulty of understanding
aitios always as a “causal term”; indeed, a close analysis of its occurrences
in ancient sources, and above all in the Homeric poems, illustrates – as
Eva Cantarella has again well highlighted – that the term has at least two
basic meanings: aitios is both the “cause” in an objective sense (and as
such it refers solely to the existence of a causal relation between action
and event), and the “person responsible” as “guilty”. In this latter meaning,
aitios is used when it is possible to ascribe an action to somebody who
7. CantareLLa [1980] 2011, p. 49.
48
LAURA PEPE
intentionally carried it out.8 But we can go still further. It is true that,
according to the general rule, even the person acknowledged as not aitios
is subject to the consequences of his action; but it is also true that in the
poems a new and radically different idea appears, according to which
the person who acts without intention, and hence is not guilty (aitios),
is considered not deserving of any punishment. Paradigmatic, in this
perspective, is the previously mentioned passage (Iliad I, 335) concerning
the heralds Talthybius and Eurybates sent by Agamemnon, against whom
Achilles does not react, for the very reason that he recognizes that they are
not aitioi. Similarly, in Odyssey XXII, 356-357, Telemachus convinces his
father not to kill Phemius, who, exactly as the herald Medon, was forced
to serve the suitors during Odysseus’ absence (cf. Odyssey XXII, 351[…
]-353: οὔ τι ἑκών […] οὐδὲ χατίζων […] ἀνάγκῃ); hence, as innocent
(anaitioi), they should not be punished.
Given this situation, we can conclude that different, apparently
contradictory conceptions coexist in the Homeric poems. “In un quadro
ancora dominato, in prevalenza, dalla attribuzione di una responsabilità
oggettiva, che prescinde da ogni considerazione sull’atteggiamento
psichico dell’agente, si innestano elementi che aprono squarci su
prospettive diverse”; this is moreover further evidence that, “non esiste
un mondo omerico, non esiste un uomo omerico, e non esiste, quindi, una
soluzione omerica al problema della responsabilità”.9
After these preliminary remarks, the purpose of this paper is threefold.
First, I will examine whether in the Homeric poems the possible difference
in the treatment of intentional and unintentional acts affected also
intentional and unintentional homicide. Second, I will consider how the
situation evolved in Athens during the seventh century BC, when Drakon
enacted the irst written law on homicide. Finally, I will investigate the
terms of the ifth century debate on criminal responsibility for homicide.
HOMICIDE IN HOMER
As he is perfectly aware of the difference between intentional and
unintentional actions, Homer is also perfectly aware of the distinction
8. CantareLLa 1979, p. 273; CantareLLa [1980] 2011, p. 61.
9. CantareLLa [1980] 2011, p. 66 (author’s italics).
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
49
between intentional and unintentional homicide.10 It is important to
stress – for the moment just with a hint – that the Homeric (and generally
Greek) concept of what was intentional and what was not cannot be
compared with the idea we have of these notions.11 Let’s consider, for
example, a well-known passage, Iliad XXIII, 83-88, which will also
provide essential information about the general treatment of homicide in
the poems. After his death, Patroclus, appearing to Achilles in a dream
and reminding him that he too is going to die soon, exhorts him to let
their bones lie together, in the name of their old friendship; a friendship
that was born the day Patroclus, still a boy (τυτθὸν ἐόντα, v. 85), was
forced to leave his homeland, and came to Achilles’ country, because he
had killed Amphidamus’ son “though I willed it not, in wrath over the
dice” (οὐκ ἐθέλων, ἀμφ᾽ἀστραγάλοισι χολωθείς, v. 88). Why – assuming
that these words represent an actual and objective expression of Homeric
classiications and not a subjective and advantageous justiication12 –
does Patroclus say he killed “unintentionally” (ouk ethelôn)? Some
scholars believe that the phrase indicates an involuntary manslaughter
that resulted from recklessness (Patroclus had the intention to strike but
not to kill);13 but I think it more appropriate to link ouk ethelôn to the
following participle cholôtheis, so that the wrath could be assumed to be
the cause of Patroclus’ unintentional killing.14 Several other, albeit later,
10. For the different terms – boulomai, ethelô, hekôn – used in the Homeric poems to
indicate different types of intention see masChke [1926] 1968, p. 2 ff.
11. For the deinition of the Greek terms hekôn/hekousios and akôn/akousios,
traditionally, but approximately, translated respectively with “intentional”, “willingly”,
“voluntarily”, and “unintentional”, “unwillingly”, “involuntarily”, see riCkert 1989,
p. 2 f. and passim. For the meaning of the terms, with particular reference to homicide, cf.
PePe forth., esp. § 2.
12. Contra cf. PeLLoso 2012, p. 199 note 30, for whom Patroclus’ statement about
the lack of mens rea in his behavior cannot be considered meaningful for the Homeric
concept of unintentional killing, for the simple fact that it is uttered by the doer himself.
Now, it is certainly possible that here Patroclus is trying to mitigate his moral guilt,
even though this has no consequences on his “legal” guilt; but I do not agree that his
words cannot be signiicant as far as the Homeric classiication of the different kinds of
homicide is concerned. In fact, the idea they express can be compared with the content of
Agamemnon’s justiication – once again valid only on the moral level – for the abduction
of Briseis (Iliad XIX, 86-89; 137), with the only difference being that in this case his
justiication is conirmed also by Achilles, victim of his offence (Iliad XIX, 270-273); on
the point cf. DoDDs [1951] 1990, p. 3 ff.
13. GioffreDi 1974, p. 31 f.
14. CantareLLa 1976, p. 43 ff.; CantareLLa 1979, p. 267 f.
50
LAURA PEPE
sources conirm that the Greeks considered akousion, “unintentional”, an
act performed by someone who in that moment is not compos sui (because
of an outburst of wrath, anger vel sim.).15 And it is worth noting that this
example is itself enough to highlight the radical difference between our
notion and the Greek one of what is intentional or unintentional, since it
is plain that we consider “intentional” the action performed in a raptus –
at most, we would say that it is not “premeditated”.16
What we have now to consider is whether the unintentional character
of Patroclus’ killing has any effect on his punishment, or, more correctly,
on the treatment he receives. The answer is negative. It is common
knowledge, in fact, that the Homeric world is dominated, mostly, by
“competitive” more than “collaborative” values. In the perspective of this
“ethic of success”, the hero who wants to continue “being” or “being said
to be” such has both the right and the duty to react with vengeance. But it
is clear that revenge takes no account of the mental attitude of the doer; it
reckons only with facts. There is just one way to avoid revenge, namely to
go away, exactly as Patroclus did; but this kind of light is merely a factual
remedy.
It is, however, true – and this provides a further conirmation of the
lack of homogeneity in Homeric society – that in the poems we also ind,
linked with the surfacing of “collaborative values”, the divergent idea that
revenge could be avoided by a voluntary composition of the offence, the
poinê. When, and if, the wronged party (or the victim’s relatives, in case
of homicide) decides to accept the poinê, he gives up his right to avenge
himself; but, once again, the decision about accepting the poinê is – at
least theoretically – independent of any evaluation of the doer’s mental
attitude.17
15. For the sources and their analysis cf. PePe 2012, p. 134 ff.
16. Contra, for the inclusion of homicides committed in the heat of the moment in the
category of voluntary homicide – which was characterized by the presence of a simple
harmful intent – see maCDoWeLL 1963, p. 60; Loomis 1972; GaGarin 1981, p. 31; PhiLLiPs
2007, p. 75 ff.; PhiLLiPs 2008, p. 59 note 4. For further analysis of the topic, see PePe 2012,
p. 99 ff.; PePe forth., § 5; PeLLoso 2012, p. 188 ff.
17. There is no mention of the intent of the killer in the trial scene on the Shield of
Achilles (Iliad XVIII, 497-508), where the thema decidendum is only whether the poinê
has been paid by the killer to the family of the victim. Of course – even if there is no hint
in our sources that this was the rule – it is possible to admit that the relatives of the victim
were more inclined to accept the poinê if they acknowledged that the killing had been
unintentional. David Phillips, whom I would like to thank for having discussed this topic
with me, will recognize in the text and in this footnote some of his suggestions.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
51
Ultimately, in the society described by Homer, the awareness of the
difference between intentional and unintentional homicide, and hence the
awareness that the latter is a less serious offence than the former, already
existed, but it did not have any effect as far as the “penalty” – rectius, the
consequences for the killer – is concerned; the offence is reciprocated by
an equal – or equivalent – reaction. This situation was to change, partly at
least, with Drakon’s law on homicide.
DRAKON
According to some ancient sources, and particularly the Constitution
of the Athenians (7.1), Drakon, in 621/0 BC, was the irst to give the
Athenians written laws (thesmoi),18 which were almost completely
replaced by the politeia enacted, less than thirty years later, by Solon.19 The
only Drakonian laws kept by Solon were the laws on homicide, phonikoi
nomoi, which were still in force in the ifth and fourth centuries BC. They
are handed down both by various literary works, especially logographic
speeches – many accurate quotations of them can be found in the irst
section of the Demosthenic discourse Against Aristocrates, §§ 22-85 –
and by a direct source of outstanding relevance, namely an inscription
on a marble stone unearthed in Athens some 150 years ago, in 1843.20
Thanks to the text of the decree that in the irst nine lines precedes the
transcription of the law itself, the document is generally ascribed to 409/8
BC;21 that year, after the oligarchic coup d’État of 411 BC, the reborn
democracy decided to reinscribe some of the existing laws perceived as
18. On the passage, see rhoDes 1981, p. 130 ff.; contra, humPhreys 1991, p. 18 ff.
maintains that probably Drakon wrote exclusively the laws on homicide.
19. The historical existence of Drakon was irst questioned by BeLoCh 1926, p. 258
ff.; and, more recently, both seaLey 1976, p. 104 (cf. also seaLey 1987, p. 115 ff.), and
fiGueira 1993, p. 288 ff., underscored as barely believable the fact that the tradition
ascribes to Athens two legislators, while just one is mentioned for all the others Greek
poleis. Against this argument see however GaGarin 1981, p. 1 note 1: “[this] is in fact
an argument for Drakon’s historical existence, since the tradition would have been more
likely to reduce two early igures to one than vice versa”.
20. For the details of the discovery and the restoration of the inscription cf. strouD
1968, p. 1 ff. The text of the law can be read in IG I3.104.
21. Maybe earlier if we accept Todd’s suggestion (toDD 1996, p. 103 note 5) that the
term of the anagrapheis (the state oficials appointed to reinscribe the law) ran from 411/0,
or more likely from 410/9 BC.
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LAURA PEPE
more democratic.22 In order better to highlight how the issue of criminal
responsibility is handled in the law, it is irst of all worth considering its
general content, and particularly its incipit, whose interpretation inluences
the overall evaluation of the nomos. It is important to state in advance that
the meaning of every single word of the inscription is so controversial that
necessarily I will take into account only the theories that appear to be of
particular relevance to the topic here discussed.
Scholars have debated at length the subject, extent and scope of the law.
According to the hypothesis that can be well qualiied as the “traditional”
one, which basically reads the law also in the light of what the indirect,
classical sources say about it, Drakon introduced some radical innovations
to the current system.23 First, he abolished private revenge. Second, he
established different courts24 for the judgment of phonos ek pronoias and
phonos akousios (respectively – but the translation is conventional due to
the aforementioned difference between our concept of intentionality and
the Greek one – “intentional” and “unintentional killing”). Third, he stated
that the penalty should be differentiated according to the evaluation of
mens rea; hence, whereas the person who was judged guilty of phonos ek
pronoias was punished with death, the one who committed a less serious
phonos akousios was condemned to exile;25 he could, however, avoid
exile if he received the aidesis, “pardon”, by the victim’s relatives (the
terms of the aidesis are indicated in ll. 13-19 of the epigraphic law, where
it is speciied which relatives, by unanimous agreement, could grant it).
Yet, especially in recent years, this hypothesis has been widely criticized.
Relying both on the argument that the regulation of homicide in classical
times cannot be compared with the Drakonian one – hence, what classical
authors say about phonikoi nomoi is barely useful to understand the
meaning of Drakon’s law –, and on the Aristotelian statement (Politics
II, 1274b15-8) that Drakonian laws did not introduce any element of
22. Cf. GaLLia 2004.
23. Among the main supporters of this theory cf. LiPsius 1908, p. 601; De sanCtis 1912,
p. 166 ff.; BusoLt, sWoBoDa 1926, p. 811 ff.; masChke [1926] 1968, p. 53 ff.; Latte 1931,
p. 133 ff.; Latte 1933, p. 280 ff.; Jones 1956, p. 259; PaoLi 1965, p. 836; BisCarDi 1982,
p. 286 ff.; CantareLLa 1975, p. 293 ff.; CantareLLa 1976, p. 84 ff.; forsDyke 2005, p. 86 ff.;
PhiLLiPs 2008, p. 49 ff.; PePe 2008, p. 139 ff.; PePe 2012, p. 13 ff.; PeLLoso 2012, p. 188 ff.
24. The conviction, quite popular in the past, that already in Drakon’s time phonos ek
pronoias was tried by the Areopagus has been now almost completely abandoned (contra,
GaGLiarDi 2012, p. 42 ff.); bibliography and status quaestionis in PePe 2012, p. 49 ff.
25. Cf., e.g., Antiphon, Tetralogies I, 2.9 and On the Murder of Herodes 10; Lysias, On
the Murder of Eratosthenes 50 and Against Andocides 14; Demosthenes, Against Meidias 43.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
53
innovation, some scholars deny that the legislator put an end to private
revenge or differentiated the penalty according to the evaluation of mens
rea. According to them, Drakon simply set up a “système vindicatoire
mitigé”,26 and gave some written rules to the existing and sometimes
confused procedures of vendetta and private compensation. From this
perspective, any weighing of intention and mens rea was, exactly as in the
past, mostly marginal, if not totally irrelevant.27
Now, I think it very dificult to accept that the locution ek pronoias,
which appears among the irst words of the epigraphic law (IG I3. 104, 11
[incipit of Drakon’s law on homicide]: καὶ ἐὰμ μὲ ᾽κ προνοίας κτ[ένει τίς
τινα, φεύγ]ε[ν), as well as, a little further below, the provision of particular
consequences for the person who killed akôn (IG I3. 104, 16-18: κτ]ένει
δὲ ἄκον, γνõσι δὲ hοι πεντ[έκοντα καὶ hς hοι ἐφέται ἄκοντ]α κτναι etc.),
does not have anything to do with a speciic attention of the lawgiver to
the mens rea, and hence with the different sanctions for those who killed
intentionally, ek pronoias, and unintentionally, akôn. And, since we have
no evidence that this distinction, though well known, had any concrete
implication in pre-Drakonian times, it is reasonable to infer that it was
Drakon who introduced it as a signiicant element of originality.
But let’s now consider the thesmos/nomos itself, and let’s analyze
especially the irst line of it, which – as already said – is the most important
one for understanding the purpose and general content of the whole law.
For a long time in the past28 it was stated that the epigraphic text deals
only with “unintentional” homicide; accordingly, at the beginning of the
law (l. 11), the deinition of the offense (καὶ ἐὰμ μὲ ᾽κ προνοίας κτένει
τίς τινα, to be translated “and if one man kills another unintentionally
[μὲ ᾽κ προνοίας]”) is followed by the indication of the sanction (φεύγεν,
“let him be exiled”). But this assumption, for various reasons, seems to
me barely convincing. To say the least, it does not give any satisfactory
explanation of the presence of the initial kai, understood as a coordinating
conjunction;29 also, it does not explain why the unintentional nature of
the offense is indicated with a negative locution (mê ek pronoias) and not
26. moDrzeJeWski 1991, p. 9.
27. In this sense, besides moDrzeJeWski 1991, p. 8 ff., cf., e plurimis, GaGarin 1981,
p. 111 ff.; humPhreys 1991, p. 35 ff.; thür 1991, p. 53 ff.; CaraWan 1998, p. 45 f. e 79 ff.;
LeWis 2007, p. 66.
28. But cf., recently, GaGLiarDi 2012, p. 45 ff.; eCk 2012, p. 218.
29. For the different theories proposed to justify the presence of the initial kai, “and”,
and the arguments against them, cf. PePe 2012, p. 17 ff.
54
LAURA PEPE
with the positive adjective (akôn), which appears twice in the inscription
some lines below (ll. 16-18: κτένει δὲ ἄκον, ἄκοντα κτναι).30 Moreover,
it seems to contradict the decree that precedes the transcription of the
law, where we read (ll. 4-5) that some appointed state oficials, the
anagrapheis, were ordered to reinscribe τὸν Δράκοντος νόμον τὸμ περὶ
τô φόνο, namely “the” law of Drakon on homicide, in its entirety, and not
just a part of it.
In order to ind a possible solution to these problems, a new
interpretation of the irst line of the law – which necessarily affects the
reading of the rest of it as well – has been recently proposed.31 If we
rely on the aforementioned statement in the decree, and hence assume
that, from its very beginning, the law concerns homicide in general, it is
appropriate to assign a different meaning to what appear to be the two key
terms of the sentence, namely kai and pheugen. Owing to the dificulty
of understanding it as a coordinating conjunction, “and”, kai shall be
translated “even”; hence, the sense of the irst segment of the phrase
will be “even if somebody does not kill intentionally (ek pronoias)”32
(implied, “as well as if somebody kills ek pronoias”). Consequently, it is
better to give a different meaning to the main verb, pheugen; in fact, if
we understood it in the sense of “to go into exile”, hence taking the irst
sentence as a whole to mean “even if somebody does not kill another
ek pronoias, he should go into exile (exactly as the one who kills ek
pronoias)”, we would postulate that intentional and unintentional homicide
were punished in the same way. But this interpretation of the irst line,
30. For the arguments against the hypothesis of CantareLLa 1975, p. 295 ff. (cf. also
CantareLLa 1976, p. 105 ff.), according to whom the locution mê ek pronoias qualiied a
particular kind of involuntary killing that lacked pronoia, “premeditation”, see PePe 2012,
p. 130 ff.; PePe forth., § 5; PeLLoso 2012, p. 206 ff. note 42.
31. Or, rectius, it has been proposed again after the attempt at a different restoration,
and hence interpretation, of the irst line of the law suggested by tsantsanoGLou 1972,
p. 170 ff. (namely, καὶ ἐὰμ μὲ ᾽κ προνοίας κτ[ένει τίς, φόνο φεύγ]ε[ν); see, e.g., mirhaDy
2008, p. 16 ff.; PhiLLiPs 2008, p. 51 note 74; PePe 2012, p. 26 ff.; PeLLoso 2012, p. 191 ff.,
esp. 193 note 24.
32. For the opportunity of understanding the phrase mê ek pronoias as “does not
kill intentionally” rather than “kills unintentionally” – given the absence of a category
of homicide qualiied as mê ek pronoias (pace Cantarella: cf. supra, note 30), see esp.
GaGarin 1981, p. 36: “its use [scil. of the phrase mê ek pronoias] is to deny that a particular
action belongs to the category ἐκ προνοίας; […] in every case it negates a positive category
and we should translate it “not intentionally” rather than “unintentionally”.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
55
given some years ago by Michael Gagarin,33 is clearly inconsistent with
the recurring assertion in ancient sources that the two kinds of homicide
were penalized differently, respectively with death and exile34. If so, it is
better to understand pheugen in the technical legal sense, well attested
for a later period, “to stand trial”; the possible argument against this
hypothesis, namely the dificulty in conceiving that already in Drakon’s
times pheugô had acquired this technical procedural meaning, is nulliied
by the plausible presence in the Drakonian law itself of a compound
of diôkô, “to prosecute”, the verb that normally serves as a correlative
of pheugô (l. 21: συνδιόκ]εν, referring to those who, together with the
closest relatives, take part in the killer’s prosecution).35
The opening sentence, understood as “even if somebody does not kill
another intentionally, he shall stand trial”, clearly shows Drakon’s irst,
fundamental innovation: the legislator established the necessity – or
rectius the opportunity, given the limits of the dikê phonou, action for
homicide, which had to be initiated only by the victim’s relatives – of
a trial for all homicides, both intentional and unintentional.36 The irst
aim of this procedure was the abolition or, at least, the control of the
existing system of revenge and private settlements, which, for the sole
reason of not being written, were neither careful nor rigorous. Drakon
introduced a system that could ensure certainties in procedure, settlement
and penalty.37
This system entailed a inal and authoritative decision about the guilt
and the degree of guilt of the defendant, who, as we may infer from the
following sentence, had to appear before the basileis and the ephetai (ll.
11-13: δ]ικάζεν δὲ τὸς βασιλέας αἴτιον φόνο Ε [......17......] Ε βολεύσαντα·
33. GaGarin 1981, p. 96 ff.
34. Cf. supra note 25.
35. Cf. also PhiLLiPs 2008, p. 51 note 74.
36. With the sole exception of phonoi dikaioi, “justiiable homicides” (l. 33 ff.) that
were not subject to trial (at least in Drakon’s law) and penalty: cf. PePe 2012, p. 184 ff.
37. The fact there is no indication of the penalty in the irst line of the law should not
be considered a problem, pace GaGarin 1981, p. 30 note 1, CantareLLa 1994, p. 212 and
GaGLiarDi 2012, p. 46; not only could the sanction be speciied elsewhere in the text, but an
indication of the penalty here would be quite out of place. In fact, only if we admit that the
opening sentence contains procedural instructions, does the law as a whole reveal a proper
inner coherence, with logical and chronological sequences: summons (l. 11); indication of
the judges (basileis, ephetai, ll. 11-13); rules about aidesis (probably possible only after
the judges had decided the case, l. 13-19); on the point cf. mirhaDy 2008, p. 17 ff.; PePe
2012, p. 27 ff.; PeLLoso 2012, p. 194 note 24.
56
LAURA PEPE
τὸς δὲ ἐφέτας διαγνõναι). There is no need to discuss here the many
exegetical and philological problems that this sentence raises. It will
be enough, for instance, to remember that it is dificult to identify the
basileis38 and to clarify their activity, signiied by the verb dikazen.39
Moreover, the lacuna of seventeen letters makes it dificult, although not
impossible, to understand precisely the object of dikazen. This latter point,
however, merits further discussion: since this sentence contains the phrase
aition phono(u), it is at least appropriate to formulate a hypothesis on its
meaning.
Both the comparison with some loci similes of the logographic tradition,
and the analysis of the particular constructions of dikazô, allow us to restore
the lacuna with an ininitive clause, for example [ναι ἒ τὸν αὐτόχερ᾽εἴτ]
ε βολεύσαντα.40 If this is correct, the sentence states: “the basileis are to
dikazen that aition phonou is both the person who killed with his hands
(autochera) and the person who planned to kill (boleusanta)”. Hence,
aition phonou would be the result of the activity of dikazen performed
by basileis; this qualiication, aitios phonou, was to be given both to the
38. The use of the plural makes it dificult to take the term as indicating the archon
basileus (pace De sanCtis 1912, p. 142; hiGnett 1952, p. 312; strouD 1968, p. 46 f.;
harrison [1971] 1998, II, p. 43); rather, the basileis should be identiied with the archon
basileus together with the phulobasileis, the pre-Cleisthenic tribe-kings named, for
instance, in Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 8.3 (cf. e plurimis BusoLt, sWoBoDa
1926, p. 792 ff.; Bonner, smith [1930] 1970, p. 117; WoLff 1946, p. 72; maCDoWeLL
1963, p. 87; GaGarin 2000, p. 571 ff.; PePe 2012, p. 32 ff.).
39. For example, some scholars understand the verb as referring to the pre-trial activity
of the basileus, who determines the nature of the homicide and introduces the case to the
competent court (cf., e.g., Bonner, smith [1930] 1970, p. 115 ff.; CantareLLa 1976, p. 91;
see also GaGarin 2000, p. 572, who, however, gives a broader deinition of the verb dikazô,
which presumably included “at least some of the duties that we know from Ath. Pol. 57
[…], such as handling the preliminary proclamation, arranging for the trial, conducting the
preliminary hearings, and supervising the conduct of the trial”). For others, it describes
the basileus’ (or phulobasileis’) task of presiding over the session of the court and judging
the case together with the ephetai (cf. LiPsius 1905, p. 17 f.). WoLff 1946, p. 71 ff. –
whose hypothesis has been widely accepted: cf., among others, maCDoWeLL 1963, p. 38;
WaLLaCe 1989, p. 26 f.; taLamanCa 1979, p. 130 ff. –, believes instead that dikazen means
“to state the right” (“the ‘kings’, on the ground of the verdict of the ephetai, pronounced
the defendant “responsible for the homicide”, so that the consequences laid down in the
law automatically might take place”, p. 75). Finally, for CaraWan 1998, p. 68 ff. (and cf.
also mirhaDy 2008, p. 19 ff.), who follows thür 1970, dikazen is the proposition by the
basileis of a preliminary judgment in order to settle the dispute. Status quaestionis and
further discussion of the topic in PePe 2012, p. 30 ff.
40. PePe 2012, p. 31 f.; for other similar restorations see esp. p. 32 note 53.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
57
autocheir and to the bouleusas. Now, I am of the opinion that both words,
autocheir and bouleusas, refer irst of all to the actual way the offence
was effected; but they also refer to the intentional, rectius ek pronoias,
nature of the act. We can ind conirmation of this assumption in later
literary sources, where autocheir consistently indicates a person who uses
his hands with full control,41 and bouleuô the activity of somebody who
intentionally plots a plan that somebody else will have to execute.42
Thus, we would have a deinite conirmation that, just like Homer,
Drakon does not use the word aitios as a generic “causal term”, to indicate
the agent of any kind of homicide; aitios phonou is instead the “guilty”,
inasmuch as he is the perpetrator of an intentional (rectius, ek pronoias)
killing.43 Only the one who has been judged aitios phonou deserves the
death penalty. The one who is not aitios, because his phonos has been
judged akousios, will be punished with a less serious penalty, exile. But
at this point, in order better to understand what exactly ek pronoias and
akousios meant, and what elements and conditions qualiied a homicide
now as ek pronoias, now as akousios, it is worth shifting from archaic to
classical sources, since only from the latter can we try to obtain a deinition
of the two kinds of homicide. This analysis will also allow us to deal with
the last argument of our survey, and to understand irst how the problem
of responsibility for homicide was handled in the ifth century, and second
if, and when, criminal responsibility was excluded.
41. E.g., Demosthenes, Against Meidias 116; Against Leptines 157-8; Isocrates, Panegyricus 111; [Aristotle], Constitution of the Athenians 39.5.
42. Against the hypothesis that postulates the existence of a bouleusis, “planning”, of
involuntary homicide cf. PePe 2012, p. 163 ff.
43. After a survey of all its occurrences from Homer until, at least, Antiphon (cf. PePe
2012, p. 42 ff. with the relevant footnotes, esp. 82–83), I am persuaded that aitios always designates someone who is “responsible for an intentional action”. The only possibly
doubtful occurrence in Homer is Odyssey XXII, 155: Odysseus, who is preparing his inal
vendetta against the suitors, realizes that his enemies are taking weapons from a storehouse he had previously ordered closed, and hence supposes that some of his treacherous
servants are cooperating with the suitors; but Telemachus admits that the fault is only his,
and nobody else is aitios, because he was the one who forgot to close the door. Even if,
according to the communis opinio, aitios here may indicate a person guilty of an unintentional error, I think it not awkward to understand the phrase in the sense of “nobody is
intentionally planning anything against us”.
58
LAURA PEPE
HOMICIDE IN THE FIFTH CENTURY
The question of which elements qualiied a homicide as ek pronoias
is highly controversial;44 in fact, neither classical nor Hellenistic sources
provide us an unambiguous legal deinition of pronoia. Certainly, the one
who committed a phonos ek pronoias killed “intentionally”; actually,
however, it is not clear whether the phrase ek pronoias – as some scholars
claim45 – is the same (or at least has the same legal effect) as the more
generic hekousios, and hence indicates homicides characterized by a
simple harmful intent and includes also homicides committed “in the heat
of the moment”; or, rather, it refers to a more restricted category, which
contains only homicides committed with pronoia, “premeditation”. The
irst hypothesis seems to be challenged by some hints in various sources
– starting from the Iliadic reference to the killing committed by Patroclus
(supra, p. 49) – which suggest both that a homicide committed without
premeditation was considered “not intentional”, and that, to deine a
phonos as ek pronoias, the presence of a speciic intent to kill, and not
just to harm, was necessary.46 Moreover, other clues in classical authors
– especially in Antiphon’s Against the Stepmother, the only extant speech
from a homicide trial held on the Areopagos – seem to imply that to be
ek pronoias a phonos should have speciic characteristics that could be
compared – even if not at all identiied – with our “premeditation”.47 Be
that as it may, obviously the person who killed ek pronoias was responsible
for his act, and he was subject to the most severe penalty.
Things are more complicated when we deal with phonos akousios.
When was a phonos qualiied as akousios, and hence when was someone
considered responsible for having committed it? The only extant work
that allows us to answer this question – or at least to try to – is the Second
Tetralogy. The Tetralogies, ascribed to Antiphon, do not represent real
cases; nonetheless, “they imitate the form and relect the concerns of real
44. For a general overview cf. PeLLoso 2012; PePe forth., § 4.
45. They are quoted supra n. 16.
46. Cf., e.g., Aristotle, Ethica Megala I, 16.1-2: a woman, prosecuted before the
Council of the Areopagus for having given her partner a love potion that caused his death,
was acquitted since the judges recognized that she had no intention to kill, dianoia tou
apolesthai (δι’ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀπέλυσαν ἢ διότι οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας. ἔδωκε μὲν γὰρ φιλίᾳ,
διήμαρτεν δὲ τούτου· διὸ οὐχ ἑκούσιον ἐδόκει εἶναι, ὅτι τὴν δόσιν τοῦ φίλτρου οὐ μετὰ
διανοίας τοῦ ἀπολέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐδίδου).
47. For a more detailed analysis of the topic see PePe 2012, p. 87 ff.; PePe forth., § 4.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
59
cases” and “offer a theoretical mimesis of legal praxis”. And even though,
due to the sophistic nature of the work itself and to its structure, the
topic discussed is given two possible deinitions and solutions, neither of
which appears to be stronger or more valid than the other, “in their staged
scenarios we can watch the play of contemporary legal thought”,48 so that,
considering the two opposing speeches in the light of it, some conclusions
about criminal responsibility for homicide in ifth century Athens can be
drawn.
It is well known that the defendant in the ictitious trial of the Second
Tetralogy is a young man who, throwing his javelin, struck and killed
a team-mate, and is charged by the father of the victim with having
committed a phonos akousios. The father of the killer, speaker for the
defense, while agreeing on the “unintentional”, akousios, nature of the
homicide, does not agree on the terms and the ways the adjective akousios
should be understood. Ultimately, the debate concerns irst the deinition of
akousios, and second, the problem of attribution of criminal responsibility
for the deed – topics on which the prosecution and the defense take two
opposite stances.
The plaintiff, on the one hand, maintains that akousios phonos is that
phonos which results from a mere causal mechanism; and, since causality
entails culpability, the agent is liable simply because he caused the
outcome. In fact, to deny – as the defense does – that the one who struck
and killed neither wounded nor killed is a sign of incredible audacity and
shamelessness (3.5); moreover, since it is evident that nobody but the
defendant threw the javelin, he is the only one responsible for the homicide,
and he deserves to be punished as prescribed by the law that orders the
punishment of the killer (3.7). The defendant would be innocent only if he
were standing still and not throwing his javelin when the boy was killed;
the mere fact of having thrown the javelin makes the defendant a killer
(3.10). The plaintiff’s position is well condensed in the questions: “Who
threw the javelin? To whom is the boy’s death to be in fact attributed?”
(ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ βαλών; εἰς τίν᾽ὁ φόνος ἀνήκει; 3.7). The ground of his charge
is assumed to be a “physic of causality”, consistent with the provision
of the law that “orders the punishment of the killer” (3.7). The boy must
be punished because, simply by the act of throwing, he caused the death
48. WohL 2010, p. 119. On the Tetralogies, analyzed in the perspective here considered,
see GaGarin 1978; GaGarin 1997, p. 7 ff.; GaGarin 2002, p. 52 ff.; CaraWan 1993;
CaraWan 1998, p. 171 ff.
60
LAURA PEPE
and is consequently the killer. The plaintiff never talks about intentions;
indeed, from his perspective – a traditional perspective, which can be
compared with the Homeric one – intentions are totally irrelevant.49
On the other hand, the defendant’s father challenges the idea that his
son committed a phonos akousios, asserting that liability for homicide
could not be determined by a mere relation of cause and effect; to him,
the guilty party is not the one who threw the javelin, but rather the one
in whose behavior can be recognized the presence of an hamartia (2.6),
the notion of which can be deduced from some preceding and following
sentences. He maintains, in fact, that his son did not throw with insolence
or intemperance (οὐχ ὕβρει οὐδὲ ἀκολασίᾳ, 2.3); he adds that, had he
thrown the javelin outside the area designated for its light (2.4), or against
an order, or in a wrong moment, or from a wrong place (2.7), he could be
considered guilty. But, since he did everything correctly (πάντα ὀρθῶς,
2.7) and hence committed no hamartia, he killed nobody, although he
threw (2.3). He was not the cause, but instead the victim (ἔπαθε) of the
accident, since he was prevented from hitting the target (2.7). This being
the case, someone else is pointed out as responsible and guilty; namely,
the victim, who, running forward just at the moment of the throwing, put
himself between the javelin and the target (2.5; cf. 4.5-8). By dying, the
guilty victim punished himself for his own hamartia (2.8). The defendant
is the irst to admit that the arguments he uses are typically sophistic, “close
and subtle” (λεπτὰ δὲ καὶ ἀκριβῆ, 4.2). Relying on them, he clearly wants
to undermine the traditional idea that the person who merely mechanically
caused a death, without any intention of doing so, is to be considered liable
and guilty of phonos akousios; and the deinition he gives of hamartia
allows us to compare his notion of phonos akousios to, for instance, the
Italian “omicidio colposo”,50 or to the kind of homicide that in common
law is generally qualiied as “negligent manslaughter”.51
49. For the principle according to which the person who commits a homicide, regardless
of his intention, is subject to punishment cf. also Plato, Laws IX, 865b-c.
50. Art. 43 codice penale: “[il delitto] è colposo, o contro l’intenzione, quando l’evento,
anche se preveduto, non è voluto dall’agente e si veriica a causa di negligenza o imprudenza o imperizia, ovvero per inosservanza di leggi, regolamenti, ordini o discipline”.
51. Negligent manslaughter, which “involves cases where a person causes the death of
another by gross carelessness” [a], is included in the category of involuntary manslaughter,
which covers all types of homicide that are unlawful at common law but where the accused
lacks the guilty mind required for murder; involuntary manslaughter encompasses also
reckless manslaughter (“a person causes the death of another when aware of the risk
that her or his conduct may cause harm to another” [a]; “recklessness is distinguishable
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
61
If it is true that the Tetralogies were written towards the end of the
V century52, then the question at issue in this work fully joins in the heated
intellectual debate of the time on individual (criminal and generally moral)
responsibility. From this debate emerges the idea that it is necessary to
distinguish between the “material agent” and the person who is “truly
responsible” and that it is necessary to consider “responsible” only the
person who played an active part in the realization of a deed.
Many contemporaneous works (or works referring to this period)
prove the existence of this debate. In his Life of Pericles, for instance,
Plutarch recalls that Pericles and the sophist Protagoras spent an entire
day discussing a case very similar to that of the Second Tetralogy. An
athlete unintentionally (akousiôs) hit somebody with his javelin and killed
him; who, “according to the most correct reasoning” (kata ton orthotaton
logon), ought to be held responsible for the disaster? The javelin, the
thrower, or the judges of the contest?53 Now, it is clear that, if there were no
doubt that the material agent is always responsible, the whole discussion
– and especially the indication of a possible responsibility of the judges,
who clearly were not materially involved in the accident – would have
made no sense.54
Moreover, in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, the purpose of the sophist
is to deny the heroine’s guilt, not assuming – as, for instance, Stesichorus
from negligence in that the former involves advertent risk-taking while the latter involves
inadvertence to a risk” [b]) and unlawful manslaughter (“the death of another is caused
by an unlawful and dangerous act” [a]): yeo 1997, p. 149 ff., esp. 162 ff. (quotes [a] from
p. 150, [b] from p. 163). In the category of criminal homicide of the Model Penal Code
(MPC § 210.1-2: “a person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being. Criminal homicide
is murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide”) a homicide committed negligently
constitutes negligent homicide (MPC § 210.4), whereas the qualiication of manslaughter
is given only to homicides committed recklessly (MPC § 210-3); also in this case, “the
essence of the difference between recklessness and negligence […] is that the reckless
actor must “consciously disregard” a substantial and unjustiiable homicidal risk created
by his conduct, whereas the negligent actor need only disregard a risk of which he “should
be aware” (Commentary to MPC, § 210.4).
52. Against the ascription to the ifth century (and consequently to Antiphon) of the
Tetralogies see, recently, CaraWan 1998, p. 171 ff.
53. Plutarch, Pericles 36.5: Πεντάθλου γάρ τινος ἀκοντίῳ πατάξαντος Ἐπίτιμιον
τὸν Φαρσάλιον ἀκουσίως καὶ κτείναντος, ἡμέραν ὅλην ἀναλῶσαι μετὰ Πρωταγόρου
διαποροῦντα, πότερον τὸ ἀκόντιον ἢ τὸν βαλόντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀγωνοθέτας κατὰ τὸν
ὀρθότατον λόγον αἰτίους χρὴ τοῦ πάθους ἡγεῖσθαι.
54. Cf. also PePe 2012, p. 154 ff.
62
LAURA PEPE
did, following in his Palinodes the variant version of the myth in which it
was Helen’s ghost who went to Troy, while she stayed in Sparta – that she
did not commit the act, but instead showing that she cannot be charged
with having committed it; actually, rather than “acting”, she “suffered”.
Whatever was the reason that induced her to lee to Troy with Paris, she
is not responsible. Hence, she does not deserve the blame that has been
haunting her for years. Guilty are the gods, or Tyche, or Anagke, if they
compelled her to escape (τῇ Τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, 6). If
she was forced by violence, bia, it was the one who used bia that “acted”,
while she simply “suffered” (ὁ <μὲν> ἁρπάσας ὡς ὑβρίσας ἠδίκησεν, ἡ δὲ
ἁρπασθεῖσα ὡς ὑβρισθεῖσα ἐδυστύχησεν [...] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ
ἔπαθε, 7). Again, if she was convinced by logos, whoever convinced her,
since he forced her, did wrong (ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ,
12), while she did no wrong; she was only unfortunate (οὐκ ἠδίκησεν
ἀλλ᾽ ἠτύχησεν, 15). Last but not least, if the cause of her behavior was
eros, there are two possibilities: in fact, if eros is a god, it is impossible
for a weak human being to resist a divine power (εἰ μὲν θεός, θεῶν θείαν
δύναμιν πῶς ἂν ὁ ἥσσων εἴη τούτων ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός;
19); if, instead, eros is a kind of sickness or disease, once again Helen
is not guilty but unfortunate (εἰ δ᾽ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς
ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ᾽ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον, ibid.).55
Some tragedies of the last years of the V century similarly echo the
debate; for example, the comparison between Sophocles’ Oedipus the
King (around 430 BC) and the later Oedipus at Colonus (401 BC) can
well demonstrate the change of perspective as far as responsibility is
concerned.56 While the irst Oedipus punishes himself because he feels
responsible for what he materially did, the second Oedipus proclaims
himself “pure” (καθαρός, v. 548), not guilty: he did not “do” those actions,
rather he “suffered” them (ἔπαθον […] οὐκ ἔρεξα, vv. 538-539). In a
different ield, but basically with the same answers, the topic is dealt with
in Thucydides’ work, the irst “scientiic” historical treatise; in one of its
irst chapters the historian underscores that it is necessary to distinguish
between “alleged” and “real causes” (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν,
ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ [...] αἱ δ᾽ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἴτιαι, I, 23.6),
55. For similar remarks on Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen see esp. Dover 1974, p. 144 ff.;
CantareLLa 1976, p. 112 ff.; CantareLLa 1979, p. 274 f.
56. Cf. also Jones 1956, p. 263 f.
HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
63
and that the “responsibility” for an event cannot be ascribed to the act that
merely caused it.
This is the background in which we can place the answer to the
speciic issue of criminal responsibility for homicide. The person who
merely caused the deed, and acted without any premeditation, intention,
or negligence, is neither responsible nor, consequently, deserves any
punishment. At the beginning of this paper we saw that Homer sometimes
denied that a mere causal agent was to be considered responsible, hence
punishable. The process already started in Homer reaches its coherent
conclusion towards the end of the ifth century.
Abbreviations
IG i3: David LeWis (ed.), Inscriptiones Graecae. Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis
anno anteriores, Berlin-New York, 1981.
MPC: Model Penal Code, Philadelphia, 1962.
NNDI: Novissimo Digesto Italiano, Torino, 1957-1975.
PWRE: August Friedrich von PauLy, Georg WissoWa et al. (ed.), RealEncyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1893-.
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Anthropologie
des mondes
grecs anciens
MÈTIS
N. S. 13 2015
Dossier : Responsabilité pénale, causalité et intentionnalité. Droit grec et
philosophie de l’action. Varia : Images, narration et dispositif scénique (vase
François ; monuments delphiques). Calendrier religieux spartiate. Écriture
antique de l’histoire (Hérodote et Thucydide). Position herméneutique et
vérité du texte (Bollack). Signiications de l’ofrande sacriicielle.
SOMMAIRE
Dossier Aitia. Causalité juridique, causalité philosophique
Catherine Darbo-Peschanski et Cristina Viano : Introduction • Alberto Maffi :
Causalité et responsabilité dans le droit de la Grèce ancienne • Catherine DarboPeschanski : De l’aitios juridique à l’aitia platonicienne. Quelques suggestions • Laura
Pepe : Some Remarks on Homicide and Criminal Responsibility in Ancient Greece •
Cristina Viano : Causalité et responsabilité chez Lysias et Aristote • Lucia Calboli
Montefusco : Aition and aitia in the theory of Status • Carlo Natali : Quelques considérations inales.
Varia Sarah Olsen : Conceptualizing Choreia on the François vase: heseus and the
Athenian Youths • Pierre Vesperini : Les logoi philosophoi face aux images • Fred S.
Naiden : Sacriicing “In the Greek Fashion” • Angeliki Petropoulou : Hieromênia and
sacriice during the Hyakinthia • Carmine Pisano : Aspasia « maestro di retorica »
• César Sierra Martín : Cuando Heródoto muestra el Tucídides que lleva dentro:
consideraciones sobre Hdt VII, 107 y VIII, 111 • Andrea Cozzo : L’épistémologie de
Jean Bollack ou Bollack contre Bollack.
H I S TO I R E • P H I LO LO G I E • A R C H É O LO G I E
Prix : 40 €
ISBN 978-2-7132-2509-3
ISSN 1105-2201