I discuss the epistemic status of algorithmic predictions in the legal realm. My main claim is that algorithmic predictions do not give us knowledge, not even proba- bilistic knowledge. The situation, however, is relevantly different from... more
I discuss the epistemic status of algorithmic predictions in the legal realm. My main claim is that algorithmic predictions do not give us knowledge, not even proba- bilistic knowledge. The situation, however, is relevantly different from the one in which we find ourselves at the time of assessing statistical evidence in general, and it is rather related to the fact that algorithmic fairness in legal contexts is essentially undetermined. In the light of this, we have to settle for justified beliefs and justified credences. I end by drawing some morals for the Knowledge Norm of action.
You can find the full paper here:
https://rdcu.be/dLsNu
You can find the full paper here:
https://rdcu.be/dLsNu
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I explore a game theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent's well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fi xed, and hence the overall... more
I explore a game theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each
agent's well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fi xed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are `reflective altruists', in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete information, but that it requires the concept of an underspeci ed game; underspeci ed games have radically underdetermined matrices. Players locked in ungroundedness will be assumed to engage simultaneously in an implicit second order game in which they try to coordinate their fi rst order matrices. If they fail to coordinate, their fi rst order interaction cannot be recast as a game in the first place.
agent's well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fi xed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are `reflective altruists', in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete information, but that it requires the concept of an underspeci ed game; underspeci ed games have radically underdetermined matrices. Players locked in ungroundedness will be assumed to engage simultaneously in an implicit second order game in which they try to coordinate their fi rst order matrices. If they fail to coordinate, their fi rst order interaction cannot be recast as a game in the first place.
We investigate cases of preference change in the context of cake-cutting problems. In some circumstances, believing that some other player can be credited with a particular preference structure triggers a preference shift by imitation. As... more
We investigate cases of preference change in the context of cake-cutting problems. In some circumstances, believing that some other player can be credited with a particular preference structure triggers a preference shift by imitation. As a result of this, players may experience regret. However, in typical examples the extent of the change (and the ensuing regret) cannot be anticipated, so players cannot adjust their behavior beforehand. Our goal is to describe the phenomenon, provide a formal model for it, and explore circumstances and allocation procedures that may alleviate some of its negative consequences. In the face of utility shifts we propose a new criterion for fairness, which we dub Ratifiability; in a ratifiable allocation rational players are happy to stick to their choices, in spite of the changes in utilities they may experience. We argue that this embodies a sense of fairness that is not captured by other properties of fair allocation.
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In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow's impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as 'voters' in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two... more
In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow's impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as 'voters' in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters (the dictator), provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow's theorem applies to the amalgamation of evidence; the 'voters' here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha's proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow's pessimistic conclusion. In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow's result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms (or disconfirms) complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow's conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see Duhem problem under a different, positive light – to wit, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table.
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According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from... more
According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from theidea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficientconditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture.I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for trueknowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemicterms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement;sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this resultlends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a ModeratePeircean stance on epistemic matters.
In this paper I discuss the role of normativity in model building, particularly within formal epistemology. I begin by making some distinctions and clarifications, and then I focus on the problem of testing normative models. I suggest a... more
In this paper I discuss the role of normativity in model building, particularly within formal epistemology. I begin by making some distinctions and clarifications, and then I focus on the problem of testing normative models. I suggest a novel way to think about putting normative models to the test, which consists in building meta-models for first order normative settings. I argue that a successful meta-modeling strategy should enable us to illuminate the mechanism that underlies a given normative structure, and in this sense it can further test or refine our intuitions concerning what ought to be the case.
Next I propose a model for probability aggregation that seeks to illustrate our prior discussion on the relevance and purpose of meta-model building for normative modeling in general. I suggest that, under certain circumstances, it is can be rewarding to look at probability aggregation as a type of cooperative bargaining. Individual agents are assumed to hold utilities over possible probability assignments to propositions. Given such utilities, I show how to build an appropriate (pseudo)bargaining situation, such that points inside the bargaining set are correlated with sets of probability assignments (on a given proposition) by the individual agents. Solving the bargaining problem helps us figure out the probability that can be credited to the group as a whole. We then obtain a unified perspective on two seemingly disparate phenomena – probability aggregation and cooperative bargaining. The proposal illustrates how normative meta-models are meant to work: Bargaining models here act as meta-models that can help us elicit intuitions regarding probability aggregation (the first-order phenomenon) in an indirect way.
Next I propose a model for probability aggregation that seeks to illustrate our prior discussion on the relevance and purpose of meta-model building for normative modeling in general. I suggest that, under certain circumstances, it is can be rewarding to look at probability aggregation as a type of cooperative bargaining. Individual agents are assumed to hold utilities over possible probability assignments to propositions. Given such utilities, I show how to build an appropriate (pseudo)bargaining situation, such that points inside the bargaining set are correlated with sets of probability assignments (on a given proposition) by the individual agents. Solving the bargaining problem helps us figure out the probability that can be credited to the group as a whole. We then obtain a unified perspective on two seemingly disparate phenomena – probability aggregation and cooperative bargaining. The proposal illustrates how normative meta-models are meant to work: Bargaining models here act as meta-models that can help us elicit intuitions regarding probability aggregation (the first-order phenomenon) in an indirect way.
Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from... more
Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A successful translation should enable us to derive a version of Fitch’s Paradox in a probabilistic setting. I offer a suitable schematic form for probabilistic Moorean propositions, as well as a concomitant proof of a probabilistic Knowability Paradox. Moreover, I argue that traditional candidates to play the role of probabilistic Moorean propositions will not do. In particular, we can show that violations of the so-called ‘Reflection Principle’ in probability (as discussed for instance by Bas van Fraassen) need not yield structurally unknowable propositions. Among other things, this should lead us to question whether violating the Reflection Principle actually amounts to a clear case of epistemic irrationality, as it is often assumed. This result challenges the importance of the principle as a tool to assess both synchronic and diachronic rationality—a topic which is largely independent of Fitch’s Paradox—from a somewhat unexpected source.
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a game whose Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. The sheer perversity of the interaction involved in the PD has bewildered game theorists and social scientists alike. Despite the fact that players... more
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a game whose Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. The sheer perversity of the interaction involved in the PD has bewildered game theorists and social scientists alike. Despite the fact that players could be better off by jointly cooperating, they have individually a dominant strategy for defection that carries out a suboptimal outcome for everyone. This article explores and assesses this result, contrasting one-shot and repeated interactions.
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In this paper I examine what pragmatism in general, and Rorty's pragmatism in particular, have to say about the status of theories of human rationality, especially as applied to rational action and decision. More precisely, I discuss the... more
In this paper I examine what pragmatism in general, and Rorty's pragmatism in particular, have to say about the status of theories of human rationality, especially as applied to rational action and decision. More precisely, I discuss the legitimacy of a certain kind of theorizing, which deals with rationality as understood, and as experienced, by the first person point of view. I contend that this language game can, and should, be preserved within the quarters of a pragmatist philosophy.
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The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a... more
The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More precisely, the model seeks to correlate knowledge states with interpretations of a given formal language L, in such a way that the epistemic state of an agent at a given time gives rise to a picture of how things could be, if there weren’t anything else to know. Interpretations of L proceed along supervaluational ideas; hence, the model as a whole can be seen as a particular application of supervaluational semantics to epistemic matters.
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Page 1. 1 CREER, INFERIR Y ACEPTAR: UNA DEFENSA DE LA INFERENCIA A LA MEJOR EXPLICACIÓN APTA PARA INCRÉDULOS * Eleonora Cresto [Publicado en Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. XXVIII, N° 2, 2002)] ...
I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall... more
I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are ‘reflective altruists’, in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete information, but that it requires the concept of an underspecified game; underspecified games have radically underdetermined matrices. Players locked in ungroundedness will be assumed to engage simultaneously in an implicit second-order game in which they try to coordinate their first-order matrices. If they fail to coordinate, their first-order interaction cannot be recast as a game in the first place.
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Licenciamiento Esta obra está bajo una licencia Atribución-No comercial-Sin obras derivadas 2.5 Argentina de Creative Commons. ... Para ver una copia breve de esta licencia, visite http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/. ...... more
Licenciamiento Esta obra está bajo una licencia Atribución-No comercial-Sin obras derivadas 2.5 Argentina de Creative Commons. ... Para ver una copia breve de esta licencia, visite http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/. ... Para ver la licencia completa en ...
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Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from... more
Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A successful translation should enable us to derive a version of Fitch’s Paradox in a probabilistic setting. I offer a suitable schematic form for probabilistic Moorean propositions, as well as a concomitant proof of a probabilistic Knowability Paradox. Moreover, I argue that traditional candidates to play the role of probabilistic Moorean propositions will not do. In particular, we can show that violations of the so-called ‘Reflection Principle’ in probability (as discussed for instance by Bas van Fraassen) need not yield structurally unknowable propositions. Among other things, this should lead us to question whether violating the Reflection Principle actually amounts to a clear case of epistemic irrationality, as it is often assumed. This result challenges the importance of the principle as a tool to assess both synchronic and diachronic rationality—a topic which is largely independent of Fitch’s Paradox—from a somewhat unexpected source.
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This article is a revision of the previous edition article by F. Schick, volume 18, pp. 12059–12062, © 2001, Elsevier Ltd.
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Licenciamiento Esta obra está bajo una licencia Atribución-No comercial-Sin obras derivadas 2.5 Argentina de Creative Commons. ... Para ver una copia breve de esta licencia, visite http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/. ...... more
Licenciamiento Esta obra está bajo una licencia Atribución-No comercial-Sin obras derivadas 2.5 Argentina de Creative Commons. ... Para ver una copia breve de esta licencia, visite http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/. ... Para ver la licencia completa en ...
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En este trabajo argumento a favor de la idea de que una explicación científica es una res-puesta a una pregunta, aunque no necesariamente a una pregunta-por-qué. Esto no quiere decir que las preguntas-por-qué no sean elementos... more
En este trabajo argumento a favor de la idea de que una explicación científica es una res-puesta a una pregunta, aunque no necesariamente a una pregunta-por-qué. Esto no quiere decir que las preguntas-por-qué no sean elementos fundamentales de toda investigación científica: ...
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ABSTRACT: In this paper I suggest an argument against contemporary skepticism within the framework of a reliabilist theory of knowledge. First I identify the skeptical statement that should concern any externalist theory, such as... more
ABSTRACT: In this paper I suggest an argument against contemporary skepticism within the framework of a reliabilist theory of knowledge. First I identify the skeptical statement that should concern any externalist theory, such as reliabilism. This statement says it is impossible to ...
Abstract: The paper presents a critical account of some naturalistic strategies against contemporary skepticism. I analyze both a linguistic and a scientificist naturalism, and propose two main theses: A) Despite some obvious... more
Abstract: The paper presents a critical account of some naturalistic strategies against contemporary skepticism. I analyze both a linguistic and a scientificist naturalism, and propose two main theses: A) Despite some obvious differences among them, both naturalistic standpoints ...
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Page 1. REVISIÓN DE CREENCIAS Y RACIONALIDAD Eleonora Cresto Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar una introducción a las llamadas teorías de revisión de creencias. Una teoría de revisión de creencias es, ante ...
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Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario Contraseña. ...
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We discuss a potential application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to the amalgamation of the evidence provided by different experimental sources. It has been suggested that, as long as there are three or more theories and at least two... more
We discuss a potential application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to the amalgamation of the evidence provided by different experimental sources. It has been suggested that, as long as there are three or more theories and at least two sources of evidence, Arrow’s negative result applies, and hence the aggregation of individual rankings is bound to coincide with the ranking delivered by one of the sources. Here we show that Arrow’s result need not obtain when dealing with the amalgamation of the evidence. To do so we discuss how different types of sources typically require different attitudes on the part of researchers regarding various auxiliary statements. Due to confirmational holism, the set of items to be ordered by level of confirmation is actually a set of structured elements. We argue that this simple fact will often impose restrictions on the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow’s conditions. This phenomenon has interesting consequences at the time of considering the legitimacy of making meaningful comparisons among hypotheses that are rival in a radical way. We end by suggesting possible extensions of our framework to other contexts that require aggregating individual rankings, and in which Arrow’s theorem can be said to apply.
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Horacio Arlo-Costa fue sin dudas uno de los principales logicos que ha producido nuestra Facultad de Filosofia y Letras. Fue, ademas, una de las principales fuerzas detras de la consolidacion, a nivel mundial, del ambito de reflexion... more
Horacio Arlo-Costa fue sin dudas uno de los principales logicos que ha producido nuestra Facultad de Filosofia y Letras. Fue, ademas, una de las principales fuerzas detras de la consolidacion, a nivel mundial, del ambito de reflexion conocido con el nombre de “epistemologia formal”, una disciplina nueva constituida en la interseccion de la logica epistemica, la teoria de la decision, la inferencia ampliativa y la teoria del conocimiento tradicional.
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Cuadernos del CIMBAGE. Universidad de Buenos Aires. cimbage@econ.uba.ar. ISSN (Versión impresa): 1666-5112. ARGENTINA. 2002. Eleonora Cresto. REVISIÓN DE CREENCIAS Y RACIONALIDAD. Cuadernos del CIMBAGE ...