Thomas Waldman
Macquarie University, Security Studies and Criminology, Faculty Member
- Politics, Strategic Studies, War Studies, Defence and Strategic Studies, Clausewitz, Military Science, and 27 moreMilitary History, Post-Conflict State Building, Fragile States, Peace and Conflict Studies, Conflict, International Relations, International Security, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Assessment, New Wars Debate, Civil-military relations, Military and Politics, Ethnic Conflict and Civil War, War and violence, War Theory, Afghanistan, Security, Peace, Ethnicity, Human Rights, International Law, International organizations, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, Conflict Analysis, Mediation, and American Foreign Policyedit
- Dr Thomas Waldman is Senior Lecturer in International Security Studies at the Department of Security Studies and Crim... moreDr Thomas Waldman is Senior Lecturer in International Security Studies at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Sydney. He is author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity. He has experience working in conflict affected countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nepal.edit
The way US rationales for delegating military tasks to proxy forces are communicated and perceived contributes to strategic outcomes.
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This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the... more
This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.
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This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military... more
This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.
Research Interests: Strategy (Military Science), Conflict, War Studies, Security Studies, American Foreign Policy, and 14 moreInsurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Use of Force & Counter-terrorism, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, Military, Intervention, Private Military Companies, Military Intervention, Special Operations Forces, Drones, Proxy Wars, Private Military and Security Companies, Covert Operations, and Security Force Assistance
This report presents the independent findings from the 'Impact Evaluation of the Cluster Community Development Council (CCDC) Pilot Project'. The evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development of the... more
This report presents the independent findings from the 'Impact Evaluation of the Cluster Community Development Council (CCDC) Pilot Project'. The evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [MRRD/NSPIII/CN/759] and was undertaken by a multi disciplinary team from the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit in partnership with the Kabul-based Tadbeer Consulting.
The field work was carried out between September 2014 and March 2015 and covered the following NSP supported communities:
CCDCs: Etifaq, Azadi, Sarab; Guhdar, Nargis, Shibar; Hisarshai, Motahida, Itehad.
CDCs: Akhwanzadagan, Bazar Kalay, Batton, Darbazala, Ba-ar, Pioywolu, Kariz and Hajyan, Miran and Malikan, Zargaran and Baba; Qalacha, Baghalak, Dhanai Ghudar, Kharzari, Kham, Qalai Wakil, Gunbad, Paynmori, Sadbag; Mashi, Yakatoot, Zambokan, Ali Kayee, Khwaja Muhamad Aslam, Naydaraz, Ghazi Abad Baala, Haji Ali Arabi, Sayed Ghiasuddin Peer.
The field work was carried out between September 2014 and March 2015 and covered the following NSP supported communities:
CCDCs: Etifaq, Azadi, Sarab; Guhdar, Nargis, Shibar; Hisarshai, Motahida, Itehad.
CDCs: Akhwanzadagan, Bazar Kalay, Batton, Darbazala, Ba-ar, Pioywolu, Kariz and Hajyan, Miran and Malikan, Zargaran and Baba; Qalacha, Baghalak, Dhanai Ghudar, Kharzari, Kham, Qalai Wakil, Gunbad, Paynmori, Sadbag; Mashi, Yakatoot, Zambokan, Ali Kayee, Khwaja Muhamad Aslam, Naydaraz, Ghazi Abad Baala, Haji Ali Arabi, Sayed Ghiasuddin Peer.
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This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or ‘reconciliation’, in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official... more
This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or ‘reconciliation’, in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official western position has evolved iteratively from initial rejection to near complete embrace of exploring the potential for talks. It is widely assumed that the deteriorating security situation was the sole determinant of this major policy reversal, persuading decisionmakers to rethink what had once been deemed unthinkable. Moreover, given the politicized and sensitive nature of the subject, we might expect the potential for outside opinion to influence decision-makers to be low. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that it would be a mistake to underestimate the role that research and expert knowledge played—the story is more nuanced and complex. Research coalesced, sometimes prominently, with other key drivers to spur and shape policy change. Importantly, it often took experts to make sense of events on the ground, especially where the failure of the military approach was not recognized, understood or palatable to those in official circles. Research interacted with changing events, policy windows, the emergence of new personalities and the actions of various intermediaries to shape emerging positions. More broadly, the case of reconciliation in Afghanistan reveals the difficulties and challenges, but also the variety of opportunities and techniques, for achieving research influence in conflict-affected environments.
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Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has... more
Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has examined the ways in which research influences policy in fragile states. Based on in-depth interviews with officials and researchers, this article begins to shed light on the central dynamics pertaining to research use in such contexts by exploring in some detail the experience of British in-country policymakers in three countries – Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone. The picture that emerges is a mixed one, with evidence of extensive use of different forms of research combined with worrying practices and lingering deficiencies in some key areas.
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In a recent article in Foreign Policy, John Arquilla extols a creative design approach to armed conflict, which involves ‘a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build’ – a consideration, he argues, that was ignored by even the... more
In a recent article in Foreign Policy, John Arquilla extols a creative design approach to armed conflict, which involves ‘a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build’ – a consideration, he argues, that was ignored by even the greatest thinkers on war such as Carl von Clausewitz. The piece is thought-provoking, timely and necessary. It raises important issues as defense cuts threaten to undermine key elements of American military power. Nevertheless, I want to address a few issues raised by the piece. I do not argue against the principle of design per se, which is perfectly sensible, but I want to try to distinguish it from other concepts and perhaps restore some of Clausewitz’s unfairly tarnished reputation in the process.
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Carl von Clausewitz produced what is widely recognised as the greatest book on war. Less commonly appreciated is the nature of the approach he adopted which enabled him to arrive at his central theoretical conclusions. In the course of... more
Carl von Clausewitz produced what is widely recognised as the greatest book on war. Less commonly appreciated is the nature of the approach he adopted which enabled him to arrive at his central theoretical conclusions. In the course of his studies Clausewitz confronted a number of central methodological dualisms. He believed the tensions inherent in these pairs could not be ignored and ultimately sought to reconcile their apparent contradictions through a dialectical process of intense reflection and study. Knowledge of such issues offers students of war and strategy a valuable methodology in coming to grips with such a vast and complex subject.
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An exploration of the meaning of the most quoted — and most frequently misunderstood — concept in On War.
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The concept of chance has often been approached by military thinkers in either an unreasonably fatalistic or complacently dismissive manner. However, Carl von Clausewitz (1780‐1831) developed a more accurate and realistic conception. For... more
The concept of chance has often been approached by military thinkers in either an unreasonably fatalistic or complacently dismissive manner. However, Carl von Clausewitz (1780‐1831) developed a more accurate and realistic conception. For him, chance in war is an inescapable yet ambiguous phenomenon: it can create opportunities to be exploited or equally dash the best laid plans. Frequently disregarded in theory, Clausewitz maintained that chance, uncertainty, and friction are central to the nature of war, along with the human qualities required to overcome them such as courage, determination, and adaptability. Modern developments have not rendered these insights obsolete and, if anything, they hold even greater relevance to contemporary warfare. Western militaries fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been continually challenged by chance events and unforeseeable setbacks. Overconfidence bred by technological superiority has contributed to militaries inadequately capable of confronting unexpected developments in all of war’s dimensions. Understanding Clausewitz’s ideas can help prepare military leaders for the unpredictable in war.
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Strategic Conflict Assessments have become a staple of UK government engagement in conflict affected and fragile states over the last decade. The guidance for conducting SCAs is, however, somewhat dated and was not intended to serve as a... more
Strategic Conflict Assessments have become a staple of UK government engagement in conflict affected and fragile states over the last decade. The guidance for conducting SCAs is, however, somewhat dated and was not intended to serve as a cross-government analytical tool. A revised and updated analytical tool is therefore required; one that builds on the strengths of the existing guidance; that draws on contemporary understandings of conflict and fragility; and that responds to new organisational imperatives.
While there is evidence of an emerging consensus around the basic requirements of a new analytical tool, elements of revision remain contested. The present review seeks to chart a course through competing opinions and interests in order to propose overarching principles which can guide the drafting of a revised analytical framework.
While there is evidence of an emerging consensus around the basic requirements of a new analytical tool, elements of revision remain contested. The present review seeks to chart a course through competing opinions and interests in order to propose overarching principles which can guide the drafting of a revised analytical framework.
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As Student Partnerships Worldwide (SPW) expands its operations into regions recovering from violent conflict – such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Nepal – it is imperative that staff and volunteers have a general understanding of current... more
As Student Partnerships Worldwide (SPW) expands its operations into regions recovering from violent conflict – such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Nepal – it is imperative that staff and volunteers have a general understanding of current thinking and research on conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and theories of change, particularly as these issues relate to youth and conflict.
This document is intended purely as an introductory overview and seeks to situate SPW’s work within the wider realm of conflict resolution so that SPW staff can understand better how their work fits into the bigger picture of peacebuilding, both practically on the ground and at a theoretical level.
This document should not be considered a comprehensive guide to conflict resolution. Rather, it points towards some of the major issues engaging scholars and practitioners in the field and aims to help SPW staff new to the subject get to grips with the (often confusing) terminology used in contemporary conflict resolution. It also outlines some of the approaches other major international intergovernmental organisations, agencies, and NGOs have adopted with respect to peacebuilding, both at policy and programmatic levels.
This document is intended purely as an introductory overview and seeks to situate SPW’s work within the wider realm of conflict resolution so that SPW staff can understand better how their work fits into the bigger picture of peacebuilding, both practically on the ground and at a theoretical level.
This document should not be considered a comprehensive guide to conflict resolution. Rather, it points towards some of the major issues engaging scholars and practitioners in the field and aims to help SPW staff new to the subject get to grips with the (often confusing) terminology used in contemporary conflict resolution. It also outlines some of the approaches other major international intergovernmental organisations, agencies, and NGOs have adopted with respect to peacebuilding, both at policy and programmatic levels.
Research Interests:
British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however... more
British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however threatens to compromise this reputation. The insurgency remains intense, civil war threatens to engulf the country, British troops are dying in numbers and some troops have been accused of war crimes. How are we to explain the failures in Iraq? In this article I offer a version of events based on a Clausewitzian framework. I demonstrate that British troops in Iraq are deployed in a ‘strategic void’ as a result of political failures in both the UK and US, which means troops are compromised, vulnerable and strategically aimless. Their actions are crucially detached from higher political objectives. Failure to heed Clausewitz's admonitions has led to a situation in which British ‘strategy’ amounts to hope, wait and see, while British troops fight, do and die.
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British defence policy has altered significantly since the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Those changes have been prompted largely by the shifting nature of the strategic environment over that period, and in particular the... more
British defence policy has altered significantly since
the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Those
changes have been prompted largely by the shifting
nature of the strategic environment over that period,
and in particular the events of 11 September 2001.
However, the strategic foreign policy objectives of
former Prime Minister Tony Blair have also helped to
shape the direction of British defence policy and have
had a fundamental impact on the role, structure and
welfare of the Armed Forces.
This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive
assessment of all aspects of defence policy since
1997, but an introduction to some of the main issues
that have shaped the defence agenda in that time. It
also examines the prospects for defence since Gordon
Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007.
the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Those
changes have been prompted largely by the shifting
nature of the strategic environment over that period,
and in particular the events of 11 September 2001.
However, the strategic foreign policy objectives of
former Prime Minister Tony Blair have also helped to
shape the direction of British defence policy and have
had a fundamental impact on the role, structure and
welfare of the Armed Forces.
This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive
assessment of all aspects of defence policy since
1997, but an introduction to some of the main issues
that have shaped the defence agenda in that time. It
also examines the prospects for defence since Gordon
Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007.
Research Interests:
This paper is intended to provide an insight into some of the broader contextual issues that have influenced British defence policy over the last ten years. Specifically it considers the parameters of defence policy planning and some... more
This paper is intended to provide an insight into some
of the broader contextual issues that have influenced
British defence policy over the last ten years.
Specifically it considers the parameters of defence
policy planning and some of the dimensions of modern
warfare that have shaped its direction. It also provides
an explanation for the difficulties in assessing the
nature and size of the UK defence budget.
of the broader contextual issues that have influenced
British defence policy over the last ten years.
Specifically it considers the parameters of defence
policy planning and some of the dimensions of modern
warfare that have shaped its direction. It also provides
an explanation for the difficulties in assessing the
nature and size of the UK defence budget.
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America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military’s exposure to danger is limited, and... more
America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military’s exposure to danger is limited, and special forces and covert instruments are on the increase. Important strategic decisions are taken with minimal scrutiny or public engagement.
This compelling account charts the historical emergence of this distinctive tradition of war and explains the factors driving its contemporary prominence. It contrasts the tactical advantages of vicarious warfare with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.
This compelling account charts the historical emergence of this distinctive tradition of war and explains the factors driving its contemporary prominence. It contrasts the tactical advantages of vicarious warfare with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.
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Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history and defence literatures, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning. In this book, Waldman explores... more
Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history and defence literatures, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning. In this book, Waldman explores Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for understanding war - the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance and passion. By situating the great Prussian in historical context, he presents a conception truer to Clausewitz’s intention. Seeking to achieve this through an in-depth reinterpretation of On War and Clausewitz’s other writings, conducted through the prism of the trinity, this book draws on existing studies but argues that there is room for clarification. It presents fresh perspectives into aspects of Clausewitz's thought and emphasises elements of his theory that have often been neglected. Furthermore, it provides a solid basis from which debate on the nature of modern war can move forward.
Reviews
‘In this committed and intelligent exploration of Clausewitz's dynamic framework for the understanding of war, Thomas Waldman demonstrates the continuing value of the "remarkable trinity" of passion, chance and policy for understanding war. He uses it to engage directly with Clausewitz, as well as with his many critics and interpreters.’
Sir Lawrence Freedman, King's College London, UK
‘Thomas Waldman penetrates to the core of Clausewitz’s timeless insights into war and politics and provides the essential modern guide to understanding his work and its continuing relevance. Clausewitz has been endlessly misunderstood. Waldman corrects those errors, focussing on the Trinity - or multiple trinities - identified by Clausewitz - that war is the unlikely alloy of primordial passion, logic and luck.’
Chris Bellamy, Greenwich Maritime Institute, UK
‘Waldman provides a deep and insightful discussion of the relevance of classical Clausewitzian political-military theory to war in both the historical and contemporary worlds - a potent antidote to the ahistorical imaginings of the “New Wars” scholars.’
Christopher Bassford, National Defense University, USA and editor of The Clausewitz Homepage"
Reviews
‘In this committed and intelligent exploration of Clausewitz's dynamic framework for the understanding of war, Thomas Waldman demonstrates the continuing value of the "remarkable trinity" of passion, chance and policy for understanding war. He uses it to engage directly with Clausewitz, as well as with his many critics and interpreters.’
Sir Lawrence Freedman, King's College London, UK
‘Thomas Waldman penetrates to the core of Clausewitz’s timeless insights into war and politics and provides the essential modern guide to understanding his work and its continuing relevance. Clausewitz has been endlessly misunderstood. Waldman corrects those errors, focussing on the Trinity - or multiple trinities - identified by Clausewitz - that war is the unlikely alloy of primordial passion, logic and luck.’
Chris Bellamy, Greenwich Maritime Institute, UK
‘Waldman provides a deep and insightful discussion of the relevance of classical Clausewitzian political-military theory to war in both the historical and contemporary worlds - a potent antidote to the ahistorical imaginings of the “New Wars” scholars.’
Christopher Bassford, National Defense University, USA and editor of The Clausewitz Homepage"
Research Interests: Military History, Military Science, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, and 10 moreInternational Studies, International Security, War Studies, Strategic Studies, Political Science, International Affairs, Strategy, Defence and Security, Defence and Strategic Studies, and Security and Defence Studies
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Carl von Clausewitz’s On War requires a patient reader. It is disjoined, unfinished, conceptually outdated and even contradictory at times. But it remains the single most important book in the study of war and this is not only because of... more
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War requires a patient reader. It is disjoined, unfinished, conceptually outdated and even contradictory at times. But it remains the single most important book in the study of war and this is not only because of its penetrating and sobering insights on the nature and character of war and warfare, but also because of its capacity to determine diverging paths of understanding conflict as a socio-political phenomenon. However, much of the ink Clausewitz has been written in, draws deceptive and theoretically void hagiographies that either mislead “or do not fully convey the complexity of his arguments” (p.1). Thomas Waldman’s new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, challenges this pattern of thinking and articulates an intellectually refreshing and novel understanding of the core elements of Clausewitz’s theory of war, the trinity.
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In seeking to confront various security threats while simultaneously evading associated military and political costs, America has come to rely on the vicarious warfighting approaches of delegation, danger-proofing and darkness. Thomas... more
In seeking to confront various security threats while simultaneously evading associated military and political costs, America has come to rely on the vicarious warfighting approaches of delegation, danger-proofing and darkness. Thomas Waldman shows in a new CSP journal article that the results are not promising. Security is not a commodity that can be bought on the cheap.
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On the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, guest-bloggers Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Dr Thomas Waldman lay bare the scope and ongoing toll of disappearance as a tool of war.
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This is the first of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
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This is the second of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
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This is the last of a three-part blog series by Dr Tom Waldman exploring Clausewitz’s famous trinity.
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Tom Waldman, from the Department of Politics, PRDU recently gave a talk at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Tom is the recent author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate). Here Tom... more
Tom Waldman, from the Department of Politics, PRDU recently gave a talk at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.
Tom is the recent author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate).
Here Tom explains why Clausewitz’s famous dictum – ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ – embraces a complexity and depth that is often missed.
Tom is the recent author of War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate).
Here Tom explains why Clausewitz’s famous dictum – ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ – embraces a complexity and depth that is often missed.
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The essential argument of this paper is simple: there has been a distinct lack of British strategy in Iraq. One of the central causes of this has been the nature of Blair's foreign policy approach and the relationship that has emerged... more
The essential argument of this paper is simple: there has been a distinct lack of British strategy in Iraq. One of the central causes of this has been the nature of Blair's foreign policy approach and the relationship that has emerged between the US and UK under Tony Blair, especially since 9/11.
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Clausewitz's aphorism that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is widely quoted but often misconceived. The author of a new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, Thomas Waldman will clarify the Prussian theorist's... more
Clausewitz's aphorism that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is widely quoted but often misconceived. The author of a new book, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, Thomas Waldman will clarify the Prussian theorist's insights into the fundamental relationship between war and politics, highlight pitfalls in interpretation, and underline its critical importance for understanding contemporary war.