Robert Donoghue

The increasing deployment of algorithmic management in the workplace poses significant occupational safety and health risks for workers. In this article, we argue that existing and proposed EU regulatory frameworks are inadequate to address these risks, especially psychosocial risks, created or exacerbated by algorithmic management. While existing and proposed regulatory frameworks have significant implications for employers’ obligations to mitigate these risks, we identify several psychosocial risks created or exacerbated by algorithmic management and show how the current and proposed regulatory frameworks fall short of adequately addressing these risks. We observe that these frameworks, based largely in the ‘safety by design’ tradition, focus on the design phase of the technology life cycle. This focus does not adequately address risks that arise in the use or deployment stage of algorithmic management. There is therefore a need for a stand-alone piece of legislation at the EU lev...

In what follows, I argue that Hegel's conceptualization of free will makes the mistake of collapsing the possibility of organic freedom (the ability to act freely of causal determination) into the potential for moral freedom (the capacity to act in accordance with Reason). This article engages in three distinct tasks in making this argument. First, I provide a critical overview of Hegel's conception of free will-namely, how he envisages the movement from the abstract, incomplete, and undeveloped will, to that of a concrete, complete, and developed one through the unfolding of Reason. Second, I introduce the contemporary debate regarding nomological determinism between libertarians and skeptics, of both the in compatibilist and compatibilist variety. I suggest that, in the context of the modern free will debate, Hegel is best categorized as a compatibilist as he both accepts causal determinism but remains committed to the notion that certain persons can act in concert with their own volition. Third, I argue that Hegel's compatibilist understanding of free will has important and problematic consequences for legal theory, particularly normative jurisprudence. Compatibilism, generally, and Hegel's particular version, substantiates the idea of basic moral desert which poses a serious threat to the possibility of moral progress from a retributive justice system to a consequentialist one.

This paper argues that hard libertarianism is not a social philosophy guided by the 'presumption of liberty'. Instead, hard libertarianism is more appropriately conceived of as a 'property-rights-based theory of justice'. Moreover, libertarians maintain that institutionalizing their avowed theory of justice will sufficiently secure individual liberty. This too is inaccurate: for it will be shown that libertarian theory overlooks relevant social threats to the freedom of persons. The classical understanding of liberty holds that one's freedom is compromised when their will is subordinated to the will of an arbitrary power. As we will see, libertarianism shows concern for only one mechanism by which arbitrary powers can subordinate the will of others to their own: aggression. However, I will show that there exist other significant mechanisms beyond aggression by which people can see their will subordinated to an arbitrary power. In what follows, I offer the mechanism of 'dependency exploita-tion' as one such example. Thus, a theory of justice focused exclusively on preventing aggression-as libertarianism does-fails to adequately address other meaningful mechanisms of will-subordina-tion. Alternative political theories committed to the presumption of liberty-such as neo-republican-ism-takes seriously the problem of dependency exploitation (in addition to aggression), and therefore offer a more compelling social philosophy for freedom lovers.

The republican revival of recent decades, spearheaded by thinkers like Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, has brought forth many interesting questions. This article takes up one such inquiry: what is the relationship between neo-republicanism and socialism? On the one hand, there appears to be a number of striking similarities between these social philosophies, such as their shared principal commitment to the liberation of people. On the other hand, however, a number of philosophers have questioned whether an allyship between them is theoretically sound. In what follows is an attempt to fuse these philosophies into a singular project under the heading of 'emancipationism'. In so doing, it will be shown that not only are neo-republicanism and socialism mutually compatible, they are, in fact, incomplete without one another. Each of these traditions focuses on the eradication of a particular evil. Whereas neo-republicanism tends to highlight the problem of domination, the socialist tradition emphasizes the need to abolish exploitation. Thus, it will be shown that by conjoining the core commitments of these social philosophies, and the language both traditions employ when condemning domination and exploitation respectively, a stronger theory of freedom and justice emerges.