Mesut Uyar

This is a comprehensive new operational military history of the Ottoman Army during the First World War. Drawing from archives, official military histories, personal war narratives and sizeable Turkish secondary literature, it tells the incredible story of the Ottoman Army's struggle from the mountains of the Caucasus to the deserts of Arabia and the bloody shores of Gallipoli. The Ottoman Army, by opening new fronts, diverted and kept sizeable units of British, Russian and French forces away from the main theatres and even sent reinforcements to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Against all odds, the Ottoman Army ultimately achieved some striking successes, not only on the battlefield but in their total mobilisation of the empire's meagre human and economic resources. However, even by the standards of the First World War, these achievements came at a terrible price in casualties and, ultimately, loss of territory. Thus, instead of improving the integrity and security of the empire, the war effectively dismantled it and created situations and problems hitherto undreamt of by a besieged Ottoman leadership. In a unique account, Uyar revises our understanding of the war in the Middle East.

Tükidides, savaş konusu içinde güç ilişkileri, emperyalizm, yozlaşma ve savaşın nedenleri tezlerini inceleyip gelecek nesillere istifade edebilecekleri ders ve deneyimler aktarmaya çalıştı. Tezlerinin tamamı savaşla ilgilidir. Bunları savaştan soyutlamak, boyut ve önemlerinin azalmasına neden olacaktır. Bu tezler özellikle son elli sene içinde birçok Tükidides incelemesine konu oldu. Ancak Tükidides’in temel tezlerinden biri ihmal edildi. Bu tez, savaşta komuta sorunudur. Tükidides bu sorunun varlığını farkedip inceleyen ilk kişidir. Aslında eserini yazmaya başladığında bu sorunu ve savaşta bireyin önemini pek kavrayamadı. Bütün önemi, şehirler ve toplu olarak vatandaşlarına verdi. Ancak Perikles, Brasidas, Alkibiades, Kleon, Demosthenes ve Nikias gibi sivil-asker liderlerin olayların gidişatına etkileri, O’nun fikrini zamanla değiştirmesine yolaçtı. Çünkü kriz anlarında bireylerin hiç olmadığı kadar önem kazandığını farketti. Savaşın Atina’nın yenilgi ve felaketi ile bitmesi, Tükidides'i eseri yeniden değerlendirmeye zorladı. Zamansız ölümü bu tezi etraflı ve bütünlüklü incelemesine imkan tanımadı. Kanaatimizce bunlar, savaşta komuta sorununun klasik ve modern incelemecilerce gözden kaçırılmasının temel nedenidir.

I. Dünya Savaşı’nın 100. yıl dönümü münasebetiyle ülkemizde ve bütün dünyada savaşa yönelik popüler ve akademik ilgi ciddi derecede artmıştır. Son on yılda farklı dillerde binlerce kitap ve çok daha fazla sayıda makale yayımlandı. Büyük törenler ve anma programları düzenlendi. Yeni anıtlar açıldı. Yeni filmler ve sergiler izleyicilerle buluştu. Ancak bu faaliyet ve yayınların odak noktasında öteden beri popüler olan muharebeler yer aldı. Çanakkale muharebe meydanlarını milyonlarca kişi ziyaret etti. Ama Sarıkamış dışında Kafkas Cephesi’nin muharebe meydanları bu ilgiden nasibini pek de alamadı. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti hudutları dışında kalan muharebe meydanları bakımından durum daha kötüydü. Kutülamare Zaferi yeniden keşfedildi ama İngiliz ordusunun iki kez yenildiği ve ancak üçüncüsünde oldukça maliyetli bir zafer kazandığı Gazze Muharebeleri gene gözlerden ırak kaldı.
İşte bu türden ihmal ve ilgisizlikler bu kitabın yazılmasının temel sebebidir. Sina-Filistin Cephesi, I. Dünya Savaşı boyunca Osmanlı’nın en uzun soluklu ve önemli cephesiydi. Sina-Filistin Cephesi tank ve diğer zırhlı araçlar ile kimyasal silahların kullanıldığı tek Osmanlı cephesidir. Osmanlı subaylarının çoğu farklı tarihlerde bu cephede görev yaptı. Ekim 1918’de bu cephenin çökmesinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun yenilgiyi kabullenip ateşkes istemesinde önemli etkisi vardır. Ancak günümüzde Filistin’in Türkiye toprakları dışında yer alması ve kazanılan zaferlere rağmen muharebelerin nihayetinde Osmanlı’nın yenilgisiyle sonuçlanması Gazze Muharebelerinin ihmal edilmesine ve hatta unutulmasına sebep olmuştur. Yani Gazze Muharebelerinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için sonun başlangıcını işaret etmesinin psikolojik ağırlığı hafızadan silinmesinde büyük rolü olmuştur. İşin ilginç tarafı bölge halkı muharebeleri anmaya devam etse de bunu tamamen İngiliz ve Avustralyalı bakış açısıyla yapmakta, Osmanlı subay ve askerlerini tümüyle görmezden gelmektedir. Oysa bu coğrafyada yaşayan Arapların ve hatta bazı Yahudilerin dedeleri Osmanlı ordusunda görev yapmış ve bir kısmı bu muharebeler esnasında vefat etmiştir. I. Gazze Muharebesi’nin kahramanı 79. Alay’ın askerlerinin çoğunluğunu Filistinli ve Suriyeli Araplar teşkil etmekteydi. Ancak şimdi torunları dedelerinin görev yaptığı Osmanlı ordusunu değil düşmanlarını anmayı tercih etmektedir. Çünkü Haziran 1916’da başlayan Arap İsyanıyla ilgili sonradan Arap milliyetçilerinin yarattığı efsaneler tarihî gerçeklerin üstünü örtmüştür. Üstelik III. Gazze-Bi‵rüssebi‘ Muharebesi’nin yenilgiyle sonuçlanması sadece Osmanlı egemenliğini sona erdirmedi aynı zamanda hem İsrail Devleti’nin doğuş sürecini hem de günümüz Filistinlilerinin sorunlarını başlattı. Dolayısıyla barış içinde birlikte yaşamanın da sonu bu yenilgiyle gerçekleşti.

Turkish Yıldız-70 Atma 4 (Star-70 Drop 4) was a three-pronged operation involving amphibious, parachute, and airborne (helicopter) assaults on Cyprus.1 It was conceived and conducted as Turkey’s military response to the coup on the island in July 1974. Having considered the coup as a way station to Enosis, the island’s unification under Greek rule, Ankara acted decisively to prevent such an outcome at any cost. Turkey’s primary political objective was to deny Greece full control over a strategically important island in the Eastern Mediterranean. The operation was undertaken against a background of steadily improving Turkish military capabilities for adjacent power projection. The campaign stood as the culmination of a partial transformation of the Turkish military from a territorial defense force to that which could fight the Cold War as a part of a grand alliance to an expeditionary organization to meet national contingencies independently within a decade.

This book, Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, is a study of amphibiosity with a view toward examining how the Turks successfully conducted a post–Second World War amphibious campaign in a contested environment. Phase Line Attila details the
Turkish amphibious invasion of northern Cyprus in July 1974 and the
follow-on breakout operation in August.

The Ottoman Army had a significant effect on the history of the modern world and particularly on that of the Middle East and Europe. This study, written by a Turkish and an American scholar, is a revision and corrective to western accounts because it is based on Turkish interpretations, rather than European interpretations, of events. As the world's dominant military machine from 1300 to the mid-1700's, the Ottoman Army led the way in military institutions, organizational structures, technology, and tactics. In decline thereafter, it nevertheless remained a considerable force to be counted in the balance of power through 1918. From its nomadic origins, it underwent revolutions in military affairs as well as several transformations which enabled it to compete on favorable terms with the best of armies of the day. This study tracks the growth of the Ottoman Army as a professional institution from the perspective of the Ottomans themselves, by using previously untapped Ottoman source materials. Additionally, the impact of important commanders and the role of politics, as these affected the army, are examined. The study concludes with the Ottoman legacy and its effect on the Republic and modern Turkish Army.

This is a study survey that combines an introductory view of this subject with fresh and original reference-level information. Divided into distinct periods, Uyar and Erickson open with a brief overview of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the military systems that shaped the early military patterns. The Ottoman army emerged forcefully in 1453 during the siege of Constantinople and became a dominant social and political force for nearly two hundred years following Mehmed's capture of the city. When the army began to show signs of decay during the mid-seventeenth century, successive Sultans actively sought to transform the institution that protected their power. The reforms and transformations that began frist in 1606 successfully preserved the army until the outbreak of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1876. Though the war was brief, its impact was enormous as nationalistic and republican strains placed increasing pressure on the Sultan and his army until, finally, in 1918, those strains proved too great to overcome. By 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the leader of a unified national state ruled by a new National Parliament. As Uyar and Erickson demonstrate, the old army of the Sultan had become the army of the Republic, symbolizing the transformation of a dying empire to the new Turkish state make clear that throughout much of its existence, the Ottoman Army was an effective fighting force with professional military institutions and organizational structures.

Publisher




The Ottoman Empire was founded by and named for a Turk from Asia Minor, Ghazi Osman, whose first victory was over the Byzantines at the Battle of Baphaeum in 1301. From then until the early 20th century, Ottoman Turks held power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The height of the empire was in the 16th century, under Suleyman I, known as "the Magnificent" to European, North African, and Persian armies that feared his military might. Ottoman ships roamed the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; Suleyman's troops attacked Belgrade, Rhodes, Hungary, Algeria, Iran, and even Vienna. Yet, by the end, the Ottomans barely held onto Anatolia, the European side shrunken to only a few miles west of Istanbul. The empire, unable to recover from defeats in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and WW I, fell in 1923 to an uprising led by Kemal Ataturk. There has long been a need for a military history of the Ottomans in English, and Uyar (Turkish Military Academy) and Erickson (US Marine Corps) provide a very complete one. There may be more focused studies on Ottoman campaigns but little better on the Ottoman army and nothing better in a single volume. Summing Up: Essential. All levels/libraries.
K. R. DeVries Loyola University Maryland

Choice, Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, July 2010


English languages of the Ottoman empire have generally glossed over information regarding the makeup of the military, relating the battles from a European perspective. Uyar (international relations, Turkish Military Academy) and Erickson (military history, United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA) both officers with combat experience, tell the story of the Ottoman military organization and how it managed to conquer most of the Near East, North Africa, the Balkans and almost the Hapsburg empire. The authors begin with the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century and end with the fall of the empire and the start of a secular state under Ataturk. Weapons, strategy and personalities of the leaders are all covered as well as the composition of the rank and file. The role of the Janissaries, that uniquely Ottoman institution, is explained as well. The battles most known in the west, the taking of Constantinople in 1453 and the failure to take Vienna in 1683, are both examined from the Ottoman point of view, using documents not available to most western scholars. This book fills a formerly blank space in the history of Eastern Europe and the Near East. Annotation ©2010 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Reference & Research Book News, 02/01/2010


THE UNKNOWN SOLDIERS
David Barchard

Lord Curzon, rather unflatteringly, said that the Turks were a nation of private soldiers. Bu drop the “private” and many Turks, until very recently, would have agreed with him. Considering the prominence of the army in Turkish society throughout the country’s history, it is surprising, how little substantial history has been written about it – leaving books on “civil-military relations” to one side. Now the gap has been filled with this fine account by Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson. It helps that both men have a military background themselves. Colonel Uyar is not only a military historian but also a serving officer in the Turkish army with something most historians these days do not have; plenty of active service experience.
In fewer than 300 action-packed pages, the book takes the reader from the very earliest Ottoman fighting units, described as “a steppe nomadic cavalry force”, up to 1919 and the death of the empire, when “almost overnight, regiment after regiment…changed its loyalty from the sultan to the Turkish nationalist cause”. This is an aspect of the establishment of the republic that is usually overlooked. By the end, the Turkish army, though battered and impoverished, had for several decades been a modern army organized along European lines.
The book covers the classical age of Ottoman military supremacy and the conquest of Anatolia, the Arab Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans, followed by a long period of decline after the mid-17th century. The Ottoman military were technologically resourceful long after the rest of Turkish society appeared to have frozen in time, and by the 1730s the first attempts to import military science from Europe were taking place.
However, the largest section of the book covers the period between 1826 – when the traditional Ottoman forces, the Janissaries, were disposed of in a blaze of grapeshot, to be replaced by a modern army – and the end of the First World War. Throughout this time, military collapse and partition seemed imminent, and the non-Turkish provinces of the empire were peeled away in a series of military defeats. But the military reforms - and the officer corps they produced – were sufficient to enable Atatürk and his fellow officers to win the War of Independence and create modern Turkey. His account focuses both on the close-up details of military history – how battles ad campaigns were fought, and why they were won or lost – and on deeper long-term issues, including shortages of skills and resources, and sultans who often spent more time designing uniforms than working on organisation. The authors write damningly that the earliest period of reform, 1826 to 1853, “was probably more valuable for Ottoman military in the destruction o its antique institutions than for any long-lasting changes which emerged”.
One recurrent tendency was for newly created corps of army officers to see themselves as guardians of society. At the time of the Young Turk revolution, the officer corps became convinced of the wisdom of an enlightened military dictatorship.
The English occasionally falters, but this account is written with intelligence, verve and very deep knowledge of Ottoman history. It is a book to which military historians, as well as students of the Ottoman world, will surely return to again and again.

Cornucopia, vol.7, no.44, Autumn 2010, p.22

the Ottoman army and its officer corps were wholly unprepared for modern warfare in 1853. The opening battles exposed structural problems, but they also overshadowed the major changes which were underway. Academically trained officers without any aristocratic and political connections were gaining power and prestige albeit slowly.
The influx of Hungarian and Polish emigrant officers revitalized the military reforms thereby empowered the Military Academy graduates. Education, training and battlefield performance rather than status and household politics came to determine commission and promotion. One of the major lessons of the Crimean War was the realization of the future of the empire and army depended on the quality of the officer corps, and that quality, in turn, was a direct result of the selection and educational processes. Unfortunately for the empire both the military reforms and new generation of academy graduates needed time and resources which the empire did not have.

Ottoman-Turkish official military history writing started as a part of the war propaganda eff ort and as a way to disseminate lessons learned and train future generations of officers. During the armistice period (1919–1922), a modest but successful programme was carried out, resulting in some quality publications. The foundation of the new republic and the drastic changes that were introduced stalled the First World War official military history writing programme for a short period of time. However, the real trouble was suff ered between 1947 and 1958 when the programme was effectively stopped. Belen’s volumes were the result of a completely
new programme which ended with the publication of the last volume in 2002. Consequently, and in direct contrast to Western official military histories of the First World War, Turkey has three different official history series. Official military history by definition is history writing that is authorized and sponsored by the state. For obvious reasons, it sees the war eff ort through official lenses, whereas war veterans’ individual memoirs provide a distorted reality of the war. Official histories provide the overarching narrative and personal war experiences add colour and accessibility. In Turkey these two problematic lenses have kept the memory of the First World War alive and have enabled the Turkish public to rediscover it. The centenary has brought the war even more into the public consciousness. Such a development in Turkey could not have happened without the publication of official histories and personal war narratives.

The recent revival of academic and popular interest in the Korean War
in Turkey has played an important role in instigating the production of
new books and documentaries. In Turkish accounts the Battle of Kunu-ri
(November 1950) figures more prominently than any other event during
the entire conflict. However, the Turkish Brigade’s performance at this
battle remains controversial. This paper assesses the impact of U.S.
military assistance on Turkish military’s transformation, compares and
contrasts the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the battle (known in
U.S. sources as the Battle of Chongchon), and discusses why the official
perspectives of the engagement diverge substantially.

Halide Edib Adıvar, Kurtuluş Savaşı anılarını kalem aldığı Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı kitabında özellikle Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin açıldığı dönemi “iç savaş” olarak isimlendirir ve “her yerde, kardeşler arasında kan dökülüyordu. Her yerde, yeni oluşmuş bir şekil almamış düşünceler arasında mücadele devam ediyordu” diye tasvir eder. Bir görgü şahidi ve edebiyatçı olarak Halide Edib’in fark ettiği Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın aynı zamanda bir iç savaş olduğu gerçeğini az sayıda tarihçi dile getirmiştir. Resmi tarih kitaplarında ülke geneline yayılan ve uzun süre devam eden isyan ve ayaklanmaların varlığı kabul edilip bazılarında detaylı bir şekilde anlatılsa da bu durumun adının konulmasından çekinilmiştir. 1. Dünya Savaşı’nın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için yenilgiyle bitmesi sonrasında ülkenin yabancı işgaline uğraması, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nı başlatsa da yabancı ordulara karşı verilen konvansiyonel ve gayrinizami savaş, mücadelenin sadece bir boyutudur. Savaşın bir de iç boyutu bulunmaktadır.

1697 Zenta yenilgisinden bu yana Türk ordusu kuşatıcı manevrayla bir zafer kazanmadı. Yakın dönemde Balkan Savaşları’ndan Kurtuluş Savaşı’na kadar girişilen manevraya dayanan bütün muharebeler yenilgiyle sonuçlandı. Sarıkamış en bilinen örnek iken Balkan Savaşları esnasında
Kırkkilise, Lüleburgaz, Kumanova ve Manastır hep manevraların yenilgiyi getirdiği muharebelerdir. Bu durum doğal olarak Türk subaylarına ağır bir
psikolojik baskı yaratmakta, morallerini ve kendilerine güvenlerini sarsmaktaydı. Bu yüzden Büyük Taarruz sadece Kurtuluş Savaşı’nı zaferle sona erdiren bir muharebe değil aynı zamanda Türk’ün makûs talihi değiştiren bir dönüm noktasıdır.

Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın 100. yıl dönümü bize bu savaşın önemli hadise ve muharebelerini anmanın yanı sıra mevcut literatürü de gözden geçirmek, hatalarını gidermek ve anlaşılır bir şekilde farklı okur gruplarına sunmak
için fırsat yaratmaktadır. Tarihimizde az sayıda muharebeye verilmiş “melhame-i kübra” (büyük ve kanlı muharebe) unvanını taşıyan Sakarya Muharebesi bu açıdan iyi bir örnektir. Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın coğrafi alan, süre, şiddet ve zayiat (ölü ve yaralı) açılarından en büyük muharebesi olduğu gibi Ankara Hükümeti’nin karşılaştığı en büyük tehlikeydi.

1991’den bu yana özellikle yıldönümlerinde, 1nci İnönü Muharebesi gazete köşe yazılarından televizyon programlarına kadar uzanan yelpazede tekrar ve tekrar tartışılmaktadır. Ancak ne yazık ki bu tartışmalar, somut bir sonuca ulaşamamakta ve mevcut tarihi bilgilere bir katkı sağlamamaktadır. Bu makale, muharebe ve tartışmaları şimdiye kadar ihmal edilen operasyonel askeri tarih çerçevesinde inceleyerek yeni bir bakış açısı getirmek ve hiç değilse bazı iddiaları neticeye bağlamak için yazılmıştır.

Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nın askerî safahatı ülkemizde bilinmemektedir. Başta Plevne olmak üzere zaferlere odaklanan anlatım tarzı yüzünden çoğunluk birbirinden bağımsız iki cephede savaşıldığı ve başından sonuna büyük felâketlerin yaşandığından bile haberdar değildir. Bu nedenle bu makalede yaşanan stratejik, operatif ve taktik komuta sorunlarına vurgu yapılarak savaşın askerî bir özeti verilmektedir.

1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı sonuçları ve yarattığı tahribat açısından özellikle Türkiye'de hâlâ hatırlanan ve tartışılan bir konudur; ancak, ne yazık ki, savaşın askerî yönü detaylarıyla incelenip tartışılmamaktadır. Oysa savaşın stratejik, operatif ve taktik komutası günümüze değerli dersler sunacak düzeyde zengindir. Her iki taraf da çok büyük komuta hataları yapmış ve daha az hata yapan Rusya savaşı kazanmıştır.

The Sanders German Military Advisory Mission was designed and called upon to revitalize a defeated army in the Balkan Wars and to route out its partisan politics. However, the diplomatic crisis which started upon the mission's arrival in Istanbul, the outbreak of the First World War seven months later, and the Ottoman Empire's decision to join the war on the German side after a difficult period of neutrality obliged the mission to face unexpected crises and situations to assume duties other than those originally contemplated. The increase of German personnel, which had started before the war, turned into a veritable avalanche after the war broke out, and thousands of German soldiers, most of whom were independent of the mission command, pursued different objectives. Against this anarchic atmosphere and despite infighting with Ottoman officers, the Sanders Mission played an important role in modernizing the Ottoman Army and rendering it more effective. Through German support and training, Ottoman officers and soldiers accumulated the knowledge and experience that they otherwise would have gained only through a much longer and more arduous process.
Sanders Alman Askeri Yardım Misyonu, Balkan Savaşlarında bozguna uğramış bir orduyu tekrar ayağa kaldırmak ve onu siyasetin dışına çıkarmak için tasarlandı ve çağrıldı. Ancak misyonun İstanbul’a gelmesiyle başlayan diplomatik kriz, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın yedi ay sonra patlak vermesi ve sancılı bir tarafsızlık sonrasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun savaşa Almanya’nın yanında dahil olmasıyla misyon beklenmedik krizler ve durumlarla yüzleşip tasarlanandan farklı ödevler üstlenmek zorunda kaldı. Savaş öncesinde başlayan personel artışı savaş esnasında bir çığa dönüştü ve çoğu misyondan bağımsız binlerce Alman askerleri farklı hedefler doğrultusunda faaliyet gösterdi. Bu anarşik yapıya ve Osmanlı subaylarıyla yaşanan çekişmelere rağmen misyonun Osmanlı Ordusu’nun modernleşmesi ve askeri etkinliğinin artmasında büyük rolü olmuştur. Osmanlı subay ve askerleri aksi takdirde daha uzun ve zorlu bir süreçte edinecekleri bilgi ve deneyimleri savaş esnasında Alman eğitim ve desteğiyle edinmişlerdir.

At the beginning of the First World War, Romania was the ideal candidate for alliance with the Ottoman Empire whereas Bulgaria was the enemy. However developments beyond the control of both nations put them against each other. Against all these the Ottoman troops contributed greatly to the war against Romania.

Öz Çeçenler tek başlarına veya diğer Kafkas milletleriyle beraber 1750'den beri Rus işgali ve yönetimine karşı direnmektedir. Bu direniş 1850'ler ve 1990'larda tepe noktasına çıkmıştır. Bu makalenin iddiası, bu iki tepe noktasında Çeçenlerin ve Rusların çözüm getirmeyen aynı stratejileri ve yöntemleri uyguladıkları ve geçmişten hiçbir ders almadıklarıdır. Bu kısırdöngü iyi analiz edilirse, gelecekte soruna barışçı çözüm bulmak mümkün olacaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Çeçenistan, Rusya, Gayri Nizami Harp, Ayrılıkçı Milliyetçilik, Şeyh Şamil. Abstract Chechens have fought against Russian occupation and administration since 1750 by themselves or with other Caucasian nations. This struggle has reached its peak once in 1850s and then again in 1990s. The main thesis of this article is that both Chechens and Russians had applied the same pointless strategy and methods and that they had not learned anything from history. If this vicious circle is examined thoroughly, a peaceful conflict resolution will be available.

The Gallipoli campaign occupies an important place in modern Turkish history, a position reinforced by the release of new publications and the construction of additional monuments to mark the centenary of the conflict. However, these are comparatively recent developments as, just decades ago, the Gallipoli campaign was not regarded as significant to the foundation of the Turkish Republic nor as a powerful source of national identity. While popular Turkish remembrance and commemoration of the campaign began with the wartime propaganda and myth-making of the period, the Turkish War of Independence proved more significant to the national consciousness, inspiring its own particular myths and legends. Yet, with the passage of time, official military histories, personal war narratives, the construction of the Dardanelles Martyrs' Memorial in the early 1950s and the official campaign of the 1980s to create a more articulated Gallipoli history proved instrumental in establishing Gallipoli as crucial to the foundation narrative. Alongside this, recent political and sociocultural developments have also seen the creation of an alternative Islamic myth (with the controversy that accompanies it) while reinforcing the omnipresence of Gallipoli in Turkish history and national consciousness. The Gallipoli campaign occupies an important place in modern Turkish history. From both the official Turkish and popular perspective, it is regarded not only as a magnificent victory, but also as signifying the birth of the new Turkish nation which emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The centenary of the Gallipoli campaign has prompted the publication of large numbers of Turkish language books on various aspects of the campaign – a trend that would have been most unlikely just three decades ago. Indeed Gallipoli has earned its prominent position in Turkish history only after a lengthy and arduous journey, having long remained solely of interest to Turkish military officers and a small group of enthusiasts. Only official military historians and veterans produced books and articles and these were consumed by a relatively small audience. Even the construction of monuments and cemeteries was a protracted and difficult process. In contrast to Britain, Australia and New Zealand, Turkish observance and commemoration of the Gallipoli campaign was observed on a single day – 18 March – and was for many years a local affair, only becoming

Thanks to centenary there is burgeoning interest in understanding the war from "the other side of the hill" but stereotypes, common mistakes and remnants of wartime propaganda continue to obscure the true picture of the Ottoman Army. The critical role played by German General Liman von Sanders during initial landings at Gallipoli has been riddled with myths, legends and wartime propaganda.

At its height the Ottoman Empire occupied an area that stretched from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea and from Poland in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south. Its success was based on strong and well-organised military and administrative structures, the control of trade routes and a diverse mix of geography, population and cultures.

Did Germany engineer the war for its own territorial ambitions, or was it a victim of the complicated diplomatic web that bound it to an unstable Hapsburg empire? The issue of German culpability is still hotly debated today, not least amongst German historians. We take the view from Berlin to find out how the war was perceived within the borders of the Central Powers.

Bu makalede, 19 ncu yüzyılın başından bu yana Türk askerî sistemini de önemli ölçüde etkilemiş
olan ve etkileri günümüzde de devam eden Prusya askerî sisteminin doğuşu ve olgunlaşması
incelenmiştir. Oldukça eski ve eksik bir makale olmasına ragmen gelen istek üzerine bu makaleyi ekliyorum.

The Gallipoli campaign occupies an important place in modern Turkish history. From both the Turkish official and popular perspective, it was not only a magnificent victory, but also signified the birth of the new Turkish nation from the wreck of the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to the forthcoming centenary of the Gallipoli campaign, ever-increasing numbers of new books about various aspects of the campaign are being published every year in Turkey. But astonishingly these have been only recent developments.

According to commonly held opinion, Arab officers of the Ottoman Army were instrumental in the initiation of the Arab Revolt and the Ottoman final defeat by throwing their lot in with the British and French. This article is an effort to correct this stereotypical opinion by making use of untapped Ottoman archive records and creating a data set. Even though the Ottoman Empire did not manage to integrate different ethnic groups, it did succeed in creating a viable and effective officer corps by making use of military educational institutions for implanting general unity and a sense of inclusiveness. Thanks to esprit de corps and long-established military institutions, most of the Arab officers stayed loyal to the empire up until the very end.

"Beginning with the restoration of the constitution in 1908, officers began to write and publish their thoughts and ideas about various aspects of the military, especially their combat experiences and criticisms of past campaigns. Various journals and newly opened literary clubs became the centers of discussion for the exchange of ideas. Furthermore, for the first time in the history of the empire, the military authorities encouraged these activities. Illustrating this, the official military science journal Mecmua-i Askeri (Military Magazine) became the most important vehicle for the transmission of new ideas and critiques in the Ottoman military renaissance.
However, the real breakthroughs came after the humiliating defeats suffered at the hands of the small Balkan states. The defeats caused a very serious mental depression to take hold of the officer corps, which forced them to discuss openly their concerns about the fate of the empire and the possible scenarios facing it. Most of the career officers voiced their frustrations on the apparent weakness of the army and its obvious military incapacity. Every publication (especially memoirs) immediately created new discussions and new publications. Even though most of them pointed out political issues, military problems and possible solutions were the essential components of these discussions. Some of the most favored topics were the performance of the Ottoman General Staff, outdated and cumbersome methods and procedures, the triangular divisional system, the mechanism and dynamics of attack and defense, new weapons (especially machine guns), combat support and service support, recruitment and how to increase morale and élan. Ottoman military history was often used (not always scientifically) to prove the validity of one’s claims.
Interestingly as the Turkish officers hesitantly but continuously became nationalistic their publications also mirrored this development. They tried to reach a wider public by simplifying their ideas or making use of various literary prose forms and poems. Ottoman historical figures, famous conquests and victories were widely used in earlier times to transmit nationalist messages. But this time the authors tried to blend military commentary with nationalism, religion and other popular feelings.
This military renaissance was the main force behind the vigorous reorganization of the Ottoman military. However, neither German officers, who were working within the Ottoman Army, nor other foreign military officers in the empire, seemed to notice these intellectual developments. They continued to perceive and describe the Ottoman military as archaic and its officer corps as ill-trained, corrupt and highly politicized. In short, western officers in the empire uniformly asserted that the Ottoman military was a hopeless case. Throughout the interim period and even during World War I, Turkish officers continued to communicate their ideas through official reports and personal letters to higher command echelons. Moreover, many of them maintained pocket diaries even during the most intense combat operations.
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