Los temas de la acción, la ética y la política son comunes, hacia los siglos 4-1 AC, a la filosof... more Los temas de la acción, la ética y la política son comunes, hacia los siglos 4-1 AC, a la filosofía clásica de Grecia y de India, aunque la manera de hablar sobre ellos que todavía prevalece no termine de mostrar un lenguaje común para hacerlo. El propósito de este artículo es destacar ese sentido común en estas dos tradiciones filosóficas, y hacerlo siguiendo la filosofía de la identidad personal que debemos a Paul Ricoeur (1990). Ricoeur hace inseparables la ipseidad y la ética de Aristóteles, a quien considera el primero que supo plantear que la acción (prâxis) depende del ser propio o agente (autós). Recordemos que la ipseidad identifica a las personas de otra manera que con nombres, números, y colores corporales y políticos (mismidad). De hecho implica el saber del ser propio con el ser propio, y el considerar a los demás como iguales en este sentido. Comencemos por fijar algunos principios. El antiguo intelecto (sánscrito buddhi, griego noûs) es la "clave de arco" que pone en su lugar el sentido de la identidad, la psicología, la ética, la política, etc. Es lo capaz de ser absolutamente a partir de sí. Puede ser divino o humano, pero también sólo autónomo. Puede ser activo en el sentido de la acción de los agentes sociales/políticos, pero también activo en el sentido de la quietud de los sabios contemplativos griegos, y de los sabios que están quietos en la acción, como los yoguis.
Consistency with the old Greek sense of ethics and politics brought to India with Alexander the G... more Consistency with the old Greek sense of ethics and politics brought to India with Alexander the Great in the time of Aristotle should shed so me light on those subjects that came up soon af ter in the Sanskrit books. Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā speak of the virtues of sages and warriors with meditations presenting a sense of virtue more important than that fixed by varṇas or castes. For the Pāṇḍava to be sattvic should not mean to be reborn in any better caste but to follow a path that begins with the sense of personal identity that yoga and Ricoeur's ipseity show.
Mahābhārata speaks of snakes in fantastic manners, and Śaṅkara then looks like making sense on wh... more Mahābhārata speaks of snakes in fantastic manners, and Śaṅkara then looks like making sense on what snakes really are. I hold that something relevant goes missing with Śaṅkara's philosophy here.
Śaṅkara's notes on Bhagavadgītā speak of the difference between the rope and the snake though this point is not in the text, and he rather makes it to clarify what the text says (BhgBh 2.16, 13.10-16 and 26). The sensory organs present something that is not what knowledge sees but a superimposition or appearance which may cause fear (bhaya). Brahman is the knowable (jñeya), the fearless. The snake causes fear and the knowledge of the rope or the real makes it disappear as if it were unreal (sat/asat). But Mahābhārata speaks of snakes not as what someone can see when looking at rope but as identifying a species of people, namely the āsura, the Kaurava and even certain Brahmins. There were Brahmins who seriously questioned the Brahmin self of others, though this subject shows almost only indirectly. By the way, snakes can be dangerous animals, and everybody naturally understands them as something bad. It is very possible to see a snake when looking at a rope in a somewhat dark place, at least in old India, because there is a natural defense mechanism acting. But it is as likely to see snakes in certain types of people: MBh starts the Ādiparvan talking precisely about exterminating snakes and suggesting a much deeper problem than perceptual mistakes. Śaṅkara comments that the problems posed by the sensory organs are solved with knowledge, and this, in his words, implies differentiating kṣetra and kṣetrajña, because kṣetrajña must be present for those problems to disappear. Birth does not bring about such difference and people should learn to do it. One learns to see a rope where there seems to be a snake, or to see there is no water where there is a mirage. Those who do not learn have to start over and try again. Then, in his words and above all, one learns that the self is not reborn, even if it seems to be, when one knows the Brahman that gives meaning to both being and non-being. Śaṅkara is perfectly consistent with a Bhg which is, importantly, no part of a larger narrative featuring Brahman. Brahman does not depend on any kind of testimonies, being what is known by those who are free of rebirth. Everything Mahābhārata says would be nothing more than the snake that we see where in truth there a rope is only. Śaṅkara's Bhg would teach that we should get rid of snakes as we know them and not because of what others say about them, and this would be the sense in which the knowledge of Brahman itself does not imply any kind of action. Which is the thesis that guides the advaita reading of the Bhg. Undoubtedly Śaṅkara was a renouncer, as the śramaṇas who opposed Vedic ritualism were, but he was a Brahmanical brahmin who did not give much regard to castes. On the other hand, the Mahābhārata that we know gives a common sense to those differences of the people and to the supreme antagonists, the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava, without relinquishing their identities. And it does so out of what the ātman is, the self, namely, a being that takes care of himself/herself. Not a being that depends on anything else, but who is out of himself/herself. The Vedic ritualism of the Mahābhārata, the yajñas, seems to be defined by the sacrifice of the serpents, sarpasatra, and with this sense of
Los temas de la acción, la ética y la política son comunes, hacia los siglos 4-1 AC, a la filosof... more Los temas de la acción, la ética y la política son comunes, hacia los siglos 4-1 AC, a la filosofía clásica de Grecia y de India, aunque la manera de hablar sobre ellos que todavía prevalece no termine de mostrar un lenguaje común para hacerlo. El propósito de este artículo es destacar ese sentido común en estas dos tradiciones filosóficas, y hacerlo siguiendo la filosofía de la identidad personal que debemos a Paul Ricoeur (1990). Ricoeur hace inseparables la ipseidad y la ética de Aristóteles, a quien considera el primero que supo plantear que la acción (prâxis) depende del ser propio o agente (autós). Recordemos que la ipseidad identifica a las personas de otra manera que con nombres, números, y colores corporales y políticos (mismidad). De hecho implica el saber del ser propio con el ser propio, y el considerar a los demás como iguales en este sentido. Comencemos por fijar algunos principios. El antiguo intelecto (sánscrito buddhi, griego noûs) es la "clave de arco" que pone en su lugar el sentido de la identidad, la psicología, la ética, la política, etc. Es lo capaz de ser absolutamente a partir de sí. Puede ser divino o humano, pero también sólo autónomo. Puede ser activo en el sentido de la acción de los agentes sociales/políticos, pero también activo en el sentido de la quietud de los sabios contemplativos griegos, y de los sabios que están quietos en la acción, como los yoguis.
Consistency with the old Greek sense of ethics and politics brought to India with Alexander the G... more Consistency with the old Greek sense of ethics and politics brought to India with Alexander the Great in the time of Aristotle should shed so me light on those subjects that came up soon af ter in the Sanskrit books. Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā speak of the virtues of sages and warriors with meditations presenting a sense of virtue more important than that fixed by varṇas or castes. For the Pāṇḍava to be sattvic should not mean to be reborn in any better caste but to follow a path that begins with the sense of personal identity that yoga and Ricoeur's ipseity show.
Mahābhārata speaks of snakes in fantastic manners, and Śaṅkara then looks like making sense on wh... more Mahābhārata speaks of snakes in fantastic manners, and Śaṅkara then looks like making sense on what snakes really are. I hold that something relevant goes missing with Śaṅkara's philosophy here.
Śaṅkara's notes on Bhagavadgītā speak of the difference between the rope and the snake though this point is not in the text, and he rather makes it to clarify what the text says (BhgBh 2.16, 13.10-16 and 26). The sensory organs present something that is not what knowledge sees but a superimposition or appearance which may cause fear (bhaya). Brahman is the knowable (jñeya), the fearless. The snake causes fear and the knowledge of the rope or the real makes it disappear as if it were unreal (sat/asat). But Mahābhārata speaks of snakes not as what someone can see when looking at rope but as identifying a species of people, namely the āsura, the Kaurava and even certain Brahmins. There were Brahmins who seriously questioned the Brahmin self of others, though this subject shows almost only indirectly. By the way, snakes can be dangerous animals, and everybody naturally understands them as something bad. It is very possible to see a snake when looking at a rope in a somewhat dark place, at least in old India, because there is a natural defense mechanism acting. But it is as likely to see snakes in certain types of people: MBh starts the Ādiparvan talking precisely about exterminating snakes and suggesting a much deeper problem than perceptual mistakes. Śaṅkara comments that the problems posed by the sensory organs are solved with knowledge, and this, in his words, implies differentiating kṣetra and kṣetrajña, because kṣetrajña must be present for those problems to disappear. Birth does not bring about such difference and people should learn to do it. One learns to see a rope where there seems to be a snake, or to see there is no water where there is a mirage. Those who do not learn have to start over and try again. Then, in his words and above all, one learns that the self is not reborn, even if it seems to be, when one knows the Brahman that gives meaning to both being and non-being. Śaṅkara is perfectly consistent with a Bhg which is, importantly, no part of a larger narrative featuring Brahman. Brahman does not depend on any kind of testimonies, being what is known by those who are free of rebirth. Everything Mahābhārata says would be nothing more than the snake that we see where in truth there a rope is only. Śaṅkara's Bhg would teach that we should get rid of snakes as we know them and not because of what others say about them, and this would be the sense in which the knowledge of Brahman itself does not imply any kind of action. Which is the thesis that guides the advaita reading of the Bhg. Undoubtedly Śaṅkara was a renouncer, as the śramaṇas who opposed Vedic ritualism were, but he was a Brahmanical brahmin who did not give much regard to castes. On the other hand, the Mahābhārata that we know gives a common sense to those differences of the people and to the supreme antagonists, the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava, without relinquishing their identities. And it does so out of what the ātman is, the self, namely, a being that takes care of himself/herself. Not a being that depends on anything else, but who is out of himself/herself. The Vedic ritualism of the Mahābhārata, the yajñas, seems to be defined by the sacrifice of the serpents, sarpasatra, and with this sense of
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Ricoeur hace inseparables la ipseidad y la ética de Aristóteles, a quien considera el primero que supo plantear que la acción (prâxis) depende del ser propio o agente (autós). Recordemos que la ipseidad identifica a las personas de otra manera que con nombres, números, y colores corporales y políticos (mismidad). De hecho implica el saber del ser propio con el ser propio, y el considerar a los demás como iguales en este sentido. Comencemos por fijar algunos principios. El antiguo intelecto (sánscrito buddhi, griego noûs) es la "clave de arco" que pone en su lugar el sentido de la identidad, la psicología, la ética, la política, etc. Es lo capaz de ser absolutamente a partir de sí. Puede ser divino o humano, pero también sólo autónomo. Puede ser activo en el sentido de la acción de los agentes sociales/políticos, pero también activo en el sentido de la quietud de los sabios contemplativos griegos, y de los sabios que están quietos en la acción, como los yoguis.
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Śaṅkara's notes on Bhagavadgītā speak of the difference between the rope and the snake though this point is not in the text, and he rather makes it to clarify what the text says (BhgBh 2.16, 13.10-16 and 26). The sensory organs present something that is not what knowledge sees but a superimposition or appearance which may cause fear (bhaya). Brahman is the knowable (jñeya), the fearless. The snake causes fear and the knowledge of the rope or the real makes it disappear as if it were unreal (sat/asat). But Mahābhārata speaks of snakes not as what someone can see when looking at rope but as identifying a species of people, namely the āsura, the Kaurava and even certain Brahmins. There were Brahmins who seriously questioned the Brahmin self of others, though this subject shows almost only indirectly. By the way, snakes can be dangerous animals, and everybody naturally understands them as something bad. It is very possible to see a snake when looking at a rope in a somewhat dark place, at least in old India, because there is a natural defense mechanism acting. But it is as likely to see snakes in certain types of people: MBh starts the Ādiparvan talking precisely about exterminating snakes and suggesting a much deeper problem than perceptual mistakes. Śaṅkara comments that the problems posed by the sensory organs are solved with knowledge, and this, in his words, implies differentiating kṣetra and kṣetrajña, because kṣetrajña must be present for those problems to disappear. Birth does not bring about such difference and people should learn to do it. One learns to see a rope where there seems to be a snake, or to see there is no water where there is a mirage. Those who do not learn have to start over and try again. Then, in his words and above all, one learns that the self is not reborn, even if it seems to be, when one knows the Brahman that gives meaning to both being and non-being. Śaṅkara is perfectly consistent with a Bhg which is, importantly, no part of a larger narrative featuring Brahman. Brahman does not depend on any kind of testimonies, being what is known by those who are free of rebirth. Everything Mahābhārata says would be nothing more than the snake that we see where in truth there a rope is only. Śaṅkara's Bhg would teach that we should get rid of snakes as we know them and not because of what others say about them, and this would be the sense in which the knowledge of Brahman itself does not imply any kind of action. Which is the thesis that guides the advaita reading of the Bhg. Undoubtedly Śaṅkara was a renouncer, as the śramaṇas who opposed Vedic ritualism were, but he was a Brahmanical brahmin who did not give much regard to castes. On the other hand, the Mahābhārata that we know gives a common sense to those differences of the people and to the supreme antagonists, the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava, without relinquishing their identities. And it does so out of what the ātman is, the self, namely, a being that takes care of himself/herself. Not a being that depends on anything else, but who is out of himself/herself. The Vedic ritualism of the Mahābhārata, the yajñas, seems to be defined by the sacrifice of the serpents, sarpasatra, and with this sense of
Ricoeur hace inseparables la ipseidad y la ética de Aristóteles, a quien considera el primero que supo plantear que la acción (prâxis) depende del ser propio o agente (autós). Recordemos que la ipseidad identifica a las personas de otra manera que con nombres, números, y colores corporales y políticos (mismidad). De hecho implica el saber del ser propio con el ser propio, y el considerar a los demás como iguales en este sentido. Comencemos por fijar algunos principios. El antiguo intelecto (sánscrito buddhi, griego noûs) es la "clave de arco" que pone en su lugar el sentido de la identidad, la psicología, la ética, la política, etc. Es lo capaz de ser absolutamente a partir de sí. Puede ser divino o humano, pero también sólo autónomo. Puede ser activo en el sentido de la acción de los agentes sociales/políticos, pero también activo en el sentido de la quietud de los sabios contemplativos griegos, y de los sabios que están quietos en la acción, como los yoguis.
Śaṅkara's notes on Bhagavadgītā speak of the difference between the rope and the snake though this point is not in the text, and he rather makes it to clarify what the text says (BhgBh 2.16, 13.10-16 and 26). The sensory organs present something that is not what knowledge sees but a superimposition or appearance which may cause fear (bhaya). Brahman is the knowable (jñeya), the fearless. The snake causes fear and the knowledge of the rope or the real makes it disappear as if it were unreal (sat/asat). But Mahābhārata speaks of snakes not as what someone can see when looking at rope but as identifying a species of people, namely the āsura, the Kaurava and even certain Brahmins. There were Brahmins who seriously questioned the Brahmin self of others, though this subject shows almost only indirectly. By the way, snakes can be dangerous animals, and everybody naturally understands them as something bad. It is very possible to see a snake when looking at a rope in a somewhat dark place, at least in old India, because there is a natural defense mechanism acting. But it is as likely to see snakes in certain types of people: MBh starts the Ādiparvan talking precisely about exterminating snakes and suggesting a much deeper problem than perceptual mistakes. Śaṅkara comments that the problems posed by the sensory organs are solved with knowledge, and this, in his words, implies differentiating kṣetra and kṣetrajña, because kṣetrajña must be present for those problems to disappear. Birth does not bring about such difference and people should learn to do it. One learns to see a rope where there seems to be a snake, or to see there is no water where there is a mirage. Those who do not learn have to start over and try again. Then, in his words and above all, one learns that the self is not reborn, even if it seems to be, when one knows the Brahman that gives meaning to both being and non-being. Śaṅkara is perfectly consistent with a Bhg which is, importantly, no part of a larger narrative featuring Brahman. Brahman does not depend on any kind of testimonies, being what is known by those who are free of rebirth. Everything Mahābhārata says would be nothing more than the snake that we see where in truth there a rope is only. Śaṅkara's Bhg would teach that we should get rid of snakes as we know them and not because of what others say about them, and this would be the sense in which the knowledge of Brahman itself does not imply any kind of action. Which is the thesis that guides the advaita reading of the Bhg. Undoubtedly Śaṅkara was a renouncer, as the śramaṇas who opposed Vedic ritualism were, but he was a Brahmanical brahmin who did not give much regard to castes. On the other hand, the Mahābhārata that we know gives a common sense to those differences of the people and to the supreme antagonists, the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava, without relinquishing their identities. And it does so out of what the ātman is, the self, namely, a being that takes care of himself/herself. Not a being that depends on anything else, but who is out of himself/herself. The Vedic ritualism of the Mahābhārata, the yajñas, seems to be defined by the sacrifice of the serpents, sarpasatra, and with this sense of