Emma Soubrier

The inaugural workshop of the SALAM project asked: What is the role of the arms trade between Europe & North America and the MENA region, especially Gulf Cooperation Council countries? Participants explored the economic, political, and strategic roles that the arms trade is commonly said to play in bilateral and multilateral ties between countries in North America, Europe and the MENA region. They also questioned whether the arms trade delivers on these propositions. Discussions probed whether the trade successfully ensures security in the MENA region, is an efficient diplomatic tool to exert influence over partners, and/or helps improve collaboration among regional actors. Exploring these propositions from different viewpoints and through various case studies, participants highlighted the nuances within conventional narratives, debated whether they ever captured the role of the trade, and questioned if evolving conditions today require new analytical models altogether.

Globally, the number of armed conflicts has steadily increased since 2011, many of them in the Middle East and involving some of the world’s largest arms importers, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This multiplication of conflicts exposes the inconsistencies in the arms export control regimes of the world’s largest arms exporters, including France. Exploring five conflict case studies (Russia/Ukraine 2014-2015, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Philippines), this report highlights discrepancies between France’s narrative about its arms export controls and its export practices.

France advertises that its arms exports are done with absolute respect for its international commitments and considerations for conflict situations. It notably applies the European Union (EU) Council Common Position that instructs that Member States shall deny an export license if this would provoke or prolong intrastate or interstate armed conflict (criteria 3 and 4). However, the report shows that France has exported weapons to conflict parties on numerous occasions – and that the disconnect between the French narrative and its arms export policy does not stop there.

Through the five conflict case studies, the report explores other arguments that make up this storytelling à la française. Two of its pillars are the idea that French export control processes are already “strict, transparent and responsible” enough as they are, and the proposition that weapons sales are an intrinsically essential support to the country’s strategic autonomy and foreign policy interests. This latter priority include the crucial need to be a reliable long-term supplier and to sustain strategic partnerships often associated with such arms trade.

The report posits that these arguments have been at best incomplete, and at worst erroneous. Furthermore, they preclude any fruitful conversation on how to course correct. Demystifying them and conducting a sober assessment of their validity is critical because the evolving dynamics of armed conflict around the world heighten the need for genuine accountability in the global arms trade. Crucially, if left unchecked, these dynamics also precisely undermine France’s strategic autonomy and its foreign policy interests, notably because of the growing reverse influence of client states and the long-term destabilization linked to arms (re)transfers to non-state actors.

Drawing on documentary sources and interviews, the report lays the groundwork for a renewed debate around arms sales in France. It aims to generate discussions about how the export control regime could be revised to align with strategic goals associated with manufacturing and exporting weapons, without jeopardizing compliance with international commitments and the upholding of international security.

This article considers the politics and economics of arms trade in the Persian Gulf from the perspective of the importers, rather than the usual focus on the exporters. It analyses the purposes that weapons purchases have served over the last three decades for three of the most important Middle Eastern arms importers-the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. This shows an increasingly blurred divide between the political, economic and strategic dimensions of the arms trade. It suggests an important shift in the relations between the arms client/importing states, supplier/exporting states, and defense industrial companies.

Ce papier présente l'approche émirienne de la région ANMO depuis le début des « Printemps arabes », en prenant le soin de définir l'originalité des choix stratégiques de ce petit État du Golfe qui permettent de comprendre les lignes directrices sous-tendant l'intervention des EAU sur la scène régionale depuis 2011, en particulier vis-à-vis de trois pays : Syrie, Égypte et Libye. Pour ce faire, l'article explore trois dynamiques fondamentales de la posture antirévolutionnaire et néanmoins résolument tournée vers le changement des EAU : leur prise de distance prudente à l'égard des mouvements de contestation, leur consolidation d'un hard power conquérant, et la logique mercantile et discrètement transformatrice guidant leur établissement stratégique de nouveaux comptoirs et clients régionaux.

This article analyses the Emirati approach to the MENA region since the beginning of the Arab Spring and the originality of the strategic choices of this small Gulf State, casting light on the underlying currents of the UAE's regional interventions and engagements since 2011, particularly in Syria, Egypt and Libya. We explore three of the principal motivations in the UAE's policies, which are counter-revolutionary and yet firmly oriented towards change: careful distancing from movements of contestation, use of conquering hard power, and the mercantile and subtly transformative current guiding the establishment of new markets and clients in the region.

Petit émirat menacé par la pression de ses voisins, le Qatar résiste par une politique de fidélisation de ses anciens amis et par une ouverture tous azimuts sur de nouveaux partenaires. En diffusant une image de modération, Doha s'efforce d'assurer sa sécurité et de conforter son indépendance.

Les Émirats arabes unis (EAU) ont connu une expansion spectaculaire depuis leur indépendance en 1971. Depuis une dizaine d’années, ils s’affirment sur la scène internationale. Ils développent une stratégie portuaire ambitieuse et s’engagent de manière croissante dans des conflits armés. Leur politique étrangère est principalement guidée par la volonté d’assurer la survie des EAU dans un environnement volatil. Elle se traduit notamment par une opposition ouverte aux Frères musulmans.

The Gulf region has long been considered a “Western lake” – formally British with the colonial presence of the United Kingdom until the early 1970s, and less formally American given the continued military footprint of the United States, starting with the Naval Support Activity Bahrain. But lately the international relations of the Gulf countries increasingly have been characterized by a diversification of partnerships, including in a field that has historically been deemed the preserve of the United States and European allies: arms trade, and defense and security cooperation. What is the impetus for these new trends; what currents do they point to inside and outside the region; and are these dynamics likely to lead to a deep reshaping of Gulf security, with its center of gravity shifting away from traditional friends and guardians?

Giving an overview of evolving military cooperation and arms transfers between three Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and emerging outside powers, this paper evaluates the relative weight of these new partnerships. Additionally, it argues that the dynamics of these new partnerships point to changing underlying power strategies of the Gulf states. Traditional powers involved in the region should take this multipolarization of Gulf security into account to build new cooperation schemes.

The concept of Gulf security usually focuses on regime stability, territorial integrity against potential external aggression, military procurement, and the free flow of oil and gas. However, the health crisis brought about by the coronavirus pandemic has confirmed what has been increasingly apparent in the past few years: Gulf security is first and foremost human security.

It is crucial to bring the human security aspect front and center in the debates on Gulf security as it encompasses critical challenges for the region’s population, but also because recent and increasing sources of human insecurity threaten some of the foundational premises underpinning the polities of the Gulf Arab states, particularly their rentier political economy and regime-centric approach to security. This paper reframes human security issues as an inherent part of national security in the Gulf states and suggests innovative and pertinent ways to address future challenges with greater inclusivity.

In particular, it reviews the risks that the Gulf countries face regarding public health, food, and water security, as well as environmental security more broadly. It then assesses how these issues directly challenge some of their traditional definitions of security, in economic and strategic contexts. Finally, it offers some pathways to tackle the multifaceted security challenges the future holds for Gulf countries.

This article looks at the way France's arms exports have historically been framed as an inherent part of the country's core policies to achieve “strategic autonomy” at the domestic and international levels. It posits that taking this argument for granted without subjecting it to critical scrutiny is hazardous because it enables the continued unquestioned support for French arms sales and hampers the development of more stringent export control processes. Today, the need to look beyond this blanket storytelling is heightened in a context where unchecked exports relying on outdated views of global dynamics have precisely started to undermine France's strategic autonomy and interests. Not only does the country's growing dependence on exports create an antinomy of arms sales as a means of strategic independence, but the phenomenon of clients' reverse influence onto suppliers amidst a consolidated buyer's market also calls into question the autonomy of France's foreign policy.

Les partenariats stratégiques de la France avec le Qatar et les Émirats arabes unis (EAU), reposant sur des accords de défense scellés au début des années 1990 et sur d’importantes ventes d’armement, ont évolué durant la dernière décennie de deux manières qui sont susceptibles de mener à un recul de notre statut privilégié auprès de ces États clés et, en creux, de la place de la France à l’international. Ces deux tendances sont la réduction de nos parts dans leurs marchés d’armement et l’inversion du rapport de dépendance – donc d’influence – entre les acteurs. Cet article se propose d’examiner ces deux réalités afin d’en comprendre les enjeux, et d’envisager des pistes pour préserver les intérêts français dans un contexte mouvant et hautement concurrentiel.

The Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the profuse literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aimed at explaining the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper, which focuses on evolving trends of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, aims at filling this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game.

Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other main purposes.

The author hence begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions. She starts by giving an overview of the reactions that this importance of – sparkly – appearances in Gulf countries’ arms purchases stirs before trying and analysing the internal and international motivations behind this reality.

Then, the essay turns to all indirect ways through which arms trade in Qatar and the UAE guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime. Pointing to multiple international and domestic political, social and strategic determinants playing out in this area, the author argues that it perfectly illustrates their multifaceted survival strategy as “Small Princes-States”.

Finally, the study turns to new dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of new external incentives – chief among which was the global economic context combined with the regional turmoil and its associated vacuum of power – meeting with new internal priorities. The author points to the two countries’ recent assertiveness, analyses the impact this has on the Client State – Supplying State – Industrial company triangle, and questions whether or not this can lead to new rules of the regional and global security game.

L’utilisation par les pays du Golfe de leur manne financière à des fins de rayonnement et d’influence n’est pas nouvelle. Leur diplomatie économique a même une dénomination spécifique: la riyal politik, realpolitik déployée grâce au riyal. Cependant, les « printemps arabes » ont fait évoluer les pratiques de riyal politik des pays du Golfe. D’un instrument à visée accommodatrice, leur poids économique est devenu un véritable outil de puissance, c’est-à-dire un instrument à visée transformatrice des dynamiques régionales dans le but d’y défendre leurs intérêts. A cet égard, l’Égypte est un cas d’étude des plus intéressants.

Les pays du Golfe ont toujours été des clients importants d’équipements de sécurité et de défense. Ceci tient à plusieurs déterminants, tels que le fait qu’ils soient assis sur des réserves considérables de pétrole et de gaz, leur position stratégique entre l’Asie, l’Afrique et l’Europe ainsi que l’environnement
régional chargé en conflictualités potentielles dans lequel ils évoluent, notamment marqué par la présence des grands voisins iranien et irakien, perçus comme des menaces plus ou moins existentielles par les États de la Péninsule arabique.

Face à ces divers paramètres, les pétromonarchies du Golfe sont mues par deux préoccupations : assurer leur sécurité nationale contre des menaces conventionnelles ou asymétriques extérieures, mais aussi et surtout préserver la stabilité de leurs régimes.

Cette réalité duale s’est, dès le début, avérée « bénéfique » pour les industries de défense occidentales, et particulièrement celles des États-Unis. Il faut cependant noter que les règles régissant les marchés de défense dans la Péninsule arabique semblent aujourd’hui en pleine mutation.

Nous nous proposons d’analyser ici comment ces pétromonarchies ont, depuis trois ans, repensé leurs pratiques de riyal politik. Les pays du Golfe utilisaient traditionnellement leur puissance économique comme moyen d’influence, c’est-à-dire comme instrument à visée accommodatrice vis-à-vis
d’un environnement régional et international dans lequel ils aspiraient à rayonner et non à s’imposer comme "hégémon". Or, ce poids économique semble récemment être devenu pour eux un véritable outil de puissance, c’est-à-dire un instrument – cette fois – à visée transformatrice des dynamiques régionales dans le but de défendre, dans ce cadre, leurs intérêts.

The Arab uprisings have rightfully provoked an incredible burgeoning of research projects and fuelled existing ones with new energy. Among the numerous issues the “Arab Spring” has arisen is the question of its impact on the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This paper focuses on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and aims at analyzing its response to the ambient disorder in terms of security strategies.

Considering how closely interlinked Saudi foreign and security policies have always been, it is important to examine the impact of the recent regional events on Saudi security issues and interests. Together with the political realities on ground, they indeed represent the main determinants of the dynamics of the Saudi response that this paper analyzes.

The idea explored in this paper is that the evolving strategic environment faced by KSA (at both regional and global levels) represents new security challenges as well as a window of opportunity to adopt more assertive foreign and security policies.

This paper studies how the Arab uprisings deeply modify global security issues and related risks in the whole Middle-East and North Africa region, which represents specific pressures and security issues as well as a window of opportunity onto a new regional lead for KSA. The more assertive Saudi foreign and security policies this has led to are assessed through the “hegemonic vs. defensive” analysis and a third view is offered: the current Saudi security strategies could be read as an attempted leadership on a revived “hegemonic cooperation”.

In order to test this hypothesis, the paper explores another issue: the role of geo-economic trends, associated with a perceived shift in traditional alliances and interests, in the new Saudi strategic stance. Examining the change in traditional security paradigms in the region – particularly linked to uncertainty about the future US position towards the Gulf –, the author goes through the scope of possible strategies it opens for KSA and its partners: a continued reliance on the West as ultimate security guarantee, a diversification of partnerships looking East and the development of an integrated regional security system.

With regards to the latter option, possibly combined with the other two, the paper then examines how this GCC “hegemonic security cooperation” could work within what has been labelled as the “Arab Gulf Moment”. This analysis involves a development on regional antagonisms and rivalries which are likely to jeopardize this option. Finally, the author offers an outlook on the regional and global repercussions that these renewed Saudi strategies towards its security challenges could have.