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The way US rationales for delegating military tasks to proxy forces are communicated and perceived contributes to strategic outcomes.
This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the... more
This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.
This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military... more
This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.
The concept of the political settlement has risen to occupy a central place in British policy toward conflict-affected and fragile states. Yet, at around the turn of the millennium, the term was barely mentioned in official circles and... more
The concept of the political settlement has risen to occupy a central place in British policy toward conflict-affected and fragile states. Yet, at around the turn of the millennium, the term was barely mentioned in official circles and the so-called ‘good governance’ approach held sway as the dominant operational mode. So, how had this transformation in policy approach come about and what was the role of research? In this article, we demonstrate that research played a central role in influencing the rhetoric of policymakers through a process we term ‘cumulative influence’. Indeed, the subject of political settlements represents an excellent case study for understanding the dynamics of research utilisation. It allows us to build on existing models and suggest useful ways forward in this important area of public policy analysis.
Policy Recommendations: Within the UK there is currently a bias depicting drones as precise, clean and value free. Our recommendations question this. 1) Precision is a 'myth': We need to stop deceiving ourselves that progress is being... more
Policy Recommendations: Within the UK there is currently a bias depicting drones as precise, clean and value free. Our recommendations question this. 1) Precision is a 'myth': We need to stop deceiving ourselves that progress is being made and costs are being avoided through precision. War is never cost-free. But it appears to be in most accounts of contemporary conflict. We term this 'Drone Chic'. The stories we tell ourselves deceive us. 2) No strategy: Drones are tactical devices and cannot substitute for an overarching and coherent national strategy. Yet we ignore the primacy of the tactical and celebrate false 'victories' through simply 'proportionate and discriminate' means. A form of Moralism has replaced Politics. 3) The Victims: It is not just 'death' on the receiving end of the drone that demands attention. There are profound consequences for those living under the ever present and seemingly omnipotent machines hovering in the sky above. Drones are, we believe, 'disheartening'. They change cultural practices and cause psychological damage. 4) 'Where are the women?': More investigation is needed as to the gendered effects of drones and drone killing on the ground. What are the hard socioeconomic implications for families when the men are killed? What are the psychological implications for those who witness drone strikes? Can the rise in female suicide rates in places such as Afghanistan be attributed in part to an increase in drone strikes? 5) The Veterans: One of the important 'stories' we are told about drones is that they are accurate and precise. Yet the mounting evidence points, on numerous occasions, in 'precisely' the opposite direction. Do drone pilots 'suffer' trauma and PTSD from their duties? 6) Future concerns: As drones continue to proliferate into the hands of both state and non-state actors, we must realize that drones can be used in a multitude of ways which may compromise our safety.
Research Interests:
This report presents the independent findings from the 'Impact Evaluation of the Cluster Community Development Council (CCDC) Pilot Project'. The evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development of the... more
This report presents the independent findings from the 'Impact Evaluation of the Cluster Community Development Council (CCDC) Pilot Project'. The evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [MRRD/NSPIII/CN/759] and was undertaken by a multi disciplinary team from the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit in partnership with the Kabul-based Tadbeer Consulting. 

The field work was carried out between September 2014 and March 2015 and covered the following NSP supported communities:

CCDCs: Etifaq, Azadi, Sarab; Guhdar, Nargis, Shibar; Hisarshai, Motahida, Itehad.

CDCs: Akhwanzadagan, Bazar Kalay, Batton, Darbazala, Ba-ar, Pioywolu, Kariz and Hajyan, Miran and Malikan, Zargaran and Baba; Qalacha, Baghalak, Dhanai Ghudar, Kharzari, Kham, Qalai Wakil, Gunbad, Paynmori, Sadbag; Mashi, Yakatoot, Zambokan, Ali Kayee, Khwaja Muhamad Aslam, Naydaraz, Ghazi Abad Baala, Haji Ali Arabi, Sayed Ghiasuddin Peer.
This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or ‘reconciliation’, in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official... more
This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or ‘reconciliation’, in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official western position has evolved iteratively from initial rejection to near complete embrace of exploring the potential for talks. It is widely assumed that the deteriorating security situation was the sole determinant of this major policy reversal, persuading decisionmakers to rethink what had once been deemed unthinkable. Moreover, given the politicized and sensitive nature of the subject, we might expect the potential for outside opinion to influence decision-makers to be low. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that it would be a mistake to underestimate the role that research and expert knowledge played—the story is more nuanced and complex. Research coalesced, sometimes prominently, with other key drivers to spur and shape policy change. Importantly, it often took experts to make sense of events on the ground, especially where the failure of the military approach was not recognized, understood or palatable to those in official circles. Research interacted with changing events, policy windows, the emergence of new personalities and the actions of various intermediaries to shape emerging positions. More broadly, the case of reconciliation in Afghanistan reveals the difficulties and challenges, but also the variety of opportunities and techniques, for achieving research influence in conflict-affected environments.
Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has... more
Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has examined the ways in which research influences policy in fragile states. Based on in-depth interviews with officials and researchers, this article begins to shed light on the central dynamics pertaining to research use in such contexts by exploring in some detail the experience of British in-country policymakers in three countries – Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone. The picture that emerges is a mixed one, with evidence of extensive use of different forms of research combined with worrying practices and lingering deficiencies in some key areas.
In a recent article in Foreign Policy, John Arquilla extols a creative design approach to armed conflict, which involves ‘a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build’ – a consideration, he argues, that was ignored by even the... more
In a recent article in Foreign Policy, John Arquilla extols a creative design approach to armed conflict, which involves ‘a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build’ – a consideration, he argues, that was ignored by even the greatest thinkers on war such as Carl von Clausewitz. The piece is thought-provoking, timely and necessary. It raises important issues as defense cuts threaten to undermine key elements of American military power. Nevertheless, I want to address a few issues raised by the piece. I do not argue against the principle of design per se, which is perfectly sensible, but I want to try to distinguish it from other concepts and perhaps restore some of Clausewitz’s unfairly tarnished reputation in the process.
The concept of the political settlement has risen to occupy a central place in British policy toward conflict-affected and fragile states. Yet, at around the turn of the millennium, the term was barely mentioned in official circles and... more
The concept of the political settlement has risen to occupy a central
place in British policy toward conflict-affected and fragile states. Yet,
at around the turn of the millennium, the term was barely
mentioned in official circles and the so-called ‘good governance’
approach held sway as the dominant operational mode. So, how
had this transformation in policy approach come about and what
was the role of research? In this article, we demonstrate that
research played a central role in influencing the rhetoric of policymakers through a process we term ‘cumulative influence’. Indeed, the subject of political settlements represents an excellent case study for understanding the dynamics of research utilisation. It allows us to build on existing models and suggest useful ways forward in this important area of public policy analysis.
Research Interests:
Carl von Clausewitz produced what is widely recognised as the greatest book on war. Less commonly appreciated is the nature of the approach he adopted which enabled him to arrive at his central theoretical conclusions. In the course of... more
Carl von Clausewitz produced what is widely recognised as the greatest book on war.  Less commonly appreciated is the nature of the approach he adopted which enabled him to arrive at his central theoretical conclusions.  In the course of his studies Clausewitz confronted a number of central methodological dualisms.  He believed the tensions inherent in these pairs could not be ignored and ultimately sought to reconcile their apparent contradictions through a dialectical process of intense reflection and study.  Knowledge of such issues offers students of war and strategy a valuable methodology in coming to grips with such a vast and complex subject.
An exploration of the meaning of the most quoted — and most frequently misunderstood — concept in On War.
The concept of chance has often been approached by military thinkers in either an unreasonably fatalistic or complacently dismissive manner. However, Carl von Clausewitz (1780‐1831) developed a more accurate and realistic conception. For... more
The concept of chance has often been approached by military thinkers in either an unreasonably fatalistic or complacently dismissive manner. However, Carl von Clausewitz (1780‐1831) developed a more accurate and realistic conception. For him, chance in war is an inescapable yet ambiguous phenomenon: it can create opportunities to be exploited or equally dash the best laid plans. Frequently disregarded in theory, Clausewitz maintained that chance, uncertainty, and friction are central to the nature of war, along with the human qualities required to overcome them such as courage, determination, and adaptability. Modern developments have not rendered these insights obsolete and, if anything, they hold even greater relevance to contemporary warfare. Western militaries fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been continually challenged by chance events and unforeseeable setbacks. Overconfidence bred by technological superiority has contributed to militaries inadequately capable of confronting unexpected developments in all of war’s dimensions. Understanding Clausewitz’s ideas can help prepare military leaders for the unpredictable in war.
Strategic Conflict Assessments have become a staple of UK government engagement in conflict affected and fragile states over the last decade. The guidance for conducting SCAs is, however, somewhat dated and was not intended to serve as a... more
Strategic Conflict Assessments have become a staple of UK government engagement in conflict affected and fragile states over the last decade. The guidance for conducting SCAs is, however, somewhat dated and was not intended to serve as a cross-government analytical tool. A revised and updated analytical tool is therefore required; one that builds on the strengths of the existing guidance; that draws on contemporary understandings of conflict and fragility; and that responds to new organisational imperatives.

While there is evidence of an emerging consensus around the basic requirements of a new analytical tool, elements of revision remain contested. The present review seeks to chart a course through competing opinions and interests in order to propose overarching principles which can guide the drafting of a revised analytical framework.
As Student Partnerships Worldwide (SPW) expands its operations into regions recovering from violent conflict – such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Nepal – it is imperative that staff and volunteers have a general understanding of current... more
As Student Partnerships Worldwide (SPW) expands its operations into regions recovering from violent conflict – such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Nepal – it is imperative that staff and volunteers have a general understanding of current thinking and research on conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and theories of change, particularly as these issues relate to youth and conflict. 

This document is intended purely as an introductory overview and seeks to situate SPW’s work within the wider realm of conflict resolution so that SPW staff can understand better how their work fits into the bigger picture of peacebuilding, both practically on the ground and at a theoretical level. 

This document should not be considered a comprehensive guide to conflict resolution.  Rather, it points towards some of the major issues engaging scholars and practitioners in the field and aims to help SPW staff new to the subject get to grips with the (often confusing) terminology used in contemporary conflict resolution.  It also outlines some of the approaches other major international intergovernmental organisations, agencies, and NGOs have adopted with respect to peacebuilding, both at policy and programmatic levels.
British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however... more
British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however threatens to compromise this reputation. The insurgency remains intense, civil war threatens to engulf the country, British troops are dying in numbers and some troops have been accused of war crimes. How are we to explain the failures in Iraq? In this article I offer a version of events based on a Clausewitzian framework. I demonstrate that British troops in Iraq are deployed in a ‘strategic void’ as a result of political failures in both the UK and US, which means troops are compromised, vulnerable and strategically aimless. Their actions are crucially detached from higher political objectives. Failure to heed Clausewitz's admonitions has led to a situation in which British ‘strategy’ amounts to hope, wait and see, while British troops fight, do and die.
British defence policy has altered significantly since the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Those changes have been prompted largely by the shifting nature of the strategic environment over that period, and in particular the... more
British defence policy has altered significantly since
the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Those
changes have been prompted largely by the shifting
nature of the strategic environment over that period,
and in particular the events of 11 September 2001.
However, the strategic foreign policy objectives of
former Prime Minister Tony Blair have also helped to
shape the direction of British defence policy and have
had a fundamental impact on the role, structure and
welfare of the Armed Forces.
This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive
assessment of all aspects of defence policy since
1997, but an introduction to some of the main issues
that have shaped the defence agenda in that time. It
also examines the prospects for defence since Gordon
Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007.
This paper is intended to provide an insight into some of the broader contextual issues that have influenced British defence policy over the last ten years. Specifically it considers the parameters of defence policy planning and some... more
This paper is intended to provide an insight into some
of the broader contextual issues that have influenced
British defence policy over the last ten years.
Specifically it considers the parameters of defence
policy planning and some of the dimensions of modern
warfare that have shaped its direction. It also provides
an explanation for the difficulties in assessing the
nature and size of the UK defence budget.
America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military’s exposure to danger is limited, and... more
America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military’s exposure to danger is limited, and special forces and covert instruments are on the increase. Important strategic decisions are taken with minimal scrutiny or public engagement.

This compelling account charts the historical emergence of this distinctive tradition of war and explains the factors driving its contemporary prominence. It contrasts the tactical advantages of vicarious warfare with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.
The overarching objective of this book is to analyse the manner in which statebuilding-oriented research has and can influence policies in fragile, post-conflict environments. Large-scale, externally-assisted statebuilding is a relatively... more
The overarching objective of this book is to analyse the manner in which statebuilding-oriented research has and can influence policies in fragile, post-conflict environments. Large-scale, externally-assisted statebuilding is a relatively new and distinct foreign policy domain having risen to the forefront of the international agenda as the negative consequences of state weakness have been repeatedly revealed in the form of entrenched poverty, regional instability and serious threats to international security. Despite the increasing volume of research on statebuilding, the use and uptake of findings by those involved in policymaking remains largely under-examined. As such, the main themes running through the book relate to issues of research influence, use and uptake into policy. It grapples with problems associated with decision-making dynamics, knowledge management and the policy process and draws on concepts and analytical models developed within the public policy and research utilisation literature. This book will be of great interest to researchers, knowledge managers and policymakers working in the fields of post-war reconstruction, statebuilding, fragile states, stabilisation, conflict and development.
Research Interests:
Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history and defence literatures, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning. In this book, Waldman explores... more
Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history and defence literatures, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning. In this book, Waldman explores Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for understanding war - the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance and passion. By situating the great Prussian in historical context, he presents a conception truer to Clausewitz’s intention. Seeking to achieve this through an in-depth reinterpretation of On War and Clausewitz’s other writings, conducted through the prism of the trinity, this book draws on existing studies but argues that there is room for clarification. It presents fresh perspectives into aspects of Clausewitz's thought and emphasises elements of his theory that have often been neglected. Furthermore, it provides a solid basis from which debate on the nature of modern war can move forward.

Reviews

‘In this committed and intelligent exploration of Clausewitz's dynamic framework for the understanding of war, Thomas Waldman demonstrates the continuing value of the "remarkable trinity" of passion, chance and policy for understanding war. He uses it to engage directly with Clausewitz, as well as with his many critics and interpreters.’
Sir Lawrence Freedman, King's College London, UK

‘Thomas Waldman penetrates to the core of Clausewitz’s timeless insights into war and politics and provides the essential modern guide to understanding his work and its continuing relevance. Clausewitz has been endlessly misunderstood. Waldman corrects those errors, focussing on the Trinity - or multiple trinities - identified by Clausewitz - that war is the unlikely alloy of primordial passion, logic and luck.’
Chris Bellamy, Greenwich Maritime Institute, UK

‘Waldman provides a deep and insightful discussion of the relevance of classical Clausewitzian political-military theory to war in both the historical and contemporary worlds - a potent antidote to the ahistorical imaginings of the “New Wars” scholars.’
Christopher Bassford, National Defense University, USA and editor of The Clausewitz Homepage"
Research Interests:
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War requires a patient reader. It is disjoined, unfinished, conceptually outdated and even contradictory at times. But it remains the single most important book in the study of war and this is not only because of... more
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War requires a patient reader. It is disjoined, unfinished, conceptually outdated and even contradictory at times. But it remains the single most important book in the study of war and this is not only because of its penetrating and sobering insights on the nature and character of war and warfare, but also because of its capacity to determine diverging paths of understanding conflict as a socio-political phenomenon. However, much of the ink Clausewitz has been written in, draws deceptive and theoretically void hagiographies that either mislead “or do not fully convey the complexity of his arguments” (p.1). Thomas Waldman’s new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, challenges this pattern of thinking and articulates an intellectually refreshing and novel understanding of the core elements of Clausewitz’s theory of war, the trinity.
This chapter analyses recent efforts by Western states to address the threat from terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan since the end of the long-running International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commencement of the new... more
This chapter analyses recent efforts by Western states to address the threat from terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan since the end of the long-running International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commencement of the new Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in 2015. Although the RSM era has seen responsibility for security increasingly transferred to the Afghan government, Western states remain heavily engaged in the country. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and partner countries have deployed some 14,000 troops in support of the RSM ‘train, advise and assist’ (TAA) mission (SIGAR 2018). For the United States, Afghanistan remains its largest overseas military operation involving the deployment of thousands of civilian and military advisors as well as special operations forces as part of a separate counter-terror mission: Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Indeed, America continues to dominate the Western coalition’s Afghanistan strategy, with European partners generally following its lead.
In seeking to confront various security threats while simultaneously evading associated military and political costs, America has come to rely on the vicarious warfighting approaches of delegation, danger-proofing and darkness. Thomas... more
In seeking to confront various security threats while simultaneously evading associated military and political costs, America has come to rely on the vicarious warfighting approaches of delegation, danger-proofing and darkness. Thomas Waldman shows in a new CSP journal article that the results are not promising. Security is not a commodity that can be bought on the cheap.
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On the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, guest-bloggers Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Dr Thomas Waldman lay bare the scope and ongoing toll of disappearance as a tool of war.
Research Interests:
This is the first of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
This is the second of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
This is the last of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
Tom Waldman, from the Department of Politics, PRDU recently gave a talk at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Tom is the recent author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate). Here Tom... more
Tom Waldman, from the Department of Politics, PRDU recently gave a talk at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.

Tom is the recent author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate).

Here Tom explains why Clausewitz’s famous dictum – ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ – embraces a complexity and depth that is often missed.
Research Interests:
The essential argument of this paper is simple: there has been a distinct lack of British strategy in Iraq. One of the central causes of this has been the nature of Blair's foreign policy approach and the relationship that has emerged... more
The essential argument of this paper is simple: there has been a distinct lack of British strategy in Iraq.  One of the central causes of this has been the nature of Blair's foreign policy approach and the relationship that has emerged between the US and UK under Tony Blair, especially since 9/11.
Clausewitz's aphorism that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is widely quoted but often misconceived. The author of a new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, Thomas Waldman will clarify the Prussian theorist's... more
Clausewitz's aphorism that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is widely quoted but often misconceived. The author of a new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, Thomas Waldman will clarify the Prussian theorist's insights into the fundamental relationship between war and politics, highlight pitfalls in interpretation, and underline its critical importance for understanding contemporary war.