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This chapter highlights the capacious reach of Gulf-led deception operations into the world of professional football. In doing so, it addresses the growing assertiveness of Saudi Arabia in extending its influence operations under the... more
This chapter highlights the capacious reach of Gulf-led deception operations into the world of professional football. In doing so, it addresses the growing assertiveness of Saudi Arabia in extending its influence operations under the tutelage of MBS and how the use of sockpuppets was leveraged on Twitter to spread and influence narratives about the proposed takeover by Saudi's Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Newcastle United Football Club (NUFC). It also explores the discursive phenomenon of disinformation meta­ narratives, whereby disinformation from other instances, in this case the Gulf Crisis, is combined with the new narratives in order to rationalise foreign policy to new, impressionable and invested audiences. Here, NUFC fans were made to believe that Saudi's bid to take over NUFC was being scuppered by Qatar as the result of a feud, and not reasons related to piracy and human rights. Crucially, it highlights how football fans in general are being targeted by the deception order, which is monetising deception to either engage in sportswashing or negative campaigning.
You are being lied to by people who don't even exist. Digital deception is the new face of information warfare. Social media has been weaponised by states and commercial entities alike, as bots and trolls proliferate and users are left to... more
You are being lied to by people who don't even exist. Digital deception is the new face of information warfare. Social media has been weaponised by states and commercial entities alike, as bots and trolls proliferate and users are left to navigate an infodemic of fake news and disinformation. In the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East, where authoritarian regimes continue to innovate and adapt in the face of changing technology, online deception has reached new levels of audacity. From pro-Saudi entities that manipulate the tweets of the US president, to the activities of fake journalists and Western PR companies that whitewash human rights abuses, Marc Owen Jones' meticulous investigative research uncovers the full gamut of tactics used by Gulf regimes and their allies to deceive domestic and international audiences. In an age of global deception, this book charts the lengths bad actors will go to when seeking to impose their ideology and views on citizens around the world.

https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/digital-authoritarianism-in-the-middle-east/
Despite efforts by the EU and the U.S. governments to curtail Russian disinformation through sanctioning or blocking state-backed media such as RT and Sputnik News, thousands of fake Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube accounts are currently... more
Despite efforts by the EU and the U.S. governments to curtail Russian disinformation through sanctioning or blocking state-backed media such as RT and Sputnik News, thousands of fake Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube accounts are currently spreading Russian state propaganda and disinformation. In fact, some accounts do so in a coordinated fashion in both Mandarin Chinese and English, helping to peddle Beijing’s propagandistic narratives, too.

Through a variety of network analysis techniques, I identified between 2-7,000 fake Twitter accounts spreading Chinese- and English-language propaganda and disinformation since March 2022. Yet, the real number of fake accounts is likely to be much higher. The content includes videos, cartoons, and infographics that amplify a variety of pro-Beijing, pro-Moscow, antidemocratic, and anti-Western narratives. These Twitter accounts match many of the narratives used by fake accounts on Facebook and YouTube.
The media ecosystem in Bahrain has primarily been shaped by the security interests of the ruling family and its formal and informal protectors, initially the British, and following Independence in 1971, Saudi Arabia and the United States.... more
The media ecosystem in Bahrain has primarily been shaped by the security interests of the ruling family and its formal and informal protectors, initially the British, and following Independence in 1971, Saudi Arabia and the United States. From its inception just before the Second World War, to the Uprising of 2011, television, radio, and the local press have been leveraged as a means of distributing state propaganda and public relations. Technological change has been embraced, but only to the extent to which it facilitates Bahrain’s neoliberal development as a commercial ICT hub. The rise of citizen journalism, social media, and de-spatialized technologies has prompted some resistance to this top-down media-assisted authoritarianism, but the regime has adapted to instrumentalize these new technologies as tools of surveillance.
Exploring Bahrain's modern history through the lens of repression, this concise and accessible account work spans the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, looking at all forms of political repression from legal, statecraft, police... more
Exploring Bahrain's modern history through the lens of repression, this concise and accessible account work spans the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, looking at all forms of political repression from legal, statecraft, police brutality and informational controls. Considering several episodes of contention in Bahrain, from tribal resistance to the British reforms of the 1920s, the rise of the Higher Executive Committee in the 1950s, the leftist agitation of the 1970s, the 1990s Intifada and the 2011 Uprising, Marc Owen Jones offers never before seen insights into the British role in Bahrain, as well as the activities of the Al Khalifa Ruling Family. From the plundering of Bahrain's resources, to new information about the torture and murder of Bahrain civilians, this study reveals new facts about Bahrain's troubled political history. Using freedom of information requests, historical documents, interviews, and data from social media, this is a rich and original interdisciplinary history of Bahrain over one hundred years.
The Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies’ Evaluation Committee is very pleased to present the 2016 Dissertation Award to MARC OWEN JONES for his dissertation: Methods of Repression in Bahrain during the 20th and 21st... more
The Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies’ Evaluation Committee is very pleased to present the 2016 Dissertation Award to MARC OWEN JONES for his dissertation: Methods of Repression in Bahrain during the 20th and 21st Century: From the Civil List to Social Media
From projecting ideology and influence, to maintaining a notion of 'Gulfness' through the selective exclusion or inclusion of certain beliefs, cultures and people, the notion of Gulfization is increasingly pertinent as Gulf countries... more
From projecting ideology and influence, to maintaining a notion of 'Gulfness' through the selective exclusion or inclusion of certain beliefs, cultures and people, the notion of Gulfization is increasingly pertinent as Gulf countries occupy a greater political and economic role in wider Middle East politics. This volume discusses the notion of Gulfization, and examines how thoughts, ideologies, way of life and practises are transmitted, changed, and transduced inside and outside the Gulf. From historical perspectives such as the impact of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution in Yemen, to studies on the contemporary projection of Salafism or hyper-nationalism in the Gulf monarchies, this book explores, contends, and critiques the transnational and regional currents that are making, and unmaking, the new Gulf Moment. This volume is based on the 28th Gulf Conference held at the University of Exeter in 2016.
The 2011 uprisings that started in Tunisia and swept across the region have been extensively covered, but until now the Gulf island of Bahrain has almost been forgotten from the narration of events that have dramatically changed the... more
The 2011 uprisings  that started in Tunisia and swept across the region have been extensively covered, but until now the Gulf island of Bahrain has almost been forgotten from the narration of events that have dramatically changed the region. Bahrain's Uprising examines the ongoing protests and the state’s repression, revealing a sophisticated society shaped by its  political struggle against a reactionary ruling elite that see’s the island as the bounty of conquest. The regime survived largely through foreign political and economic patronage, notably from Britain, America, and Saudi Arabia – a patronage so deep, that the island became the first immediate target of the Arab Spring’s counter-revolutionary mobilisation that continues today.
The book explores the contentious politics of Bahrain, and charts the way in which a dynamic culture of street protest, a strong moral belief in legitimate democratic demands and creative forms of resistance continue to hamper the efforts of the ruling elite to rebrand itself as a liberal, modernising monarchy. Drawing on powerful testimonies, interviews and conversations from those involved, this broad collection of writings  provides a rarely heard voice for the lived experiences of  Bahrainis and the research of young scholars studying them. From the trial speech by one of the most prominent political leaders of the uprising, to the evocative prose of an imprisoned poet, the book harnesses the power of storytelling, to lead into scholarly articles that address the themes of space, social movements, postcolonialism,  social media, and the role of foreign patrons. Published on the eve of the 2016 bicentenary of British-Bahrain relations, the book in particular focuses on the role of the British government, together showing the depth of historical grievance beyond the sectarian narrative that has come to define the limited reporting of events in the country.
Bahrain’s Uprising provides a powerful insight into the Arab Spring's forgotten front, and will be of lasting value not only to scholars and students of the Middle East, but also to activists seeking to learn from, and build upon, Bahrain history and the uprising's legacy.
The problem of digital repression and digital authoritarianism is often framed as something done exclusively by states like China, Iran or Russia. But this framing is a misconception. Authoritarian regimes across the world and US-based... more
The problem of digital repression and digital authoritarianism is often framed as something done exclusively by states like China, Iran or Russia. But this framing is a misconception. Authoritarian regimes across the world and US-based Big Tech converge in transnational repression through a combination of content control, surveillance and data collection. Driven by profits, Big Tech platforms often selectively moderate content, amplifying certain narratives while suppressing others based on corporate interests or geopolitical alignments. These tech giants, with their vast reach and influence, exceed or complement the power of states, enabling a broader scope for repression.
This paper presents a longitudinal, deacade-long analysis of over 12,000 mainstream British media outlets’ headlines about the Qatar World Cup and the Russia World Cup published since 2010. A corpus analysis, sentiment/tonal analysis and... more
This paper presents a longitudinal, deacade-long analysis of over 12,000 mainstream British media outlets’ headlines about the Qatar World Cup and the Russia World Cup published since 2010. A corpus analysis, sentiment/tonal analysis and topic analysis were conducted on all headlines. The results show that approximately 1700 British mainstream newspaper headlines mentioning Qatar since 2010 are about the world cup, with two-thirds of those stories being negative: most focusing on reports of poor working conditions for migrant workers, allegations of corruption and bribery, and even Qatar’s alleged support of terrorism. By contrast, out of approximately 11,000 headlines referencing Russia, only 2% of headlines referenced the Russia World Cup. The number of annual stories about the World Cup in Qatar was almost twice that of Russia. These numbers reflect how reporting on Qatar in the past decade has frequently been through the prism of the World Cup and reflects an established trend in Western media to portray sports mega-events in Global South countries negatively. This limited inclusion of Qatar in media discourses outside its role as World Cup host, along with predominantly reductionist and negative representations, conforms with existing studies on coverage of sports events and other large events in the Global South. Longitudinal studies demonstrate other other interesting developments, for example how the Gulf Crisis displaced coverage of the World Cup
The Middle East has experienced rapid, albeit asymmetrical, digitalization over the past twenty years. Despite the benefits of technology, there is increasing evidence that it is being used to engage in new practices that fundamentally... more
The Middle East has experienced rapid, albeit asymmetrical, digitalization over the past twenty years. Despite the benefits of technology, there is increasing evidence that it is being used to engage in new practices that fundamentally alter the repressive capacity and reach of the state. Here authoritarian states are shifting to emergent totalitarian states.
Authoritarian regimes and other ‘bad’ actors in the Middle East are using social media for large scale deception operations. With little transparency from tech companies and poor regulation around disinformation, monitoring and tracking... more
Authoritarian regimes and other ‘bad’ actors in the Middle East are using social media for large scale deception operations. With little transparency from tech companies and poor regulation around disinformation, monitoring and tracking those operations falls uncomfortably upon journalists, activists and academics.[1] It is therefore necessary to share and discuss emerging techniques of identifying deception with academics across disciplines. It is also important to be transparent about detection methods in an environment where the terms ‘bot’ and ‘troll’ are frequently deployed against those who have opposing views. Being clear about methods of identifying deception can be instructive in a number of ways. Without identifying and acknowledging such deception, sociological studies of social media will inevitably be plagued with ‘corrupted’ data. Scholars using social media data must be adept at filtering out such deception.
A product of the global rise of right-wing populism has been a seeming normalisation of gendered public disinformation, which portrays female public figures as unintelligent, untrustworthy, irrational, and libidinous. Social media has... more
A product of the global rise of right-wing populism has been a seeming normalisation of gendered public disinformation, which portrays female public figures as unintelligent, untrustworthy, irrational, and libidinous. Social media has also allowed gendered disinformation to be used in targeted harassment campaigns that seek to intimidate and shame women, reducing their public visibility through psychological violence. Despite this, very few studies on social media involving the Arabic language have explored in detail this phenomenon in the Persian Gulf, despite numerous examples of harassment against women public figures. Since 2017, women journalists critical of regional governments have been subjected to increased attacks online, but none as intense as the attack on Al Jazeera anchor Ghada Oueiss in June 2020. Through keyword analysis, network analysis, and open-source intelligence techniques (OSINT), this paper highlights the intensity and scale of one such attack, identifying the increasing role of malinformation and disinformation in attempting to silence journalists. Such documentation can be useful in demonstrating the volume, velocity, and discursive nature of the attacks threatening women's visibility online. This research also accounts for a potential mechanism of such attacks, which follow a playbook of: 1) leaking information through anonymous accounts, 2) co-opted or loyalist influencers amplifying the attacks, and 3) uncritical local media jumping on the attacks (breakout). From a transformative perspective, it is increasingly important that such attacks are documented, exposed, and analysed to provide evidentiary claims of such abuse. It also highlights the issues of such abuse in authoritarian regimes, who clamp down on online debate, except appear not to do so when the messaging reflects state propaganda.
Revolutions seldom involve more than one percent of the population. However, in Bahrain, a small island nation with a population of around 570,000, twenty percent of the population took to the streets in February 2011 to demand greater... more
Revolutions seldom involve more than one percent of the population. However, in Bahrain, a small island nation with a population of around 570,000, twenty percent of the population took to the streets in February 2011 to demand greater democratic reform, making it “proportionally one of the greatest shows of ‘people power’ in modern history.” The regime's response was disproportionally brutal. Saudi-dominated troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force were “invited to” or “invaded” Bahrain, depending on who is telling the story. Under cover of the Saudi military, Bahrain's security forces killed dozens of civilians, torturing, maiming, and raping many others. The arsenal of repressive techniques was exhaustive. Belonging also was used as a tool of repression, with many being stripped of their Bahraini citizenship on spurious, terror-related charges.
Many of the studies of disinformation tend to reflect transatlantic security concerns, and focus on the activities of Russia and China. There is notably less analysis of disinformation in the Arabic-speaking world and wider MENA region.... more
Many of the studies of disinformation tend to reflect transatlantic security concerns, and focus on the activities of Russia and China. There is notably less analysis of disinformation in the Arabic-speaking world and wider MENA region. This article analyses a number of MENA-based COVID-19 disinformation campaigns from 2020, highlighting how COVID-19 disinformation has been instrumentalised by regional actors to attack rivals or bolster the legitimacy of their own regimes. It highlights in particular how certain ‘superspreaders’ of disinformation tend to promote Saudi, Emirate and right wing US foreign policy in the Middle East.
To address the dual need to examine the weaponization of social media and the nature of non-Western propaganda, this article explores the use of Twitter bots in the Gulf crisis that began in 2017. Twitter account-creation dates within... more
To address the dual need to examine the weaponization of social media and the nature of non-Western propaganda, this article explores the use of Twitter bots in the Gulf crisis that began in 2017. Twitter account-creation dates within hashtag samples are used as a primary indicator for detecting Twitter bots. Following identification, the various modalities of their deployment in the crisis are analyzed. It is argued that bots were used during the crisis primarily to increase negative information and propaganda from the blockading countries toward Qatar. In terms of modalities, this study reveals how bots were used to
manipulate Twitter trends, promote fake news, increase the ranking of anti-Qatar tweets from specific political figures, present the illusion of grassroots Qatari opposition to the Tamim regime, and pollute the information sphere around Qatar, thus amplifying propaganda discourses beyond regional and national news channels.
Social media has permitted activists to subvert censorship and state controlled media. As a result, it has become a key medium for experimenting with and/or creating genres previously marginalised or discouraged by the Bahraini... more
Social media has permitted activists to subvert censorship and state controlled media. As a result, it has become a key medium for experimenting with and/or creating genres previously marginalised or discouraged by the Bahraini government. This article explores aspects of revolutionary cultural production and creative resistance in Bahrain since the uprisings in 2011, and examines the role social media has played in shaping and defining it.  Focusing on memes, parody accounts, and the YouTube serial bahārna drama, this paper looks at the rise of political satire online, and the evolution of satirical forms over the progression of the uprising as a dialectic with government policy and propaganda. This paper argues that social media has facilitated the emergence of new forms of satire in Bahrain, and has allowed activists to assert, to both local and global audiences, and in different registers, the integrity of a desired revolutionary aesthetic by confronting state attempts to paint the revolution as schismatic and divisive. As such, 2011 marked a new turn in Bahrain’s satirical heritage. It also argues that the subversive nature of satire makes it a favourable genre with regards to revolutionary cultural production and the public sphere, yet acknowledges that satirical forms, as a response to authoritarian policies, are rarely devoid of the tutelage necessary to make it a truly revolutionary form of counter narrative. [Pre Proof]
This is a study of how the Bahraini regime and its supporters utilized Facebook, Twitter and other social media as a tool of surveillance and social control during the Bahrain uprising. Using a virtual ethnography conducted between... more
This is a study of how the Bahraini regime and its supporters utilized
Facebook, Twitter and other social media as a tool of surveillance
and social control during the Bahrain uprising. Using a virtual ethnography conducted between February 2011 and December 2011, it establishes a typology of methods that describe how hegemonic forces and institutions employed social media to suppress both online and offline dissent. These methods are trolling,
naming and shaming, offline factors, intelligence gathering and passive observation. It also discusses how these methods of control limit the ability of activists to use online places as spaces of representation and anti-hegemonic identity formation.
While there is considerable research on the positive role social media plays in activism, this article addresses the relative paucity of literature on how hegemonic forces use social media to resist political change
Here, we examine the challenges to democratization in Bahrain, with a particular focus on how the recent 2011 Uprising has resulted in a deepening of authoritarianism. It is argued that the recent unrest has brought into sharp relief the... more
Here, we examine the challenges to democratization in Bahrain, with a particular focus on how the recent 2011 Uprising has resulted in a deepening of authoritarianism. It is argued that the recent unrest has brought into sharp relief the absence of “quality” democracy in Bahrain, and that any form of democratic transition is dependent on the will of a conservative Al Khalifa-Saudi nexus. While the pro-democracy movement may have prompted minor concessions on the part of the government, the extent of the popular mobilization triggered the Al Khalifa regime’s authoritarian reflex, and they have reacted to throttle the Uprising by putting in place legislative, ideological, and political barriers to reform, which points not only to a current de-democratization, but also a lack of future democratization. In addition to arguing for the post-2011 undoing of democracy in Bahrain, this paper also points to two major barriers to future democratization; (1) a conservative, post-Independence Al Khalifa-Saudi coalition assisted by large military resources (2) protracted communal tension brought about by the government’s instrumentalization of sectarianism
Disinformation and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. How was Khashoggi smeared and his death minimised on social media and elsewhere in the wake of his murder.
The investigation of how a dozen fake journalists fooled dozens of real news outlets to publish over 100 fake opinion articles for over a year.
This chapter lays out an interdisciplinary typology (or template) for understanding repression. Jones, M. (2020). Defining Political Repression. In Political Repression in Bahrain (Cambridge Middle East Studies, pp. 21-29). Cambridge:... more
This chapter lays  out an interdisciplinary typology (or template) for understanding repression. Jones, M. (2020). Defining Political Repression. In Political Repression in Bahrain (Cambridge Middle East Studies, pp. 21-29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108558822.003
This chapter lays out the various definitions of 'political repression'. It is from my following publication: Jones, M. (2020). Defining Political Repression. In Political Repression in Bahrain (Cambridge Middle East Studies, pp. 21-29).... more
This chapter lays out the various definitions of 'political repression'. It is from my following publication: Jones, M. (2020). Defining Political Repression. In Political Repression in Bahrain (Cambridge Middle East Studies, pp. 21-29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108558822.002
 1 社会的に媒介された宗派主義の台頭
 2 ツイッター上のヘイトスピーチの分布を把握する方法
 3 分析の限界
 4 調査結果
 5 ツイッター上の新たな宗派的ヒエラルキーか
This study demonstrates that sectarian hate speech is not a monolithic or ubiquitous phenomenon around the Arab-speaking Twittersphere. On the contrary, it tends to reinforce previous studies that highlight that sectarian slurs are more... more
This study demonstrates that sectarian hate speech is not a monolithic or ubiquitous phenomenon around the Arab-speaking Twittersphere. On the contrary, it tends to reinforce previous studies that highlight that sectarian slurs are more prevalent from accounts located in certain countries. It also buttresses the idea that anti-Shiʿa hate speech is more common on Twitter, and that the prevalence of both anti-Sunni and Shiʿa slurs dissipate profoundly outside the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. Unlike some previous studies, this makes some methodological changes to account for bots and account duplicates. It also offers more information on city level hate speech, noting that Saudi cities are the most prominent with regards to anti-Shiʿa hate speech, and Baghdad and other Saudi cities common for anti-Sunni hate speech. Contrary to other studies, this research show that anti Shiʿa hate speech is more prevalent per 100,000 twitter user in Yemen, Saudi and Kuwait/Qatar, while anti-Sunni hate speech is more common Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. This divergence could be a function of methodology, but more likely other factors, such as the protracted conflict in Yemen.
This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics in Bahrain. This has created a discourse in which belligerents are... more
This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics in Bahrain. This has created a discourse in which belligerents are framed according to the contemporary transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, reifying a narrative that can contribute to the perpetuation of anti-Shi‘a and anti-Baḥārna  prejudice. Using a closer reading of historical and modern sources, this paper argues that it was not solely the Islamic Revolution, nor the discovery of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, that shifted government policy towards Bahrain’s Shi‘a. Instead, ethno-religious discrimination is rooted in the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest, which was ossified by colonial intervention, but reinvigorated by Bahrain’s Independence, growing Saudi influence, the Iran-Iraq war, and a historically-rooted Al Khalifa antipathy towards the indigenous population. Thus, changes in the modalities of repression are better explained by a multitude of interacting factors, rather than the totalising influence of Iran.
Bahrain's Modern History (20th and 21st Century)
A Chapter from Bahrain's Uprising, edited by Marc Owen Jones and Ala'a Shehabi
Research Interests:
Jones, M. (2016) in Elareshi et al (Eds), Social Media in the Arab World: Communication and Public Opinion in the Gulf States. I.B.Tauris: London.
Research Interests:
From the edited book 'Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf', Jones, M., and Shehabi, A. (eds). 2015. Zed Books.
Research Interests:
Chapter in the edited volume: Social Media in the Arab World: Communication and Public Opinion in the Gulf States. Published by I.B. Tauris. Elareshi, M., Al Jaber, & K., Gunter, B. (Eds). 2006.
Research Interests:
● This report details a sprawling, multi-modal, two-wave influence operation, most of which spreads xenophobic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Qatar propaganda and disinformation, with the rest cloaked in language of compassion and secularism. ●... more
● This report details a sprawling, multi-modal, two-wave influence operation, most of which
spreads xenophobic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Qatar propaganda and disinformation, with the
rest cloaked in language of compassion and secularism.
● Some of the content is specific, asking users to divest or boycott Qatar-owned institutions
like Paris Saint-Germain F.C. or Harrods, or applauding Texas A&M University’s recent
decision to shut down its Qatar campus.
● The operation is active on Facebook, Twitter/X, Wikimedia (mainly Wikipedia and Wikidata),
YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok online; and has made offline appearances on billboards and
at the CPAC conference. It has deployed dozens of videos and images across platforms,
across different levels of quality, with many clearly AI-generated.
● It has spread its narratives online using at least 978 Facebook ads, hosted on at least 25
Facebook Pages, supported by a network of at least 44 “burner” Pages, some of which were
clearly stolen; using several overt, branded Twitter accounts, supported by more covert
advertising/booster accounts, and likely paid engagement networks too; and by vandalising
at least 47 Wikimedia properties using 9 accounts often working in coordination.
● The operation has targeted France, the UK, the USA, and Saudi Arabia in the 1st wave
(2024/JAN-MAR); and the UK, Belgium, France, Sweden, Croatia, Malta, and Germany, in the
2nd wave (2024/MAY-JUN, just weeks before EU elections, and in a UK general election year).
● It includes content in Arabic, Spanish, French and English.
● The minimum reach of this operation on Facebook is 41,074,052, with a conservative
projected Facebook advertising spend range of between 100,000 USD - 272,000k USD1 This
means it may have reached up to 61% of the entire population of France, and is likely the
largest known Facebook influence campaign targeting countries in the EU The campaigns on
Twitter also accumulated at least several million impressions/views, and the TikTok video
was viewed over a million times.
● Despite always violating Facebook’s advertising standards or rules, the operation has been
resilient. Most pages taken down mid-attack were observed either restored, or migrated to a
different URL. It seems the network uses infrastructure from and tactics honed in Vietnam’s
content/engagement farming industry and digital asset marketplaces, including techniques
enabling it to repeatedly sneak past platform moderation crews’ procedures for inauthentic
conduct detection, scrutiny, and even takedown.
● The mission of the operation appears to be attacking Qatar and advancing neoconservative
geopolitical interests, stoking and exploiting anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and
anti-protester sentiment in the process — during an election-heavy year, no less.
● The operation started towards the end of 2023, and has run consistently since.
The past two decades have seen rapid digitalization in much of the Middle East. While smartphone penetration, social media usage and internet adoption have all increased, the region is widely unequal in its access and deployment of... more
The past two decades have seen rapid digitalization in much of the Middle East. While smartphone penetration, social media usage and internet adoption have all increased, the region is widely unequal in its access and deployment of digital technology. The wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are among some of the world leaders in 5G adoption, while countries like Yemen are reported to have one of the lowest internet speeds in the world. This belies the starkness of the digital divide in the MENA region. Indeed, mobile subscription penetration is around 90% in Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain, while the number is only around 40% in Yemen. Similarly, countries in the GCC often hover around 100% internet adoption, while in Egypt, it is around 50%. Arab media and ICT infrastructure share similarities in terms of governance and socio-political context, but they are far from homogenous, especially in terms of resources and reach.
Separate incidents surrounding events at Leeds General Infirmary sent social media into a tailspin — but neither was true, writes researcher Marc Owen Jones.
The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is likely to have a further chilling effect on already fearful critics of the Saudi regime. It has also exposed the extent of the online disinformation operation working to silence critics of the kingdom and... more
The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is likely to have a further chilling effect on already fearful critics of the Saudi regime. It has also exposed
the extent of the online disinformation operation working to silence
critics of the kingdom and Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).
Last week, Bahrain Watch published an investigation into the secret funding of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ahead of its annual Manama Dialogue. The investigation demonstrated that one third of the... more
Last week, Bahrain Watch published an investigation into the secret funding of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ahead of its annual Manama Dialogue. The investigation demonstrated that one third of the think-tank's funding was coming from the Bahraini ruling family. In this article, the investigative researchers behind these revelations delve into the activities and role that the IISS has played over the past twenty-five years-critically questioning the IISS claim of "independence," and its relationship with the Bahraini and British governments. Farea Almuslimi and Sama'a Al-Hamdani are two young Yemeni researchers. In 2015, they both accepted the IISS invitation to attend the 11 th Manama Dialogue. Despite the invitation, both Almuslimi and Al-Hamdani had to purchase their own airfare and hotel accommodations. As an analyst, Almuslimi had risen to prominence in some policy circles of Washington DC. He is perhaps most known for his testimony before the US Congress about US drone warfare in Yemen. Al-Hamdani has likewise been outspoken about her country's plight. With a valid Bahraini visa, Almuslimi arrived in Manama just in time for the beginning of a packed three-day forum. Al-Hamdani,
As part of examining bots, let's have a look how anti Qatar hashtags may have been inflated by fake accounts and/or propaganda.By looking at Twitter hashtags related to the Qatar spat, we can determine whether there is any validity to... more
As part of examining bots, let's have a look how anti Qatar hashtags may have been inflated by fake accounts and/or propaganda.By looking at Twitter hashtags related to the Qatar spat, we can determine whether there is any validity to claims of an ongoing smear campaign, and perhaps infer whether Qatar is facing some form of broader cyber assault that may include hacks. To locate Twitter bots and propaganda, pattern analysis can be conducted. Broadly speaking, this involves looking at lists of Twitter accounts to identify multiple similarities that suggest accounts are part of a network. A sample of around 33,300 was collected from the hashtag #قناه_الجزيره_تسيء_للملك_سلمان (Al Jazeera disrespects King Salman).
This Report details how a fake news army of Twitter bots were mobilised to spread anti Al Jazeera propaganda during the Qatar Crisis
Possibilities of technological liberation through social media use has been marred by increasingly innovative use of counter-revolutionary or informational control tactics by national authorities, global corporations, intelligence... more
Possibilities of technological liberation through social media use has been marred by increasingly innovative use of counter-revolutionary or informational control tactics by national authorities, global corporations, intelligence agencies and Western PR firms. The Arab Uprisings have brought this into sharp relief, and far from being the stuff of conspiratorial fantasy, the dangers of social media are real. From using social media to deliver malicious links that identify activists, to using torture to extract login details for activists’ social media accounts, technology has presented multiple opportunities for regime surveillance and control.  Furthermore, technologies like Prism, which track online sources for signs of information that can increase social tension, also reflect how personal sharing can facilitate information interventions by state agencies.
Introduction Welcome to the first edition of UK News Media Review. It is produced by the News and Journalism Research Group, Department of Media and Communication, University of Leicester. Its aim is to provide an overview of key... more
Introduction
Welcome to the first edition of UK News Media Review. It is produced by the News and Journalism
Research Group, Department of Media and Communication, University of Leicester. Its aim is to
provide an overview of key developments, events, and issues relating to the news industry and its
outputs and audiences. The review presents headline commentaries and summary research findings
from diverse sources with links to original source publications.
Contents
Audiences
- Television News Audiences
- Radio News Audiences
- Newspaper Circulation and Readership
- Magazine Circulation and Readership
- Online News Services
News Outputs
- Broadcast News Output in the UK
- Coverage of 2010 General Election
News Ownership
Employment in News Profession


*
1 The UK News Media Review is compiled by the News and Journalism Research Group, Department of Media and
Communication, University of Leicester. Its members include: Dimitrinka Atanasova, Jessica Bain, Vincent
Campbell, Roger Dickinson, Barrie Gunter, Marc Jones, Julian Matthews, Kostas Saltzis.
Research Interests:
Foreword: On the Prelude to the 14 February Uprising - Abdulhadi Khalaf Introduction: Bahrain's Uprising, the Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf - Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones Part I: Voices of the Condemned 1. A Trial of... more
Foreword: On the Prelude to the 14 February Uprising - Abdulhadi Khalaf Introduction: Bahrain's Uprising, the Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf - Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones Part I: Voices of the Condemned 1. A Trial of Thoughts and Ideas - Ibrahim Sharif 2. God After Ten O'Clock - 'Ali Al Jallawi 3. A Room with a Wiew: An Eyewitness to the Pearl Uprising - Tony Mitchell Part II: Configuring Dissent: Charting Movements, Space, and Self-Representation in Bahrain 4. Shifting Contours of Activism and Possibilities for Justice in Bahrain - Luke G.G. Bhatia and Ala'a Shehabi 5. The Many Afterlives of Lulu: The Story of Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout - Amal Khalaf 6. Tn Tn Ttn and Torture in Bahrain: Puncturing the Spectacle of the 'Arab Spring' - John Horne Part III: Suppressing Dissent in an Acceptable Manner: Modes of Repression, Foreign Involvement and Institutional Violence 7. On the Side of Decency and Democracy: The History of British-Bahraini Rel...
Revolutions seldom involve more than one percent of the population. However, in Bahrain, a small island nation with a population of around 570,000, twenty percent of the population took to the streets in February 2011 to demand greater... more
Revolutions seldom involve more than one percent of the population. However, in Bahrain, a small island nation with a population of around 570,000, twenty percent of the population took to the streets in February 2011 to demand greater democratic reform, making it “proportionally one of the greatest shows of ‘people power’ in modern history.” The regime's response was disproportionally brutal. Saudi-dominated troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force were “invited to” or “invaded” Bahrain, depending on who is telling the story. Under cover of the Saudi military, Bahrain's security forces killed dozens of civilians, torturing, maiming, and raping many others. The arsenal of repressive techniques was exhaustive. Belonging also was used as a tool of repression, with many being stripped of their Bahraini citizenship on spurious, terror-related charges.
Despite being afflicted by cyclical bouts of unrest over the past century, repression in Bahrain as a concept has not been the focus of considerable academic attention. This is the first interpretive historical and contemporary study of... more
Despite being afflicted by cyclical bouts of unrest over the past century, repression in Bahrain as a concept has not been the focus of considerable academic attention. This is the first interpretive historical and contemporary study of repression in Bahrain. It addresses the limitations of regime-type analysis and quantitative studies of repression, which tend to focus on the co-variation between repression and demobilization. Using a template analysis, a virtual ethnography and framing theory, this thesis offers a new conceptualisation of repression. Several episodes of contention in Bahrain are analysed, including; tribal resistance to the British reforms of the 1920s, the rise of the Higher Executive Committee in the 1950s, the leftist agitation of the 1970s, the 1990s Intifada, and the 2001 Uprising. Using evidence from multiple sources, including recently released Foreign and Commonwealth Office files, social media, and historical records, this thesis argues that Bahrain's...
A product of the global rise of right-wing populism has been a seeming normalisation of gendered public disinformation, which portrays female public figures as unintelligent, untrustworthy, irrational, and libidinous. Social media has... more
A product of the global rise of right-wing populism has been a seeming normalisation of gendered public disinformation, which portrays female public figures as unintelligent, untrustworthy, irrational, and libidinous. Social media has also allowed gendered disinformation to be used in targeted harassment campaigns that seek to intimidate and shame women, reducing their public visibility through psychological violence. Despite this, very few studies on social media involving the Arabic language have explored in detail this phenomenon in the Persian Gulf, despite numerous examples of harassment against women public figures. Since 2017, women journalists critical of regional governments have been subjected to increased attacks online, but none as intense as the attack on Al Jazeera anchor Ghada Oueiss in June 2020. Through keyword analysis, network analysis, and open-source intelligence techniques (OSINT), this paper highlights the intensity and scale of one such attack, identifying th...
To address the dual need to examine the weaponization of social media and the nature of non-Western propaganda, this article explores the use of Twitter bots in the Gulf crisis that began in 2017. Twitter account-creation dates within... more
To address the dual need to examine the weaponization of social media and the nature of non-Western propaganda, this article explores the use of Twitter bots in the Gulf crisis that began in 2017. Twitter account-creation dates within hashtag samples are used as a primary indicator for detecting Twitter bots. Following identification, the various modalities of their deployment in the crisis are analyzed. It is argued that bots were used during the crisis primarily to increase negative information and propaganda from the blockading countries toward Qatar. In terms of modalities, this study reveals how bots were used to manipulate Twitter trends, promote fake news, increase the ranking of anti-Qatar tweets from specific political figures, present the illusion of grassroots Qatari opposition to the Tamim regime, and pollute the information sphere around Qatar, thus amplifying propaganda discourses beyond regional and national news channels.
believes this revolution to be “the most important event in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps in the entire Middle East, in the second half of the twentieth century” (p. 80). With it, he argues, the regional landscape changed in two major... more
believes this revolution to be “the most important event in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps in the entire Middle East, in the second half of the twentieth century” (p. 80). With it, he argues, the regional landscape changed in two major ways: first, it marked the end of calm as the USallied Iranian monarchy was replaced by a radical, revolutionary, anti-American Islamic republic; and second, it brought about direct US military involvement in the Gulf. Gause offers a refreshingly dispassionate perspective on American military involvement in the Persian Gulf, culminating in the two Gulf Wars of 1990 and 2003 (Chapters 4 and 5). While the US strategic objective of securing the status quo remained unchanged, the thinking behind it evolved in the period 1971–2008. During the Cold War, keeping the Soviet Union out of the Persian Gulf was the main incentive. But the end of the Cold War and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 changed this in favour of direct military intervention to reverse Saddam Hussein’s expansionism. This evolving thinking took a bigger turn, with President Bush’s “global war on terror” leading to the second Gulf war in 2003. Gause reminds us not to underestimate the shock of 9/ 11 to the US psyche. Before 2001, US policy in the Persian Gulf was limited to adjusting to local changes and relying on local allies short of military involvement. But the decision to go to war in 2003 was very different, as it intended to change Iraq’s political system: the previous time the USA had initiated a regime change was half-a-century before, in 1953 when the elected government of Iran was toppled. The 2003 war, he points out, was driven in large part by Washington’s belief that “the character of domestic political regimes in the region was the key to understanding their foreign policy” (p. 239). In his concluding section, Gause reiterates the importance of factors such as oil, ideology, and identity as power resources, stressing the point that recognising this does not negate “Realist insights about anarchy, power and conflict in the Persian Gulf”, but “contextualises those Realist insights by giving us a fuller understanding of how state leaders define their interests and understand the power resources at their disposal”. Transnational ideologies and identities are important in understanding security dynamics, but they are power resources “in the hands of state and non-state actors” (p. 243). Acknowledging this functionalist approach as the driving force behind state and regime choices clearly offers a more integrated explanation. It is indeed timely to see a volume on the Persian Gulf— or the Middle East for that matter— that goes beyond the fashionable discourse on ideology, religiosity or ethnicity and makes good use of tested theoretical insights from politics and international relations by taking into account concepts such as power, interests, resources, and decision-making processes. It is equally enticing to see much analytical clarity, thematic overview and narrative being packed in a volume that is concise and highly accessible, yet avoids deductive predictions about the Persian Gulf region.
This is the author accepted manuscript.Exeter Critical Gulf Series 1This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics... more
This is the author accepted manuscript.Exeter Critical Gulf Series 1This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics in Bahrain. This has created a discourse in which belligerents are framed according to the contemporary transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, reifying a narrative that can contribute to the perpetuation of anti-Shi‘a and anti-Baḥārna prejudice. Using a closer reading of historical and modern sources, this paper argues that it was not solely the Islamic Revolution, nor the discovery of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, that shifted government policy towards Bahrain’s Shi‘a. Instead, ethno-religious discrimination is rooted in the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest, which was ossified by colonial intervention, but reinvigorated by Bahrain’s Independence, growing Saudi influence, the Iran-Iraq war, and a historically-rooted Al Khalifa antipathy towards the indigenous population. Thus, changes in the modalities of repression are better explained by a multitude of interacting factors, rather than the totalising influence of Iran
The 2011 uprisings that started in Tunisia and swept across the region have been extensively covered, but until now the Gulf island of Bahrain has almost been forgotten from the narration of events that have dramatically changed the... more
The 2011 uprisings that started in Tunisia and swept across the region have been extensively covered, but until now the Gulf island of Bahrain has almost been forgotten from the narration of events that have dramatically changed the region. Bahrain's Uprising examines the ongoing protests and the state’s repression, revealing a sophisticated society shaped by its political struggle against a reactionary ruling elite that see’s the island as the bounty of conquest. The regime survived largely through foreign political and economic patronage, notably from Britain, America, and Saudi Arabia – a patronage so deep, that the island became the first immediate target of the Arab Spring’s counter-revolutionary mobilisation that continues today. The book explores the contentious politics of Bahrain, and charts the way in which a dynamic culture of street protest, a strong moral belief in legitimate democratic demands and creative forms of resistance continue to hamper the efforts of the r...
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Interested parties are asked to submit paper proposals (abstracts of 300-500 words), as well as a full CV including affiliation and contact details, before 1st April 2017 to gulfconference@exeter.ac.uk. Candidates whose abstracts are... more
Interested parties are asked to submit paper proposals (abstracts of 300-500 words), as well as a full CV including affiliation and contact details, before 1st April 2017 to gulfconference@exeter.ac.uk.  Candidates whose abstracts are accepted will be notified by 1st May.

In recent decades, scholarship on the Middle East has benefited from a dynamic approach to the relationship between identities and boundaries. The post-structural turn encouraged us to think beyond bounded communities to reveal the interconnections, exchanges and forms of relationality that cross and contest perceived cultural and national boundaries. More recently, the Arab revolutions brought our attention to discourses of liberation throughout the region along with collective challenges to hegemonic power and hopes for new moral communities. While paying heed to the ways in which boundaries are being transgressed and disintegrated, this conference alternatively asks how boundaries have been actively constructed and constituted throughout the Gulf region (Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq) in the production of social, ethnic, linguistic, religious, political and even ontological distinctions. While communities and flows of people regularly transcend enforced and imagined boundaries, the active and conscious formation and maintenance of such boundaries remains a felt social reality. Throughout the region, 2016 has been a year of creating and reproducing hegemonic boundaries as much as it has been one of transgression and mass movement. We ask what role boundaries have played in the formation of identities, distinctions and hierarchies in the Gulf, past and present. What can a renewed focus on boundaries tell us about the use and abuse of power in the region? We invite participants from across various disciplines to critically engage with the concept of the boundary.
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Torture, tear gas, bird shot, electrocution, anal rape, and beatings are just some of the examples of state-sponsored violence undertaken by the Bahraini regime since 2011. This more commonplace 'state-sponsored' violence has monopolised... more
Torture, tear gas, bird shot, electrocution, anal rape, and beatings are just some of the examples of state-sponsored violence undertaken by the Bahraini regime since 2011. This more commonplace 'state-sponsored' violence has monopolised the headlines due to its egregious nature and visceral unpleasantness. Yet the rise of social media, and the devolution of acts of surveillance and online vigilantism has confused this binary of state versus loyalist violence. Now, acts of social control undertaken by those representing the hegemonic order, such as balṭajiyya (thugs), but not necessarily agents of the state, are becoming increasingly important as a regime survival strategy in Bahrain. This paper acknowledges the importance of violent acts undertaken by those representing the hegemonic order, while also problematising the notion of violence itself. In Bahrain, where surveillance and social media are increasingly an important tool in the state's intimidation of activists and civilians, it is important to critically interrogate how the generation of fear through social media and surveillance constitutes violence itself. These strategies of control, which generate physiological responses such as fear anxiety, should no longer be distinguished entirely from acts of physical violence, and taken more seriously as a form of repression.
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Last year the Bahrain government began an extensive process of police reform. These appointments came as the government sought to implement recommendations laid out in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report, an investigation... more
Last year the Bahrain government began an extensive process of police reform. These appointments came as the government sought to implement recommendations laid out in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report, an investigation that was highly critical of how the country's security apparatus had operated following the widespread unrest that began last year. Despite these reforms, police deviance continues. By looking at the relationship between police deviance and politics, this paper rejects the idea that police deviance in Bahrain is the result of a few 'rotten apples', and instead argues that police deviance is a systemic necessity, imperative in preserving Sunni hegemony in Bahrain. It explores how police deviance is a form of political currency in Bahrain, vital in maintaining the loyalty of the ruling regime's support base, who believe that softer forms of policing will result in a 'Shia takeover'. In this respect, police deviance includes acts of excessive force, brutality and police misconduct. The paper also explores how deviance as political currency involves excessive leniency towards regime supporters who engage in criminality, as subjecting them to the full extent of the law might risk isolating the support of those on whom the regime's legitimacy based. In this case, deviance is defined as 'failure to perform law enforcement duties'. This paper concludes by arguing that police deviance is an inevitable outcome of maintaining the current hegemonic order, and that police reform is therefore impossible without political reform.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's rise has led to a surge in online disinformation spread by far-right accounts in the country. Now they are bringing that skillset to the Israel-Gaza war
On November 18, 2022, the eve of the Qatar FIFA World Cup, an unusual story began to appear in papers across the globe. Media outlets reported that Qatar’s national football team had bribed Ecuador to lose their opening game 2–1. Despite... more
On November 18, 2022, the eve of the Qatar FIFA World Cup, an unusual story began to appear in papers across the globe. Media outlets reported that Qatar’s national football team had bribed Ecuador to lose their opening game 2–1. Despite the absence of any proof, barring a single tweet from a Gulf-based influencer named Amjad Taha,[1] mainstream and highly subscribed news outlets across South America and Europe, including La Patilla (Venezuela), De Telegraaf (Netherlands), Fox Sports Mexico, and El Comercio (Ecuador), reported the story as if it could be true. The story went viral in multiple languages, including Italian, Greek, Spanish, Dutch, and English. Given the extant allegations of corruption that had marred Qatar’s bid, perhaps editors thought that the news was plausible. But it is striking that most journalists did not seem to corroborate the story, nor to discover what many observers of Gulf politics already knew: Taha was a routine source of disinformation in the Gulf.[2]
Russian disinformation may come first to mind for interfering in U.S. politics, but some of the most damning evidence of efforts to influence the American public leads to Washington’s allies in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United... more
Russian disinformation may come first to mind for interfering in U.S. politics, but some of the most damning evidence of efforts to influence the American public leads to Washington’s allies in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are at the forefront of undermining democratic deliberation–from manipulating the impact of Donald Trump’s tweets, to tricking editors across the world into publishing propaganda. Worryingly, Twitter seems to be very slow to do anything about it.
Social media propaganda emanating from Saudi Arabia and the UAE seeks to justify the Tunisian president’s decision to sack the prime minister.
US Tech Companies like Twitter probably breathed a sigh of relief when Biden announced that he was not going to directly sanction Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for ordering the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
Anatomy of a disinformation campaign: The coup that never was
How did a few Saudi influencers and thousands of sock puppets trick media into reporting on a made-up coup in Qatar?
At the end of July, the hashtag "Tunisians revolt against the Brotherhood" began to trend on Twitter—the Brotherhood being the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist political movement maligned in particular by the United Arab Emirates and... more
At the end of July, the hashtag "Tunisians revolt against the Brotherhood" began to trend on Twitter—the Brotherhood being the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist political movement maligned in particular by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It spread online just as Tunisian President Kais Saied suspended parliament, deposed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and concentrated other powers in his hands, in what is widely accepted now as a "self-coup" or autogolpe. Since then, Saied has indefinitely extended the period of emergency under the Tunisian constitution that he used to justify his power grab, ignoring his own 30-day deadline to unfreeze parliament, amplifying concerns about authoritarian retrenchment in the country.
Research Interests:
U.S. investigators claim Russians might be behind some the hacking of the Qatar News Agency that prompted a diplomatic crisis in the Gulf, but that seems unlikely given current GCC tensions and the homegrown nature of the cyber battle... more
U.S. investigators claim Russians might be behind some the hacking of the Qatar News Agency that prompted a diplomatic crisis in the Gulf, but that seems unlikely given current GCC tensions and the homegrown nature of the cyber battle leading up to the spat. While the recent diplomatic breakdown between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors exposes the political differences between the Gulf Cooperation Council member states, it also highlights the emergence of new types of cyber and information warfare. Instead of the Gulf states simply turning their methods of surveillance and propaganda inward to their citizens, they could now be using these methods against one another.
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The more appalling the human rights record, the better the customer at London's arms fair

Saudi Arabia was ranked 161 out of 167 on the Democracy Index. To put things into perspective, North Korea was 167
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The five Gulf countries, the majority of which have significant wealth, have taken zero refugees.
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Despite the government's partial electoral reforms, Bahrain's elections have been marred by opposition boycotts, dubious electioneering, and controversial candidates - See more at:... more
Despite the government's partial electoral reforms, Bahrain's elections have been marred by opposition boycotts, dubious electioneering, and controversial candidates - See more at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-bahrains-election-promises-are-husbands-iphones-and-jobs-1503052065#sthash.dBCLREMN.dpuf
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Britain has played a prominent role in protecting Bahrain’s government and its Ruling Family from internal and external threats ever since Bahrain became an informal protectorate in 1861. This protection has ranged from overt strategies,... more
Britain has played a prominent role in protecting Bahrain’s government and its Ruling Family from internal and external threats ever since Bahrain became an informal protectorate in 1861. This protection has ranged from overt strategies, such as direct military intervention, to subtle ones, such as the export of surveillance technologies for use by Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior. Even after Bahrain’s Independence in 1971, Britain has continued to play an important, albeit less direct role in Bahrain’s internal and external security.
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In 2011, Bahrain’s state security services crushed a pro-democracy uprising. Tens were killed, hundreds tortured, and thousands incarcerated. Since then, low-level violence has continued to afflict the country. In order to appease its... more
In 2011, Bahrain’s state security services crushed a pro-democracy uprising. Tens were killed, hundreds tortured, and thousands incarcerated. Since then, low-level violence has continued to afflict the country. In order to appease its mostly Western critics, who were concerned by its repressive behaviors, the al-Khalifa regime vociferously embarked on a dubious process of political and security-sector reform.
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Although Bahrain has largely fallen out of the global media spotlight, a renewed government crackdown ahead of the ‘Tamorrod’ protests on August 14th is threatening to push the country towards a deeper crisis. In order to deal with this... more
Although Bahrain has largely fallen out of the global media spotlight, a renewed government crackdown ahead of the ‘Tamorrod’ protests on August 14th is threatening to push the country towards a deeper crisis. In order to deal with this ‘terrorist’ threat, King Hamad called for an extraordinary session of parliament, and despite the questionable constitutionality of the meeting, the virtually oppositionless elected assembly agreed to 22 pieces of draconian anti-terror legislation. In testament to the dire conditions of Bahrain’s government controlled civil society, the Minister of Human Rights lauded these repressive recommendations, which included the revocation of citizenship for convicted of terrorism, and the banning of protests in Manama.
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Even during the 1990s intifada in Bahrain, I do not remember witnessing much trouble. I heard the odd skirmish, and the occasional siren, but as a child you tend to think that the police are the good guys and anyone giving them trouble... more
Even during the 1990s intifada in Bahrain, I do not remember witnessing much trouble. I heard the odd skirmish, and the occasional siren, but as a child you tend to think that the police are the good guys and anyone giving them trouble are "the bad guys." Sometimes people would discuss "trouble in the villages," but other than that, my ignorance of the situation was the result of youthful indifference cultivated by an informal apartheid.
Fast forward to 2013, and my youthful ignorance serves as a useful metaphor for the alarming extent of apparent Western indifference to the ongoing political crisis in Bahrain.
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Joe Calzaghe, the retired boxing world champion, is reportedly heading to Bahrain’s Diplomat Radisson Blu hotel to share anecdotes about his long and illustrious career. This seemingly innocuous opening statement belies a more worrying... more
Joe Calzaghe, the retired boxing world champion, is reportedly heading to Bahrain’s Diplomat Radisson Blu hotel to share anecdotes about his long and illustrious career. This seemingly innocuous opening statement belies a more worrying truth, wherein the Bahraini regime is exploiting the visits of celebrities like Calzaghe to project an image of normalcy and tranquillity.
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The Bahraini government spends thousands and thousands of dollars on PR companies every month. Their purpose of using such companies is simple: to project a positive image of Bahrain while also tempering any negative press coverage.
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On 5 May the Bahraini regime arrested prominent human rights activist and 2012 Index award winner Nabeel Rajab for inciting violence on social networking sites. This is the second time Rajab has been arrested for so-called “cyber crimes”,... more
On 5 May the Bahraini regime arrested prominent human rights activist and 2012 Index award winner Nabeel Rajab for inciting violence on social networking sites. This is the second time Rajab has been arrested for so-called “cyber crimes”, and last year the regime accused him of publishing false information on Twitter.

These attacks on free speech illustrate how authoritarian regimes can use social media as a convenient “evidence-gathering” tool to prosecute those who dare speak out. Indeed, Rajab’s arrest is a warning shot to others: a reminder that engaging in online activism could result in a prison sentence.

While the fear of arrest is an important concern for many activists using social media, there are other factors at work that might deter people from criticising the Bahraini regime. One of these is trolling, an aggressive form of online behaviour directed at other web-users. It usually comes from anonymous accounts, and its severity can range from death threats and threats of rape, to spiteful comments and personal abuse. It is particularly common on Twitter. Here’s a little taster of what I’ve experienced
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How much of Bahrain's wealth has been taken by the Ruler and the Al Khalifa family over the past 80 years? Based on an analysis of the Government of Bahrain’s financial reports, it would appear that between the years of 1926 and 1970,... more
How much of Bahrain's wealth has been taken by the Ruler and the Al Khalifa family over the past 80 years? Based on an analysis of the Government of Bahrain’s financial reports, it would appear that between the years of 1926 and 1970, Bahrain's ruling family received about a quarter of the nation's wealth. In fact, the amount given to the ruling family per year was always the largest item of recurrent expenditure.
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The Bahrain Grand Prix, which ended yesterday, is fast becoming one of the most contentious sporting events in the world. Pro-democracy and human rights activists utilise the F1 as a platform to draw attention to the plight of many... more
The Bahrain Grand Prix, which ended yesterday, is fast becoming one of the most contentious sporting events in the world. Pro-democracy and human rights activists utilise the F1 as a platform to draw attention to the plight of many Bahrainis who have suffered severe human rights abuses at the hands of a government who have yet to demonstrate any tangible commitment to reform and accountability.
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In Bahrain, members of the ruling Al Khalifa family, or those responsible for protecting their interests (i.e. the security forces) have historically been afforded a large degree of impunity. This is despite evidence that points to their... more
In Bahrain, members of the ruling Al Khalifa family, or those responsible for protecting their interests (i.e. the security forces) have historically been afforded a large degree of impunity. This is despite evidence that points to their participation in gross acts of oppression. In the recent uprising, no member of the state security forces has been found guilty of torture or murder, and no high-level government officials have been questioned for their complicity in the crackdown.
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In his Friday sermon three days ago, Bahrain’s most senior Shi’a cleric Isa Qassim sent a strong message out to the state security services, saying, "Whoever you see abusing women, you must crush them." Unsurprisingly, such words caused... more
In his Friday sermon three days ago, Bahrain’s most senior Shi’a cleric Isa Qassim sent a strong message out to the state security services, saying, "Whoever you see abusing women, you must crush them." Unsurprisingly, such words caused considerable anxiety in Bahrain, where tensions and violence seem to have escalated sharply since the beginning of the year. On Sunday, in what is one of the more powerful videos to emerge from Bahrain in the past year, residents of al-Eker videoed themselves chasing away riot police with Molotov cocktails, sticks and stones. Protesters have claimed that this was in retaliation to this incident, in which women appear to be struck and manhandled by riot officers after becoming involved over a man’s arrest.
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While some may be forgiven in thinking that Bahrain’s protests are limited to attempted peaceful sit-ins, tyre burnings and roadblocks, they would be wrong. Protest comes in many different forms, and Bahrainis have expressed their... more
While some may be forgiven in thinking that Bahrain’s protests are limited to attempted peaceful sit-ins, tyre burnings and roadblocks, they would be wrong. Protest comes in many different forms, and Bahrainis have expressed their discontent in a great variety of ways. While some methods attract more criticism than others, little attention has been paid to softer forms of resistance. I’m not talking about boycotts or withdrawing money from banks, but creative forms of protest that show defiance through humour or beauty.
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The reputation of Bahrain’s security apparatus has long been plagued by allegations of torture, ill treatment, and arbitrary arrest, yet it is only since February 2011 that such transgressions have been so well-documented. The prevalence... more
The reputation of Bahrain’s security apparatus has long been plagued by allegations of torture, ill treatment, and arbitrary arrest, yet it is only since February 2011 that such transgressions have been so well-documented. The prevalence of new media technologies combined with the scale of this year’s crackdown have enabled the global public to get an insight into the day to day transgressions perpetrated by the state’s security apparatus, which includes acts of theft, vandalism, excessive force, and unjustifiable violence. In addition to this, there is a growing body of evidence that shows how the security forces are using more unorthodox weapons to suppress protesters, including stones, slingshots and Molotov cocktails. In addition to this auxiliary arsenal of weapons, a number of videos have emerged that show members of the security forces throwing steel rods at protesters.
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Blogger Liliane Khalil claims to be an online journalist, but some say they've exposed her as another online hoax. We interviewed Marc Owen Jones, who posted about the investigation on his blog.
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بدأت قصة ليليان خليل عندما اختفى مطلع مايو حساب ليليان على تويتر. ليليان، التي تقدم نفسها كصحافية أمريكية من أصل فلسطيني تعيش في الولايات المتحدة، كان تكتب على موقع Bahrain Independent وهو موقع موال للسلطة في البحرين. لكن اختفاء حسابها... more
بدأت قصة ليليان خليل عندما اختفى مطلع مايو حساب ليليان على تويتر. ليليان، التي تقدم نفسها كصحافية أمريكية من أصل فلسطيني تعيش في الولايات المتحدة، كان تكتب على موقع Bahrain Independent وهو موقع موال للسلطة في البحرين. لكن اختفاء حسابها أثار استغراب بعض رواد الإنترنت، فراحوا يبحثون عن أخبار عنها على النت، ووجدوا أن حسابات أخرى لها اختفت كما كل مقالاتها على موقع Bahrain Independent وبدأت الشكوك تزداد حول هويتها. هل هي شخصية وهمية كما كانت أمينة عراف؟ أم مجرد ضحية لحملة تشن ضدها على النت؟ تعرفوا إلى قصتها الكاملة في هذه الحلقة من أصوات الشبكة.
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My discussion on the anniversary of protests in Bahrain
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Discussion on the media war in Bahrain
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While popular rhetoric tends to look at the emancipatory role of social media in the Arab Uprising, there is still a shortage of debate about its ability to act as a tool of repression. Using Bahrain as a case study, this seminar will... more
While popular rhetoric tends to look at the emancipatory role of social media in the Arab Uprising, there is still a shortage of debate about its ability to act as a tool of repression. Using Bahrain as a case study, this seminar will explore how social media is used by the regime and hegemonic forces to quell online dissent, encourage vigilantism, and discourage dissent 'on the ground.' This study will lay the foundation for a broader discussion concerning the lack of representational spaces available for Bahrain's activists and, as a corollary, the implications of this lack of space on identity and identity performance.
Political, cultural, historical and contemporary analysis on Bahrain
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This project argues that marginalised communities in Bahrain are being denied representative material public space by oppressive government crackdowns. In a quest to seek out spaces to represent themselves, these subaltern groups are... more
This project argues that marginalised communities in
Bahrain are being denied representative material public
space by oppressive government crackdowns. In a quest to
seek out spaces to represent themselves, these subaltern
groups are turning to new technologies to articulate their
subjugation. These technologies, which include mobile
phones and the internet, function as creators of space that
offer the potential to challenge traditional physical concepts
of public space, and therefore democracy. When
marginalised groups use these technologies to depict
political violence exacted against them, they create new
spaces that represent a point of counter-hegemonic struggle
in which identities and ideologies are brought to the fore.
This project seeks to examine videos of political violence on
YouTube in order to identify how they influence the creation
of counter-space. By doing so, I hope to contribute to an
understanding of both intra-Bahraini sectarian conflict, and
also broader intra-Arab prejudices. It also seeks to
contribute to the debate on public space, and to explore the
implications of how YouTube and the internet function as a
forum for debate, communication and democratic encounter.
Furthermore, it will address how the internet is a useful
methodological tool for gathering data on the region
Research Interests: