Cette introduction vise a situer dans l’histoire de la philosophie et a justifier l’interet d’un programme d’enquetes sur les motivations affectives pour mettre en perspective et en dialogue les quatre articles qui suivent dans ce... more
Cette introduction vise a situer dans l’histoire de la philosophie et a justifier l’interet d’un programme d’enquetes sur les motivations affectives pour mettre en perspective et en dialogue les quatre articles qui suivent dans ce fascicule.
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This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is... more
This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does
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We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is social entanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second... more
We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is social entanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second dimension is disentanglement, the valuational element of the theory that licenses the anchoring of agency and responsibility in distinct actors. We then present an issue for the account: the problem of bad company.
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The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have... more
The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.
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In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives—utterances that express emotions and other affects—from descriptives, including those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent... more
In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives—utterances that express emotions and other affects—from descriptives, including those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of emotion and value (2), we show how these three features derive from the nature of affects, concentrating on emotions (3). We then spell out how theories of non-natural meaning and communication in the philosophy of language allow claims that expressives inherit their meaning from specificities of emotions—namely, from being felt, evaluative attitudes toward propositional or non-propositional contents (4). 1. Expressives vs. descriptives: three benchmarks Supposing that utterances (1)–(3) and (4)–(9) respectively refer to the same phenomena, compare groups A and B.
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In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinct emotion. Being moved is the experience of being struck by the goodness of some specific positive value being exemplified. I start by... more
In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinct emotion. Being moved is the experience of being struck by the goodness of some specific positive value being exemplified. I start by expounding this account. Next, I discuss three issues that have emerged in the literature regarding it. These concern respectively the valence of being moved, the scope of the values that may constitute its particular objects, and the cognitive sophistication required for experiencing it. My main contention is that when we understand that the presence of the specific positive value must be apprehended as finally, importantly, and impersonally good to trigger being moved, these issues do not arise.
Research Interests: Psychology and Philosophy
Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is... more
Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
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Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and... more
Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
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Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its... more
Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral ...
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If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call thetransparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that... more
If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call thetransparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call theparallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illum...
Research Interests: Marketing, Sociology, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Emotion, and 11 morePhilosophy, Applied Ethics, Empathy (Psychology), Political Science, Moral Philosophy, Simulation, Rating Scale, American Psychological Association, Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and Costs and Benefits
ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that... more
ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.
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How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame... more
How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.
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The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to “avoidance” emotions (like contempt and disgust)... more
The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to “avoidance” emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to “punitive” emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.
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In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist... more
In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might acc...
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<p>This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say... more
<p>This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria's nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (<italic>valence</italic>). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (<italic>individuation</italic>). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria's remark to Sam (<italic>intentionality</italic>). Finally, there is anger's relation to behaviour (<italic>motivation</italic>). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does.</p>
There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from... more
There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is da...
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Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the... more
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We t...
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La culpabilite est une emotion morale, la honte ne l'est pas. Cette idee, a quelques exceptions notoires, traverse l'histoire de la theorisation de ces deux emotions. Dans cet article, apres une breve discussion de la notion... more
La culpabilite est une emotion morale, la honte ne l'est pas. Cette idee, a quelques exceptions notoires, traverse l'histoire de la theorisation de ces deux emotions. Dans cet article, apres une breve discussion de la notion d'« emotion morale », j'expose les raisons avancees en sa faveur et les rejette. Ma critique a deux volets distincts : (1) Elle consiste d'abord a rejeter les criteres qui militent en faveur d'une comprehension de la honte comme amorale et la culpabilite comme morale. Ces objections passent, comme nous le verrons, par un rejet des theses selon laquelle(a) la honte est de nature sociale et (b) qu'elle tend a engendrer des comportement anti-sociaux. Elle consiste ensuite a esquisser une morale personnelle de la honte et de la culpabilite qui illustre les limites des demarches contemporaines, notamment de la psychologie evolutionniste, qui concoivent l'ethique purement en termes du « vivre en commun » ou autrement dit purement en ter...
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the... more
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudesas opposed to, for ...
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Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the... more
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We t...
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Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette... more
Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitude...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Art
"In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emotions with the attractive and widespread idea that emotions are relations between a subject and a value. I start by explaining that the... more
"In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emotions with the attractive and widespread idea that emotions are relations between a subject and a value. I start by explaining that the challenge requires that we avoid ascribing to animals cognitive capacities that are too complex and I close by putting forward a theory which, through its specific articulation of the relation between emotion and value, is ideally placed to meet this challenge. Before that, I present the grounds for the claim that emotions are forms of evaluations. I stress the fact that!this idea has traditionally led to a theory of emotions according to which emotions are nothing but judgments of value, the consequence being that animals are construed as devoid of emotions. I then consider whether a particular theory – the perceptual theory – is apt to resolve the problem. According to it, emotions constitute experiences of evaluative properties which could be enjoyed by members of many different species. Given that there are compelling reasons to reject this theory, I finally present an original alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions – that has the virtue, among others, of being able to account for animal emotions."
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There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from... more
There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful', ‘offensive, ‘annoying', ‘dangerous', ‘contemptible', ‘admirable', ‘amusing', ‘exciting', ‘boring', and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects,... more
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.
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In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should... more
In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries.
Research Interests: Philosophy and Dialectica
Research Interests: Psychology and Ethics
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This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a... more
This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war ( Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgr...
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Perception, Adolescent, Medicine, and 8 moreShame, Humans, Female, Male, Young Adult, Self Concept, Adult, and Morals
In this article, we ask whether and in what way emotions are in themselves good for the well-being of the individuals who experience them. Our overall argument aims at showing that an objectivist list theory of well-being suitably... more
In this article, we ask whether and in what way emotions are in themselves good for the well-being of the individuals who experience them. Our overall argument aims at showing that an objectivist list theory of well-being suitably anchored within a value-based theory of the emotions provides the best framework for answering these questions. Emotions so conceived, we claim, provide for the sort of first-person perspective understanding of values that is required in order to pursue them. This conclusion we reach only after having brought to light in the first part of the article the limitations of rival hedonist and desire-based theories of well-being. We conclude that at least part of the insights fueling these theories, i.e., good feelings and getting what one wants are a measure of how well our lives go, can happily be accounted for within the approach we recommend.
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The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame... more
The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.
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In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in... more
In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which “others” play an essential role. We argue that while all
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In this article, we encourage a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions qualify as evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion-value connection at the level of emotional content... more
In this article, we encourage a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions qualify as evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion-value connection at the level of emotional content and that we should instead locate it at the level of emotional attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we situate the leading accounts of the emotions in the contemporary literature. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they conceive of the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we then substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons for which such an approach may be resisted and which respectively pertai...
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This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a... more
This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgro...