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. The familiar decision analysis setting in accounting, such as a cost-volume-profit analysis setting, is modeled as arising in a “larger” context in which subsequent choice is also contemplated. We then ask when this “larger” context... more
. The familiar decision analysis setting in accounting, such as a cost-volume-profit analysis setting, is modeled as arising in a “larger” context in which subsequent choice is also contemplated. We then ask when this “larger” context decomposes in a manner such that the immediate problem of interest can be modeled as an expected utility maximization problem that is completely divorced from the subsequent choice problem. Outcome and taste independence conditions are the key ingredients in being able to model the immediate problem as having no link whatever to its successor. Resume. Le contexte dans lequel les techniques d'analyse de decision comme par exemple l'analyse coĉt-volume-profit est utilisee est un cadre d'un modele elargi qui tient compte du choix subsequent. On se demande en quelles circonstances ce contexte elargi peut-il se decomposer de facon telle que le probleme d'interet immediat en soit un de maximisation completement separe du probleme du choix subsequent. Le resultat et des conditions d'independance de preference sont les ingredients cles pour modeler le probleme immediat comme n'ayant aucun lien avec son successeur.
We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under... more
We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under heterogeneous beliefs. We introduce the ...
The purpose of this paper is to explore the theory of agencies (both for single and multiple agents) to derive additional insights into the nature of optimal contracts and the demand for information in contracting.
In this study we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficient statistics to strictly (Pareto) dominate all nonsufficient statistics as information for contracting in agencies with moral hazard. We first observe that strict... more
In this study we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficient statistics to strictly (Pareto) dominate all nonsufficient statistics as information for contracting in agencies with moral hazard. We first observe that strict dominance requires that an optimal compensation scheme itself be a sufficient statistic. Since this can occur only in settings where the family of distributions parameterized by the
All papers in this volume examine aspects of the two related fields generally known as information economics and agency theory. Most of the authors teach accounting and their papers have implications for accounting, but they examine... more
All papers in this volume examine aspects of the two related fields generally known as information economics and agency theory. Most of the authors teach accounting and their papers have implications for accounting, but they examine general information and agency issues that are applicable to a broad range of information and contractual settings. Atkinson and Feltham (1982), Baiman (1982), Verrecchia (1982), and Feltham (1984) provide reviews of information economics and agency-theory research, with particular emphasis on accounting implications. Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) provide a general survey of information analysis in the economics literature. The interested reader is encouraged to read these review articles to obtain an overview of the two fields.
... Economic Sufficiency and Statistical Sufficiency in the Aggregation of Accounting Signals Amin H. Amershi University of Minnesota Rajiv D. Banker University of Minnesota Srikant M. Datar Carnegie Mellon University ... f (y, z; a) =exp... more
... Economic Sufficiency and Statistical Sufficiency in the Aggregation of Accounting Signals Amin H. Amershi University of Minnesota Rajiv D. Banker University of Minnesota Srikant M. Datar Carnegie Mellon University ... f (y, z; a) =exp {p(a) y+ q (a)z - r(a)+ s (y) +t(z - yy)j (4) ...
This paper provides a complete analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for financial markets to achieve fully Pareto-efficient allocation of aggregate wealth through trade in economies with arbitrary preferences. We show that... more
This paper provides a complete analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for financial markets to achieve fully Pareto-efficient allocation of aggregate wealth through trade in economies with arbitrary preferences. We show that full Pareto efficiency obtains only if the market structure of contingent claims spans the information partition of a minimal aggregate wealth statistic and a Halmos-Savage sufficient statistic for the beliefs of the traders. All the known allocation efficiency results in the literature due to Arrow, Hakansson, John, Ross, and others are unified by this result. A SECURITY IS A certificate that entitles the holder to a stream of cash flows
Conducts an exploratory analysis of the probability distribution of the ratio total debt/total invest capital, to determine if the occurrence of the Finobacci golden mean and ratio, as possible values of this ratio, are random or... more
Conducts an exploratory analysis of the probability distribution of the ratio total debt/total invest capital, to determine if the occurrence of the Finobacci golden mean and ratio, as possible values of this ratio, are random or indicative of firm survival. Uses highly technical mathematical and algebraic explanatory means to emphasize points. Adopts the use of figures and tables to aid explanation. Concludes that, although some progress has been made, more sophisticated analysis is required.
... Economic Sufficiency and Statistical Sufficiency in the Aggregation of Accounting Signals Amin H. Amershi University of Minnesota Rajiv D. Banker University of Minnesota Srikant M. Datar Carnegie Mellon University ... f (y, z; a) =exp... more
... Economic Sufficiency and Statistical Sufficiency in the Aggregation of Accounting Signals Amin H. Amershi University of Minnesota Rajiv D. Banker University of Minnesota Srikant M. Datar Carnegie Mellon University ... f (y, z; a) =exp {p(a) y+ q (a)z - r(a)+ s (y) +t(z - yy)j (4) ...
This paper provides an economic rationale for modern manufacturing control practices such as the minimal inventories in Just in Time (JIT)systems, zero-defect policies, and continuous improvement. The popular and academic literature... more
This paper provides an economic rationale for modern manufacturing control practices such as the minimal inventories in Just in Time (JIT)systems, zero-defect policies, and continuous improvement. The popular and academic literature contains descriptive studies on the mechanics of these systems and their perceived benefits. We use a model of production to analyze both informational and incentive rationales for reduced inventories.
In this study we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficient statistics to strictly (Pareto) dominate all nonsufficient statistics as information for contracting in agencies with moral hazard. We first observe that strict... more
In this study we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficient statistics to strictly (Pareto) dominate all nonsufficient statistics as information for contracting in agencies with moral hazard. We first observe that strict dominance requires that an optimal compensation scheme itself be a sufficient statistic. Since this can occur only in settings where the family of distributions parameterized by the
This book draws together a long series of papers by the two senior authors, alone and in collaboration with each other and with other friends and colleagues, to whose thinking and stimulation we are grateful. Both of us have had a strong... more
This book draws together a long series of papers by the two senior authors, alone and in collaboration with each other and with other friends and colleagues, to whose thinking and stimulation we are grateful. Both of us have had a strong primary concern with the ...
Abstract A copula-based approach for pricing crack spread options is described. Crack spread options are currently priced assuming joint normal distributions of returns and linear dependence. Statistical evidence indicates that these... more
Abstract A copula-based approach for pricing crack spread options is described. Crack spread options are currently priced assuming joint normal distributions of returns and linear dependence. Statistical evidence indicates that these assumptions are at odds with the ...
... Stan Baiman, John Dickhaut, Gordon Duke, Jerry Feltham, Jim Jordan, Chandra Kanodia, Eric Noreen, Terry O'Keefe, and an anonymous referee provided useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are... more
... Stan Baiman, John Dickhaut, Gordon Duke, Jerry Feltham, Jim Jordan, Chandra Kanodia, Eric Noreen, Terry O'Keefe, and an anonymous referee provided useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are responsible for the remaining errors. ...
We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under... more
We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under heterogeneous beliefs. We introduce the ...
Abstract. A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myer-son's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is... more
Abstract. A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myer-son's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is a "cost plus" type of transfer pricing. ...