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Alexi  Gugushvili
  • Department of Sociology, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RQ
  • +441223332465
Background A large proportion of premature deaths in Russia since the early 1990s, following the transition from communism, have been attributed to hazardous drinking. Little is known about the correlates of alcohol consumption. We... more
Background
A large proportion of premature deaths in Russia since the early 1990s, following the transition from communism, have been attributed to hazardous drinking. Little is known about the correlates of alcohol consumption. We present new data on the consumption of alcoholic beverages among middle-aged and older Russians and identify socio-demographic, socio-economic, and life-course correlates of frequent drinking.

Methods
Within the framework of the PrivMort project, conducted in 30 industrial towns in the European part of Russia, we acquired information on the frequency of drinking among 22,796 respondents and 57,907 of their surviving and deceased relatives. We fit three-level mixed-effects logistic regression models of frequent drinking in which respondents’ relatives, aged 40 and over, are nested in their families and towns.

Results
Deceased male relatives consumed alcohol significantly more often, while deceased female relatives consumed alcohol significantly less often than the respondents of corresponding gender. In a multivariable analysis, we found that individuals’ education, communication with family members, labour market status, history of unemployment, and occupational attainment are all significant correlates of frequent drinking in Russia. These associations are stronger among men rather than among women.

Conclusion
There are significant differences between frequency of drinking among surviving and deceased individuals and frequent drinking is associated with a wide array of individual socio-demographic, socio-economic, and life course factors that can partially explain high alcohol consumption in post-communist Russia.
Research Interests:
Previous scholarship suggests that the effect of perceived intergenerational mobility on attitudes related to social justice, inequality and redistribution is more salient than the effect of individuals' objective intergenerational... more
Previous scholarship suggests that the effect of perceived intergenerational mobility on attitudes related to social justice, inequality and redistribution is more salient than the effect of individuals' objective intergenerational mobility. However, virtually no studies have attempted to link individuals' perception of experiencing intergenerational mobility and their support for different welfare state programmes. In my study using nationally representative and comparative survey data for 33 Western European welfare democracies and post‐socialist transition societies, I found that perceived intergenerational mobility is associated with support for certain welfare state programmes. Results from multilevel linear probability models indicate that subjectively downwardly mobile individuals are less likely to support education and healthcare expenditure and more likely to prefer targeted assistance of the poor, while subjectively upwardly mobile individuals oppose extra spending on housing and old‐age pensions. The described associations are more vividly manifested in post‐socialist societies than in the analysed Western European democracies.
The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition... more
The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition society, Georgia, as a case study. Who are the heroes and villains in Georgian collective memory? What factors influence who is seen as hero or villain and why? How do these selections correlate with Georgian national identity? We attempt to answer these research questions using a newly generated dataset on contemporary Georgian perspectives on the recent history. Our survey results show that according to the representative sample of the Georgian population from the beginning of the 20th century the main heroes include Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ilia Chavchavadze, and the Patriarch Ilia II; Eduard Shevardnadze, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Vladimir Putin represent main villains; and those that appear on both lists are Mikheil Saakashvili and Joseph Stalin. We highlight two clusters of attitudes that are indicative of how people think about Georgian national identity, mirroring civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism. How Georgians understand national identity impacts not only who they choose as heroes or villains, but whether they provide an answer at all.
Previous scholarship suggests that subjective intergenerational mobility plays a more important role than objective intergenerational mobility in affecting attitudes towards social justice, inequality and redistribution. However,... more
Previous scholarship suggests that subjective intergenerational mobility plays a more important role than objective intergenerational mobility in affecting attitudes towards social justice, inequality and redistribution. However, virtually no studies attempt to link individuals’ perception of experiencing intergenerational mobility and their support for different welfare state programmes. Using data from nationally representative and comparative surveys for 33 Western European mature democracies and post-socialist transition societies, I find that subjective intergenerational mobility is systematically associated with support for certain welfare state programmes. Individuals who perceive themselves being downwardly mobile are less likely to support education and healthcare expenditures and more likely to prefer targeted assistance of the poor; while individuals who perceive themselves being upwardly mobile tend to oppose extra spending on housing and on old-age pensions. The reported associations appear to be stronger in post-socialist societies than in mature Western democracies.
Objectives The very high rates of smoking among men and the rapid changes among women in the Post-Soviet countries mean that this region offers an opportunity to understand better the intergenerational role of parental influences on... more
Objectives The very high rates of smoking among men and the rapid changes among women in the Post-Soviet countries mean that this region offers an opportunity to understand better the intergenerational role of parental influences on smoking. Methods In this study, we exploit a unique data set, the PrivMort cohort study conducted in 30 Russian and 20 Belarusian towns in 2014–2015, which collects information on behaviours of middle-aged and older individuals and their parents, including smoking. We explored the associations between smoking by parents and their offspring using multiply imputed data sets and multilevel mixed-effect Poisson regressions. Results Adjusting for a wide array of social origin, socio-demographic, and socioeconomic variables, our analysis suggests that sons of regularly smoking fathers have prevalence ratios of 1.35 [95% confidence intervals (CI) 1.21–1.50] and 1.39 (CI 1.23–1.58) of smoking, while the figures for daughters of regularly smoking mothers are 1.91 (CI 1.40–2.61) and 2.30 (CI 1.61–3.28), respectively, in Russia and Belarus. Conclusions Intergenerational paternal and maternal influences on smoking should be taken into account in studies seeking to monitor the rates of smoking and the impact of tobacco control programmes.
Regime change experienced in post-communist societies is of great significance for research in social stratification and mobility. Nonetheless, the existing literature does not provide a clear answer if cross-national differences in... more
Regime change experienced in post-communist societies is of great significance for research in social stratification and mobility. Nonetheless, the existing literature does not provide a clear answer if cross-national differences in social mobility are determined by communist legacies or by the divergent paths these countries followed in their transition to the capitalist system. It is hypothesised that higher income inequality and an overall decline in material wellbeing would increase the importance of parental economic capital, whereas the relative role of parental cultural capital in offspring’s life chances would decline. For 24 societies in Central and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, I find evidence on the decisive role of social origins, particularly parental education, in predicting individuals’ educational and occupational attainment. However, significant and systematic changes in intergenerational social mobility from pre- to post-transitional cohorts are not observed. The derived findings are robust to alternative specifications of social origins and destinations. Arguably, differences in intergenerational links between parents’ and offspring’s socio-economic status resulted from historical discrepancies in the communist period rather than the consequences of idiosyncratic developments in post-communist transition.
Research on intergenerational social mobility and health-related behaviours yields mixed findings. Depending on the direction of mobility and the type of mechanisms involved, we can expect positive or negative association between... more
Research on intergenerational social mobility and health-related behaviours yields mixed findings. Depending on the direction of mobility and the type of mechanisms involved, we can expect positive or negative association between intergenerational mobility and health-related behaviours. Using data from a retrospective cohort study, conducted in more than 100 towns across Belarus, Hungary and Russia, we fit multilevel mixed-effects Poisson regressions with two measures of health-related behaviours: binge drinking and smoking. The main explanatory variable, intergenerational educational mobility is operationalised in terms of relative intergenerational educational trajectories based on the prevalence of specified qualifications in parental and offspring generations. In each country the associations between intergenerational educational mobility, binge drinking and smoking was examined with incidence rate ratios and predicted probabilities, using multiply imputed dataset for missing data and controlling for important confounders of health-related behaviours. We find that intergenerational mobility in relative educational attainment has varying association with binge drinking and smoking and the strength and direction of these effects depend on the country of analysis, the mode of mobility, the gender of respondents and the type of health-related behaviour. Along with accumulation and Falling from Grace hypotheses of the consequences of intergenerational mobility, our findings suggest that upward educational mobility in certain instances might be linked to improved health-related behaviours.
Since 2016, Georgia has been categorized as an upper middle-income economy by the World Bank. e latter corresponds to the trends from the various micro-level data sets, which suggest that the middle class has been expanding in the recent... more
Since 2016, Georgia has been categorized as an upper middle-income economy by the World Bank. e latter corresponds to the trends from the various micro-level data sets, which suggest that the middle class has been expanding in the recent years. However, what can be referred to as 'the middle class' in the Georgian context is still largely in the making, and this process remains vulnerable to endemic problems such as high inequality, low urbanization, agricultural underdevelopment, and the existence of rather large, vulnerable social groups. Political stability, geopolitics and international economic shocks all play a role in the prospects of the middle class in Georgia.
Research Interests:
Building on the previously investigated macro-sociological models which analyze the consequences of economic development, income inequality, and international migration on social mobility, this article studies the specific contextual... more
Building on the previously investigated macro-sociological models which analyze the consequences of economic development, income inequality, and international migration on social mobility, this article studies the specific contextual covariates of intergenera-tional reproduction of occupational status in post-communist societies. It is theorized that social mobility is higher in societies with democratic political regimes and less liberalized economies. The outlined hypotheses are tested by using micro-and macro-level datasets for 21 post-communist societies which are fitted into multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions. The derived findings suggest that factors specific to transition societies, conventional macro-level variables, and the legacy of the Soviet Union explain variation in intergenerational social mobility, but the results vary depending which birth cohorts survey participants belong to and whether or not they stem from advantaged or disadvantaged social origins. These findings are robust to various alternative data, sample, and method specifications.
Research Interests:
Background Population-level data suggest that economic disruptions in the early 1990s increased working-age male mortality in post-Soviet countries. This study uses individual-level data, using an indirect estimation method, to test the... more
Background

Population-level data suggest that economic disruptions in the early 1990s increased working-age male mortality in post-Soviet countries. This study uses individual-level data, using an indirect estimation method, to test the hypothesis that fast privatisation increased mortality in Russia.

Methods

In this retrospective cohort study, we surveyed surviving relatives of individuals who lived through the post-communist transition to retrieve demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of their parents, siblings, and male partners. The survey was done within the framework of the European Research Council (ERC) project PrivMort (The Impact of Privatization on the Mortality Crisis in Eastern Europe). We surveyed relatives in 20 mono-industrial towns in the European part of Russia (ie, the landmass to the west of the Urals). We compared ten fast-privatised and ten slow-privatised towns selected using propensity score matching. In the selected towns, population surveys were done in which respondents provided information about vital status, sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics and health-related behaviours of their parents, two eldest siblings (if eligible), and first husbands or long-term partners. We calculated indirect age-standardised mortality rates in fast and slow privatised towns and then, in multivariate analyses, calculated Poisson proportional incidence rate ratios to estimate the effect of rapid privatisation on all-cause mortality risk.

Findings

Between November, 2014, and March, 2015, 21 494 households were identified in 20 towns. Overall, 13 932 valid interviews were done (with information collected for 38 339 relatives [21 634 men and 16 705 women]). Fast privatisation was strongly associated with higher working-age male mortality rates both between 1992 and 1998 (age-standardised mortality ratio in men aged 20–69 years in fast vs slow privatised towns: 1·13, SMR 0·83, 95% CI 0·77–0·88 vs 0·73, 0·69–0·77, respectively) and from 1999 to 2006 (1·15, 0·91, 0·86–0·97 vs 0·79, 0·75–0·84). After adjusting for age, marital status, material deprivation history, smoking, drinking and socioeconomic status, working-age men in fast-privatised towns experienced 13% higher mortality than in slow-privatised towns (95% CI 1–26).

Interpretation

The rapid pace of privatisation was a significant factor in the marked increase in working-age male mortality in post-Soviet Russia. By providing compelling evidence in support of the health benefits of a slower pace of privatisation, this study can assist policy makers in making informed decisions about the speed and scope of government interventions.

Funding

The European Research Council.
Research Interests:
In this article we pursue, using appropriate British birth cohort data, various issues that arise from recent research into the 'direct' effect of social origins on individuals' social mobility chances: i.e. the effect that is not... more
In this article we pursue, using appropriate British birth cohort data, various issues that arise from recent research into the 'direct' effect of social origins on individuals' social mobility chances: i.e. the effect that is not mediated by education and that can be seen as giving rise to non-meritocratic 'glass floors' and 'glass ceilings'. We show that if educational level is determined at labour market entry, class destinations are significantly associated with class origins independently of education. However, we go on to investigate how far the direct effect may be underestimated by an insufficiently comprehensive treatment of social origins, and also how far it may be overestimated by a failure to take into account the effects of later-life education and resulting changes in individuals' relative qualification levels. Finally, having arrived at our best estimates of the extent of the direct effect, we seek to identify factors that mediate it. While individuals' cognitive ability and sense of locus of control prove to play some part, reported parental help in the labour market does not appear to be of any great importance. Some implications of our findings both for further research and for the ideal of an education-based meritocracy are considered.
Research Interests:
The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition... more
The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition society, Georgia, as a case study. Who are the heroes and villains in Georgian collective memory? What factors influence who is seen as a hero or a villain and why? How do these selections correlate with Georgian national identity? We attempt to answer these research questions using a newly generated data set of contemporary Georgian perspectives on recent history. Our survey results show that according to a representative sample of the Georgian population, the main heroes from the beginning of the twentieth century include Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ilia Chavchavadze, and Patriarch Ilia II. Eduard Shevardnadze, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Vladimir Putin represent the main villains, and those that appear on both lists are Mikheil Saakashvili and Joseph Stalin. We highlight two clusters of attitudes that are indicative of how people think about Georgian national identity, mirroring civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism. How Georgians understand national identity impacts not only who they choose as heroes or villains, but also whether they provide an answer at all.
Research Interests:
This article explores the consequences of intergenerational social mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. It is hypothesised that those who experience improvements in socio-economic status through social mobility are... more
This article explores the consequences of intergenerational social mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. It is hypothesised that those who experience improvements in socio-economic status through social mobility are more likely to blame poverty on individual characteristics such as laziness and lack of willpower and are less likely to attribute failure to injustice in society, and on the macro-level, the effect of social mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty is moderated by contextual environment. The described hypotheses are tested by using multinomial and multilevel logistic regressions and two complementary datasets—European Values Studies and the Life in Transition Survey. The derived findings suggest that social mobility is indeed associated with perceptions of individual blame and social blame of why some people are in need. However, these effects are manifested primarily among subjectively mobile individuals and are also conditioned by the legacy of socialism and the level of economic development of countries where individuals reside.
Research Interests:
This study uses the UNDP/UNICEF Social Exclusion Survey in Macedonia and Serbia and focus on the questions of (i) why are there sometimes no differences in emigration intentions between unemployed and employed groups, and (ii) why many... more
This study uses the UNDP/UNICEF Social Exclusion Survey in Macedonia and Serbia and focus on the questions of (i) why are there sometimes no differences in emigration intentions between unemployed and employed groups, and (ii) why many gainfully employed individuals still intend to migrate to another country for employment. This research differs from the majority of studies, which do not distinguish between various types of jobs and variation in emigration intentions stemming from employment stratification. Employment sectors and individuals’ occupations have been taken as the main forms of job segregation, but since the 1990s some scholars have claimed that traditional labour market stratification is losing its relevance. We contribute to the migration literature by testing the “individualization hypothesis” – that specific characteristics of employees serve as better covariates of emigration intentions than “umbrella” concepts of industry and social class. Our findings suggest that emigration intentions among employed individuals are more likely to be affected by the type of contract and job security than by standard job-related variables such as sector and occupation of employment.
Research Interests:
Background: Previous research using routine data identified rapid mass privatisation as an important driver of mortality crisis following the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, existing studies on the mortality... more
Background: Previous research using routine data identified rapid mass privatisation as an important driver of mortality crisis following the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, existing studies on the mortality crisis relying on individual level or routine data cannot assess both distal (societal) and proximal (individual) causes of mortality simultaneously. The aim of the PrivMort Project is to overcome these limitations and to investigate the role of societal factors (particularly rapid mass privatisation) and individual-level factors (e.g. alcohol consumption) in the mortality changes in post-communist countries.
Research Interests:
This article explores the association between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes towards income differences in post-socialist societies. I hypothesise that based on the psychological mechanism of self-serving bias in causal... more
This article explores the association between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes towards income differences in post-socialist societies. I hypothesise that based on the psychological mechanism of self-serving bias in causal attribution, those who experience upward social mobility are more likely to support greater income differences, and that subjective intergenerational mobility has stronger association with attitudes towards income differences than objective mobility because individuals filter their objective environment in order to derive their subjective perceptions of the world and their own experiences. The described hypotheses are tested with two cross-national data sets – European Values Studies and Life in Transition Survey. The derived findings are robust to alternative statistical specifications and indicate that individuals who perceive themselves as subjectively mobile have significantly different attitudes towards income differences in comparison to non-mobile groups, but that this effect does not manifest among objectively mobile individuals.
Research Interests:
In recent years, as part of the broader policies of economic liberalization, the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens has attracted considerable political, social and media attention in transition societies. The regime of land... more
In recent years, as part of the broader policies of economic liberalization, the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens has attracted considerable political, social and media attention in transition societies. The regime of land ownership in Georgia has evolved from the complete restriction of foreign acquisition in the beginning of the 1990s, to the unrestricted sale of land to foreign citizens from 2010 onwards. An analysis of newly-available data from International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) National Identity module suggests that respondents in Georgia, along with Russia, hold the most negative attitudes toward selling land to foreigners compared to other countries. I hypothesize that this is the result of a confluence of factors such as the communist legacy, historical memory, rural nationalism, agricultural underdevelopment and inequality. The quantitative part of this article tests socio-demographic, geographic , ideological, and identity-based explanations of within-country variation in attitudes toward the purchase of land by foreigners. The results suggest that socio-demographic and geographic variables such as respondents' age and regional belonging explain some variance in the dependent variable, but that the major effects stem from individuals' perceptions of economic protectionism, xenophobia, and ethnic national identity.
Research Interests:
In this article we explore the spatial variation of support for former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in his home country, Georgia. This research contributes to the literature on reputational politics by highlighting the role of spatial,... more
In this article we explore the spatial variation of support for former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in his home country, Georgia. This research contributes to the literature on reputational politics by highlighting the role of spatial, rather than only social, factors in the construction of public opinion about Stalin. We illustrate how geographic factors impact Georgians' perceptions of the Soviet dictator by examining various aspects of place at various scales—including distance to Gori, Stalin's birthplace, the history of urbanization, and economic and political indices. To this end we map attitudes toward the Soviet dictator and use a multilevel spatial regression technique to explain variance in support for Stalin across forty-seven districts of Georgia. This enables us to explore the impact of place on people's attitudes by examining (1) whether there are local and regional hotspots of Stalin admiration and, if so, (2) what the contextual explanations of these attitudes are.
Research Interests:
One of the most important components of post-socialist transition has been economic liberalization. This article inquiries into how the latter is associated with intergenerational mobility in occupational status. Using European Values... more
One of the most important components of post-socialist transition has been economic liberalization. This article inquiries into how the latter is associated with intergenerational mobility in occupational status. Using European Values Studies (EVS) data from the nationally representative samples for a large number of post-socialist societies, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) index of economic liberalization, and multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions, I test the “meritocracy as functional imperative” perspective which implies that life chances depend on the efficiency considerations of liberalized economy. The derived results are robust to alternative model and variable specifications and suggest that economic liberalization explains cross-national differences in intergenerational status reproduction, and is better suited for macro-sociological models of mobility in occupational status than other conventional contextual explanations such as economic development and income inequality.
Recently, there has been a renewed focus on analyzing post-Soviet memory, including the rekindling of debate on contemporary perspectives of Josef Stalin. Most notably, the publication of The Stalin Puzzle has helped bring attention to... more
Recently, there has been a renewed focus on analyzing post-Soviet memory, including the rekindling of debate on contemporary perspectives of Josef Stalin. Most notably, the publication of The Stalin Puzzle has helped bring attention to the persistence of positive accounts and admiration, along with ambivalent and contested images, of the former dictator of the Soviet Union. Using survey data and multivariate statistical methods, we test five broad hypotheses – socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender – to ascertain what factors might shape people's attitudes toward Stalin in Georgia. Our analysis reveals that elderly, poor men from rural areas have the most positive associations of Stalin, whereas young, wealthier women from cities, those who are open to privatization, and perceive Russia as Georgia's biggest threat judge Stalin negatively. Counterintuitively, non-Georgian minorities show higher esteem for Stalin than Georgians. We envision that the effects of cohort replacement, economic development, and urbanization will decrease positive perceptions of Stalin in years to come.
Is globalisation a conductive or destructive force for public policy development in the countries of transition? The problem is investigated through an example of oil-rich Azerbaijan. This paper first presents the current situation in the... more
Is globalisation a conductive or destructive force for public policy development in the countries of transition? The problem is investigated through an example of oil-rich Azerbaijan. This paper first presents the current situation in the country, defines links between globalisation and public policy and describes empirical research and its main findings. The paper then explores the circumstances that have prompted such a development and concludes with the possible policy implications.
This study shows that the district level outcomes in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia are significantly associated with the mean household deprivation levels. This effect is statistically significant after controlling for the... more
This study shows that the district level outcomes in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia are significantly associated with the mean household deprivation levels. This effect is statistically significant after controlling for the regional dummies, urbanisation level, current district's population size, the proportion of orthodox population, local ideological preferences, and the rate of turnout on the election day. The OLS models of the share of received votes in the proportional system and the logit models of the odds of victory of a ...
In this article we explore the spatial variation of support for former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, in his home country, Georgia. This research contributes to the literature on reputational politics by highlighting the role of spatial,... more
In this article we explore the spatial variation of support for former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, in his home country, Georgia. This research contributes to the literature on reputational politics by highlighting the role of spatial, rather than only social, factors in the construction of public opinion about Stalin.  We illustrate how geographic factors impact Georgians’ perceptions of the Soviet dictator by examining various aspects of place at various scales -- including distance to Gori, Stalin’s birthplace, the history of urbanization, and economic and political indices. To this end we map attitudes toward the Soviet dictator and use a multilevel spatial regression technique to explain variance in support for Stalin across 47 districts of Georgia. This enables us to explore the impact of place on people's attitudes by examining (1) whether there are local and regional hotspots of Stalin admiration, and, if so, (2) what are the contextual explanations of these attitudes.
Research Interests:
Recently, in post-Soviet space, new Stalin statues have been created, and old ones have reappeared. These battles, both symbolic and material, over monuments fuel and exemplify contemporary “memory wars.” This article highlights the... more
Recently, in post-Soviet space, new Stalin statues have been created, and old ones have reappeared. These battles, both symbolic and material, over monuments fuel and exemplify contemporary “memory wars.” This article highlights the disparate meanings of three historical Stalin monuments that served as focal points for three major cases of mass demonstrations during Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign: Tbilisi, Budapest, and Prague. Next, drawing on newly found materials from Tbilisi’s Central Committee Archive of the Communist Party of Georgia, this article discusses Bogdan Muradovich Kirakosian’s never-realized project to build a massive Stalin monument that would have overlooked Tbilisi. Last is the analysis of survey data that captures individuals’ attitudes towards Stalin for those born in Georgia before 1945 in order to surmise how such a grand monument to Stalin would have been received at the time.
This article studies public welfare preferences in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Generalised ordered logistic regression models and predicted probabilities are employed to analyse comparable attitudinal... more
This article studies public welfare preferences in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Generalised ordered logistic regression models and predicted probabilities are employed to analyse comparable attitudinal survey data. The results vary considerably among the countries, but age is the most important covariate of welfare preferences, followed by individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. The findings also indicate that popular perceptions of transition, notably in Ukraine and Moldova, are most strongly linked to preferences concerning the state’s involvement in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor rather than to preferences regarding the main welfare state programmes such as pensions and healthcare.
This article explores the impact of spatial location – place – on people’s attitudes by examining whether support for Stalin is concentrated in his birthplace: Gori, Georgia. Using a variety of multivariate statistical methods, including... more
This article explores the impact of spatial location – place – on people’s attitudes by examining whether support for Stalin is concentrated in his birthplace: Gori, Georgia. Using a variety of multivariate statistical methods, including propensity score-matching, we examine a recent survey indicating high levels of admiration for Stalin in his home country. We explore two main questions: First, is there a “hometown effect” – do people in Gori love Stalin unconditionally because they came from the same place? Second, is Gori so exceptional from the rest of Georgia? We conclude that there is indeed a stronger level of support for Stalin in Gori, but when shifting scales and looking within the category, we find that the highest admiration stems from the town’s rural outskirts.
Recently, there has been a renewed focus on analyzing post-Soviet memory, including the rekindling of debate on contemporary perspectives of Josef Stalin. Most notably, the publication of The Stalin Puzzle has helped bring attention to... more
Recently, there has been a renewed focus on analyzing post-Soviet memory, including the rekindling of debate on contemporary perspectives of Josef Stalin. Most notably, the publication of The Stalin Puzzle has helped bring attention to the persistence of positive accounts and admiration, along with ambivalent and contested images, of the former dictator of the Soviet Union. Using survey data and multivariate statistical methods, we test five broad hypotheses – socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender – to ascertain what factors might shape people's attitudes toward Stalin in Georgia. Our analysis reveals that elderly, poor men from rural areas have the most positive associations of Stalin, whereas young, wealthier women from cities, those who are open to privatization, and perceive Russia as Georgia's biggest threat judge Stalin negatively. Counterintuitively, non-Georgian minorities show higher esteem for Stalin than Georgians. We envision that the effects of cohort replacement, economic development, and urbanization will decrease positive perceptions of Stalin in years to come.
Although old-age benefits help to alleviate poverty in Georgia, the system does not satisfy its main stakeholders. Retirees believe that pensions are unfair and inadequate, while experts and governmental officials realize the growing... more
Although old-age benefits help to alleviate poverty in Georgia, the system does not satisfy its main stakeholders. Retirees believe that pensions are unfair and inadequate, while experts and governmental officials realize the growing burden of benefits for the country’s public finances. The past experience of pension (non) reforms suggest that changes are sensitive to the government’s capacity to reform, the fiscal health of the economy, political stability and the ideological preferences of the ruling elites. The transfer of power through parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012–2013 opened an opportunity for reforming the pension system based on broad public consensus and economic sustainability.
Something amazing happened in Georgia’s 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream... more
Something amazing happened in Georgia’s 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream ran under the leadership of Georgia’s richest man, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and won 85 seats in the unicameral, 150-member Parliament. Georgia’s post-Soviet background and circumstances make the 2012 opposition win and subsequent orderly handover of power truly remarkable. Indeed, among the “competitive authoritarian” regimes found in what used to be the USSR, it is nearly unheard of. Georgia is lucky to be getting a fourth chance at democracy, after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), and Saakashvili faded. But this chance remains a fragile one.
This study shows that the district level outcomes in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia are significantly associated with the mean household deprivation levels. This effect is statistically significant after controlling for... more
This study shows that the district level outcomes in the  2012  parliamentary elections in Georgia are significantly associated with  the  mean household deprivation levels. This effect is statistically significant after controlling for  the regional dummies, urbanisation level,  current  district’s population size, the  proportion  of orthodox population, local ideological preferences, and the rate of turnout on the  election day. The OLS models of the share of received votes in the proportional system and the logit models  of  the odds of victory  of a party  candidate in the  majoritarian contest both reveal that the districts with  the  lowest  and  highest  material deprivation levels  were more likely to vote for the oppositional coalition. The results are robust even after excluding from the  analysis two  fraud-prone regions of SamtskheJavakheti and Kvemo Kartli."
Using data from the Generations and Gender Survey for the cohorts born from 1926 to 1985 in Georgia, and the linear probability models of higher educational and ISCO 1-2 occupational attainment, I find the large ascriptive... more
Using data from  the  Generations and Gender Survey for the cohorts born from 1926 to 1985 in Georgia,  and the  linear probability models  of higher educational and  ISCO 1-2 occupational attainment, I find the large ascriptive inequalities of life chances, which especially intensified for those born in 1976-85. Having  parents with the  lower socio-economic status, living in a family with the higher number of siblings,  particularly brothers, residing in deprived regions at age 15,  and  selecting  the  nonprestigious fields of studies induced by social origin, negatively and  significantly associate with life prospects. Although tertiary education serves mainly as the mediator of ascriptive factors, the latter also exert a direct effect on the occupational attainment. One of the reasons why the inequalities in life chances have increased in recent  decades is the growing gap between educational expansion and occupational upgrade and the resultant inflation of credentials.
Over the last two decades, the profile of the poor has been evolving in Georgia, but the poverty level has remained consistently high. If the official subsistence minimum is taken as the poverty line, slightly more than two-fifths of... more
Over the last two decades, the profile of the poor has been evolving in Georgia, but the poverty level has  remained consistently high. If the official subsistence minimum is taken as the poverty line, slightly more than  two-fifths of the population is poor according to the latest estimations. Arguably, persisting high poverty levels can be explained by jobless economic growth and low agricultural productivity. The institutionalisation of a targeted social assistance scheme has yet to demonstrate its efficacy. Instead of using perverse estimates of  relative poverty, the government should acknowledge deprivation as the major challenge for the country and must more eagerly attempt to cure its root causes—inappropriate human capital and narrow labour markets
Intergenerational social stratification in post-communist transition societies earned a great deal of attention from social scientist in recent years. Nevertheless, research has been primarily concentrated on currently EU member states... more
Intergenerational social stratification in post-communist transition societies earned a great deal of attention from social scientist in recent years. Nevertheless, research has been primarily concentrated on currently EU member states and Russian Federation, while the short time span of available datasets prevented scholars from making comprehensive conclusions on the emerging social stratification regimes, especially in economically and politically least successful societies such as non-Baltic East European former Soviet Union republics of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and the South Caucasian countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. This paper tries to contribute to the existing literature by employing European Values Surveys’ dataset which consists of data for all non-Asian former communist societies and provides an opportunity to make preliminary explorations of changes which have occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In line with the stated hypotheses, we find that in the least successful societies the importance of social background for social destination has increased at the larger scale than in more successful countries, while the role of parental cultural capital for offspring’s life-chances did not change much or decreased for transitional cohorts. We did not demonstrate direct links between economic and democratic transformations on the one hand and social stratification on the other, however Georgia and Belarus respectively were revealed to be the states where social stratification worsened most radically and at the same time they are among the worst performers in economic development (Georgia) and political transformations (Belarus).
This study tries to understand the modes of emigration from the South Caucasian countries. Since 2005 these societies diverged in their political and socio-economic models of development which is reflected in different covariates of... more
This study tries to understand the modes of emigration from the South Caucasian countries. Since 2005 these societies diverged in their political and socio-economic models of  development which is reflected in different covariates of emigration intentions. Using micro-level survey data from the Caucasus Barometer for 2009-2010, this paper looks how various sets of variables associate with emigration intentions. We test a hypothesis that the recent uneven economic and political developments are associated with individuals’ intentions to leave their countries. Results indicate that, controlling for other conventional emigration covariates, political attitudes have significant links with emigration intentions and the effect appears to be more important in Azerbaijan, while economic problems seem to be most relevant for emigration intentions in Georgia.
This paper employs the factor analysis technique and data from the UNDP/UNICEF Social Inclusion Survey to construct a material deprivation index for fi ve transitional societies in the Balkans (FYR Macedonia and Serbia), Eastern Europe... more
This paper employs the factor analysis technique and data from the UNDP/UNICEF Social Inclusion Survey  to construct a material deprivation index for fi ve transitional societies in the Balkans (FYR Macedonia and Serbia), Eastern Europe (Moldova and Ukraine) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan). The distribution of deprivation between these societies can be largely explained by their level of economic development, but within-county variance is not limited to monetary dimension. Controlling for settlement type, human capital and employment status in multivariate settings, the paper tests the hypothesis of the continuous importance of occupational social class and the emerging role of different life phases in individuals’ welfare outcomes. The results reveal that all specifi ed social classes and most of the defined life phases have diverse and statistically significant effects on the constructed deprivation index and the likelihood of being under 70 per cent of the median deprivation threshold. Belonging to non skilled manual, farmers and skilled manual social class as well as being a child or lone parent were revealed to have the highest risk of material deprivation. These fi ndings are in line with the conclusions made for the Western welfare democracies on the complementary nature of social class and life course dimensions in explaining social hardship.
ABSTRACT: According to 'new economics' of migration social stratification and social protection are important for emigration decisions and behaviour, but there is scarce evidence how welfare programmes independently correlate with... more
ABSTRACT: According to 'new economics' of migration social stratification and social protection are important for emigration decisions and behaviour, but there is scarce evidence how welfare programmes independently correlate with emigration. For the major emigrating societies, studies generally do not analyse social model as the covariate of emigration.
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative is a European Union (EU) project aiming to advance socioeconomic development in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. To date, virtually no research has been done on... more
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative is a European Union (EU) project aiming to advance socioeconomic development in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. To date, virtually no research has been done on comparative we!fare systems in these countries. This paper aims to narrow this gap. It i! argued here that the comparative we!fare state approach for the Central and Eastern European and Baltic Post-Communist countries is not appropriate for the selected region, since' weak democratic institutions and economic underperformance contradict the primary foundations of the we!fare state. The paper instead considers a we!fare regime paradigm developed for less advanced nations. The empirical part of the study is based on the hierarchical and kmeans clustering method to analyse different we!fare outcome and we!fare effort indicators and on binomial logistic regression technique to analyse public attitudes towards we!fare. The results of the study indicate that the we!fare outcomes in EaP countries can be clustered into three distinct groups, but that using conventional we!fare state variables, such as the total government outlay on we!fare programmes, and we!fare attitudes cannot explain the srystematic determinants of varying we!fare performance among the countries. It appears that employing the we!fare regime framework, which more vividly takes into account the domestic and international activities of state, market and household, can increase the robustness of welfare research of the strategies employed by EaP countries to address their social risks. Nevertheless, the problems with data availability and reliability might restrict the comparative research framework to only a few specific social we!fare dimensions.
Trust in local government, and other public institutions, is an important aspect of a properly functioning democracy. Political trust provides foundations of collective power, which enables governments to make decisions without having to... more
Trust in local government, and other public institutions, is an important aspect of a properly functioning democracy. Political trust provides foundations of collective power, which enables governments to make decisions without having to coerce or obtain the specific approval of citizens for a numerous separate actions (Mishler and Rose, 1997). Arguably, trust in government has been especially relevant during and after decentralization of post-communist societies, through which municipalities assumed new functions and responsibilities.
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The paper examines the factors that played a major role in development of the old-age pensionsystem in Georgia. Based on data collected from 1991–2009, this analysis centers on the system’s patterns of development and identifies four main... more
The paper examines the factors that played a major role in development of the old-age pensionsystem in Georgia. Based on data collected from 1991–2009, this analysis centers on the system’s patterns of development and identifies four main attempts to reform the old-age pension system. Economic performance, demographic aging, domestic political constellations,and external influence are traditionally thought to be responsible for the pension system reforms. Qualitative data analyses and in-depth interviews have been used to test these explanations. This analysis did not confirm the hypotheses, but it revealed that fiscal constraints and international technical assistance were the main factors behind reforms during the first two chronological attempts to change the system. Political factors and liberal economic ideology influenced the patterns of old-age pension policy development from 2004–2008, while the negative outcomes of the Russian-Georgian War and World Financial Crisis are currently the major obstacles for comprehensive pension reforms. The limitations of this study suggest that in order to clarify the exact nature of old-age pension system, shorter time periods and separate reform initiatives should be investigated.
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Abstract: This paper examines employment policies in urban areas of developing world. We follow traditional economic analysis and present the urban unemployment problem as an inequality of labour supply and demand on labour markets. The... more
Abstract: This paper examines employment policies in urban areas of developing world. We follow traditional economic analysis and present the urban unemployment problem as an inequality of labour supply and demand on labour markets. The effects of demand-side and supply-side policies on informal urban employment are investigated through econometrical models. One or several variables are employed as crude proxies for every policy option.
The volume of remittances in Georgia has been growing every year since 2001, but so has the size of the economy. This means that the share of remittances fluctuated at 5-7 percent of GDP, 2001-2010. Survey data indicate that one-tenths of... more
The volume of remittances in Georgia has been growing every year since 2001, but so has the size of the economy. This means that the share of remittances fluctuated at 5-7 percent of GDP, 2001-2010. Survey data indicate that one-tenths of households receive remittances, while the size of a typical monthly transfer amounts to 265 GEL (149 USD), most of it delivered via formal money transfer systems. There is a positive association between economic growth and remittances, but the causal effect is apparently limited to trade services because, on average, 80 percent of received transfers is spent on primary consumption. Remittances are linked to a households’ propensity to save and to have bank accounts and the higher interest in various investment options. Remittances have only a marginal impact on small business activity in rural recipient households and are associated with lower employment chances. Linkage between inflation and remittance is vague. However in those months when remittances increase, the monthly inflation rates, typically, decrease. Recipient households spend more on education and healthcare and urban recipients also report higher subjective health status and educational enrollment. The effect on inequality and poverty is not straightforward because households in the middle income range benefit disproportionately from remittances. Still, the regions with the higher rates of recipient households do experience lower levels of poverty, while individuals from recipient households have higher subjective and objective perceptions of welfare. Remittances arguably create moral hazard, at the public level, as the elderly and the poorest are less likely to be remittance recipients. This coincides with the social policies implemented, 2004-2012 , when the increase of old-age pensions and the introduction of targeted social assistance became a priority for the government.
This study reviews the factors that played a major role in the development of the old-age pension system in Georgia, 1991-2009 and identifies three main stages in this process. Fiscal constraints and international technical assistance... more
This study reviews the factors that played a major role in the development of the old-age pension system in Georgia, 1991-2009 and identifies three main stages in this process. Fiscal constraints and international technical assistance were the main factors behind reform initiatives undertaken before 2003 and during the first attempts to change the system. Political factors and liberal economic ideology influenced the patterns of pension policy development in the period 2004–2008, while the negative economic outcomes surrounding the Russian-Georgian War and Global Financial Crisis, along with decreasing political legitimacy, are thought to be major obstacles for comprehensive pension reform at present. The main lesson drawn by this study concerning the post 2012 2013 election-cycle pension initiatives is that decisive steps should be taken based on hard evidence, rather than ideological conviction.
When the so-called 5 Day War between Russia and Georgia occurred in the summer of 2008, the Estonian public reaction was especially passionate. Two major explanations stem from the strong identification of Estonians with the situation of... more
When the so-called 5 Day War between Russia and Georgia occurred in the summer of 2008, the Estonian public reaction was especially passionate. Two major explanations stem from the strong identification of Estonians with the situation of Georgia (post-Soviet state, small country, Russian citizens/speakers on Georgian territory,) and the question of existential insecurity (will the EU and NATO guarantee our security in case of necessity?). Using a mixed methods research design, in this study we investigate how the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia affected public confidence in international organisations in Estonia. Data for this study derives from three different sources. Firstly, the European Values Studies (EVS) conducted in 2008 offers a unique value for this research because fieldwork for the survey in Estonia coincided with the military confrontation between the Russia and Georgia on 8-14 August. EVS, among other domestic and international institutions, inquired about the level of confidence in the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which serve as the dependent variables of the current study. Using propensity-score matching technique, respondents who were interviewed in a time interval before the war are designated as the control group, whereas those respondents who were interviewed after the war started, can be designated as the treatment group. Secondly, the information from this dataset is further supplemented by observations and in-depth interviews conducted in Estonia both in the period around the Russo-Georgian conflict, and after it. This will enable us to go deeper into the embedded meanings of trust that Estonians exhibit towards international organisations, or the West more generally. Thirdly, we will offer a brief review of how the 2008 conflict was framed in Estonian media at the time, and how this may have shaped the perception of the Estonian public.
Based on archival research and interviews with a number of stakeholders, this study investigates the history, causes and consequence of the dual citizenship regime in Georgia. In the first years of independence dual citizenship was seen... more
Based on archival research and interviews with a number of stakeholders, this study investigates the history, causes and consequence of the dual citizenship regime in Georgia. In the first years of independence dual citizenship was seen as a measure desired by the Russian Federation which, allegedly, intended to use Russian speaking minorities in Georgia against Georgian national interests. However, by the 2000s, due to the growing Georgian Diaspora in different countries, the changes in ethnic composition decreased the perceived threat of dual citizenship and also increased the demand for it. Legislative amendments allowed the Georgian President to grant dual citizenship to foreign citizens when a foreign citizen had made a particular contribution to Georgia or when the granting of citizenship to such a person was in the interests of the State. The change in policy had dramatic consequences for the number of dual-citizens in Georgia. More than 36,000 persons were granted dual citizenship in 2004-2011, which effectively moved Georgia into a dual-citizenship regime. Economically, it has been tentatively argued that the remittances and investments from the new dual-citizens have been contributing to the local development. Politically, the granted dual-citizenships have electoral implications as the number of new citizens increases and they acquire equal rights in regard to voting. One of the major concerns is undefined military obligations in cases of dual-citizenship, especially when these citizenships stem from the presently belligerent states of Georgia and the Russian Federation.
მოცემული კვლევა აჩვენებს, რომ 2012 წლის საპარლამენტო არჩევნებამდე არსებული პოლიტიკური პრეფერენციები და საკუთრივ არჩევნების შედეგები მნიშვნელოვნად უკავშირდება ამომრჩეველთა ეკონომკური კეთილდღეობის დონეს. მოცემული კავშირი სტატისტიკურად... more
მოცემული კვლევა აჩვენებს, რომ 2012 წლის საპარლამენტო არჩევნებამდე არსებული პოლიტიკური პრეფერენციები და საკუთრივ არჩევნების შედეგები მნიშვნელოვნად უკავშირდება ამომრჩეველთა ეკონომკური კეთილდღეობის დონეს. მოცემული კავშირი სტატისტიკურად მნიშვნელოვანია მრავალი საკონტროლო მაჩვენებლის გათვალისწინების შემთხევაშიც. არჩევნებამდე გამოხატული პოლიტიკური პრეფერენციები, პროპორციული სისტემით მიღებულ ხმები და მაჟორიტარული სისტემით ოპოზიციური კოალიციის კანდიდატის გამარჯვების სტატისტიკური ანალიზი საშუალებას გვაძლევს დავასკვნათ, რომ ეკონომიკური კეთილდღეობის დაბალი და მაღალი მაჩვენებლების მქონე ამომრჩევლებმა და საარჩევნო ოლქებმა ოპოზიციურ კოალიციას მიანიჭეს უპირატესობა.
This dissertation studies the trends, covariates and consequences of intergenerational social mobility in post-socialist societies. The existing literature does not provide an answer if cross-national differences in social mobility levels... more
This dissertation studies the trends, covariates and consequences of intergenerational social mobility in post-socialist societies. The existing literature does not provide an answer if cross-national differences in social mobility levels are determined by socialist legacies or by the divergent paths these countries followed in their transition from socialist to capitalist system. In addition to the industrialisation thesis and the role of income inequality, I study the implications of political democracy and economic liberalisation for intergenerational status reproduction. Individual-level consequences of mobility are explored using the social-psychological concept of the self-serving bias in causal attribution, which implies that people are more likely to explain individual success as resulting from their own abilities and efforts. Market-based democratic systems, almost by definition, emphasise the importance of self-determination in shaping an individual’s life chances. Thus, upwardly mobile groups are expected to show greater support of unequal reward distribution. The hypotheses are tested using multivariate and multilevel statistical methods based on data from the European Values Studies and Life in Transition Survey. Although I find evidence of the decisive role of social origin in predicting educational and occupational attainment, particularly during post-socialism, cross-country variation in intergenerational social mobility can largely be explained by the institutions that were in place immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The findings suggest that while strong, positive links exist between social mobility and democracy levels in Western Europe, the economic liberalisation that took place in the early 1990s is the strongest predictor of why some post-socialist states have higher social mobility rates than others; subjective perceptions of mobility have stronger implications on attitudes than the objective mobility experience; upwardly mobile individuals do in fact demonstrate more support for inequality, democracy and market economy, but the strength of these links is mediated by macro-contextual variables.
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