Yusuf Dasdemir

This paper deals with a solution to the infamous liar paradox, usually known in the Arabic literature as Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. The solution is raised by a fifteenth-century Ottoman treatise that is attributed, among others, to Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. The paper also compares it with the solution by the contemporary Persian philosopher, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. The short treatise devoted to the paradox is one of the few works by Ottomans on the subject and it comprehensively addresses the paradox in its two forms. An analysis of the solution offered by the treatise to the paradox, the paper aims to bring Ottoman discussions of the liar to the attention of contemporary scholarship and contribute to filling the obvious gap in the literature on the paradox in Islamic thought.

A sentence that declares itself to be false or not true is
called a “liar sentence” and the logical and semantic problems following
from such sentences are called the “liar paradox”. Liar sentences
have the paradoxical feature of being true if false and false if
true, and as such, they threaten the principle of non-contradiction,
the basic axiom of Aristotelian logic. This paper deals with a treatise
on the paradox by an Ottoman scholar, later titled The Solution
to the Paradox Called Irrational Root (Ḥall al-maghlaṭa almusammāt
bi-l-jadhr al-aṣamm) and discusses the identity of its
author because, in the secondary literature as well as manuscripts
and library records, it is either anonymous or attributed to different
names. This paper aims to question the generally accepted
view that it is by Ḫocazāde by raising arguments to show that
Ḫaṭībzāde’s authorship is also well possible. The paper also makes
the treatise accessible for further theoretical discussions by presenting
here a new critical edition and translation of the text. Given
that contributions by Ottoman scholars to the discussions about
the subject have not yet been investigated enough, this paper will
serve to fill the gap in the literature.

This study will deal with the very short treatise and its commentary, both by Ḫādimī, with occasional reference to Aḳvirānī’s and Ḳarṣī’s commentaries as well as other logic works by Ḫādimī. It aims to discuss for the first time the influential eighteenth-century Ottoman scholar-logician’s position on the parts of propositions and, by doing so, to contribute to the newly emerging area of Ottoman logic. It also provides as an appendix a critical edition of Ḫādimī’s commentary on his treatise to make the work accessible to contemporary scholarship.
The study consists of two sections. The first will introduce the author and the manuscript copies of the treatise and its commentary that I have managed to locate. The second will analyse Ḫādimī’s stance on the problem of parts of propositions. Since a more in-depth analysis of the treatise lies beyond the scope of this writing, I will confine my treatment to the parts directly related to the problem in question.

This study deals with the skeptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī. Though not skeptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs skeptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. The paper questions Qūnawī’s implicit assumption that if there is disagreement on a proposition p, then p is relative, and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his skepticism as well as to shed light to the largely unknown terrain of skepticism in the medieval Islamic world.

This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī's (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought-Sufism and philosophy in this case-led to some adaptation problems and internal inconsistencies for these currents. Keywords Avicennan theory of demonstrative science-Akbarian tradition of Sufism-Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī-Mullā Fanārī

This paper addresses discussions in post-Avicennan Arabic logic on various characterizations of metathetic propositions and their status vis-à-vis the existential import condition by focusing on the arguments made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and the counter-arguments by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365), both of whom established their positions in a framework drawn by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037), the most prominent figure in the tradition of classical Arabic logic. In his logic texts, Avicenna thoroughly discusses the problem of the existential import in metathetic propositions (ma'dūla), and seems to have presumed the existential import to be a truth-condition for affirmative propositions, and therefore, for affirmative metathetic propositions as well. For Avicenna, in other words, an affirmative metathetic proposition presumes its subject-terms's possibly existent referent(s). However, the theologian philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who lived about a century and half after Avicenna, criticized his views on metathetic propositions and their existential import among other things, thereby igniting a wave of debates in the tradition, in which Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī participated in the following century. By studying this contained problem, this paper seeks to address a wider scholarly concern regarding the vitality of post-classical Arabic logic, and to establish that this period witnessed the flourishing of philosophical debate among Arabic logicians.

Öz: Bu çalışma İbn Sînâ sonrası İslam mantık geleneğinde ma'dûle önermelerin tanım ve varlıksal içerik açısından du-rumları konusunda yapılan tartışmaları ele almaktadır. Bunun için özellikle Fahreddin er-Râzî (ö. 606/1210) tarafından getirilen eleştiriler ve Kutbüddin er-Râzî et-Tahtânî (ö. 766/1365) tarafından bunlara karşı öne sürülen cevaplar üzerinde durulacaktır. İslam mantık geleneğini çok büyük ölçüde belirlemiş ve sonraki nesiller için tartışma çerçevesini çizmiş bir isim olarak İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037), eserlerinde ma'dûle önermeler ve varlıksal içerik hakkında da geniş değerlendirmelerde bulunmuştur. Onun olumsuz önermeler için olmasa da olumlu önermeler için varlıksal içerik şartını koyduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Ona göre bu kural ma'dûle önermeler için de geçerlidir ve onlardan da olumlu olanlar varlıksal içerik şartını sağlamak zorundadır. Ancak İbn Sînâ'dan yaklaşık bir buçuk asır sonra yaşamış olan kelâmcı-filozof Fahreddin er-Râzî, diğer pek çok konuda olduğu gibi ma'dûle önermeler ve bunların varlıksal içeriği konularında da İbn Sînâ'ya eleştiriler yöneltmiş ve gelenek içerisinde yeni bir tartışma literatürüne öncülük etmiştir. Nitekim bir sonraki yüzyılda Kutbüddin et-Tahtânî de bu tartışmalara katılmıştır. Çalışma, İslam mantık geleneğinin İbn Sînâ sonrasında da fikrî ve felsefî hareket-liliğini kaybetmediğini ve felsefî-mantıksal içeriği ve değeri olan tartışmalar üretmeye devam ettiğini ma'dûle önermeler bağlamında göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Geleneğin İbn Sînâ sonrası dönemine ilişkin araştırmaların henüz başlangıç aşa-masında olduğu düşünüldüğünde çalışmanın literatüre mütevazı da olsa bir katkı sunması beklenmektedir. Anahtar kelimeler: İslam mantık geleneği, İbn Sînâ mantığı, varlıksal içerik, ma'dûle önermeler, Fahreddin er-Râzî, Kut-büddin er-Râzî et-Tahtânî. Abstract: This paper addresses discussions in post-Avicennan Arabic logic on the definition of metathetic propositions and their status in relation to existential import requirements, focusing on the arguments made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and the counter-arguments by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365), who both establish their positions in the framework drawn by the most prominent figure in the tradition of classical Arabic logic, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037). In the latter's works, the problem of the existential import requirement in metathetic propositions (ma'dūla) are thoroughly discussed and Avicenna seems to have presumed the existential import as a truth-condition for affirmative propositions, and therefore, affirmative metathetic propositions. For Avicenna, in other words, an affirmative metathetic proposition presumes its subject-term's possibly existent referent(s). However, the theologian-philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who lived about a century and half after Avicenna, raised criticisms against him in terms of metathetic propositions and their existential import among other things and ignited a wave of debates in the tradition, in which Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī took place in the following century. Through a study of this contained problem, this paper aims to address a wider scholarly concern regarding the vitality of post-classical Arabic logic. By studying the issue of existential import in metathetic propositions, this paper seeks to establish that in fact, this period was witness to the flourishing of philosophical debate among Arabic logicians.

This paper examines Avicenna’s remarks and considerations on conditional propositions and the oppositonal relations between them. It also tries to detect his ancient and Arabic sources and his influence on the tradition of Arabic logic after him. It aims to show that Avicenna’s theory of conditionals has original aspects different from that of ancient logicians and that he improved this theory significantly. It also aims at showing that Avicenna’s theory is essentially Peripatetic, not Stoic.

As a product of non-religious or even pagan social environment for non-religious and universal purposes, logic has had to undergo some evolutions and even renounce some of its parts or aspects to survive in the religion-oriented scientific milieus. In the history of Aristotelian logic, as far as I know, the first challenge of this kind is what befell to logic while it was studied in the school of Alexandria. Ammonius, son of Hermias, the successor of his father as the master of the Alexandrian school of philosophy, tried his best to implant Greek philosophy and logic in an overwhelmingly Christian society and reportedly had to come to an agreement with the bishop not to teach some things inconvenient to the religious community. Similarly in the Syrian schools, logic was mutilated most probably for religious reasons and the Organon was read and taught only up to the end of the seventh chapter of the Book One of the Prior Analytics. When transmitted to the Arabo-Islamic World, logic seems to have suffered from the same fate for a while. In the circles of religious scholars, particularly grammarians and theologians treated logic as an unwelcome innovation and a foreign interloper and harshly questioned its very existence and legitimacy. It was Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī that changed this miserable destiny of logic in the Islamicate World. Ghazali extends logic a stable and respected place in the curricula of the Islamic madrasas that has so far been endured since then, but it has been too costly for logic because logic gained that status at the expense of its philosophical features and implications.
This paper treats Ghazali’s efforts to Islamicize logic giving some illustrative examples of what we might call his ‘Islamic logic’ and reconsiders the religio-social background of these efforts. It aims to shed some light upon very important questions about the nature and reasons of Ghazali’s favorable treatment of logic and the significance of this treatment in the history of Arabic logic. Since, I think, Ghazali’s historical and doctrinal contribution to the Arabic logic has been relatively overlooked in the scholarly circles, I hope that this paper modestly contributes to filling the gap in the literature.