- School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Deakin University
D3.12 Melbourne Campus
221 Burwood Highway, Burwood VIC 3125
Australia - 9244 3870
Jack Reynolds
Deakin University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Methodology, 20th-century German philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Derrida, Embodiment Theory, Merleau-Ponty, and 35 moreHistory of Analytic Philosophy, Phenomenology of the body, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Time, Jean Paul Sartre, Deleuze, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy, 20th Century French Philosophy/Theology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Jacques Derrida, Existentialism, Deconstruction, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Other, Derridean Deconstruction, Alterity, Gilles Deleuze, Perception, Intersubjectivity, Naturalism, Phenomenology of Temporality, Ray Brassier, Alva Noe, Enactivism, Embodiment, Embodied Cognition, Situated Cognition, Social Cognition, Metaphysics, Psychology, Functionalism, and Psychoanalysisedit
Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the historical interaction between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century has sometimes been adversarial in nature. While the major... more
Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the historical interaction between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century has sometimes been adversarial in nature. While the major phenomenologists have drawn deeply on science, they have often also sought to discipline the reach and ambition of science, with such attempts sometimes provocatively posed - e.g. science does not think. For the phenomenologist, the success of empirical science should be bracketed when doing philosophy, even if it is not so clear that considerations to do with the consequences of science for the life-world are quite so assiduously bracketed. Moreover, modes of reasoning that are characteristic of the empirical sciences (e.g. inference to the best explanation, reduction, causal explanation, etc.), and generally endorsed by the philosophical naturalist, are held to be non-phenomenological. In the opposite direction, phenomenology is frequently reproached by naturalists and scientists for being, as Daniel Dennett suggests, a theoretical trajectory with no agreed method and hence no agreed results; nothing that might play a role in engagement with science, as John Searle complains. On both of these commonly held views, then, phenomenology cannot be a potential research program in interaction with empirical sciences: the phenomenologist standardly embraces this; the naturalist typically bemoans it and suspects an untenable “first philosophy”.
In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.
To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.
In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.
To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.
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A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the differences between three competing currents of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, post-structuralist philosophy, and... more
A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the differences between three competing currents of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, post-structuralist philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy. Avowed or tacit philosophies of time define representatives of each of these groups and also guard against their potential interlocutors. However, by bringing the temporal differences between these philosophical trajectories to the fore, and showing both their methodological presuppositions and their ethico-political implications, this book begins a long overdue dialogue on their respective strengths and weaknesses. It argues that there are systemic temporal problems (chronopathologies) that afflict each, but especially the post-structuralist tradition (focusing on Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida and their prophetic future politics) and the analytic tradition (focusing on John Rawls and analytic methodology in general, particularly the tendency to oscillate between forms of atemporality and intuition-oriented “presentism”). What is required is a “middle-way” that does not treat the living-present and the pragmatic temporality associated with bodily coping as an epiphenomenon to be explained away as either a transcendental illusion (and as a reactive force that is ethically problematic), or as a subjective/psychological experience that is not ultimately real.
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Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two... more
Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two approaches and even envisaged a post-continental and post-analytic philosophy. Opening with a history of key encounters between philosophers of opposing camps since the late 19th Century - from Frege and Husserl to Derrida and Searle - the book goes on to explore in detail the main methodological differences between the two approaches. This covers a very wide range of topics, from issues of style and clarity of exposition to formal methods arising from logic and probability theory. The final section presents a balanced critique of the two schools’ approaches to key issues such as Time, Truth, Subjectivity, Mind and Body, Language and Meaning, and Ethics. Analytic Versus Continental is the first sustained analysis of both approaches to philosophy, examining the limits and possibilities of each. It provides a clear overview of a much-disputed history and, in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both traditions, also offers future directions for both continental and analytic philosophy.
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This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir.
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While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays... more
While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays presuppose an oppositional relationship between them, and between phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. Jack Reynolds systematically explores their relationship by analyzing each philosopher in terms of two important and related issues—embodiment and alterity. Focusing on areas with which they are not commonly associated (e.g., Derrida on the body and Merleau-Ponty on alterity) makes clear that their work cannot be adequately characterized in a strictly oppositional way. Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity proposes the possibility of a Merleau-Ponty-inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. Reynolds argues that there are salient ethico-political reasons for choosing an alternative that accords greater attention to our embodied situation.
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This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship... more
This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception.
Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler
Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler
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This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Analytic and Continental philosophy have become increasingly specialised and differentiated fields of... more
This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Analytic and Continental philosophy have become increasingly specialised and differentiated fields of endeavour. This important collection of essays details some of the more significant methodological and philosophical differences that have separated the two traditions, as well as examining the manner in which received understandings of the divide are being challenged by certain thinkers whose work might best be described as post-analytic and meta-continental. Together these essays offer a well-defined sense of the field, of its once dominant distinctions and of some of the most productive new areas generating influential ideas and controversy. In an attempt to get to the bottom of precisely what it is that separates the analytic and continental traditions, the essays in this volume compare and contrast them on certain issues, including truth, time and subjectivity. The book engages with a range of key thinkers from phenomenology, post-structuralism, analytic philosophy and post-analytic philosophy, examines the strengths and weaknesses of each tradition, and ultimately encourages enhanced understanding, dialogue and even rapprochement between these sometimes antagonistic adversaries. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.
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In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem"... more
In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem" for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus' work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.
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In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and... more
In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy.
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Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s political work can nonetheless make some important contributions to the issue, both descriptively and normatively. Although his... more
Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s political work can nonetheless make some important contributions to the issue, both descriptively and normatively. Although his political writings have been neglected in recent times, his interpretations of Marxism and Machiavelli enabled him to develop an account of political phronesis and virtù that sought to retain the strengths of their respective positions without succumbing to their problems. In the process, he provides grounds for generalizing the problem of “dirty hands” beyond Michael Walzer’s influential understanding that pertains primarily to “emergencies” and singular time-slice actions, and addresses concerns about the coherence of the very idea that there is justified action that one ought to do which remains wrong. Merleau-Ponty does this by emphasizing the diachronic relationship between theoretical principles and concrete political action over a period of time, thus imbuing the problem of dirty hands with a historicity that is not sufficiently recognized in the more static and action-focused discussions.
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The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied... more
The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.
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Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and 9 morePhenomenology, Psychopathology, Phenomenology of the body, Phenomenology of the Body (Philosophy), Phenomenology of Temporality, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, Experiential Learning, Tourette Syndrome, and Subjective Experience
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Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by... more
Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by copyright, and many are subject to publishers' policies regarding use, reproduction or communication. Please check individual records for details of other permissible use. If you believe that any material has been made available without permission of the copyright owner please contact us with the details.
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Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone,... more
Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the “usual suspects” or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and i...
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Phenomenology has been described as a "non-argumentocentric" way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone,... more
Phenomenology has been described as a "non-argumentocentric" way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the "usual suspects" or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and in terms of justification. This paper identifies two main steps to making this case. The first step takes seriously the consequences of the intrinsically dialectical aspect of phenomenology in intersection with other modes of philosophy, the natural attitude, and non-philosophy. The second step focuses on transcendental reflection and arguments about the conditions/structures they contain. Together, these two steps aim to rescue phenomenology from the objection that it has an "ostrich epistemology" with regard to the ostensible purity of description, the intuition of essences, or the "conditions" ascertained through transcendental reflection.
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The article Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism, written by Maurizio Meloni and Jack Reynolds, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet... more
The article Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism, written by Maurizio Meloni and Jack Reynolds, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 18 June 2020 without open access. With the author(s)’ decision to opt for Open Choice the copyright of the article changed on 6 November 2020 to ©The Author(s) 2020 and the article is forthwith distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution.
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Introduction: Chronopathologies: The Politics of Time Part I. Analytic Philosophy, Atemporality, and Presentism: Some Encounters Across the Chunnel Chapter 1: Analytic and Continental Philosophy: A Contretemps? Chapter 2: Common Sense and... more
Introduction: Chronopathologies: The Politics of Time Part I. Analytic Philosophy, Atemporality, and Presentism: Some Encounters Across the Chunnel Chapter 1: Analytic and Continental Philosophy: A Contretemps? Chapter 2: Common Sense and Philosophical Methodology: Some Metaphilosophical Reflections on Analytic Philosophy via Deleuze Chapter 3: Negotiating the Non-negotiable: Rawls, Derrida, and the Intertwining of Political Calculation and Ultra-politics Part II. Poststructuralism, Time Out of Joint, and Future Politics Chapter 4: The Politics of Futurity in Derrida and Deleuze Chapter 5: Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and the Ethic of the Event Chapter 6: Deleuze's Perverse-structure: Beyond the Other-structure and the Struggle for Recognition Chapter 7: Derrida, Friendship, and the Transcendental Priority of the "Untimely" Part III. Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Pragmatic Temporality: An Anachronistic Dialogue Chapter 8: Time Out of Joint: Between Phenomenol...
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According to several commentators, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) has been read more widely in his own lifetime than any other philosopher in the history of philosophy, and around 100,000 people paid tribute to him at his funeral in Paris. He... more
According to several commentators, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) has been read more widely in his own lifetime than any other philosopher in the history of philosophy, and around 100,000 people paid tribute to him at his funeral in Paris. He is also arguably the only self-proclaimed existentialist, at least of the major historical figures associated with the tradition, even if it is true that his initial acceptance of the label consisted largely in a begrudging assent to the media proliferation of the term with which Marcel had first described him and his partner, de Beauvoir. That said, Sartre is rightly considered to be the canonical existentialist, both in terms of public reception (he regularly graced the pages of Vogue in the US in the 1950s and was synonymous with French intellectual life), and academically, where his opus Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943) still stands as the iconic and defining work of the tradition. Being and Nothingness was partly inspired by Sartre's encounter with Heidegger's Being and Time while he was a prisoner of war. Sartre's main influences in this work are Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel, but it is difficult to determine to what extent each of them influenced him, largely because Sartre's interpretations of them are always creative and do a certain violence to their texts (this is perhaps why Heidegger's response to Sartre in “Letter on Humanism” is so scathing).
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It is hard to think of many contemporary European philosophers who have not endorsed the denunciation of existentialism for being a humanism that was initiated by Heidegger and has been perpetuated in the anti-humanism of structuralists... more
It is hard to think of many contemporary European philosophers who have not endorsed the denunciation of existentialism for being a humanism that was initiated by Heidegger and has been perpetuated in the anti-humanism of structuralists such as Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes. Concerned with the way in which both languages and systems produce individuals as subjects, structuralism took over from existentialism both academically and perhaps even in terms of public attention. Structuralism sought to arrive at a stable and secure knowledge of a system or a structure by charting differences within that structure and, significantly, it sought to do so without any references to subjectivity and consciousness, which were, as we have seen, a significant part of existential phenomenology. However, it was not long before structuralism was itself being challenged by poststructuralism in the late 1960s. Philosophers such as Michel Foucault (at least in his middle and later work), Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida were all important in this regard, challenging the “centrist” assumption of structuralism that an understanding of one key or central element of the structure – whether it be kinship laws, the workings of language, the educational system, or the devices employed in a literary text – allows for an explanation of the entire system. Poststructuralism also cast into question structuralism's rather strict determinism, instead insisting on the role of unpredictable and random forces in the genesis of any structure, law or norm.
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I am grateful that someone whose work I greatly admire could be the philosopher to so eloquently and succinctly cut to the heart of the problem that I posed in the previous issue of Deleuze Studies. James Williams' critical reply... more
I am grateful that someone whose work I greatly admire could be the philosopher to so eloquently and succinctly cut to the heart of the problem that I posed in the previous issue of Deleuze Studies. James Williams' critical reply leaves me, prima facie, confronted by a stark alternative: either I have misunderstood Deleuze, or I have illustrated problems and lacunae in Deleuze. I will suggest, however, that this is a false alternative, and that Williams' and my divergent accounts of The Logic of Sense – and even Deleuze's oeuvre as a whole – is better understood as a situation of ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or’, and hence that my interpretation of Deleuze…
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In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I... more
In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I argue in this chapter that a battle over the politics of time (and the metaphysics of time) is also a major part of what is at stake in the differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Very different philosophies of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard ...
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Paul Patton and John Protevi, eds. , Between Deleuze and Derrida Reviewed by.
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Jacques Taminiaux , The Metamorphoses of Phenomenological Reduction Reviewed by.
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Jacques Derrida , Rogues: Two Essays on Reason Reviewed by.
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PARRHESIA NUMBER 1• 2006• 88–111 SADISM AND MASOCHISM-A SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY? Jack Reynolds There has recently been a plethora of attempts to understand the key differences that separate the analytic and... more
PARRHESIA NUMBER 1• 2006• 88–111 SADISM AND MASOCHISM-A SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY? Jack Reynolds There has recently been a plethora of attempts to understand the key differences that separate the analytic and continental traditions of philosophy1, often involving either painstaking descriptions of the divergent argumentative techniques and methodologies that concern them, or comparatively examining in detail the work of certain major theorists in ...
Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by... more
Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by copyright, and many are subject to publishers' policies regarding use, reproduction or communication. Please check individual records for details of other permissible use. If you believe that any material has been made available without permission of the copyright owner please contact us with the details.
Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by... more
Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by copyright, and many are subject to publishers' policies regarding use, reproduction or communication. Please check individual records for details of other permissible use. If you believe that any material has been made available without permission of the copyright owner please contact us with the details.
The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment-e.g. those in embodied... more
The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment-e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and '4e' cognition-interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with recent findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.
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This chapter reads Merleau-Ponty's work in regard to liberal naturalism, giving particular attention to embodiment and perception. It argues that Merleau-Ponty can be plausibly considered to advocate a form of liberal naturalism, and that... more
This chapter reads Merleau-Ponty's work in regard to liberal naturalism, giving particular attention to embodiment and perception. It argues that Merleau-Ponty can be plausibly considered to advocate a form of liberal naturalism, and that it can help liberal naturalism fill its claims in and avoid some traps (i.e. ontological constructivism and methodological/epistemic separatism concerning philosophy and science).
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This chapter examines the history of phenomenology in Australia and New Zealand, regarding: (1) original phenomenological investigations and/or discoveries, (2) the interpretation, exegesis and translation of classical phenomenological... more
This chapter examines the history of phenomenology in Australia and New Zealand, regarding: (1) original phenomenological investigations and/or discoveries, (2) the interpretation, exegesis and translation of classical phenomenological texts (3) the use of classical phenomenology for the purpose of contributing to contemporary philosophical and interdisciplinary debates or (4) teaching of phenomenology in Australasian universities and the spreading of phenomenological ideas to the wider Australasian public.
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Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between... more
Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism.
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In this paper, we examine the historical relationship between phenomenology and the emerging analytic tradition. We pay particular attention to the reception of Husserl’s work by Russell, Moore, and others, and to some convergences... more
In this paper, we examine the historical relationship between phenomenology and the emerging analytic tradition. We pay particular attention to the reception of Husserl’s work by Russell, Moore, and others, and to some convergences between phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy, noted by Wittgenstein, Austin, and Ryle. Focusing on Russell and Ryle, we argue that the historical details suggest an alternative parsing of the ways to the “parting of the ways” narrative made famous by Dummett but also committed to by many others, in which we start from a common source or origin only to have two increasingly divergent inheritances of philosophy that have next to nothing in common, like the Rhine and the Danube. We will show that the period thought to be prior to the “gulf” does not evince the sort of philosophical unity and commonality of purpose sometimes ascribed to it, and that the period of socio-political institution of the ‘divide’ post World War Two, is both historically and philosophically much more complicated than it might be thought, with the ostensible rivers being rather more intertwined than is often supposed.
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In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic,... more
In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible, usually either asserting that there is little or no philosophical significance (because most of the major developments had already begun prior to the war), or maintaining that nothing was ever the same in philosophy (as elsewhere), with the creation of the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’ being but one notable consequence. I attempt to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands.
Notwithstanding that analytic philosophy and phenomenology both precede the Great War (and its prospect), and that the critique of idealism was already very strong in Anglophone countries, I argue that the war was a significant factor in the ‘divide’ between analytic and continental philosophy. My claim is not simply that this is because of the widespread rhetoric, caricature, and stereotype stemming from the war concerning Germany (and German Idealism), but that it also involves some significant methodological and meta-philosophical transformations in the incipient analytic and continental trajectories that bear a close relationship to experiences of the war by some of the key philosophers (albeit also to internal philosophical pressures). I will thus contend that the first world war is closely connected with a “parting of the ways” in such self-understandings, between “philosophy and history/politics” on the one hand, and “philosophy or history/politics” on the other, even if both of these normative self-understandings are often betrayed in practice. I will mainly focus upon phenomenology and some trajectories in early analytic philosophy to argue this case.
Notwithstanding that analytic philosophy and phenomenology both precede the Great War (and its prospect), and that the critique of idealism was already very strong in Anglophone countries, I argue that the war was a significant factor in the ‘divide’ between analytic and continental philosophy. My claim is not simply that this is because of the widespread rhetoric, caricature, and stereotype stemming from the war concerning Germany (and German Idealism), but that it also involves some significant methodological and meta-philosophical transformations in the incipient analytic and continental trajectories that bear a close relationship to experiences of the war by some of the key philosophers (albeit also to internal philosophical pressures). I will thus contend that the first world war is closely connected with a “parting of the ways” in such self-understandings, between “philosophy and history/politics” on the one hand, and “philosophy or history/politics” on the other, even if both of these normative self-understandings are often betrayed in practice. I will mainly focus upon phenomenology and some trajectories in early analytic philosophy to argue this case.
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Despite the enduring significance of Merleau-Ponty and the voluminous writings about his work, the book that was intended to be his magnum opus, The Visible and the Invisible, remains an unfinished project and one that has not had the... more
Despite the enduring significance of Merleau-Ponty and the voluminous writings about his work, the book that was intended to be his magnum opus, The Visible and the Invisible, remains an unfinished project and one that has not had the sustained attention it merits. This may seem like a strange claim, given that many of its key concepts (chiasm, flesh, reversibility, etc.) have often been addressed. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the strengths and weaknesses of this incipient ontology are not themselves particularly well-known or discussed, especially in English. In this chapter we examine this "indirect ontology," before considering some of the criticisms made by his contemporaries and ‘successors’: Lacan, Irigaray, Levinas, Derrida and Deleuze.
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In this chapter I juxtapose some of the central methodological and meta-philosophical commitments of three contemporary neo-pragmatists - Rescher, Pilstrom and Margolis - with those of Deleuze. I pay particular attention to their... more
In this chapter I juxtapose some of the central methodological and meta-philosophical commitments of three contemporary neo-pragmatists - Rescher, Pilstrom and Margolis - with those of Deleuze. I pay particular attention to their respective conceptions of the centrality (or otherwise) of transcendental reasoning, methodological naturalism, and common sense, to their respective philosophical projects, and pose some obstacles for any "transcendental pragmatics" worthy of the name.
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In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the ethico-political that we can draw explicitly from the methodological strictures of phenomenology are also consistent with some of the core more... more
In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the ethico-political that we can draw explicitly from the methodological strictures of phenomenology are also consistent with some of the core more positive dimensions of contemporary virtue ethics (especially at the more anti-theoretical end of the virtue ethical spectrum), and that central aspects of virtue ethics are consistent with most of the explicit reflections on ethical matters proffered by canonical phenomenologists.
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In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it.... more
In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I argue in this chapter that a battle over the politics of time (and the metaphysics of time) is also a major part of what is at stake in the differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Very different philosophies of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their potential interlocutors. To begin to illustrate this, I offer a patchy history of philosophy of time in the early twentieth century, the period in which the idea of a ‘divide’ between two ways of doing philosophy began to be entrenched.
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This chapter examines the connections between French existentialism and politics. Fellow travellers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir saw themselves as engaging with two theoretical trajectories that for them dominated the... more
This chapter examines the connections between French existentialism and politics. Fellow travellers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir saw themselves as engaging with two theoretical trajectories that for them dominated the mid-twentieth century intellectual milieu, one of which was ostensibly apolitical (phenomenology), the other of which involved a politicised understanding of philosophy (Marxism). Part of the motivation behind renewing phenomenology as existential phenomenology, as opposed to classical Husserlian phenomenology, was to allow them both to comprehend what was taking place during World War Two and, related to this, to allow them to try to do justice to the Marxian insight that the point is not only to understand the world but also to change it. While there are some serious risks associated with any politicising of philosophy, this chapter highlights some of the central contributions of French existentialist politics, beginning with Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and the manner in which it at least appears to consign politics to an inessential realm, before considering the subsequent illuminations on historical and political matters proffered by his contemporaries, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty. We conclude via consideration of Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, which perhaps was the culmination of existential Marxism, notwithstanding the subsequent contributions made by both Sartre and de Beauvoir. Central themes to be explored include the role of dialectical thinking in political theory, the failings that existentialists diagnosed at the heart of orthodox liberal and Marxist positions, and the specific contributions that they made in regard to issues to do with responsibility and dirty hands.
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Analytic and continental philosophers typically differ on the worth of transcendental reasoning. Analytic concern with transcendental reasoning was evident from the beginning of the movement, and although the analytic literature saw a... more
Analytic and continental philosophers typically differ on the worth of transcendental reasoning. Analytic concern with transcendental reasoning was evident from the beginning of the movement, and although the analytic literature saw a brief mini-industry on the subject following Peter Strawson’s prominent use of the method, discussion of their acceptability has always been more common than their actual use, and the trend of the discussion has run against the argument form. By contrast, in the continental traditions (from Kant to the present), it seems to us that transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous – although what the transcendental involves has been significantly and separately reconfigured by phenomenology and the genealogical turn, as well as by a more constructivist understanding of philosophy emphasising the transformative potential of the method in concept creation. In this paper, we trace these divergent attitudes vis-à-vis transcendental reasoning, with the goal of identifying some of the background differences in each tradition that (internally) justify the divergence. We begin with the analytic attitude to transcendental reasoning, which we argue is due in part to the explicit objections to transcendental reasoning absorbed by the analytic community, but also due in part to the methodological role of empiricism, the analytic understanding of transcendental argument as a form, and to a wider analytic attitude to ‘necessity-mongering’ claims. We then look at continental appropriations of such arguments, making use of Mark Sacks’ notion of a situated thought to outline transcendental reasoning involving embodiment and time, and considering the extent to which analytic criticisms apply to such usages.
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Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they... more
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Book launch talk for A. J. Bartlett and J. Clemens, Badou: Key Concepts
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Jacques Derrida , Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 Reviewed by.
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Herman Rapaport , Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work Reviewed by.
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John Llewelyn , Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by.
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My talk at Parma, Italy, Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism conference
Conference organiser: Andrea Staiti
Conference organiser: Andrea Staiti