- Confucianism, Contemporary New Confucianism, Contemporary China, Chinese Politics, Contemporary Chinese Politics And Elite Leadership, China Domestic Politics, and 13 morepolitical Confucianism, Religion Policy in China, Chinese policymaking, Chinese State and bureaucratic apparatuses, Chinese Communist Party, China studies, Chinese Studies, Chinese Religions, Contemporary Confucianism, Comparative Politics, China, Political Elites, and Chinese Elite Politicsedit
- Dr Alex Payette holds a Ph.D. in comparative politics and international relations (University of Ottawa) and is a for... moreDr Alex Payette holds a Ph.D. in comparative politics and international relations (University of Ottawa) and is a former SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) Banting postdoctoral fellow at the University of Toronto and an Adjunct Professor at the faculty of Political Science of Glendon College (York University). His research interests focus around Chinese domestic politics, elite selection and promotion mechanisms as well as internal changes in the logic of local governance. He previously published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, International Journal of China Studies, China Report, East Asia: An International Quarterly, Asiatische Studien, Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, Issues and Studies and Hong Kong Journal of Social Science, to name but a few. <Email:payette.alex@gmail.com>edit
Introduction à l’histoire politique de la Chine populaire. Analyse des institutions et des politiques publiques chinoises. Examen du rapport entre l’État et la société.
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Introduction to the political history of the People's Republic of China. Analysis of institutions and public policy. Examination of state-society relations.
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Étude des principales contributions ayant marqué le développement de l'analyse de la politique comparée et application des principales théories et approches de ce domaine.
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Épistémologie et logiques de l'analyse qualitative. Introduction à diverses approches et méthodologies. Techniques d'observation (observation participante et non participante); analyse historique documentaire, méthode comparative, analyse... more
Épistémologie et logiques de l'analyse qualitative. Introduction à diverses approches et méthodologies. Techniques d'observation (observation participante et non participante); analyse historique documentaire, méthode comparative, analyse du discours, ethnographie politique, entrevues, approche multi-méthodes.
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Introduction to the fundamental dimensions of research. Presentation of several epistemological approaches and the questions they raise. Study of diverse logics of inquiry and their modes of inference. Introduction to some techniques and... more
Introduction to the fundamental dimensions of research. Presentation of several epistemological approaches and the questions they raise. Study of diverse logics of inquiry and their modes of inference. Introduction to some techniques and methods. Elaboration of a research project covering all of the required steps.
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This course is an introduction to China's political system. It is divided in three sections: 1) Contextual/historical; 2) the study of the Chinese state and 3) case studies addressing various domestic issues. 1) The first section is... more
This course is an introduction to China's political system. It is divided in three sections: 1) Contextual/historical; 2) the study of the Chinese state and 3) case studies addressing various domestic issues.
1) The first section is dedicated to China's political history going from the end of the Qing dynasty up to the post-communist era (2018);
2) The second section focuses entirely on the study of the Chinese State (e.g. the System and regime type, Party-State and the bureaucratic apparatus, various central department, factions and interest groups within the top leadership, selection of Elites and the processes of industrial reform and economic development);
3) The last section addresses different current issues in Chinese domestic politics (e.g. economic reforms, Religion, Ethnicity, current intellectual debates (e.g. political Confucianism, liberalism, the new left, etc.) and Social Welfare).
1) The first section is dedicated to China's political history going from the end of the Qing dynasty up to the post-communist era (2018);
2) The second section focuses entirely on the study of the Chinese State (e.g. the System and regime type, Party-State and the bureaucratic apparatus, various central department, factions and interest groups within the top leadership, selection of Elites and the processes of industrial reform and economic development);
3) The last section addresses different current issues in Chinese domestic politics (e.g. economic reforms, Religion, Ethnicity, current intellectual debates (e.g. political Confucianism, liberalism, the new left, etc.) and Social Welfare).
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Mcgill University
Winter 2016
Winter 2016
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(Pol4378 in subject line) Questions sent by em ail will be answered within two days or the following class if it takes place 48h after the em ail was sent. Please note that the Professor reser ves the right not to answer an email if the... more
(Pol4378 in subject line) Questions sent by em ail will be answered within two days or the following class if it takes place 48h after the em ail was sent. Please note that the Professor reser ves the right not to answer an email if the level of language used is inadequate.
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Résumé Les legs politiques forment un facteur important qui, malgré les discours néo-traditionnels présents dans le champ des études comparatives, explique comment certaines politiques, ainsi que la structure générale du conflit... more
Résumé Les legs politiques forment un facteur important qui, malgré les discours néo-traditionnels présents dans le champ des études comparatives, explique comment certaines politiques, ainsi que la structure générale du conflit politique, ont influencé l’état des dispositions du care pour les personnes âgées à Taiwan et en République Populaire de Chine. D’une part, Taiwan transfère déjà depuis un moment les responsabilités du care liées à la famille vers la sphère publique par le biais de réformes politiques qui visent à répondre aux demandes de la société civile depuis la transition démocratique. D’autre part, le Parti-État a mis en place une série de lois « filiales » en plus de réformes politiques et économiques qui eurent comme conséquence de faire gonfler l’offre et la demande de care basé sur la famille sans toutefois remédier à la situation institutionnelle. Ces lois et réformes eurent un impact direct sur le développement des institutions offrant du soutien aux personnes âgées. Cela dit, la problématique qu’est la provision du care dans les sociétés dites « chinoises » demeure souvent présentée sous l’angle de la culture. Cette accentuation est le résultat de la prédominance d’une vision sociologique à l’intérieur de la discipline et du « retour de la culture » dans le champ de la politique comparée. Cependant, contrairement à cette tendance, l’article se propose de faire une analyse basée sur la « dépendance au sentier » de l’état actuel des dispositions du care pour les personnes âgées à Taiwan et en Chine. Celle-ci, sans pour autant passer par l’argument culturel, mettra l’accent sur l’influence des politiques récentes et sur l’émergence des structures de provision du care. En ce sens, l’objectif de l’article est de « ramener » les politiques à l’avant-plan dans l’étude des dispositions du care en Asie de l’est.
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Since the early 1980s, China has witnessed a progressive Confucian revival, especially in the academic and cultural spheres. In particular, since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive expansion of Confucian groups arising from... more
Since the early 1980s, China has witnessed a progressive Confucian revival, especially in the academic and cultural spheres. In particular, since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive expansion of Confucian groups arising from local initiatives all over China in the form of local colleges and study halls. Using four previously unexplored sites, this article studies the multiple modalities of local Confucian revival in the province of Shandong. Through interviews and extensive discussion with members of these groups, we have uncovered a strong adherence to Confucian elements and a convenient religiosity through ritual performances. Therefore, this article not only agrees with previously conducted studies on the revival of Confucianism in China but also adds new empirical elements supporting their conclusions. Finally, this article introduces the ‘Countryside Confucianism experiment’, its current meaning and ties to the ongoing local Confucian resurgence in the province of Shandong as well as its shared identity ‘closure’ characteristics, prevalent among some of these local sites’ narrative.
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This article examines the Party-State-led Countryside Confucianism experiment based in the rural vicinities of Qufu. There has been, since the 1980s, a renewed interest in Confucianism from both mainland and foreign scholars. More... more
This article examines the Party-State-led Countryside Confucianism experiment based in the rural vicinities of Qufu. There has been, since the 1980s, a renewed interest in Confucianism from both mainland and foreign scholars. More academic to begin with, the focus has recently shifted toward more local and popular groups spreading Confucian teachings across the People’s Republic. This popular resurgence, often described as disjointed and fragmented, has sometimes expressed a more religious or politically charged Confucianism. Recent developments in the Shandong province are now pointing to a more organized—through the involvement of the Party-State—local revival. I argue that this recent government involvement in local Confucian revival comes as a way to compete and reposition itself on the local “cultural market” in order to reinstate its cultural authority over Confucianism, to curb certain practices and possibly restrain the growth of foreign beliefs in the Confucian city of Qufu. This objective of the article is first to document this countryside experience as to frame it in the more general Confucian revival. Furthermore, it will examine its ties to previous rural experiences conducted in Shandong as well as some of its more indirect sociopolitical objectives. To a certain extent, understanding this Party-State-led organized form of local Confucianism will shed light on its renewed role in terms of cultural authority, cultural governance, and local Confucian revival.
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Since the early 1980s, China has been the theatre of numerous social, political and cultural changes. One of which has been the return of Confucianism, first in academia, and later on in the social, educational and political spheres. If... more
Since the early 1980s, China has been the theatre of numerous social, political and cultural changes. One of which has been the return of Confucianism, first in academia, and later on in the social, educational and political spheres. If at first Confucian revival was more academically oriented (e.g. rediscovery of classical studies, engaging with developments from Taiwan and Hong Kong, etc.), from the early 2000s on, we observed the spread of more “popular” and localized forms of Confucian revival all over China (Clart 2003; Billioud 2010; Billioud and Thoraval 2014; Guo 2013). Composed of a patchwork of different groups which have often stayed away from academia (Billioud and Thoraval 2014), they claim their own understanding of the latter and are in all likeliness an important vector driving the Confucian revival in China today. These two trends are, however, not mutually exclusive as some academics are now becoming more involved in setting up some of these local groups or regional initiatives in order to “bring the Confucian torch to the masses” (Billioud 2010). In other words, we could say that the Confucian revival has since then reached a new stage in its unfolding by progressively moving away from scholarly research to more pragmatic endeavours. That said, this chapter assesses [...]
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With the recent formal inclusion of the Renminbi (RMB) into the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) currency basket, prospects for further internationalization of the RMB are improving. However, as China attempts to simultaneously... more
With the recent formal inclusion of the Renminbi (RMB) into the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) currency basket, prospects for further internationalization of the RMB are improving. However, as China attempts to simultaneously undergo an economic transition into a more balanced growth model, and the internationalization of its currency, pressures are mounting from the impossible trinity. The latter is based on the Mundell-Flemming model. The latter posits a policy-choice problem in which a country cannot simultaneously have unfettered capital movement, an independent monetary policy, and a fixed exchange rate system. Naturally, three baskets of policy combinations are possible. Historical events such as the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) have demonstrated that countries are strictly bound by the impossible trinity. The paper posits that China should opt for the policy basket of a fully liberalized capital account, fully liberalized interest rates, and maintain its current ...
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Basé sur une approche apparentée à la politique comparée, l’article soutient l’idée que pour être à même de comprendre et d’expliquer la politique étrangère chinoise ainsi que sa diplomatie, il faut se tourner du côté du Parti-État, de sa... more
Basé sur une approche apparentée à la politique comparée, l’article soutient l’idée que pour être à même de comprendre et d’expliquer la politique étrangère chinoise ainsi que sa diplomatie, il faut se tourner du côté du Parti-État, de sa logique et de son fonctionnement interne. En ce sens, au lieu de parler de soft ou encore de sharp power, il serait bon de revoir comment fonctionne le Parti-État afin de voir si les intentions qu’on lui prête sont fondées.
Based on an approach closer to comparative politics, the article puts forward the idea that in order to understand Chinese foreign policy and its overall diplomacy, we are required to go back to the Party-State, to its internal logic and inner workings. Hence, rather than talking about soft or even sharp power, it would be wise to assess how the Party-State actually works in order to see if the intentions attributed to it are justified.
Based on an approach closer to comparative politics, the article puts forward the idea that in order to understand Chinese foreign policy and its overall diplomacy, we are required to go back to the Party-State, to its internal logic and inner workings. Hence, rather than talking about soft or even sharp power, it would be wise to assess how the Party-State actually works in order to see if the intentions attributed to it are justified.
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In July 2018, President Donald Trump stated in an interview with CNBC that he is willing to impose tariffs on all USD 505 billion worth of Chinese exports to the US. At the time of this writing, this has not become a reality. While it is... more
In July 2018, President Donald Trump stated in an interview with CNBC that he is willing to impose tariffs on all USD 505 billion worth of Chinese exports to the US. At the time of this writing, this has not become a reality. While it is strikingly clear that China cannot match the US in a tit-for-tat tariffs fight due to an imbalance in import volumes in favor of the latter, China can and has made some tactical decisions in its imposition of tariffs. For example, many of the tariffs levied on US goods target products which originate from states that have voted for Trump. At the same time, many of these products – such as soybeans – China can procure in other markets. This paper does not explore how China can mobilize the extent of its geoeconomic tools to gain an advantage in this developing trade war, as this has already been widely covered in the media. Instead, comprising two parts, this paper examines how China can use the pressures created by this trade war to better advance i...
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Plenums are an opportunity for the Central Committee members to meet, and, of course, discuss a number of important issues pertaining to the state of the domestic economy, but also to national governance. As tensions are rising inside the... more
Plenums are an opportunity for the Central Committee members to meet, and, of course, discuss a number of important issues pertaining to the state of the domestic economy, but also to national governance. As tensions are rising inside the Party-State apparatus – mainly the results of the aftermath of the anti-corruption campaign, the tenuous trade war or the chaos spreading in Hong Kong, all eyes were looking at Xi Jinping to announce the fourth plenum of the nineteenth Party Congress. The latter would come more than 600 days after the third plenum (February 2018), in the context of a tensed post-summer retreat at Beidaihe. The fourth plenum expressed tensions in the top leadership structure, but also highlighted some confusion and uncertainties as to what the Party plans to do to remedy the economic slowdown, to solve the ongoing Hong Kong crisis, and to untangle the trade talks with the United States – talks that only recently reached a tentative agreement. As such, this article r...
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As a late joiner to the Arctic Council China has made its presence felt since 2013, especially through its inclusion as an observer and through multilateral cooperation. China also has since included the Arctic in its overall Belt and... more
As a late joiner to the Arctic Council China has made its presence felt since 2013, especially through its inclusion as an observer and through multilateral cooperation. China also has since included the Arctic in its overall Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), opening a new front through the “Ice Silk Road”. That said, considering China’s largely poor international reputation, especially in light of recent events (e.g. poor management of the COVID19 crisis and subsequent “wolf warrior” diplomacy displaying hostility towards Western countries, etc.), it is oftentimes difficult for China to coax Arctic states to negotiate for access and potential resources. As such, the Party-State sometimes benefits from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities, which are more inclined to take part in such negotiations. To this effect, this chapter supports the idea that Beijing – despite not supporting the idea for itself – does benefit from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities in its quest to access the Arctic region. Consequently, the Party-State lays the foundation of relationships based on linkages and leverages that have the potential to cause domestic issues in other states. In doing so, the Party is trying to create structures of opportunity that could lead to favorable bilateral relations with numerous subnational entities, thus letting them deal with potential barriers to entry.
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Since the early 1980s, China has been the theatre of numerous social, political and cultural changes. One of which has been the return of Confucianism, first in academia, and later on in the social, educational and political spheres. If... more
Since the early 1980s, China has been the theatre of numerous social, political and cultural changes. One of which has been the return of Confucianism, first in academia, and later on in the social, educational and political spheres. If at first Confucian revival was more academically oriented (e.g. rediscovery of classical studies, engaging with developments from Taiwan and Hong Kong, etc.), from the early 2000s on, we observed the spread of more “popular” and localized forms of Confucian revival all over China (Clart 2003; Billioud 2010; Billioud and Thoraval 2014; Guo 2013). Composed of a patchwork of different groups which have often stayed away from academia (Billioud and Thoraval 2014), they claim their own understanding of the latter and are in all likeliness an important vector driving the Confucian revival in China today. These two trends are, however, not mutually exclusive as some academics are now becoming more involved in setting up some of these local groups or regional initiatives in order to “bring the Confucian torch to the masses” (Billioud 2010). In other words, we could say that the Confucian revival has since then reached a new stage in its unfolding by progressively moving away from scholarly research to more pragmatic endeavours. That said, this chapter assesses [...]
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Efforts at finding the next Politburo members have, since the mid-1970s, been at the center of Chinese Elite and leadership studies. From the late 1980s onwards, leadership selection has become more institutionalized. This allows scholars... more
Efforts at finding the next Politburo members have, since the mid-1970s, been at the center of Chinese Elite and leadership studies. From the late 1980s onwards, leadership selection has become more institutionalized. This allows scholars to narrow down their search to more “propitious” elements in order to try to predict who might ascend to the Politburo. Consequently, this article ponders if it was possible to differentiate these individuals from their less “promotable” counterparts upon their entry into the Central Committee between 1992 and 2012. Based on statistical reassessment of variables commonly found in the literature, the article argues that soon-to-be Politburo members were already displaying a different profile than that of their counterparts 5 to 10 years before their entry into the Politburo. This article does not seek to establish a perfect predictive model rather than circumscribe the profile-type and environment in which these rising Elites can be found. Lastly, the latter opens a discussion on what to expect from the results as well as competing profiles found inside the Central Committee.
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RésuméComment s’exprime le renouveau confucéen sur le plan local en Chine contemporaine? Contrairement aux discours politiquement engagés qui occupent une grande partie des débats concernant le « renouveau du confucianisme », cet article... more
RésuméComment s’exprime le renouveau confucéen sur le plan local en Chine contemporaine? Contrairement aux discours politiquement engagés qui occupent une grande partie des débats concernant le « renouveau du confucianisme », cet article tente de rendre compte de la vision locale de celui-ci à l’aide du cas du
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Résumé. Cet article défend l'idée que pour être en mesure de bien saisir la sélection des élites communistes chinoises (cadres, fonctionnaires, leaders), il faille maintenant se détourner des approches utilisant la variable... more
Résumé. Cet article défend l'idée que pour être en mesure de bien saisir la sélection des élites communistes chinoises (cadres, fonctionnaires, leaders), il faille maintenant se détourner des approches utilisant la variable factionnelle comme élément explicatif pour ensuite mettre l'accent sur les règles et les conditions formelles « nécessaires » à la nomination et à la sélection du personnel. Nous pensons que l'âge et l'expérience dans les instances du Parti et de l'État prennent progressivement le dessus sur le côté informel de la politique chinoise. Enfin, ce texte se veut une mise en garde aux chercheurs concernant l'utilisation de la notion de faction dans la politique chinoise, à ne pas accepter a priori l'existence des factions et encore moins leurs présumées influences.. This article puts forward the idea that to be able to understand the selection of Chinese communist elites (cadres, officials, leaders), we must now turn away from approaches usi...
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Lors du 6 e plénum du 19 e Congrès en novembre 2021, le Parti a déposé une nouvelle résolution historique, la troisième de son histoire. Cette dernière, qui devrait normalement inaugurer une nouvelle ère, semble troublée par les luttes... more
Lors du 6 e plénum du 19 e Congrès en novembre 2021, le Parti a déposé une nouvelle résolution historique, la troisième de son histoire. Cette dernière, qui devrait normalement inaugurer une nouvelle ère, semble troublée par les luttes intra-Parti et par un manque de conviction général qui caractérise la période post-19 e Congrès (2017-2022). En ce sens, contrairement à ses deux prédécesseures, la présente résolution, au lieu d'aider Xi Jinping à consolider sa place au sein du Parti, risque plutôt d'exacerber les tensions intra-Parti alors que celui-ci se dirige à grands pas vers la jonction critique qu'est le 20 e Congrès. Et contrairement à un certain « consensus » malavisé, prégnant surtout dans le discours médiatique occidental, la troisième résolution est loin d'offrir à Xi la consécration et la légitimité dont il a besoin pour demeurer en poste et réaliser les objectifs du second centenaire du Parti.
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With the recent formal inclusion of the Renminbi (RMB) into the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) currency basket, prospects for further internationalization of the RMB are improving. However, as China attempts to simultaneously... more
With the recent formal inclusion of the Renminbi (RMB) into the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) currency basket, prospects for further internationalization of the RMB are improving. However, as China attempts to simultaneously undergo an economic transition into a more balanced growth model, and the internationalization of its currency, pressures are mounting from the impossible trinity. The latter is based on the Mundell-Flemming model. The latter posits a policy-choice problem in which a country cannot simultaneously have unfettered capital movement, an independent monetary policy, and a fixed exchange rate system. Naturally, three baskets of policy combinations are possible. Historical events such as the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) have demonstrated that countries are strictly bound by the impossible trinity.
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How are top leaders selected in Communist China? Following an in-depth literature review of Elite formation and selection inside the Chinese Communist Party, this paper posits the existence of a “path” leading to the top of the leadership... more
How are top leaders selected in Communist China? Following an in-depth literature review of Elite formation and selection inside the Chinese Communist Party, this paper posits the existence of a “path” leading to the top of the leadership structure. The latter is built around provincial experiences, specific positions in particular regions, age thresholds and other institutional constraints which regulate and organise access to the apex of the Party-State apparatus. Therefore, the objective of this research is to emphasise the more formal side of Chinese Elite politics and at the same time to provide “guidelines” as to where to look and what to look for when trying to identify “promotable” individuals for leadership turnover.
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How do Confucian groups participate in local governance? Contrary to the growing body of literature which discuss the development of Confucianism as religion and its possible institutionalization in China, this paper will focus on the... more
How do Confucian groups participate in local governance? Contrary to the growing body of literature which discuss the development of Confucianism as religion and its possible institutionalization in China, this paper will focus on the role of these groups in the local governance. This article explores the Shenzhenbased Kongshengtang, a non-profit public interest group and will argue that the latter participates in the moral governance through its teachings and daily rituals. First, the article will introduce the Kongshengtang, its origin, activities (i.e. teachings, rituals, etc.) and its director. By examining the later, who is a student of the « Confucian master » Jiang Qing, we will demonstrate that not only does Kongshengtang actively participates in moral governance but also in the local religious landscape, even though Confucianism is not recognized as being a religion on mainland China. Moreover, it will be shown how Kongshengtang's religious and moral discourse insert it...
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Drawing upon the framework of "fragmented authoritarianism," this article attempts to formalize existing bureaucratic behaviors in the Chinese political apparatus through the inclusion of the logic of "collusive... more
Drawing upon the framework of "fragmented authoritarianism," this article attempts to formalize existing bureaucratic behaviors in the Chinese political apparatus through the inclusion of the logic of "collusive behavior" amongst the various bureaucratic levels. Policy crafting is posited as a more comprehensive notion to describe Chinese energy policymaking. Additionally, policy crafting addresses center-local internal dynamics from a new angle to better grasp the domestic conditions under which energy policy is "crafted" and implemented throughout China's bureaucratic apparatus. The main contributions of this article are theoretical and analytical. It begins by defining policy crafting and noting the explicative limits of the existing approaches to China's "informal" bureaucratic politics. The article then develops a theoretical reappraisal of the fragmented authoritarianism model in order to push it forward and supplement it with &q...
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Résumé Les legs politiques forment un facteur important qui, malgré les discours néo-traditionnels présents dans le champ des études comparatives, explique comment certaines politiques, ainsi que la structure générale du conflit... more
Résumé Les legs politiques forment un facteur important qui, malgré les discours néo-traditionnels présents dans le champ des études comparatives, explique comment certaines politiques, ainsi que la structure générale du conflit politique, ont influencé l’état des dispositions du care pour les personnes âgées à Taiwan et en République Populaire de Chine. D’une part, Taiwan transfère déjà depuis un moment les responsabilités du care liées à la famille vers la sphère publique par le biais de réformes politiques qui visent à répondre aux demandes de la société civile depuis la transition démocratique. D’autre part, le Parti-État a mis en place une série de lois « filiales » en plus de réformes politiques et économiques qui eurent comme conséquence de faire gonfler l’offre et la demande de care basé sur la famille sans toutefois remédier à la situation institutionnelle. Ces lois et réformes eurent un impact direct sur le développement des institutions offrant du soutien aux personnes âg...
Research Interests:
Since the early 1980s, China has witnessed a progressive Confucian revival, especially in the academic and cultural spheres. In particular, since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive expansion of Confucian groups arising from... more
Since the early 1980s, China has witnessed a progressive Confucian revival, especially in the academic and cultural spheres. In particular, since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive expansion of Confucian groups arising from local initiatives all over China in the form of local colleges and study halls. Using four previously unexplored sites, this article studies the multiple modalities of local Confucian revival in the province of Shandong. Through interviews and extensive discussion with members of these groups, we have uncovered a strong adherence to Confucian elements and a convenient religiosity through ritual performances. Therefore, this article not only agrees with previously conducted studies on the revival of Confucianism in China but also adds new empirical elements supporting their conclusions. Finally, this article introduces the ‘Countryside Confucianism experiment’, its current meaning and ties to the ongoing local Confucian resurgence in the province of Sha...
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Policy legacies are an important factor explaining how, regardless of the nontraditional discourse, previously implemented laws and policies have greatly influenced the state of eldercare arrangements in both China and Taiwan. On the one... more
Policy legacies are an important factor explaining how, regardless of the nontraditional discourse, previously implemented laws and policies have greatly influenced the state of eldercare arrangements in both China and Taiwan. On the one hand, Taiwan has been shifting eldercare responsibilities from the family to the public through a series of social policy reforms fueled by political demands from the civil society since its democratic transition, whereas the Chinese Party-State enacted a series of filial laws in addition to reform policies, which inflated the demand and supply for familial care while at the same time impacting the development of institutional eldercare. While the issue often framed as the prevalence of filial culture in Chinese societies, this article argues, through a path dependency-based perspective, that legal provisions, policies and the structure of the political competition are largely responsible for shaping current eldercare arrangements on both sides of t...
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Policy legacies are an important factor explaining how, regardless of the nontraditional discourse, previously implemented laws and policies have greatly influenced the state of eldercare arrangements in both China and Taiwan. On the one... more
Policy legacies are an important factor explaining how, regardless of the nontraditional discourse, previously implemented laws and policies have greatly influenced the state of eldercare arrangements in both China and Taiwan. On the one hand, Taiwan has been shifting eldercare responsibilities from the family to the public through a series of social policy reforms fueled by political demands from the civil society since its democratic transition, whereas the Chinese Party-State enacted a series of filial laws in addition to reform policies, which inflated the demand and supply for familial care while at the same time impacting the development of institutional eldercare. While the issue often framed as the prevalence of filial culture in Chinese societies, this article argues, through a path dependency-based perspective, that legal provisions, policies and the structure of the political competition are largely responsible for shaping current eldercare arrangements on both sides of t...
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As a late joiner to the Arctic Council China has made its presence felt since 2013, especially through its inclusion as an observer and through multilateral cooperation. China also has since included the Arctic in its overall Belt and... more
As a late joiner to the Arctic Council China has made its presence felt since 2013, especially through its inclusion as an observer and through multilateral cooperation. China also has since included the Arctic in its overall Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), opening a new front through the “Ice Silk Road”. That said, considering China’s largely poor international reputation, especially in light of recent events (e.g. poor management of the COVID19 crisis and subsequent “wolf warrior” diplomacy displaying hostility towards Western countries, etc.), it is oftentimes difficult for China to coax Arctic states to negotiate for access and potential resources. As such, the Party-State sometimes benefits from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities, which are more inclined to take part in such negotiations. To this effect, this chapter supports the idea that Beijing – despite not supporting the idea for itself – does benefit from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities in its quest to access the Arctic region. Consequently, the Party-State lays the foundation of relationships based on linkages and leverages that have the potential to cause domestic issues in other states. In doing so, the Party is trying to create structures of opportunity that could lead to favorable bilateral relations with numerous subnational entities, thus letting them deal with potential barriers to entry.
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As a late joiner to the Arctic Council and a recent producer of an actual arctic strategy, China has, since its inclusion as a permanent observer in 2013, made its presence as a “near arctic state” felt with talks of joint research and... more
As a late joiner to the Arctic Council and a recent producer of an actual arctic strategy, China has, since its inclusion as a permanent observer in 2013, made its presence as a “near arctic state” felt with talks of joint research and multilateral cooperation. China has also since included the arctic in its overall “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), opening a new front through the “Arctic Silk Road”. As such, notwithstanding a more important inclusion in the wider global community under more economic terms, this new chapter of the BRI directly addresses domestic concerns (e.g. access to new shipping routes, access to natural resources) tied to its current economic predicament. In addition, the People’s Republic tries to further its agenda mainly through scientific research and infrastructure financing, which is much more appealing for smaller states in the region, in order to not only gain access to resources (as a tradeoff), but also to critical arctic technologies or other technological advancements made during potential partnerships. That said, China is far from having a firm stance on the arctic, in contrast to its current foreign policy at large, which leads us to think that the Party might be worried about being isolated from the arctic race (and benefits) by being too aggressive. To this effect, the objective of this chapter is to reassess China’s arctic stance and strategy in light of the renewed BRI in order to understand China’s key interests in the region and how the relate to the BRI; and the contrasting tones of China’s wider foreign policy conduct versus the country’s tone as outlined in its Arctic White paper.
for Mapping Arctic Paradiplomacy, presented by L'observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l'Arctique (OPSA), avec l'appui du Ministère des relations internationales et de la Francophonie du Gouvernement du Québec
for Mapping Arctic Paradiplomacy, presented by L'observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l'Arctique (OPSA), avec l'appui du Ministère des relations internationales et de la Francophonie du Gouvernement du Québec
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How do Confucian groups participate in local governance? Contrary to the growing body of literature which discuss the development of Confucianism as religion and its possible institutionalization in China, this paper will focus on the... more
How do Confucian groups participate in local governance? Contrary to the growing body of literature which discuss the development of Confucianism as religion and its possible institutionalization in China, this paper will focus on the role of these groups in the local governance. This article explores the Shenzhen-based Kongshengtang, a non-profit public interest group and will argue that the latter participates in the moral governance through its teachings and daily rituals. First, the article will introduce the Kongshengtang, its origin, activities (i.e. teachings, rituals, etc.) and its director. By examining the later, who is a student of the « Confucian master » Jiang Qing, we will demonstrate that not only does Kongshengtang actively participates in moral governance but also in the local religious landscape, even though Confucianism is not recognized as being a religion on mainland China. Moreover, it will be shown how Kongshengtang's religious and moral discourse insert itself in the Party's narrative regarding harmonious society and thus, how it participates in moral governance. We will conclude by applying Yang Fenggang's religious economics framework in order to assess its validity in the case of the religious Confucianism displayed by Kongshentang.
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The global economy has entered into an unprecedented era of monetary easing, the likes of which even dwarf the post-2008 period. The Central banks of Major economies have unleashed trillions in liquidity into the international financial... more
The global economy has entered into an unprecedented era of monetary easing, the likes of which even dwarf the post-2008 period. The Central banks of Major economies have unleashed trillions in liquidity into the international financial system in an attempt to offset the economic damage caused by the still ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Party-State, and every other country that is not the US, the EU and Japan, is feeling the fallout from this global monetary easing, especially that of which is being pumped out of the US.
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On April 19 2020, Sun Lijun was put under investigation. Sun is the mishu (personal secretary) of Meng Jianzhu, Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission [zhengfa] from 2012 to 2017, and a close ally of... more
On April 19 2020, Sun Lijun was put under investigation. Sun is the mishu (personal secretary) of Meng Jianzhu, Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission [zhengfa] from 2012 to 2017, and a close ally of Politburo member Han Zheng, who is also a full member of Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Gang.
*shorten version of the full article provided by the Cercius Group*
*shorten version of the full article provided by the Cercius Group*
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China, which is at the moment barely recovering from the covid19 crisis, already came out during March to announce that the country was slowly getting back to work, something that is more than vital for both the domestic economy and the... more
China, which is at the moment barely recovering from the covid19 crisis, already came out during March to announce that the country was slowly getting back to work, something that is more than vital for both the domestic economy and the Party-State itself. The early days of the “end” of the containment have not been easy for Chinese workers. Aside from the Hubei-Jiangxi Bridge incident on March 27, manufacturers as well as assembly lines are trying to reignite the economic engine, while the rest of the planet is entering its quarantine and self-isolation period.
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De plus en plus, on cherche à blâmer la Chine pour la situation actuelle ; la tendance est à souligner comment le Parti tente d’étouffer l’épidémie depuis le début, comment les chiffres sont faux, etc. Le tout se déroule alors que les... more
De plus en plus, on cherche à blâmer la Chine pour la situation actuelle ; la tendance est à souligner comment le Parti tente d’étouffer l’épidémie depuis le début, comment les chiffres sont faux, etc. Le tout se déroule alors que les pays occidentaux font face à la pandémie de façon « suboptimale » et que certains individus du Ministère des Affaires étrangères chinois optent publiquement pour des théories du complot. D’autres intéressés nous parlent également de la redéfinition de la scène géopolitique post-covid19 par la Chine, ou encore de l’instrumentalisation de la crise par la Chine à des fins politiques (p. ex faire des gains politiques ou encore économiques au détriment d’autres pays, etc.). Cela dit, rien de substantiel n’a changé depuis le début de pandémie et rien n’indique non plus de grands changements dans un futur proche. Aussi de dire, la crise du covid19 risque plutôt de fragiliser la posture de la Chine tant sur le plan domestique (pour ce qui est du régime lui-même), qu’au plan international.
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La Chine, qui se remet à peine de la crise du coronavirus, nous parlait déjà à la fin du mois du mars de l’inévitable retour au travail, retour qui est nécessaire et vital pour l’économie chinoise et bien sûr, le Parti. Cela dit, ce... more
La Chine, qui se remet à peine de la crise du coronavirus, nous parlait déjà à la fin du mois du mars de l’inévitable retour au travail, retour qui est nécessaire et vital pour l’économie chinoise et bien sûr, le Parti. Cela dit, ce retour ne se fait pas dans la douceur. Outre l’incident du pont entre le Hubei et le Jiangxi de la semaine dernière – qui signale également l’inégalité de ce retour à travers la Chine, les manufactures et autres maillons de la chaines de production tentent de se remettre au travail, alors que le reste du monde commence sa période d’isolement volontaire ou encore de quarantaine.
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Mainstream press sources have widely reported on the recent wave of Cadres from the financial and banking sectors taking up roles in provincial governments. Far from being a new phenomenon, the press has been quick to assume that this... more
Mainstream press sources have widely reported on the recent wave of Cadres from the financial and banking sectors taking up roles in provincial governments. Far from being a new phenomenon, the press has been quick to assume that this round of promotions is inextricably tied to the regime's dedication to cleaning up systemic risks in the economy, and to employ more "experts" in the political realm. For the most part, Cercius Group notes that these "financiers" are nothing new, and their provincial tenures are but part of their overall career progression - via sponsored mobility. Whether or not these Cadres will have any impact on fixing systemic economic issues remains very uncertain.
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In late December 2019, Luo Huining 骆惠宁 was set aside and taken down from his provincial position, and instead sent, as several 65-year-old Cadres often do before their official retirement, to a commission led by the National People’s... more
In late December 2019, Luo Huining 骆惠宁 was set aside and taken down from his provincial position, and instead sent, as several 65-year-old Cadres often do before their official retirement, to a commission led by the National People’s Congress (NPC). As such, his sudden re-appointment at the head of the Liaison Office after the removal of Wang Zhimin, which was predictable, was received with mixed feelings.
Some are saying this “new” player could bring a breath of fresh air and bring new perspectives on the current state of affairs; some might see this move as either an ill-advised decision or the result of lengthy negotiations at the top.
Some are saying this “new” player could bring a breath of fresh air and bring new perspectives on the current state of affairs; some might see this move as either an ill-advised decision or the result of lengthy negotiations at the top.
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Faced with massive electoral losses and relentless protests, Carrie Lam flew to Beijing on the December 16 to meet with Xi Jinping in order to reassess short-term priorities when it comes the Special Administrative Zone. Some were... more
Faced with massive electoral losses and relentless protests, Carrie Lam flew to Beijing on the December 16 to meet with Xi Jinping in order to reassess short-term priorities when it comes the Special Administrative Zone. Some were expecting this meeting to lead to the resignation of Lam. However, support for Lam was reiterated and the discourse remained more or less the same. The main differences lie in the meeting itself and in one crucial discourse variation.
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On December 12, 2019, Reuters reported that the Central Government has more or less made it a policy goal of transforming Macau’s economy – diversifying its heavy exposure to the casino industry and tourism . Furthermore, state-owned... more
On December 12, 2019, Reuters reported that the Central Government has more or less made it a policy goal of transforming Macau’s economy – diversifying its heavy exposure to the casino industry and tourism . Furthermore, state-owned banks and enterprises are strongly encouraged to help build new and updated infrastructure in order to implement this project for financial “diversification”.
Among a plethora of new policies for the semi-autonomous port, the key highlights included: the establishment of a CNY-denominated stock exchange (presumably onshore CNY) ; picking up pace on the setting up of a CNY settlement center; and releasing swaths of land in the mainland for Macau to develop. Notwithstanding the obvious signal these policies send to neighboring Hong Kong and the wider international business community, it is necessary to step back and consider whether these policies are prudent, before jumping onboard the Macau bandwagon.
Among a plethora of new policies for the semi-autonomous port, the key highlights included: the establishment of a CNY-denominated stock exchange (presumably onshore CNY) ; picking up pace on the setting up of a CNY settlement center; and releasing swaths of land in the mainland for Macau to develop. Notwithstanding the obvious signal these policies send to neighboring Hong Kong and the wider international business community, it is necessary to step back and consider whether these policies are prudent, before jumping onboard the Macau bandwagon.
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Assess the promotability and get more information about factional affiliations of the new crop of Central Committee members.
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Contact us at info@cerciusgroup.com
Get your reference maps now via http://cerciusgroup.com
Contact us at info@cerciusgroup.com
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Functional Departments of the Central Committee – networks and affiliations (November 2019)
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Ever wondered who's who on the Ministerial scene? Check out our maps that provide information on networks and Cadres' affiliations.
Contact us info@cerciusgroup.com for the full version.
Contact us info@cerciusgroup.com for the full version.
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Complete with names only available via Cerciusgroup.com
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Zhang Xiaoming 张晓明, the director of the State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 国务院港澳办, was replaced a few days ago, as vice-director of the small leading group of the same name, by the current Minister of Public Security, Zhao... more
Zhang Xiaoming 张晓明, the director of the State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 国务院港澳办, was replaced a few days ago, as vice-director of the small leading group of the same name, by the current Minister of Public Security, Zhao Kezhi 赵克志. That said, it seems Hong Kong’s issues run deeper than just a few personnel appointments.
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On October 1st, the People’s Republic of China will turn 70. From its founding back in 1949, to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the Party-State, now under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has been able to adapt and change... more
On October 1st, the People’s Republic of China will turn 70. From its founding back in 1949, to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the Party-State, now under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has been able to adapt and change according to its own historical circumstances. The People’s Republic has become a critical case study in the fields of “regime resilience and transformation” and “democratization”.
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Call for papers
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS)
Publisher: Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
ISSN: 2410-9681
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS)
Publisher: Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
ISSN: 2410-9681
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Xi Jinping a réussi son pari : se débarrasser de la « Bande de Shanghai », ce solide réseau qui a permis à l’ancien président Jiang Zemin de maintenir son influence bien après sa retraite. Comme nous l’avons vu dans un premier volet,... more
Xi Jinping a réussi son pari : se débarrasser de la « Bande de Shanghai », ce solide réseau qui a permis à l’ancien président Jiang Zemin de maintenir son influence bien après sa retraite. Comme nous l’avons vu dans un premier volet, l’actuel numéro un chinois s’est attelé dès son arrivée au pouvoir fin 2012 à « nettoyer » de cette clique les postes-clés à Shanghai. Dorénavant, ce « nettoyage » assuré et assumé, tous les yeux se tournent vers l’avenir et la succession de la succession : soit les futurs cadres de la municipalité pour l’année 2032.
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Que reste-t-il de la « Bande de Shanghai », ce solide réseau qui a permis à l’ancien président Jiang Zemin de maintenir son influence bien après sa retraite ? Pressé d’asseoir son autorité sur le Parti-État, Xi Jinping s’est attelé dès... more
Que reste-t-il de la « Bande de Shanghai », ce solide réseau qui a permis à l’ancien président Jiang Zemin de maintenir son influence bien après sa retraite ? Pressé d’asseoir son autorité sur le Parti-État, Xi Jinping s’est attelé dès son arrivée au pouvoir fin 2012 à « nettoyer » de cette clique les postes-clés à Shanghai. A l’approche du 19e Congrès du Parti prévu à l’automne prochain, cette vaste opération touche à sa fin.
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Dès le mois d’août 2015, Chen Min’er [陈敏尔] est annoncé comme le « prochain leader » de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) par Bo Zhiyue, éminent spécialiste de la politique chinoise. Mais l’actuel chef du parti dans la province du... more
Dès le mois d’août 2015, Chen Min’er [陈敏尔] est annoncé comme le « prochain leader » de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) par Bo Zhiyue, éminent spécialiste de la politique chinoise. Mais l’actuel chef du parti dans la province du Guizhou est déjà trop vieux pour devenir le successeur effectif de Xi Jinping en 2022 – au terme officiel des deux mandats prévus par la Constitution – puisqu’il aura alors 62 ans. Mais il est permis de penser que Chen, allié de l’entre-deux (2022-2027), jouera plutôt un rôle d’appui institutionnel pour Xi, sans pour autant prendre les commandes de la RPC.