Shannon Stimson
Georgetown University, Government, Faculty Member
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The aim of this essay is to challenge the assumption of a basic unity of vision and purpose at the roots of Anglo-American jurisprudence through a study of the role of juries and judgment in revolutions. Through a comparative look at the... more
The aim of this essay is to challenge the assumption of a basic unity of vision and purpose at the roots of Anglo-American jurisprudence through a study of the role of juries and judgment in revolutions. Through a comparative look at the relationship between English and American conceptions of law and judgment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the conclusion can be reached that British and American jurisprudence are separated not only historically by differing court practices which commentators have frequently observed, but correlatively by essentially different theoretical conceptions of sovereignty, the nature of law, and the extent of ordinary citizens’ power to judge the legitimacy of law. This last factor has been far less frequently observed, if not implicitly denied, by legal commentators. From a theoretical perspective, this comparative analysis helps to explain why the question of the scope and limits of the judicial function in a democratic state is the overarching question of American jurisprudence, whereas in English jurisprudence it remains a question of little significance.1 At the same time, this study aims to contribute to the contemporary debate among legal and philosophical analysts of the American judicial system, by adding to these typically limited and abstract discussions of competing theories of law and adjudication a theoretical and historically informed discussion of the evolution of judicial institutions whose nature these theories are intended to elucidate.2 The aim is to reconstruct an intellectual and historical problematic that provoked both significant constitutional debate and innovative legal and jurisprudential responses in eighteenth-century American jurisprudence. That problematic is one of determining the proper locus of judgment about the content and ‘constitutionality’ of law.
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Research Interests: Epistemology and Politics
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In the task of searching for ways to ‘interpret’ the American Constitution and to understand (so as to delimit) the function of the Supreme Court, constitutional and jurisprudential theorists have almost invariably begun with Marshall’s... more
In the task of searching for ways to ‘interpret’ the American Constitution and to understand (so as to delimit) the function of the Supreme Court, constitutional and jurisprudential theorists have almost invariably begun with Marshall’s principal opinions. He remains ‘The Source’, even as widespread uncertainty and disagreement persist about the actual character of his contribution to understanding the court’s function or indeed about any particular opinion he may have written. Nevertheless, from the perspective of jurisprudential innovation, the differing perspectives on the role of courts and juries in maintaining a space for reflective judgment within the sphere of popular politics that we have already examined preceded Marshall’s major opinions (such as Marbury). Indeed, importantly, there is every reason to believe that Marshall’s jurisprudence drew from, rather than added to, at least two of these perspectives, those of Hamilton and Wilson.
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Adam Smith was born and baptized on June 5, 1723 in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, the son of Adam Smith, Sr. and his wife, Margaret Douglas. He died on July 17, 1790, at Panmure House in Edinburgh and was buried there in Canongate churchyard. An... more
Adam Smith was born and baptized on June 5, 1723 in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, the son of Adam Smith, Sr. and his wife, Margaret Douglas. He died on July 17, 1790, at Panmure House in Edinburgh and was buried there in Canongate churchyard. An individual who chose to live a private and socially retiring life – more than half of it with his mother and a cousin in the city of his birth – Smith sought with considerable success to protect his lasting reputation by having many of his private and unpublished papers and lectures burned “without any examination” at the time of death. Fortunately for posterity, some of Smith's essays on philosophical subjects escaped this conflagration and were published posthumously by his literary executors. A further two sets of notes on his lectures on jurisprudence and one set from his lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres later emerged in the form of student accounts and have been restored to scholars. Keywords: civil society; classical political economy; division of labor; Enlightenment; invisible hand; markets
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The colonial judiciary and particularly the jury system have been neglected subjects of early American law. Yet, it is common knowledge that the American colonies won their independence at a time when the jury system was being acclaimed... more
The colonial judiciary and particularly the jury system have been neglected subjects of early American law. Yet, it is common knowledge that the American colonies won their independence at a time when the jury system was being acclaimed as a fundamental guarantor of individual liberty. When colonial intractability was first displayed over the Sugar Act of 1764, the issue was not simply one of taxation, but, as Burke recognized, principally one of the power of Parliament to set aside trial by jury in an effort to enforce vastly unpopular legislation. By this act … so construed and so applied, almost all that is substantial and beneficial in a trial by jury is taken away from the subject in the colonies. A person is brought hither in the dungeon of a ship’s hold; thence he is vomited into a dungeon on land, loaded with irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported by friends, three thousand miles from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence, where no one local circumstance that tends to detect perjury can possibly be judged of; — such a person may be executed according to form, but he can never be tried according to justice.1 The British insistence on trying offenders in hated Admiralty courts was precisely a heavy-handed attempt to preclude the registering of popular sentiment with regard to these laws through jury trials. Colonials held tightly to the institution of trials by jury and lashed out at any attempt to curtail or circumvent it.2
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From Alexander Hamilton’s perspective, no mechanical structure ‘checking and balancing’ orders of men, such as Adams proposed, could alone save a ‘factious’ people from destroying itself. Nor could men rely, as Jefferson seemed to... more
From Alexander Hamilton’s perspective, no mechanical structure ‘checking and balancing’ orders of men, such as Adams proposed, could alone save a ‘factious’ people from destroying itself. Nor could men rely, as Jefferson seemed to suggest, on the improvement of human nature through technological progress and education. Although their individual visions differed, both Adams and Jefferson held out hope that a new ‘science’ of politics (or man) would vest final judgment about public law with a community or an order of homogeneous and likeminded men.1
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It has been said that in the absence of legal training, past historians have failed sufficiently to appreciate the relevance of law as a conceptual template, shaping the character of the American revolutionary project. One legal... more
It has been said that in the absence of legal training, past historians have failed sufficiently to appreciate the relevance of law as a conceptual template, shaping the character of the American revolutionary project. One legal historian, John Reid, has even suggested that non-legal historians have indeed ‘misunderstood the legal and constitutional history of the American Revolution’.1 In particular, Reid pinpoints a failure to appreciate the function of law both ‘in setting the stage’ for rebellion and in ‘formulating the conditions’ under which it was to be fought.2 By such ‘conditions of law’ Reid understands ‘not merely substantive rules of law, but the certainty, the power, and the effectiveness of that law and whether it was directed by a unicentric or multicentric authority’.3 Indeed, Reid argues persuasively that ‘legal stagesetting’ as well as constitutional concerns played a pervasive but distinguishable role in pre-revolutionary American politics. It would therefore seem particularly fruitful to consider how such conditions or legal stagesetting may have featured as well in the developing post-revolutionary American understanding of court function — particularly in decisions with regard not only to interpreting but to striking down procedurally legitimate laws.
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The locution, “classical political economy,” was coined by Karl Marx, writing in the first edition of Capital, volume 1, in order to describe those “economists who, since the time of W[illiam] Petty, have investigated the real internal... more
The locution, “classical political economy,” was coined by Karl Marx, writing in the first edition of Capital, volume 1, in order to describe those “economists who, since the time of W[illiam] Petty, have investigated the real internal framework [Zusammenhang] of bourgeois relations of production, as opposed to the vulgar economists who only flounder around with the apparent framework of those relations” (Marx 1977 [1867]: 174–5). Marx's own association with classical political economy was both liminal and critical, characterizing it as belonging to that period in England in which, he argued, “the class struggle was as yet undeveloped” (Marx 1977 [1867]: 96). For Marx, that described a period roughly from the time of Petty's Political Arithmetick (1899 [1690]), through Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1976 [1776]), to The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (2005 [1821/1817]) of David Ricardo. The key element common among the “classicals” as Marx characterized them, was recognition of some form of the labor theory of value and the proposition that the key theoretical relations of production to be studied were those between the elements of rent and wages in the early manufactory production, and socially, those relations among the larger aggregate groupings of society sustained by either rent, wages, or capital (profits), rather than the relations of putative individual actors in the market. Of Ricardo, Marx wrote in Capital, that while his analysis of the magnitude (i.e., measure) of value was “insufficient,” Ricardo had “ultimately (and consciously) made the antagonism of class interests, of wages and profits, of profits and rent, the starting point of his investigations” (Marx 1977 [1867]: 96). Keywords: equality; justice; laissez-faire; liberalism; liberty; property
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In sharp contrast to Adams’ fears of American declension, Thomas Jefferson’s political and legal thought is buttressed by psychological optimism and inner certitude. Altogether missing from Jefferson’s thought is any note of the tragic,... more
In sharp contrast to Adams’ fears of American declension, Thomas Jefferson’s political and legal thought is buttressed by psychological optimism and inner certitude. Altogether missing from Jefferson’s thought is any note of the tragic, or of the doubt, anguish, or uncertainty which come from the consciousness of the chasm separating ideals from harsh reality.1 ‘It is part of the American character’, he wrote, ‘to consider nothing as desperate; to surmount every difficulty by resolution and contrivance.’2 Altogether absent is any uncertainty or fear of some future judgment. Such doubts did not of course escape John Adams, just as they had not escaped John Locke. ‘What is there in life’, Adams wrote to Jefferson, ‘to attach us to it but the hope of a future and better? It is a cracker, a rocket, a firework at best’.3 Jefferson was less interested in the rewards of an afterlife about which we could know nothing with certainty. He had faith in the rewards and ultimate recognition of ideals in this one: ‘men’s destiny was somehow to be realized and judged on this earth and right here in America’.4 Jefferson’s ‘faith’, which was basic to his social philosophy, extended politically to a confidence in the majority to choose wise leadership, and in each individual to judge for himself what served his needs. This faith was not shaken even by the ‘turbulent majorities’ feared by Adams and Madison: The commotions which have taken place in America, as far as are yet known to me, offer nothing threatening. They are proof that people have liberty enough, and yet I could not wish them less than they have. If the happiness of the people can be secured at the expense of a little tempest now and then, or even a little blood, it will be a precious purchase. Let common sense and common honesty have fair play, and they will soon set things to rights.…5
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Page 1. RETHINKING THE STATE Perspectives ... Brasilia. What is high modernism? Scott characterizes it as a totalistic "aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society" inspired by... more
Page 1. RETHINKING THE STATE Perspectives ... Brasilia. What is high modernism? Scott characterizes it as a totalistic "aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society" inspired by a hubristic, scientific self-confidence (p. 88). ...
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Acknowledgments vii List of Contributors ix Chapter One: A History of Political Science: How? What? Why? Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson 1 Chapter Two: Anglo-American Political Science, 1880-1920 Dorothy Ross 18 Chapter... more
Acknowledgments vii List of Contributors ix Chapter One: A History of Political Science: How? What? Why? Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson 1 Chapter Two: Anglo-American Political Science, 1880-1920 Dorothy Ross 18 Chapter Three: The Origins of a Historical Political Science in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain Sandra M. den Otter 37 Chapter Four: The Historical Science(s) of Politics: The Principles, Association, and Fate of an American Discipline James Farr 66 Chapter Five: The Emergence of an Embryonic Discipline: British Politics without Political Scientists Dennis Kavanagh 97 Chapter Six: A Tale of Two Charlies: Political Science, History, and Civic Reform, 1890-1940 Mark C. Smith 118 Chapter Seven: Making Democracy Safe for the World: Political Science between the Wars John G. Gunnell 137 Chapter Eight: Birth of a Discipline: Interpreting British Political Studies in the 1950s and 1960s Michael Kenny 158 Chapter Nine: Interpreting Behavioralism Robert Adcock 180 Chapter Ten: The Remaking of Political Theory Robert Adcock and Mark Bevir 209 Chapter Eleven: Traditions of Political Science in Contemporary Britain Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes 234 Chapter Twelve: Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s) Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson 259 Chapter Thirteen: Institutionalism and the Third Way Mark Bevir 290 Bibliography 313 Index 349
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class; and suggests ideas about out-of-class community service. Gorham hopes "to bring out meaning in [Arendt's] work" (xvi, n. 1) by viewing the university as an opportune place for citizens to develop the capability of... more
class; and suggests ideas about out-of-class community service. Gorham hopes "to bring out meaning in [Arendt's] work" (xvi, n. 1) by viewing the university as an opportune place for citizens to develop the capability of judging political action. Although much of the analysis depends on applying an interpretation of Arendt, Gorham only tangentially analyzes Arendt and her interpreters and critics. He believes the political science faculty ought to stimulate students to "enlarge their mentality" and "make informed and reasoned judgments" (pp. 94, 96). A good application and critique of Arendtian theory is provided in the chapter that applies the Arendtian notions of political action and council-democracy to the development of the European Community. Gorham differentiates "movement" politics from political parties, noting that European parties are more successful in answering the "social question." Parties represent interests, not "opinion or action," and are less "political" in Arendt's sense than the movements (p. 119). Gorham observes that the practice of discussion can contribute to the demise of free public spaces because certain forms of discussion "transform free spaces into bureaucratic ones" (p. 119). He finds that Arendt's theories apply well to the early postwar European "space of appearance," but her theory fails to "account for the difficulty... of creating stable, free, democratic spaces of appearance" (p. 116). One is left to wonder about the consequence for our understanding of Arendt's theory. Does Arendt not put enough emphasis on institutions? If Europe's democratic deficit is related to a flaw in Arendt's theory, is the missing element a lack of analysis of character?
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This comment takes issue with the applicability and usefulness of the terms « dominant orthodoxy » and « dissidence » to describe contemporary American debate over the Constitution. It challenges the suggestion that the influence of... more
This comment takes issue with the applicability and usefulness of the terms « dominant orthodoxy » and « dissidence » to describe contemporary American debate over the Constitution. It challenges the suggestion that the influence of Charles Beard still gives direction to academic study of the American Revolution and the Constitutional Founding. It is the work of Louis Hartz, rather thon that of Beard, which has until recently directed the mainstream of contemporary American scholarship on the Constitutional era. However, the strength of Hartz's consensus paradigm has been weakened by evidence developed by more recent historians and political theorists, of significant conceptual variety and conceptual change at work in the debates of the Founding era. The thrust of recent scholarship on the Constitution has thus moved well beyond the influence of Charles Beard and the categories of dissidence and orthodoxy utilized by Terence Marshall.
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This article examines the relation between the rule of law and constitutionalism. It attempts to provide a better understanding of the ambiguous construct of the rule of law which still remains in the public imagination as a formative... more
This article examines the relation between the rule of law and constitutionalism. It attempts to provide a better understanding of the ambiguous construct of the rule of law which still remains in the public imagination as a formative part of political discourse. It analyses the role of the rule of law within the constitutional structure of a progressively more formalized European Union or within the more recently constituted post-communist states of Eastern Europe and considers the manner in which some contemporary jurisprudential and political thinkers have considered the rule of law.
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Research Interests: Law and Political Science
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The 2003 meetings mark the centenary of APSA. The century in which Political Science developed as an academic discipline witnessed major transformations in technology, warfare, the economy, and national and international forms of... more
The 2003 meetings mark the centenary of APSA. The century in which Political Science developed as an academic discipline witnessed major transformations in technology, warfare, the economy, and national and international forms of governance. The spread of democracy and the elaboration and defense of individual rights were at the forefront of political changes at the national and international levels. The 2003 theme considers the causes and the significance of these transformations, and it assesses the diverse ways that American political science has approached the study of democracy and justice over its hundred-year history. Among the topics we consider are: What conditions promote democratic reform? How has the understanding and practice of democracy changed over the course of the century? How do we define justice in the modern world? How are democracy and justice related? How do considerations of democracy and justice influence the process of democratic transition? In what ways ar...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Adam Smith
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... Section 4 highlights the methodological tenets of the discipline that Stewart drew in Smith's name, and considers the question of how far Stewart's reworking of Smith should be regarded as a forward-looking project... more
... Section 4 highlights the methodological tenets of the discipline that Stewart drew in Smith's name, and considers the question of how far Stewart's reworking of Smith should be regarded as a forward-looking project of forming the content and bound-aries of a discipline, as ...