Sossi Tatikyan

From September 2020 to September 2023, Azerbaijan applied a combination of hard and soft tactics, military and hybrid methods to depopulate Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) of its indigenous Armenian population. Different terms are used by various official, policy and academic circles to describe the de-Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh. The choice of term often depends on their stance, beliefs, interests and expertise. These terms include "genocide", "ethnic cleansing", "forced displacement", "displacement", "exodus", "voluntary exodus", "migration", among others. Some also use terms that mock or deny the genocide and ethnic cleansing. This article explores the most accurate terms to describe the de-Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh. It does this by comparing various perspectives and examining the compliance of the used terms with those implied in international law and relations, as well as their political applicability. The article also revisits the methods and scenarios employed by Azerbaijan, which resulted in the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The combined analysis of those aspects and overwhelming evidence shows that the de-Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh is ethnic cleansing. Legally, it also corresponds to most of the genocide criteria; however, it may be a difficult claim politically and compared with other ongoing conflicts.

On July 22, the Council of the European Union adopted the rst assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the Armenian Armed Forces. This decision was made alongside the European Commission's decision to launch a dialogue on visa liberalization to support Armenia in its long-term goal to achieve a visa-free regime with the EU. Both decisions were endorsed in the context of ongoing negotiations for the EU-Armenia new Partnership Agenda. Since October 2023, top Armenian of cials, including the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament and the Foreign Minister, have cautiously implied EU membership aspirations of the Armenian people for the rst time, generating a discourse about Armenia's "pivoting" towards the West. While some analysts warn about the potential negative implications of such a move, Armenia hasn't submitted a formal request for candidacy, causing dissatisfaction among the extra-parliamentary liberal opposition and civil society. The complexities of the perspectives of Armenia's European integration will be addressed in the next article.

A previous article identified the strengthening of the France-Armenia partnership as a key factor in Azerbaijan's escalating hostility towards France and tackled Azerbaijan's and Russia's Campaign of False Narratives in relation to it. This hostility eventually evolved into a hybrid war by Azerbaijan in the French overseas territories in the South Pacific, as well as Corsica in the French mainland. The Misuse of the Non-Aligned Movement Azerbaijan has a long-standing membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) based on its foreign policy of non-alignment and equal distancing. It held the chair of the movement from 2019 and 2023. The tenure coincided with its military campaign against Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in 2020 and 2023, resulting in their full ethnic cleansing. It also coincided with its military offensives against Armenia and occupation of more than 200 sq/km of its border regions.

Azerbaijan's campaign of disinformation and false narratives against France has escalated into a hybrid war, reaching as far as the South Paci c and Africa. This may seem surreal to many, but for those closely tracking Azerbaijan's intensifying rhetoric and actions against France since 2020, which escalated further in 2023, it is not surprising. It is no secret that the deteriorating relationship between France and Azerbaijan stems from the growing partnership between France and Armenia. Over the last two years, Azerbaijan has employed tactics of harassment against any international actor supporting Armenians. Baku has targeted the EU, its mission in Armenia, its individual member states, the U.S., international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and watchdogs, scholars, analysts and journalists. It is trying to ensure impunity for the blockade, military offensives, large-scale war and the eventual ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also aiming to evade accountability for its military offensives and creeping annexation in sovereign Armenia while continuing its expansionist demands towards Armenia. Azerbaijan has become particularly hostile towards France due to its consistent support for Armenians and criticism of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's campaign of disinformation regarding France's partnership with Armenia gradually escalated into a broader campaign against France. Its style is characteristic of an illiberal autocratic regime and mirrors Russia's similar campaign in Africa and the European neighborhood.

From September 2020 to September 2023, Azerbaijan applied a combination of tactics, both hard and soft, and military and hybrid, to depopulate Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) of its indigenous Armenian population.

Different terms are used by various official, policy and academic circles to describe the de-Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh. The choice of term often depends on their stance, beliefs, interests and expertise. These terms include “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing”, “forced displacement”, “displacement”, “exodus”, “voluntary exodus”, “migration”, among others. Some also use terms that mock or deny the genocide and ethnic cleansing.

This article explores the most accurate term to describe the de-Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh. It does this by comparing various perspectives and examining the legal and political applicability of these terms. The article also revisits the methods and scenarios employed by Azerbaijan, which resulted in the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians.

Armenia Country Report in the Special State of the Region 2024 Issue of the scholarly Baltic Worlds journal from the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) of the Södertörn University, Stockholm, dedicated to the:
A World Order in Transformation?: A Comparative Study of Consequences of the War and Reactions to These Changes in the Region

I drafted the country report on Armenia: "The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict."

Part I: Deception and Manipulation of the EU and the United States to Absorb Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijan has been using military and diplomatic coercion to achieve its maximalist, expansionist and hegemonist objectives with regard to Armenia and Armenians. It also employs wide-ranging tools of hybrid war, such as historical revisionism, disinformation, lawfare and cognitive warfare. To achieve its objectives, Azerbaijan has been also deceiving and harassing international actors. In particular, Baku has manipulated the concepts of territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as exploited geopolitical dynamics, in particular, Russia’s war in Ukraine.
All of this also has its implications for international order and other conflicts such as Kosovo-Serbia, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Israel-Palestine, Northern Cyprus.

Part II of my new article:

Part I of this article introduced the current discourse on the perspectives of Armenia’s foreign and security policy. It also introduced international relations concepts and terms that can be used to analyze its past, present and future tendencies.
Part II presents a brief overview and analysis of Armenia’s foreign and security policies between the restoration of its independence in 1991 up until the 2018 Velvet Revolution, in order to understand its current situation and future options.
The impact of these factors was not very visible or tangible with the status quo, but it became apparent and destructive in light of further developments, such as the Velvet Revolution, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the subsequent security crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia to be addressed in Part III of this article.

RUSSIA USED THE KARABAKH CONFLICT AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO ADVANCE ITS GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS.
Published in English, Armenian, Russian and German.

In the aftermath of the military offensive and ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, Azerbaijan seized control of the capital Stepanakert and demolished the de facto state that had existed for the last three decades. The status quo policy of Armenia and its reliance on Russia for security did not save Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia from the 2020 war and its consequences.

Russia missed the opportunity to save its face, once more choosing further advancement of its geopolitical interests instead of the protection of the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Russia also lost the trust of its ally Armenia, which is apparently leading to transformation in its foreign and security policies.

The Current Discourse Recently, the discourse about the transformation of foreign and security policies of Armenia, a small state facing signi cant security challenges in a volatile geopolitical environment, has been intensifying. International of cials, political gures and academics have been debating whether Armenia is in the process of "pivoting" or "changing its vector". The question arises as to whether Armenia will turn away from Russia and adopt an explicitly pro-Western foreign and security policy, or if it is only diversifying its partners to reduce its dependence on Russia. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about whether the ongoing transformation is irreversible, or if Armenia is maneuvering between power centers.
The theory and practice of international relations (IR) offer conceptual frameworks for deep-trend analysis of Armenia’s foreign and security policies since it regained independence in 1991. The frameworks also help evaluate the choices Armenia is currently facing to pursue its interests in a highly volatile and complex geopolitical environment. These concepts include pivoting, hedging, balance of power, bandwagoning, diversification, non-bloc and small states, neutrality, nonalignment, “finlandization” and equal distancing. Let’s unpack those terms.

International actors did not find a way to exercise their leverage on Azerbaijan to make it stop its obstructionism, coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, the creeping annexation of Armenia and creeping ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan was also engaging in historical revisionism and cognitive warfare based on ethnic hatred towards Armenians. Moreover, it has been harassing and bullying international actors supporting Armenians. The U.S. and EU  appeared to imply that “democratic peace” theory would reconcile Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instead, the result was an “illiberal peace” due to the autocratic nature of Azerbaijan, its use of force and refusal to accept negotiated solutions.

What (not) to do now? What is needed to encourage and achieve the return and dignified life of a significant number of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh?

If the international community fails to stop the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, this will become yet another embarrassment and a dangerous precedent for the international order, and the members of the UN Security Council, especially its permanent members, as well as the mediators, such as the United States, the EU and Russia, will be deemed responsible for it. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh should not become the collateral victims of the current complex geopolitical realities.

Part I of this article addressed scenarios that Azerbaijan is trying to impose on the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), including a scheme similar to the evacuation of the Finns from Karelia in the 1940s, integration as a means of subjugation, cutting the link with Armenia to deprive ethnic identity, and denial of not only external but also internal self-determination.

This article addresses the Holodomor-like deprivation of food as a weapon of subjugation and ethnic cleansing. After months of gradually deepening the blockade and experimenting with various methods of coercion to force Armenians out of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seems to have found a slow-paced but high-impact weapon – deliberate starvation.

On July 29, Azerbaijani border services kidnapped and detained an elderly man, Vagif Khachatryan, who was being transferred to Armenia by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) for medical treatment, and whose name was communicated and approved by the sides in advance. The transfers by the ICRC indefinitely stopped after this detention.

This arbitrary detention proves the validity of several scenarios identified in a recent article and other scenarios in a forthcoming one. At the same time, it makes explicit new but long-suspected threats posed by Azerbaijan to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, as well as highlights a new level of long-exercised Armenophobia.

The critical stage of the blockade clearly demonstrates Azerbaijan’s long-suspected mega-intentions. Some of these intentions are related to Nagorno-Karabakh and others – to sovereign Armenia. In this article, I will address only Azerbaijan’s intentions in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan is trying to carry out one of the following scenarios for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians or a combination of their elements:

1. The scenario of the 1940-1944 evacuation of Finnish Karelia
2. Integration as means of subjugation

a. Cutting the link with Armenia to deprive ethnic identity
b. Subjugation under the cover of “integration”
c. Denial of not only external but also internal self-determination

3. Sarajevo-like siege in progress
4. Great famine/starvation/Holodomor Scenario
5. A scenario combining elements of the Srebrenica massacre or Kosovo war

The EU launched a Common Security and Defence Policy civilian mission in Armenia on 20 February 2023 to contribute to deescalation and stability in its border areas, committing to serve as a soft security deterrent through its political leverage and physical presence in the region. It is expected to strengthen Armenia’s resistance to military offensives and coercion, and help achieve a sustainable peace during negotiations with Azerbaijan. The EU itself was a passive observer of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war until the second half of 2021, drawing criticism for its lacklustre policy reaction to the conflict. In the past couple of years, however, the Union has stepped in to fill the vacuum generated by the delegitimisation of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the growing polarisation between its members: Russia on the one hand, and the EU and US on the other. Armenia has the highest ranking of democracy and human rights in the region, and is trying to reduce its dependency on Russia, while Azerbaijan is the most autocratic country manoeuvring between the West and Russia, yet committed to contributing to Europe’s energy security. The deployment of the EUMA contributes to the stabilisation of the region through its political leverage, restoration of the undermined trust in the international community, and the creation of favourable conditions for ensuring its energy interests and influence in the region. Thus, the EU is walking a tightrope between liberalism and realpolitik, balancing its roles as a normative actor and geopolitical player through both mediation and deterrence.
This paper is the academic and updated version of a policy article published on the day of launching the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) (Tatikyan, 2023a). It is based not only on academic research but also practical work of the author as a member of the expert community and civil society involved in peacebuilding, public diplomacy and advocacy. Some of the analyses about the perspectives of the EU officials, the Armenian authorities and the opposition, expert community, civil society and wider public have been made on the basis of the meetings and discussions based on Chatham House rules, following and taking part in the public discourse and monitoring the media and the social media.

On 7-9 September 2022, I was invited, as a Speaker, to the 45th Annual Sanremo Round Table on current issues of International Humanitarian Law organised jointly by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In 2022, the theme of the roundtable was “After the Conflict Before the Peace: Legal, Military and Humanitarian Issues during the Transition”. I made a presentation in Session VII. Planning for post-conflict from the military and humanitarian perspectives: necessary interactions between actors.
The topic of my presentation was: "The legal and military aspects of the management of secessionist conflicts after the war and before the peace: with and withoutinternational peacekeeping". After the roundtable I was requested to turn it into  publication.
Today I received the proceedings of the roundtable, which contains my paper on pages 194-202. It contains a reflection of the analysis of multilateral peacekeeping in UN missions and unilateral Russian peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh. Please note that the last version of the paper was produced in November 2022, before the start of the Lachin blockade.

The European Union launched its civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) on February 20, 2023, within its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The objective of the EUMA is to contribute to de-escalation and stability in Armenia’s border areas, as well as support the delimitation and demarcation process and confidence-building between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Mission will complement mediation efforts led by President of the European Council Charles Michel. The EUMA will patrol and report, which will strengthen the EU’s understanding of the situation on the ground.

The EU attempted but could not obtain Azerbaijan’s authorization to deploy on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while both Azerbaijan and Russia have objected to the deployment of the EUMA.

Let’s examine the motivations of each stakeholder in the context of the deployment of this mission.

Proposing a feminist foreign policy would raise eyebrows in Armenia, a country that has been involved in armed conflict and has conventional threats to its security and sovereignty in a complicated geopolitical environment. In order to assess the relevance of feminist foreign policy for Armenia, it is important to first understand the challenges of the country's foreign and security policy, local perceptions and biases in relation to feminism, and the overall lack of representation of women in the field. licence infos At this very moment, Armenia is still going through the heavy security, political, economic, social, and psychological consequences of the military defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched by Azerbaijan in violation of international law. Azerbaijan tried to justify the war as a legitimate action to restore its territorial integrity, blaming a lack of progress in negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group although none of the parties seemed interested in conflict resolution. During the last decades, Azerbaijan had invested hydrocarbon profits to prepare This article is part of the dossier "Feminist Foreign Policy and the South Caucasus." It is based on reflections from an online workshop conducted by the Heinrich Boell Foundation in October 2022 with decisionmakers, civil society representatives, and academics from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Germany.

Since its military defeat in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s, Azerbaijan has been conducting a proactive campaign of narratives against Armenia, directed at both its domestic and international audiences. After its military victory in the 2020 Artsakh War, not only did Azerbaijan not stop the war of narratives but elevated them to a new and increasingly aggressive level, often accompanied with disinformation.

В последние годы в Армении, особенно после поражения в 44-дневной войне, некоторые группы и отдельные лица манипулируют представлением о том, что права человека и демократия являются западными, либеральными, глобалистскими и ложными ценностями, привнесенными из-за рубежа через гражданские общество с целью ослабления безопасности, обороны страны и снижения сопротивляемости общества.

Однако анализ факторов, приведших к войне, показывает, что в действительности в период, лежащий между первой и второй войнами, в Армении и Арцахе не было удовлетворительной отчетности и прозрачности ни дипломатического переговорного процесса по мирному урегулированию Арцахского конфликта, ни хода модернизации армии, повышения боеспособности и реформы оборонного сектора.

The global response to secessionist inter-ethnic conflicts is shaped by a number of factors, from the extent of the threat of ethnic cleansing, to possession and instrumentalization of energy sources and more.
The application of different approaches to inter-ethnic conflicts by the UN, regional international organizations (i.e. OSCE, EU, African Union) and major powers have created the impression that the international community applies a double standard and geopolitical considerations for different conflicts, something which is leading to the collapse of the international order.
It is difficult to assess which factors prevail in shaping the approaches of major global actors to each conflict – the severity of human rights violations or geopolitical interests. While the application of double standards is a common public perception, the approaches by key international organizations and major powers are multi-layered.
the approaches by the international community towards secessionist inter-ethnic conflicts are shaped as a result of the following factors or their combination:

The extent of the threat for ethnic cleansing making remedial secession, recognition or sovereignty an imperative to prevent it;
Foreign policy choices, alliances and aspirations, balancing vs. bandwagoning in relation to the major powers by the parties to the conflict;
Possession and instrumentalization of natural, especially energy resources;
Government systems – democracy vs. autocracy, and their respective system of values in relation to civil and political rights and liberties;
The consistency and intensity of the diplomatic strategies applied by the parties to the conflict and the dynamics in the war of narratives.

In order to understand what may happen to Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh if no appropriate international guarantees for security and human rights are put in place for them, it is helpful to review the evolution of several comparable conflicts (Nakhichevan, South Ossetia, Northern Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor and Kosovo). Of course, it is necessary to bear in mind that no two conflicts are identical; each has its unique characteristics.
The purpose of drawing parallels is to understand underlying factors in each scenario, imagine possible outcomes, and draw lessons learned and best practices. Also, despite the undermining of the international order and the flux of geopolitics, especially in light of the 2020 Artsakh War and the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is still a floor for the actors involved—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, the West and international organizations—to choose between various scenarios or their elements. Subsequent developments will also depend on the will, resilience, agility and wisdom of the Armenians in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).

After the big bang enlargements of the EU and NATO in 2004, the Southern Caucasus was recognized as an important region for the further strengthening of stability, security, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic space. The Caucasus, along with Balkans, has always been the hotspot of wider Europe. The states in the Western Balkans started developing regional cooperation and deepening their reconciliation only after the EU reiterated its determination to fully support their European prospects at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. Even being subjected to the EU’s conditionality principle, discarding old policies and mentality is not a smooth process in the Western Balkans, and it is difficult to predict whether the region will stabilize or destabilize after defining the final status of Kosovo. The policy of both the EU and NATO toward the Southern Caucasus is obscure and raises a range of questions. How they can achieve better complementarity in the region? Do the proposed Action Plans offer sufficient incentives to encourage reforms? What will follow the implementation of those Action Plans? After the EU and NATO digest their big bang enlargements, will they offer pre-accession instruments to those countries? If so, what will be the scenario of enlargement in the region—will the EU and NATO adopt a regional approach, trying to integrate all three countries at more or less the same rate, or take an individualized approach contingent on their willingness, conditional on their performance, and dependent on their interstate relations? What will be the consequences of extending the enlargement policy to the Southern Caucasus for the EU, NATO, the region as a whole, and its individual states? All these questions need answers both from the Union and the Alliance, as well as from the three states in the region.

Latest developments in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrate Azerbaijan’s intent to ethnically cleanse the indigenous Armenian population and highlight the necessity of introducing international norms in the peacekeeping architecture there.
https://evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/international-community-must-prevent-azerbaijans-creeping-ethnic-cleansing-in-nagorno-karabakh/?fbclid=IwAR3SxWyT-ofLCNMxXgaSIDqF-DTm-lawGiAA-RTLyOSbvWwVJ7H00QUYSq8

The current war in Ukraine and the reaction of the international community to it is perceived with mixed feelings in Armenia for a range of complex reasons. It has equally complex implications on Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (in Armenian – Artsakh). Despite controversial and even polarized perceptions, there are a few shared beliefs being confirmed in Armenia:

various conflicts receive international attention based on double standards,
muted consequences against Azerbaijan for the 2020 Artsakh War normalized war as an alternative to resolving disputes through negotiations,
geopolitical interests prevail over the normative framework of human rights and the values of democracy, which is leading to the collapse of the international order.

The abstention by Armenia was the only rational choice, aimed at reconciling its most vital security challenges with its system of values and sovereignty concerns. Moreover, with that vote, Armenia mirrored the contradiction between professed values of democracy and human rights on one side and geopolitical economic and security interests on the other, which it witnessed among the international community during the 2020 Artsakh War.

ollowing my previous article in July 2021, new developments have taken place in terms of the creeping annexation and aggressive military operations of Azerbaijan, the shaping of attitudes of the international community toward these, and the formation of a format for the delimitation and demarcation (D&D) process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This article is meant to provide an analysis of these developments and offer suggestions on the forthcoming phases, formats and principles of the D&D process.

What was posed as a border demarcation issue further threatens regional stability in the South Caucasus. The current context of mounting military action is not sustainable; the process must revert back to international norms.

The article presents the chronology of events and reaction to them, risks of deviating from international standards, human-rights based approach, the potential role of international mediation and the options for the way ahead.

Background On the 20 of June 2021, citizens of Armenia will head to the polling stations to participate in the parliamentary snap elections seven months after the 2 Karabakh war (September 27, 2020-November 10, 2020) and in a situation of resulting postwar political crisis. The Armenian society is highly polarized and confused about the future of the country more than ever before. According to the results of International Republican Institute (IRI) polls in May, more than 55% of the population find it difficult to answer which political party they will vote for in the elections. This lack of orientation seems to have deepened even more since the number of participants in the elections is quite high-twenty-two parties and four alliances were registered by the Central Electoral Commission running for elections on the 26 of May.

In a previous article (https://www.evnreport.com/raw-un ltered/on-the-elaboration-of-armenia-s-new-national-security-strategy), written at the beginning of the development process of Armenia's new National Security Strategy (NS Strategy) in August 2019, I explained that Armenia chose the format of an NS Strategy, a more action-oriented document, rather than a National Security Policy for a strategic framework to address the security needs of the state and its people.

In Armenian

Իմ երկու նոր` ուսուցողա-մեթոդոլոգիական հոդվածները "Ազգային անվտանգության և անվտանգության հաստատությունների բարեփոխումների ռազմավարություն" և "Անվտանգության հաստատությունների բարեփոխումներ" թեմաներով.

«ՀԿ Դեպո – Հասարակական կազմակերպությունների զարգացման ծրագրի» շրջանակում ԱՄՆ Միջազգային զարգացման գործակալության աջակցությամբ հրապարակվել է ձեռնարկ հետևյալ թեմաներով.
- Հայաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության առաջնահերթությունները և անվտանգության
ոլորտի բարեփոխումները:

Anahit Shirinyan-ը հեղինակել է առաջին`"Հայաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության առաջնահերթությունները" բաժինը, իսկ ես երկրորդ` "Ազգային անվտանգության և անվտանգության հաստատությունների բարեփոխումների
ռազմավարություն" և երրորդ` "Անվտանգության հաստատությունների բարեփոխումներ" բաժինները:

Ձեռնարկը նախատեսված է քաղաքացիական հասարակության ներկայացուցիչների, ուսանողների և առհասարակ լայն
շրջանակների համար:

Նշեմ, որ այս երկու հոդվածները գրել եմ իմ ներկայիս աշխատանքին անցնելուց առաջ, հետևաբար որպես անկախ փորձագետ:

Շնորհակալություն Եվրասիա Համագործակցություն Հիմնադրամ կազմակերպությանը համապատասխան բաժինները մեզ վստահելու համար: Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan, Gayane Mkrtchyan, Lilit Arzoyan...

Countries that use the army to restore public order and security tend to justify it by their ill-equipped, ill-trained and small police, the presence of non-state armed groups, the threat of terrorism, none of which is applicable for Armenia, and finally, by the threat to the constitutional order and resorting to violence by the protesters; this was a justification used by Kocharyan. However, even in that case, the declaration of a state of emergency was necessary for the use of army, which was enacted only retrospectively. The army could be used only to support the police in case of extreme violence by the protesters - which did not seem to be the case during protests in February-March 2008 - but not to use lethal weapons and cause casualties. Although the relevant provisions of the 2015 Constitution give more opportunity for the use of army, than the previous one, nevertheless, eventually the political will of the Head of State at the time determined its use or non-use. And finally, armies or various units of the army in different countries have reacted to the instruction to suppress protests differently, largely determining the outcome of various uprisings, revolutions and protests, such as during the Arab Spring.

Armenia is set to have a new National Security Strategy. The current strategy, adopted in January 2007, had all the necessary components, but was outdated and remained a largely superficial and declarative document as many of the defined values and principles were not fully respected or promoted.

After the big bang enlargements of the EU and NATO in 2004, the Southern Caucasus was recognized as an important region for the further strengthening of stability, security, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic space.

The Caucasus, along with Balkans, has always been the hotspot of wider Europe. The states in the Western Balkans started developing regional cooperation and deepening their reconciliation only after the EU reiterated its determination to fully support their European prospects at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. Even being subjected to the EU’s conditionality principle, discarding old policies and mentality is not a smooth process in the Western Balkans, and it is difficult to predict whether the region will stabilize or destabilize after defining the final status of Kosovo.

The policy of both the EU and NATO toward the Southern Caucasus is obscure and raises a range of questions. How they can achieve better complementarity in the region? Do the proposed Action Plans offer sufficient incentives to encourage reforms? What will follow the implementation of those Action Plans? After the EU and NATO digest their big bang enlargements,
will they offer pre-accession instruments to those countries? If so, what will be the scenario of enlargement in the region—will the EU and NATO adopt a regional approach, trying to integrate all three countries at more or less the same rate, or take an individualized approach contingent on their willingness, conditional on their performance, and dependent on their interstate relations? What will be the consequences of extending the enlargement policy to the Southern Caucasus for the EU, NATO, the region as a whole, and its individual states? All these questions need answers both from the Union and the Alliance, as well as from the three states in the region.

This paper seeks to compare the energy policies of the three Southern Caucasian states and examine the interdependence of their energy and security policies. The particular focus is the impact of energy-related issues on their Euro-Atlantic integration tendencies.

While examining how the states in the region ensure their energy
security, three aspects form the focus of this research - operational and planned oil and gas pipelines in the region, energy disputes of the three states with Russia, and the current and intended use of nuclear energy.

Two groups of oil and gas pipelines in the region have either been built since the collapse of the Soviet Union or are being planned. The first includes U.S.-backed multiple pipelines. The benefits of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines for Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as Europe, have been examined by many analysts. This paper also analyses the implications of Armenian exclusion from those pipelines, and argues that non-inclusiveness of the multiple pipelines results in the formation of dividing lines along energy alliances, which affects the tendencies of Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.
The second group of pipelines in the region are the new Russian and Iranian pipelines. Within this group, the focus of research is the extent to which the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline – and its potential transit role – contributes to energy security of Armenia.

Many experts point out that symptoms similar to those of “Dutch disease” are already evident in Azerbaijan. Recently the increase of military expenditures based on oil and gas revenues, along with bellicose rhetoric from Baku, as well as Armenia’s response to it, have been sufficiently explored. This article touches upon the implications of “Dutch disease” for the internal security of Azerbaijan and also for Georgia, which, as an oil and gas transit state, also seems to be affected by Dutch disease.

All South Caucasian states had energy disputes with Russia in 2005-2007. Gazprom announced gas price hikes not only to Georgia at the time of growing tensions between Russia and Georgia but also to Azerbaijan, with which Russia has had quite balanced relations, and Armenia, with which Russia has a strategic partnership. The paper examines the ways in which each of the three countries reacted to price hike announcements and handled the disputes, whether by political statements, negotiations and energy deals with Russia or alternative gas supplier states.

Another way of ensuring energy security in the Southern Caucasus is the use of nuclear energy. Currently Armenia is the only country in the region that has a nuclear power plant (NPP). Armenia has committed to shutting down the plant in its Action Plan within the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. Simultaneously, Armenian authorities have announced the decision to construct a new NPP as the only alternative to the old one. Georgia has also announced its intention of constructing an NPP, and Azerbaijan intends to develop a nuclear research reactor. Additionally, Turkey plans to develop nuclear energy, constructing more than one NPP.

After two decades of negative approaches by the international community, especially Western Europe, towards nuclear energy, mostly as a result of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the opposite trend has started all over the world, including the Euro-Atlantic space. The main triggers are climate change debate, power cuts in Western Europe and growing oil and gas prices. It is increasingly recognised that in addition to other advantages, nuclear energy reduces dependence on energy imports, particularly hydrocarbon fuels.

How do energy policy trends in the region affect Euro-Atlantic
tendencies? The Southern Caucasian states were the pioneers of IPAP, launching political dialogue with Allies, and advancing defence reform aimed at interoperability with NATO forces, already being pursued within the Planning and Review Process (PARP). They intend to be not only security consumers but also providers via their contribution to NATO-led peace-support operations. However, the purposes and the style of cooperation of the three states with NATO fluctuate. Georgia seeks a more advanced relationship with the Alliance. NATO membership is not on the agenda of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both countries are trying to keep the balance between the U.S. and NATO, on
one side, and Russia and Iran on the other. A main underlying difference between their foreign policies is their relationship with Turkey.

If the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is based on the “one nation, two states” notion, Armenia and Turkey do not have diplomatic relations. This reality informs Armenian threat perceptions and maintains the need for Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia. Blockade of land routes for Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan as well as exclusion of Armenia from the regional energy projects keeps Armenia dependent on Russia and Iran for its energy supply, which places limitations on Armenia's efforts to advance its Euro-Atlantic integration.

This research examines the possible ways to diminish the effects of the division of the region along energy alliances. It also examines how NATO can contribute to the energy security of its Partners in order to advance their Euro-Atlantic integration.