Giuseppe Puma

This contribution analyses the question whether the designation of diplomatic premises depends on the unilateral choice made by the sending State or is subject to the approval, at least tacit, of the receiving State. According to the International Court of Justice the latter solution is to be preferred. In the author's view, this finding of the Court is to be shared. Firstly, the definition of "diplomatic premises" under Article 1(i) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations should be interpreted in the light of the Convention as a whole, that is to say a legal instrument in which the consent of both the sending and the receiving State is a core element. Secondly, the author argues that the object and purpose of the Vienna Convention imply that the choice of the diplomatic premises is not subject to the unilateral determination of the sending State. Thirdly, it is contended that this view is supported by the subsequent practice of the States parties to the Convention.

This paper analyses the legal questions arising from the incursion of the United States (US) police into the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington. The premise was not, at that time, used for diplomatic purposes. In fact, it had been abandoned after the severance of diplomatic relations between the US and Venezuela, because of the recognition, by the former State, of a "new" interim Government in the latter. There are two questions strictly related to each other: firstly, whether the legitimate Venezuelan Government had the power to break off diplomatic relations with the US; secondly, which are the obligations of the host State on the treatment of abandoned diplomatic premises. It is argued that the source of these obligations is to be found in Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which decisively differ from those posed by Article 22 of the same Convention. In the author's opinion, Article 45 only obliges the host State to respect and protect the abandoned premise in order to ensure its potential re-use once the relations with the sending State are re-established. SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione.-2. La rottura delle relazioni diplomatiche: natura ed effetti sui rapporti tra Stato accreditante e Stato accreditatario.-3. Segue: Effetti del riconoscimento del nuovo Governo venezuelano sui rapporti diplomatici tra Stati Uniti e Venezuela.-4. Compatibilità della condotta statunitense con l'art. 45 della Convenzione di Vienna sulle relazioni diplomatiche del 18 aprile 1961. 1. Introduzione.-Il 16 maggio 2019 alcuni agenti della polizia Questo scritto è stato sottoposto a referaggio.

This paper analyzes the preliminary questions in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Separation of the Chagos Archipel- ago from Mauritius in 1965. In the first Section, it deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and in particular with the object of the request made by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2017. The aim of this Sec- tion is to underline that the formulation of the request has played a crucial role for the determination, by the Court, of the legal ground on which it based its opinion. The question has been treated correctly as a matter of de-colonization and self-determination, as suggested by the General Assembly (GA), and this choice has influenced both the admissibility and the merits of the case.
The second Section analyzes the questions of admissibility raised in the course of the Chagos proceeding. It is argued that, although the conclusions reached by the opinion are correct, the last and most important objection to the admissibility should have been treated by the Court so as to point out that consent, as such, is not a condition for the exercise of the advisory ju- risdiction, especially when “community interests” come at issue. In the bal- ance between the discretion not to render the opinion and the duty to coop- erate with other United Nations (UN) organs, the latter prevailed, given the importance of the legal values – protected by obligations erga omnes – in- volved in the legal questions put to the Court’s assessment.

Giuseppe Puma Complicità tra Stati e organizzazioni internazionali nella violazione di obblighi erga omnes Complicity between States and International Organizations in the breach obligations erga omnes This paper analyses the issue of complicity in grave breaches of international obligations erga omnes. In the first Section, this contribution scrutinizes the particular nature of international obligations erga omnes, that is to say obligations owed to the international community as a whole. It also examines the rule on aid or assistance in internationally wrongful acts, enshrined in article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and in article 14 and 58 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. In the second Section, the paper illustrates two recent cases of complicity in grave breaches of international law: the aid or assistance given by Italy and the European Union in the violation of fundamental human rights committed by Libya and the assistance given by the United Kingdom to the grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed by Saudi Arabia in the context of the Yemeni civil war. Nella prassi internazionale più recente si è registrato un numero consistente di illeciti internazionali scaturenti dalla violazione di diritti umani fonda-mentali, notoriamente tutelati da norme del diritto internazionale generale istitutive di obblighi erga omnes. La dottrina internazionalistica ha ampia-mente esaminato gli illeciti in considerazione, prestando particolare atten-zione alle gravi violazioni dei diritti umani poste in essere nel quadro della "gestione" dei flussi migratori e a quelle, parimenti gravi, commesse nel corso di conflitti armati. Il dibattito scientifico ha così contribuito a chiarire i contorni della responsabilità internazionale imputabile agli Stati autori delle condotte in discorso. Oggetto del presente lavoro è, invece, una valuta-zione in merito alla posizione dei soggetti dell'ordinamento internazionale che abbiano concorso con quegli Stati nella realizzazione di siffatti illeciti erga omnes. Questo contributo è suddiviso in due parti. Nella prima, dopo