Karl Schafer
University of California, Irvine, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Kantian ethics, Moral Psychology, Immanuel Kant, Metaethics, Kant's Practical Philosophy, and 33 moreMeta-Ethics, Rationality, Skepticism, Epistemology, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Epistemic Justification, Moral Epistemology, Internalism/Externalism, Practical Reasoning, Moral Philosophy, Normativity, Expressivism, Kant's Ethics, Practical Rationality, Epistemic Normativity, Kant, Metaepistemology, Reasons, Epistemic Value, Virtue Epistemology, Desire, Reason, Early Modern theories of the passions, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy Of Economics, Decision And Game Theory, Game Theory, Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory, Bounded Rationality, David Hume, Frankfurt School, and Business Administrationedit
- All over the place, literally and figuratively. For some other online papers, see: https://webfiles.uci.edu/schaferk/www/index.htmledit
The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real)... more
The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. In particular, following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a “demarcation challenge” concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.
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Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the... more
Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Kant, Research Methodology, Kant's Practical Philosophy, Transcendental Philosophy, and 9 moreImmanuel Kant, Kant's Ethics, Self-Consciousness, Kantian ethics, Philosophical Methodology, Rationality, Inquiry, Transcendental Idealism, and Kant's theoretical philosophy/transcendental deduction
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense?... more
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.
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Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial.... more
Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial. What is much more controversial is the precise kind of cognitive relation to things-in-themselves that Kant believes is possible from a practical point of view. Traditionally, interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as (at best) a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart – as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of serious comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. But this seriously underestimates the degree to which Kant believes we can achieve “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves from a practical point of view – or at least, it does so insofar as we focus on our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.
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In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate... more
In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.
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Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais's discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure... more
Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais's discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais's understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I'll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais's understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism.
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The title really says it all, doesn't it?
Research Interests: 17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy, Rational Choice, Practical Reasoning, History Of Modern Philosophy, Practical Rationality, and 8 moreReasons, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Early Modern Philosophy, Rationality, Philosophy of action and theory of rationality, Rationalization, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and Reasonableness
In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around... more
In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around understanding. In doing so, I discuss the relationship between understanding and the sort of reflection that gives rise to the concept of a reason, the relationship between theoretical and practical understanding, and the connections between understanding and explanatory and intersubjective reasoning. In doing so, my goal is not to often anything like a complete defense of this way of thinking about constitutivism, but rather to offer some reasons for taking it seriously as an alternative to the more popular autonomy-focused forms of constitutivism.
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In this essay, I develop and (to some degree) defend a virtue-theoretic conception of rationality as a capacity whose function is understanding, as opposed to mere truth or correctness.
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In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive when it takes as its foundation a thoroughly non-trivial conception of reason or rationality - which has both theoretical and practical... more
In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive when it takes as its foundation a thoroughly non-trivial conception of reason or rationality - which has both theoretical and practical manifestations. I also discuss how this sort of "rationalist constructivist" ought to think about the relationship between reasons and rationality.
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In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. Along the way, I discuss some recent arguments for a version... more
In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. Along the way, I discuss some recent arguments for a version of this view due to Michael Smith and Julia Markovits. I then discuss some of the advantages of the resulting view - focusing on metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational questions.
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In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. In the present... more
In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. In the present essay I develop and extend this idea from a somewhat different perspective. In doing so, I offer an alternative way of formalizing the idea that morality is modest about the weight of moral reasons, thereby making more explicit the connections between this thesis and similar issues in the epistemic sphere. In addition, I discuss how these ideas affect our thinking about the nature of self-effacement, the significance of reflective endorsement, the weight that moral reasons ought to be given in all things consideration, and the plausibility of “indirect” moral theories. Finally, I stress that it is possible to see morality as modest about the weight of specifically moral reasons, while also seeing all practical reasons as grounded in morality more indirectly – namely, by seeing morality as determining the weight that both moral and non-moral considerations deserve to have in all things considered deliberation.
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In this essay, I distinguish two different epistemological strategies an anti-realist might pursue in developing an "evolutionary debunking" of moral realism. Then I argue that a moral realist can resist both of these strategies by... more
In this essay, I distinguish two different epistemological strategies an anti-realist might pursue in developing an "evolutionary debunking" of moral realism. Then I argue that a moral realist can resist both of these strategies by calling into question the epistemological presuppositions on which they rest. Nonetheless, I conclude that these arguments point to a legitimate source of dissatisfaction about many forms of moral realism. I conclude by discussing the way forward that these conclusions indicate.
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It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is... more
It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.
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A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. Also outlines some of the prominent objections to such positions and discusses some of the limitations of these objections from the... more
A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. Also outlines some of the prominent objections to such positions and discusses some of the limitations of these objections from the quietist's perspective. (For the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, McPherson and Plunkett, eds.)
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I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of... more
I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.
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It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus,... more
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspec- tives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement pres- ent in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.
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Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. I argue that Hume has far more resources to respond to these objections than might at first appear... more
Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. I argue that Hume has far more resources to respond to these objections than might at first appear to be the case - focusing on the under-explored connection between Hume's of cognition, his account of public language, and his account of the artificial virtues.
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Hume is often taken to be the father of “double Humeanism” about practical reason. Double Humeanism combines together two views that are often attributed to Hume: a view about motivational psychology – often referred to as the Humean... more
Hume is often taken to be the father of “double Humeanism” about practical reason. Double Humeanism combines together two views that are often attributed to Hume: a view about motivational psychology – often referred to as the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM) – and a view about normative reasons for action – often called the Humean Theory of Practical Reasons (HTR). In this essay I argue that Hume accepted neither HTM nor HTR. But this does not rob Hume's views about these issues of contemporary interest. Rather, it allows us to see what was truly radical about these views - namely, a certain sort of skepticism about the normative authority of reason itself.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Hume, Motivation (Psychology), Virtue Ethics, and 23 moreVirtues (Moral Psychology), 18th Century Philosophy, Desire, Practical Reasoning, Rationalism, Moral Philosophy, History Of Modern Philosophy, David Hume, History of Moral Philosophy, Moral emotions, Practical Rationality, 17th- and 18th-century Philosophy, Moral and Political Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Early Modern Philosophy, Practical Reason, Rationality, Agency, Morality, Morality and Rationality, Beliefs and attitudes, British Empiricism, and Motivational psychology
Offers an account of Hume's response to skepticism in terms of his account of the epistemic virtues, focusing on the role of the passions of curiosity and ambition.
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On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But,... more
On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume’s discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume’s discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume’s thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.
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Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in... more
Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in agreement with or contrary to the instrumental implications of other passions or desires. And second, that there is no properly practical form of inference or reasoning. I argue that Hume’s general understanding of practical reason does not support either of these claims. Rather, Hume’s explicit discussion of these issues—like his discussion of the nature of probable inference—is intended to lay the foundation for a naturalist account of practical thought that we would today regard as embodying a substantive, non-instrumentalist theory of practical rationality. This account will, indeed, make reason the “slave of the passions,” but in a very different sense than the one familiar from most contemporary discussions of Hume.
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In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines... more
In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines (1) a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with (2) a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I'll proceed as follows. First, I'll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I'll be focusing on, and the framework within which I'll try to address them. Then I'll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant's own views. Next, I'll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of "transcendental argument" allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I'll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: (1) the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and (2) the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I'll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. Keywords Kant · Epistemology · Rationality · Virtue epistemology · Transcendental arguments · Understanding · Inference to the best explanation · Perception · Skepticism This paper sketches an approach to epistemology inspired by two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. I believe both of these elements play an important role in Kant's epistemology. But their precise character and their role in Kant's philosophy is the
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In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to... more
In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti- luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments.
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In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist... more
In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.
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In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of... more
In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the Rational Symmetry View is correct, much of the action in the epistemology of disagreement relates—not to how one should treat those one regards as an “epistemic peer” in the sense popular in that literature—but rather to who one should treat as such.
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In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that... more
In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.
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A critical discussion of Judith Butler's Senses of the Subject, in which I try to suggest that Butler may be committed to certain elements of a broadly post-Kantian approach to ethics.
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Critical Notice of Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling by Neil Sinhababu for Mind
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Review of Hume's True Scepticism by Donald Ainslie in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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Review of Leibowitz and Sinclair (eds.) Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
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Review of Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy by Jackie Taylor in Hume Studies
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Review of Charles Pidgen (ed.) Hume on Motivation and Virtue for NDPR.
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Abstract: Hume’s account of mental representation appears to involve two distinct elements, the relationship between which is far from completely clear. On the one hand, Hume often writes as though the representational properties of an... more
Abstract: Hume’s account of mental representation appears to involve two distinct elements, the relationship between which is far from completely clear. On the one hand, Hume often writes as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association plays within Hume’s discussion of these issues. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume’s discussion of these issues involves attributing to him a unified account of mental rep...
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Hume’s views about practical reason are often characterized in terms of his “double Humeanism”— i.e. the conjunction of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM) and the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). But Hume actually endorsed neither the... more
Hume’s views about practical reason are often characterized in terms of his “double Humeanism”— i.e. the conjunction of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM) and the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). But Hume actually endorsed neither the HTM nor the HTR. Instead, the purpose of his discussion of these issues was to attack certain claims about the role of the faculty of reason in the practical domain. As such, Hume’s discussion is part of a far more radical philosophical project than anything in contemporary “Humeanism”: a wholesale assault on the idea that the faculty of reason has any special normative authority in either the theoretical or practical sphere. In this way, it is only by resisting the attribution of the HTM and HTR to Hume that we can see just how deep Hume’s antirationalism extends.
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Introduction to a special double-issue by the new editorial team.