Ugo Zilioli

Literature on indeterminacy and vagueness has grown at a rapid pace, particularly since the final quarter of the twentieth century. The debate has heated up in recent decades, driven by a growing interest in metaphysical and ontic indeterminacy. Philosophers are exploring numerous models and ways to investigate the problem of indeterminacy and vagueness in a variety of fields, including the metaphysics of ordinary objects, personal identity, mereology, states of affairs, truth-making, philosophy of physics, and time, alongside the traditional sorites paradoxes. The dispute is shaped by a trichotomy of semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical approaches (J. Robert G. Williams, 2008), and new developments in modality and hyperintensionality also contribute to the discussions.

The paper aims to move beyond the mere logic of the Aristocles passage, to find external evidence for supporting a metaphysical reading of it. To do so, the paper looks at close analogies between one early Buddhist Sutra (Three Marks), the Aristocles passage and some of its other features (such as its possible oral origin and  Pyrrho's hieratic style) that often go unnoticed in current scholarship and that, if taken in due consideration, help us gain a more balanced assessment of one of the most original and troublesome texts of ancient philosophy.

This paper deals with an important strand of nihilistic arguments to be found in the works of two philosophers who have so far never been studied comparatively: the sophist Gorgias and the Buddhist monk Nāgārjuna. After having reconstructed Gorgias' moves in the first section of On What is Not (Sections 1-4), the paper shows how the nihilist arguments Gorgias uses mostly feature, under a new light, in the philosophy of emptiness developed by Nāgārjuna (Sections 5-8). The paper ends with a hermeneutical suggestion: that is, to replace traditional ‘sceptical’ interpretations of Gorgias and Nāgārjuna with an alternative one, which takes them as possibly committed to nihilism.

The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence on Cyrenaic solipsism and show how and why some views endorsed by the Cyrenaics appear to be committing them to solipsism. After evaluating the fascinating case for Cyrenaic solipsism, the paper shall deal with an (often) underestimated argument on language attributed to the Cyrenaics, whose logic—if I reconstruct it well—implies that after all the Cyrenaics cannot have endorsed a radical solipsism. Yet, by drawing an illuminating parallel with Wittgenstein’s argument on private language and inner sensations, a case is to be made for the Cyrenaics to have subscribed to a sort of ‘residual solipsism’, which in turn helps us to understand the notion of Cyrenaic privacy at a fuller extent.

In the paper I shall reconstruct the main features of Protagoras’ relativism as this is illustrated in a core section of the first part of Plato’s Theaetetus (152a–157c). More in particular, I will try to bring out the main metaphysical, semantic and epistemological views that Plato sees as arising from Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine. The scope of the paper is mainly explanatory (from the point of view of the textual arguments presented in the Theaetetus) and elucidatory (from a more theoretical point of view). I claim, in fact, that while the Theaetetus has been of much interest for histo- rians of philosophy and philosophers alike, the full philosophical importance and scope of the theories arising from Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine haven’t so far been appreciated, as they should indeed be. This lack of appreciation is particularly despicable in light of the large amount of fine scholarship on the Theaetetus, one of Plato’s most read dialogues. It also puts us in the condition of not being able to fully appreciate the philosophical sophistica- tion of the Protagorean theories Plato discusses at Theaet. 152a– 157c. These theories are, I submit, of the highest originality and they can also be of relevance for contemporary debates in meta- physics and in the history of ideas.

Cet article s'attache à comprendre si les cyrénaïques étaient sus-ceptibles d'être attaqués moyennant l'objection d'inactivité et, si oui, comment ils auraient pu essayer d'y répondre et quel type de vision morale ils auraient pu essayer de défendre. En traitant de ces questions, j'évaluerai la légitimité de l'interprétation du scepticisme cyrénaïque offerte par Jules Vuillemin. Je confirmerai ainsi la plausibilité de son interprétation et développerai en même temps l'exploration de la nature et de la portée de la philosophie cyrénaïque. Abstract: The paper aims to first understand whether the Cyrenaics were actually susceptible to the charge of apraxia; secondly, if they were, to see how they might have responded to this and what sort of ethical outlook they might have tried to defend. In dealing with these issues, I will inevitably assess the legitimacy of Vuillemin's interpretation of Cyrenaic scepticism. In so doing, I shall confirm the scholarly plausibility of his interpretation while, at the same time, providing material for further exploration of the full nature and scope of Cyrenaic philosophy.

In this contribution, I explore the treatment that Plato devotes to Protagoras’ relativism in the first section of the Theaetetus (151 E 1–186 E 12) where, among other things, the definition that knowledge is perception is put under scrutiny. What I aim to do is to understand the subtlety of Plato’s argument about Protagorean relativism and, at the same time, to assess its philosophical significance by revealing the inextric¬ability of ontological and epistemological aspects on which it is built (for this latter aspect, I refer to contemporary discussions of relativism, mainly to Margolis’ robust relativism). I then turn to Aristotle’s treatment of Protagoras’ relativism in Metaphysics Γ, sections 5 and 6, in order to show that Plato and Aristotle surprisingly share the same view as regards the philosophical content of Protagoras’ relativism  (in doing so, I take position against the standard opinion among scholars that Plato and Aristotle understand Protagoras’ relativism in different, even incompatible, ways).  What I ultimately aim to demonstrate is that Protagoras’ relativism, as understood by both Plato and Aristotle, is a coherent, even attractive, philosophical position.

In this contribution, I aim to show how locating the Platonic dialogues in the intellectual context of their own time can illuminate their philosophical content.  I seek to show, with reference to a specific dialogue (the Theaetetus), how Plato responds to other thinkers of his time, and also to bring out how, by reconstructing Plato’s response, we can gain deeper insight into the way that Plato shapes the structure and form of his argument in the dialogue. In particular, I argue that the subtler thinkers (hoi kompsoteroi) discussed by Plato’s Socrates at Tht. 156a3 are Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics. (Recent scholars, such as Giannantoni and Tsouna, have rejected this identification, which was earlier defended by Schleiermacher, Grote, Zeller and Mondolfo.)  Further, I claim that, once we recognise that the subtler thinkers are most likely to be the early Cyrenaics, we can make better sense of the scope and content of the arguments Plato puts forward at Tht. 156a - 160e (especially 156a - 157c). Also, I suggest that this identification helps us to understand a crucial part of Tht. 184b - 186e. Here Plato, in exploring the account of perception offered at 156a - 157c, uses the metaphor of the Wooden Horse to illustrate the conception of perception that he attributes to thinkers such as Protagoras and, in my view, the early Cyrenaics, who maintain that knowledge is a form of perception.

This book presents an astute comparison between philosophers in ancient Greece and India who, for some reason or another, set out to eliminate material objects from their theories. The highly original, historically rich, and analytically sophisticated discussion presented here will be of great interest to any reader wishing to learn more about fundamental questions of metaphysics, East and West (Jan Westerhoff).

REVIEW: "To defend relativism is about as thankless a task as philosophy ever confronted: informed readers typically take it to be a complete waste of time and even a mark of professional incompetence. But then, if you see its genuinely deep challenge, its defense counts as an exceptional kind of courage and amplitude of mind that very little else in philosophy ever equals. Zilioli embodies a candor, and honesty and a scholar's thoroughness and scruple that are simply a pleasure to trust in the unraveling of the full import of Plato's treatment of Protagoras' argument in the Theaetetus and Protagoras. I think it is the straightforward clarity and passion of Zilioli's effort that makes it so memorable. Beyond that, it seems to me to have simply outflanked Protagoras' strongest  detractors", Joseph Margolis.

"Ugo Zilioli has put together an inspiring, dialogical collection of papers, which explore routes traced by the evidence for the other (let's stop saying 'minor') Socratics and their heirs through many of the blank spaces left on our historical map between Plato and the Hellenistic age. At the same time as advancing our understanding of Classical metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, the papers grapple with important questions about how we do ancient philosophy, and bring much needed critical light to categories, such as that of 'school' itself, which shapes our thinking", George Boys-Stones

In the 2013 Verso Book list of the Year
REVIEWS:

"Compulsive reading", Denis O'Brien
" A pleasure to read",  Harold Tarrant
"It is essential reading for all students of ancient philosophy", George Boys-Stones
"It represents a valuable addition" Chris Gill
"All readers should find this an accessible and enjoyable book", Kurt Lampe
"This is a bold book", Robin Waterfield
"An Important contribution to the continuing rehabilitation of Hellenistic philosophy", Christopher Rowe