Severin Schroeder
University of Reading, Philosophy Department, Faculty Member
This paper offers a brief sketch of the normativity of linguistic meaning and then considers the opposing view of semantic anti-normativism as defended by Glüer & Wickforss. The author distinguishes between three different types of... more
This paper offers a brief sketch of the normativity of linguistic meaning and then considers the opposing view of semantic anti-normativism as defended by Glüer & Wickforss. The author distinguishes between three different types of obligation (moral obligation, socially enforced obligation, and freely adopted obligation) and argues that Glüer & Wickforss's position is based on a misconstrual of semantic normativity as a source of something like moral obligation, when in fact it produces only obligation of the third type.
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In this paper I offer a genetic account of how Wittgenstein developed his ideas on aesthetics in his 1933 lectures. He argued that the word ‘beautiful’ is neither the name of a particular perceptible quality, nor the name of whatever... more
In this paper I offer a genetic account of how Wittgenstein developed his ideas on aesthetics in his 1933 lectures. He argued that the word ‘beautiful’ is neither the name of a particular perceptible quality, nor the name of whatever produces a certain psychological effect, and unlike ‘good’, it does not stand for a family-resemblance concept either. Rather, the word ‘beautiful’ has different meanings in different contexts as we apply it according to different criteria. However, in more advanced regions of aesthetics the word ‘beautiful’ ceases to play an important role. Instead, we judge things to be more or less correct according to genre-specific standards or criteria, which in an aesthetic discussion are presupposed, rather than argued for. Finally, Wittgenstein came to realise that providing support for an aesthetic appraisal according to some given criteria is not the only and perhaps not even the main focus of aesthetic discussion. More interesting to him became the idea of a puzzle or perplexity in aesthetics, which he discussed in greater detail in his 1938 lectures.
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Revisiting the Wittgenstein/Davidson debate on whether reason explanations are a type of causal explanations, and considering in particular John Hyman’s recent reassessment and attempt to defend a causalist account of desires (2015), I... more
Revisiting the Wittgenstein/Davidson debate on whether reason explanations are a type of causal explanations, and considering in particular John Hyman’s recent reassessment and attempt to defend a causalist account of desires (2015), I argue for the following claims. First, the deviant-causal-connection problem remains an insurmountable objection to causalism. Secondly, using words in their ordinary senses, intentions are not desires, nor are desires dispositions; but more importantly (granting for argument’s sake that intentions are desires of sorts, and desires are dispositions of sorts), dispositions are neither causes nor ‘causal factors’. Finally, Hyman’s reassessment of the debate leaves out what is most crucial in Wittgenstein’s view, namely the observation that statements of one’s own reasons for acting are covered by first-person authority.
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According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely... more
According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. In this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is convincing.
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According to Wittgenstein, mathematics is embedded in, and partly constituting, a form of life. Hence, to imagine different, alternative forms of elementary mathematics, we should have to imagine different practices, different forms of... more
According to Wittgenstein, mathematics is embedded in, and partly constituting, a form of life. Hence, to imagine different, alternative forms of elementary mathematics, we should have to imagine different practices, different forms of life in which they could play a role. If we tried to imagine a radically different arithmetic we should think either of a strange world (in which objects unaccountably vanish or appear) or of people acting and responding in very peculiar ways. If such was their practice, a calculus expressing the norms of representation they applied could not be called false. Rather, our criticism could only be to dismiss such a practice as foolish and to dismiss their norms as too different from ours to be called ‘mathematics’.
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It has been urged repeatedly over the last two decades that empirical findings in neuroscience and psychology provide compelling reasons for endorsing a representative theory of perception. Richard L. Gregory and John R. Smythies are... more
It has been urged repeatedly over the last two decades that empirical findings in neuroscience and psychology provide compelling reasons for endorsing a representative theory of perception. Richard L. Gregory and John R. Smythies are perhaps the best-known advocates of this view. When it comes to vision, in particular, scientists of this persuasion think that the supposed alternative, ‘direct realism’, is hopelessly naïve and they conclude that, as Francis Crick puts it, ‘What you see is not what is really there; it is what your brain believes is there’ (Crick 1994, p.31).
We will take a critical look at some of these empirical findings, and discuss to what extent they support the more sweeping philosophical claims scientists have drawn from them, in particular the advocacy of representative theories of perception.
We will take a critical look at some of these empirical findings, and discuss to what extent they support the more sweeping philosophical claims scientists have drawn from them, in particular the advocacy of representative theories of perception.
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... Dreams and Grammar: Reply to Hanfling. Severin Schroeder. Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9205.00113. Issue. ... Get PDF (30K). More content like this. Find more content: like this article. Find more... more
... Dreams and Grammar: Reply to Hanfling. Severin Schroeder. Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9205.00113. Issue. ... Get PDF (30K). More content like this. Find more content: like this article. Find more content written by: Severin Schroeder. ...
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This book offers a detailed account and discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. In Part I, the stage is set with a brief presentation of Frege’s logicist attempt to provide arithmetic with a foundation and... more
This book offers a detailed account and discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. In Part I, the stage is set with a brief presentation of Frege’s logicist attempt to provide arithmetic with a foundation and Wittgenstein’s criticisms of it, followed by sketches of Wittgenstein’s early views of mathematics, in the Tractatus and in the early 1930s. Then (in Part II), Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy of mathematics (1937-44) is carefully presented and examined. Schroeder explains that it is based on two key ideas: the calculus view and the grammar view. On the one hand, mathematics is seen as a human activity — calculation — rather than a theory. On the other hand, the results of mathematical calculations serve as grammatical norms. The following chapters (on mathematics as grammar; rule-following; conventionalism; the empirical basis of mathematics; the role of proof) explore the tension between those two key ideas and suggest a way in which it can be resolved. Finally, there are chapters analysing and defending Wittgenstein’s provocative views on Hilbert’s Formalism and the quest for consistency proofs and on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
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Copyright © Severin Schroeder 2006 The right of Severin Schroeder to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2006 by Polity Press Polity... more
Copyright © Severin Schroeder 2006 The right of Severin Schroeder to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2006 by Polity Press Polity Press 65 Bridge Street Cambridge ...
Philosophy of literature (series: ratio special issues) SCHROEDER Severin.
Speakers: Stephen Mulhall (Oxford), Severin Schroeder (Reading), Rémi Clot-Goudard (Grenoble), Florian Franken Figueiredo (Campinas), Andrea Raimondi (Milan).