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... its consequences. Derek Parfit's priority viewz is an example of a nonutilitarian version of consequen-tialism, which prescribes that benefits to the worse off should count for more than benefits to the better off. Another... more
... its consequences. Derek Parfit's priority viewz is an example of a nonutilitarian version of consequen-tialism, which prescribes that benefits to the worse off should count for more than benefits to the better off. Another example ...
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In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts', recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present... more
In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts', recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
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The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or... more
The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or `editing' phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules
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The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we... more
The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral theorists make sharp, binary distinctions between right and wrong acts. However, an important argument speaking in favour of our non-binary analysis is that it better reflects our considered intuitions about the ethical trade-offs we face in discussions of nuclear power. The aim of this article is to make this argument sharp by explaining how it can be rendered compatible with, and supported by, the Capability Approach, which is quickly becoming one of the most influential frameworks for thinking about human development.
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... In many (but not necessarily all) situations in which virtuous agents have to make a choice the following propositions seem to hold true: ... As pointed out by Crisp, virtue ethics does indeed have a very central rule, namely that all... more
... In many (but not necessarily all) situations in which virtuous agents have to make a choice the following propositions seem to hold true: ... As pointed out by Crisp, virtue ethics does indeed have a very central rule, namely that all agents should be virtuous. ...
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This article discusses some ethical principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine and other indivisible goods. I argue that a number of principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine recently adopted by several national... more
This article discusses some ethical principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine and other indivisible goods. I argue that a number of principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine recently adopted by several national governments are morally unacceptable because they put too much emphasis on utilitarian considerations, such as the ability of the individual to contribute to society. Instead, it would be better to distribute vaccine by setting up a lottery. The argument for this view is based on a purely consequentialist account of morality; i.e. an action is right if and only if its outcome is optimal. However, unlike utilitarians I do not believe that alternatives should be ranked strictly according to the amount of happiness or preference satisfaction they bring about. Even a mere chance to get some vaccine matters morally, even if it is never realized.
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... Issue. Bioethics. Volume 25, Issue 5, pages 290291, June 2011. Additional Information. How to Cite. PETERSON, M. (2011), PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND UTILITARIANISM. Bioethics, 25: 290291. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01805.x. Author... more
... Issue. Bioethics. Volume 25, Issue 5, pages 290291, June 2011. Additional Information. How to Cite. PETERSON, M. (2011), PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND UTILITARIANISM. Bioethics, 25: 290291. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01805.x. Author Information. ...
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The notion of residual obligations can be used as a tool to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individual s prima facie right not to be exposed to involuntary risks, and the rights of industries and other large... more
The notion of residual obligations can be used as a tool to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individual s prima facie right not to be exposed to involuntary risks, and the rights of industries and other large organisations to carry out activities that are associated with risks. A typology of residual obligations is developed, and it is applied in a discussion of the moral obligations of those who impose risks on others. The major types are obligations to compensate, to communicate, to improve, to search for knowledge, and to have an appropriate attitude. It is argued that conscientious compliance with risk-related residual obligations is an essential component of what makes it morally acceptable to expose others to risk.
One of the central issues in radiation protection consists in determining what weight should be given to individual doses in relation to collective or aggregated doses. A mathematical framework is introduced in which such assessments can... more
One of the central issues in radiation protection consists in determining what weight should be given to individual doses in relation to collective or aggregated doses. A mathematical framework is introduced in which such assessments can be made precisely in terms of comparisons between alternative distributions of individual doses. In addition to evaluation principles that are well known from radiation protection, a series of principles that are derived from parallel discussions in moral philosophy and welfare economics is investigated. A battery of formal properties is then used to investigate the evaluative principles. The results indicate that one of the new principles, bilinear prioritarianism, may be preferable to current practices, since it satisfies efficiency-related properties better without sacrificing other desirable properties.
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We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only... more
We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only "secondary values" that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are neither value-free, nor depend exclusively on epistemic values or use non-epistemic values as tie-breakers.
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In this paper we discuss how rights-based moral theories can increase our understanding of siting controversies. It is argued that the notion of residual obligations can be used to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the... more
In this paper we discuss how rights-based moral theories can increase our understanding of siting controversies. It is argued that the notion of residual obligations can be used to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individual right not to be exposed to ...
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The contention of this paper is that the current ethical debate over embryonic stem cell research is polarised to an extent that is not warranted by the underlying ethical conflict. It is argued that the ethical debate can be rendered... more
The contention of this paper is that the current ethical debate over embryonic stem cell research is polarised to an extent that is not warranted by the underlying ethical conflict. It is argued that the ethical debate can be rendered more nuanced, and less polarised, by introducing non-binary notions of moral rightness and wrongness. According to the view proposed, embryonic stem cell research--and possibly other controversial activities too--can be considered 'a little bit right and a little bit wrong'. If this idea were to become widely accepted, the ethical debate would, for conceptual reasons, become less polarised.
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... 8, No. 4, pp.341358. Biographical notes: Nicolas Espinoza is a PhD student of Philosophy at the Luleå University of Technology in Sweden. ... More specifically, consider for example the rehabilitation and reconstruction of New... more
... 8, No. 4, pp.341358. Biographical notes: Nicolas Espinoza is a PhD student of Philosophy at the Luleå University of Technology in Sweden. ... More specifically, consider for example the rehabilitation and reconstruction of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina. ...
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According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck (e.g. Pritchard (2005, 128)), an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant... more
According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck (e.g. Pritchard (2005, 128)), an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. This paper argues, with reference to a novel variety of counterexample, that it is a mistake to focus, when assessing a given event for luckiness, on events distributed over just the nearest possible worlds. More specifically, our objection to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck reveals that whether an event is lucky depends crucially on events distributed over all possible worlds–viz., across the modal universe. It is shown that an amended modal account of luck which respects this point has the additional virtue of avoiding a notable kind of counterexample to modal accounts of luck proposed by Lackey (2008).