Danny Marks

Thailand is consistently ranked as having the worst road safety record in Asia, and one of the worst globally. Most deaths are of the rural poor, a function of necropolitical ecology. A primary factor is the materiality and design of the road system, built to increase mobility rather than improve safety, and lacking a hierarchical structure. Highways are poorly integrated into both rural areas and Thai cities, and ignore the needs of motorcycle drivers, who comprise most road users and victims. Traffic regulations are not enforced by poorly paid police officers, without adequate resources or ability to enforce traffic fines, and who engage in corrupt practices. This is compounded by inadequate driving education. These factors are complicated and caused by Thailand's fragmented and weak governance. A plethora of agencies do not cooperate and have overlapping mandates. No lead agency has been given sufficient power to improve governance of the system. The public blame drivers rather than the state. Political leadership, in favour of quick results, has attached little importance to this issue and consequently devoted insufficient resources to address it, an inaction, ignorance and urban bias that have contributed to unnecessarily high levels of rural injuries and mortality.

This chapter argues that the worsening plastic waste crisis is a failure of transboundary environmental governance. The author also shows that inequality and injustice are deeply embedded in this sector, in terms of those who contribute to the problem and in those who suffer from it. The author then uses Southeast Asia as a brief case study given that it is home to four of the world’s worst six plastic polluting countries – Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam – and has becoming the new dumping ground of the world’s plastic waste. The author also discussed the impact of COVID-19 in the region and show how injustice related to plastic waste has arisen in the region.

The intensity of Bangkok's urban heat island during the dry season can be as high as 6-7°and in the densest areas the urban heat island's intensity is approximately 4°C. The urban heat island thus is causing a city already oppressively hot to become even hotter. The urban heat island also contributes to health problems, such as heat stroke and fatigue, particularly to those with lower incomes. We historically examine the numerous causes of Bangkok's urban heat island, such as the lack of green space, high levels of air conditioning, and high rates of vehicle exhaust fumes. For example, Bangkok has only three square metres of green space per person which is one of the lowest in all of Asia. Local governmental weaknesses, administrative fragmentation, prioritisation of economic growth and limited buy-in from the private sector have intensified Bangkok's urban heat island, and imposed numerous barriers to actions that would reduce heat, such as establishing green space, restructuring urban transport or creating and following an effective urban plan. Ideas mooted to remedy these problems have yet to come to fruition, largely because of bureaucratic inertia, fragmentation and divisions within the relevant lead organisations. The political ecology lens also reveals how political-economic processes largely determine the vulnerability of urban inhabitants to heat, but also that thermal governance is highly unequal and unjust. Those who contribute to and profit the most from Bangkok's urban heat island, such as real estate developers, shopping mall owners, and automobile corporations, suffer the least from its effects, whereas lowincome communities hardly contribute to this problem, yet are the most vulnerable.

The complex relationship between human mobility and global climate change remains contested. In this viewpoint, the themes of human mobility, adaptation and climate change are explored from a political ecology perspective. A framework of political ecology of human mobility in relation to climate change is applied to the context of Vietnam's Mekong Delta (MKD). The Vietnamese government, popular media and academic studies often present the MKD in dystopian ways in which there is sometimes no more place for poor and landless farmers as a direct result of climate change. In 2019 and 2020, the MKD faced one of its most severe droughts in recent history largely tied to upstream hydropower development. In this viewpoint article, we contend that future studies can no longer establish a direct and causal relationship between climate change and human mobility, especially in light of these recent events. The underlying drivers as well as the broader context, which are shaped by political economy, market structures and forces, power relations, government policy, geopolitics, and transboundary water issues deserve a more prominent role in the analysis of human mobility patterns in the MKD and beyond.

Nontraditional participation is increasingly called for to emphasize inclusiveness and transformation from the perspectives of affected populations for climate resilience. Photovoice, a participatory action research method, has been utilized in various fields for revealing critical matters through the local lens. Meanwhile, social network sites (SNSs) such as Facebook act as an interactive platform to raise awareness and facilitate collective activism among diverse stakeholders beyond geographical boundaries through new communication forms. Building on a conceptual review of participatory resilience, we examine the methodology of photovoice and its value in the context of non-traditional participation for climate resilience. Through visual narratives, unstructured observations, and semi-structured interviews, we investigate the ways in which photovoice integrates with social media to transform participatory resilience building. We do so through a case study of the Philippines, with an emphasis on disadvantaged populations. Specifically, this work substituted traditional and digital cameras with smartphones and established a social media group on Facebook. The integrated action-oriented approach showcases the network of participation as a mosaic, discovering nuances of engagement from local perspectives. Our article seeks to contribute to the growing literature on contemporary public participation, advocating nontraditional participation for inclusive climate resilience in the era of social media.

This study develops a transboundary political ecology of air pollution to show how its spatially and socially unequal distribution constitutes a form of slow violence among already marginal sections of society. Recent research on transboundary air pollution in Southeast Asia and globally has mainly focused on the supranational or regional scale of environmental governance without taking into proper account the socially differentiated impacts of these cross-border flows of environmental harm at lower organisational scales. Air pollution in Thailand, which ranks amongst the worst in the world, generates spill-over effects across sub-national borders that disproportionately impact the urban and rural poor. We examine the drivers of the three major sources of air pollution in Thailand: vehicular emissions, agricultural emissions and industrial emissions to direct attention toward the barriers and opportunities for collaborative governance in urban, peri-urban and rural settings. The article argues that administrative fragmentation and the protection of vested economic interests by Thai business and political elites have compromised transboundary governance of the air while adding to socio-spatial inequalities and environmental injustices. We recommend legislative reforms centred on crosssectoral and cross-jurisdictional cooperation to provide redress for the slow violence perpetrated against marginal citizens in the governance of air pollution.

The 2011 Bangkok floods, a slow onset event, flooded significant parts of the city. The state's response to flooding followed a traditional cultural and hierarchical approach to justice within Thailand, stemming from Buddhist values, an informal caste system and monarchical order. This resulted in a spatially uneven outcome, with the 'preservation' of the central city and two-month-long floods in outer suburbs, exacerbated by inadequate management and coordination. Suburban communities sought a more egalitarian notion of disaster justice, with hazard burdens shared more equitably and people having adequate access to decision-making over the distribution of disaster risk and compensation for damage. Extensive damage, and reduced livelihoods, caused friction between the two views, and protests, contestations and conflicts during the floods, in four different community contexts in northern Bangkok. By generating alternative discourses, challenging the hierarchical notion of justice and taking direct action to removing floodwalls, protesters sought to reshape the spatiality of the floodwater and claim inclusive citizenship and their right to the city. Existing perceptions of disaster justice, usually focused on liberal state responses to understanding disasters as natural episodes, are alone inadequate to explain the outcomes of and responses to disasters in different cultural contexts.

In what ways are lifestyles in urbanising Thailand, increasingly oriented towards shopping mall's related to the threat to the wildlife and struggles for subsistence in distant Lao hinterlands? Our article answers this question by looking at the workings of electricity as the key infrastructure that connects these seemingly unrelated events and practices. We argue that the circulation of electricity flows along uneven channels, shifting injury and environmental harm across international borders. This circuit is perpetuating inequality and environmental injustice in the Lower Mekong. To demonstrate this claim, we analyse the electricity sector at numerous scales and locations-the urban scale in Bangkok, the country scale of Thailand and then Laos and the local community scale in Laos. We then discuss by what means various material and social processes and actors at these different scales form this circuit. Looking at circuits of power allows us to link the story of electricity consumption with that of production, with an emphasis on their extraterritoriality, multiplicity and boundaries. Our findings illustrate the effects of this circuit on spaces far from a thought-of urban area. Furthermore, we demonstrate the ways in which these effects have produced inequality and injustice across borders.

The 2011 flood was the worst in Thailand in decades. Many of the impacts occurred in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. The floods negatively affected small and medium enterprises (SMEs). One location in which high impacts on SMEs occurred was Bang Bua Thong market in Nonthaburi Province. The aim of this article is to investigate (1) how the 2011 floods affected SMEs in the market, (2) how successfully they have recovered, and (3) what actions they and the state have taken to reduce the vulnerability of SMEs to future floods. We found that the economic health of the market community has deteriorated since 2011 due to the damages caused by the floods, the poor state of the Thai economy, and increased business competition. The poor performance of the mayor during the event significantly contributed to the vulnerability of SMEs. So did the lack of an effective early warning system. Since 2011, the government has only made minor efforts to reduce flood risk. These have focused on building floodwalls to reduce risk to large-scale enterprises, which have redistributed risk to unprotected areas. No changes in land use have occurred, and hence, the drainage capacity of the market has improved little. The study revealed that socioeconomic factors interacted with the 2011 flood to negatively affect SMEs, and that key political economy drivers of vulnerability of SMEs remain unaddressed. The market has not been built back better, and the sociopolitical transformations needed to reduce vulnerability have not occurred.

This paper applies the politics of scale as a framework to examine how decentralization reforms and the associated power relations between government agencies at different levels affected disaster risk outcomes in Thailand, particularly during the 2011 floods in Central Thailand. It argues that Thailand's decentralization has been incomplete due to the retention of power and resources by central bureaucrats and the continued weak capacity of local administrative organizations (LAOs). In addition, the country's overall fragmented and politically polarized governance has hindered policy coherence at all levels, including the local level. Incomplete decentralization alongside persistent fragmentation along ministerial and sectoral lines has undermined disaster governance and distributed risks unevenly and unfairly. The governance weaknesses visibly materialized during the 2011 floods. Except for the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), LAOs once again had insufficient capacity to effectively respond to the floods and were given insufficient assistance by the central government. The central government sought to monopolize power, did not consult local communities, had limited capacity to enforce all of its decision, distributed risks unevenly, and overall performed poorly. Similarly, the BMA dominated other much smaller local government units within and beyond its formal boundaries.

This paper uses an urban political ecology analysis to question the discourses used by Thai government leaders about the causes of the 2011 floods in Bangkok and the solutions that they have proposed in response. In contrast to their argument that the main causes of the floods in Bangkok were climate change and nature, I argue that the causes of the 2011 floods are compound. They are a result of human-nature interactions: while Thailand did receive heavy rainfall that year, a number of human activities interacted with this heavy rainfall to create the floods. During the past few decades, local political elites have risen to power and profited the most from Bangkok’s urbanization activities while changes to the physical environment of Bangkok have made those living there more vulnerable to floods. These activities include massive land use change and concretization which have drastically increased run-off, over-pumping of groundwater, and the filling of canals. Further, both the local and national government’s overreliance on antiquated and poorly maintained infrastructure made the city more vulnerable to the 2011 floods.
In 2011, human decisions, particularly by politicians, about where to direct and block water heavily influenced which groups were most vulnerable. As a result, the inner city was protected at the expense of those living in the city’s peripheral areas. Analyses of disasters in urban areas need therefore need to consider how discourses, socio-political relations, and ecological conditions shape governance practices of disasters.