Alina Ng

Morality in analytical jurisprudence has always assumed a metaphysical and theoretical character. As morality and the law are connected in distinctive ways, morality plays a pivotal role in one's understanding of the concept of law. Thus far, we have taken moral norms as providing a reliable measure of right and wrong actions. But the naturalization of ethics in moral philosophy has introduced research findings from the natural sciences which suggest that morality is far more nuanced and varied than we have come to assume. Some moral norms, evolutionary biology has shown us, have less to do with propriety, righteousness, or civility, and more to do with developed biological responses to our surrounding environment. Other moral norms emerged because of political reasons rather than rectitude. This paper argues that we should consider seriously these new findings about our moral psychology in the conceptualization of law in analytical jurisprudence. Morality, if it is an unreliable source of good conscience, cannot and should not be used to provide laws with the normative force it needs to justify the imposition of obligations or to govern with legitimate authority. Until neuroscientists and developmental psychologist are able to determine with some definiteness how our capacity for moral decisions functions and establish morality as a universal feature of humankind, we need to be cautious in how much faith we place on morality as a standard setting norm to separate right from wrong.

Previous intellectual property literature demands a balance between incentives to produce for the creator of a work and access to information, knowledge, and content by the users. However, law and economics jurisprudence does not provide compelling arguments to support the notion that the copyright monopoly is the most efficient way to maximize public welfare by promoting the works of authors. The social cost from expansion of private rights is nonexistent because market structures change as technologies develop, providing society with increased accessibility to creative works. Accordingly, copyright laws need to expand as technology develops in order to realize a fair balance between private rights and public interests. The author focuses on the effect of technology on the accessibility of creative works and concludes that copyright law provides a balance between private rights and public interests that would not normally exist

Authorship and creativity are products of authentic human expression that the law must encourage in order for works to be produced. The commercial market for literary and artistic works encourages the creation of diverse works to meet popular consumer demand. Focus on popular demand may, however, result in works that lack social, educational and cultural value or utility. Natural law philosophy suggests that the copyright system should be an ethical and moral institution that would, in turn, promote the progress of society through authentic authorship. While economic incentives offer authors market rewards that may facilitate the creation and dissemination, economic rights represent only a portion of rights, which the copyright system should recognize in the author. This paper makes the case for the recognition of property rights in the author’s creation, which originating from an author’s the act of creativity and authorship, is a right to the author’s literary and artistic creation that is good against the world, and, if protected, will result in authentic expressions of greater significance upon the progress of science and the useful arts in society

Copyright laws aim to protect intangible interests in the use of literary and artistic works to provide creators with an incentive to produce. The law rationalizes that by granting exclusive “property” rights in creative works, authors will be encouraged to produce works for the ultimate benefit of society as the potential for commercial rewards is assumed to be the primary motivation for creativity. But, the exclusive control these rights give creators and owners of copyrighted works have been the subject of severe criticism because they create access barriers to the use of content, which, free speech and civil liberties advocates, argue should be free of restrictions for civil discourse and political dialogue. This Article argues that, contrary to contemporary thought that rights in the copyright system hampers progress, the protection of individual rights in literary and artistic works - besides encouraging creativity for progress - also brings into the copyright system a normative order for social conduct that advances society towards the Constitutional goal of progress. A strong institution of property rights for the copyright system correlates with greater progress of science and arts because the recognition and protection of individual authorial autonomy instills individual and collective social responsibility in how works are used and produced, generates public respect for the act of authorship, and fosters education, research, and economic development through the production and use of literary and artistic works. The creation of diverse works will contribute towards progress of science and arts only if an underlying foundation of property rights protect the creator of a work to instill a sense of individual autonomy and responsible authorship and directs public use of the work toward socially beneficial purposes in ways that strengthen, rather than weaken, the moral fabric of society. This Article concludes that the progress of science and arts is not only dependent on a system of statutory copyright provided by the Copyright Act but on an institution of property laws to provide normative guidance on proper conduct in the production and use of literary and artistic works in ways, which would advance progress.

Morality in analytical jurisprudence has always assumed a metaphysical and theoretical character. As morality and the law are connected in distinctive ways, morality plays a pivotal role in one’s understanding of the concept of law. Thus far, we have taken moral norms as providing a reliable measure of right and wrong actions. But the naturalization of ethics in moral philosophy has introduced research findings from the natural sciences which suggest that morality is far more nuanced and varied than we have come to assume. Some moral norms, evolutionary biology has shown us, have less to do with propriety, righteousness, or civility, and more to do with developed biological responses to our surrounding environment. Other moral norms emerged because of political reasons rather than rectitude. This paper argues that we should consider seriously these new findings about our moral psychology in the conceptualization of law in analytical jurisprudence. Morality, if it is an unreliable so...