Mark Turner

This article deals with the rehabilitation of economies in post-conflict states, paying particular attention to the role played by the state in this process. Using the example of Cambodia and its policies on rice production and export, the article shows the prominent role that may be played by the state in prioritised areas of economic development where there has been market failure. In the Cambodian case, the government targeted rice production and export as these had great potential for promoting the major aims of national development policy – economic growth and poverty alleviation. Using a whole-of-government approach and a combination of direct involvement and the creation of an enabling environment, the government appears to have contributed to vastly increased rice production and export.

DESCRIPTION The coordination of important decisions about development, such as determining national priorities and allocating aid, strongly influences development effectiveness. This report examines current arrangements for development coordination in Maldives and makes proposals for their reform to produce greater aid effectiveness. It contextualises the recommendations for change within current debates and declarations on aid effectiveness and the particular circumstances of Maldives.

ABSTRACT Prevailing paradigms of macro-economic management and levels and distributions of poverty in some rich countries suggest that economic and strategic self-interest rather than poverty reduction in poor countries are likely to be the primary objectives of much development assistance. The incommensurability of the paradigms of development discourse makes it unlikely that strongly held ideologically based positions on these matters will change quickly or easily. Moreover, non-altruistic positions can be maintained more readily by virtue of the loose construction of international declarations such as the Paris Declaration. Based on different interpretations of the Paris Declaration, empirical evidence from Cambodia and Indonesia of donor opportunism that is designed to maximise aid control and aid distinctiveness for non-altruistic purposes is presented. Recent sharp declines in donor legitimacy have made this more difficult to do, but even so, there have been no concomitant reductions in donor self-assurance concerning their exclusive possession of the moral and technical high ground. Such behaviour is, however, increasingly resented particularly by government officials in lower middle-income countries like Indonesia. Resulting relationships lack trust and are therefore unlikely to contribute optimally either to the realisation of non-altruistic purposes or to poverty reduction. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ABSTRACT Empirical evidence and argument concerning governance conditions and human resource management practices indicate that since the fall of Soeharto, patronage has remained a defining feature of the governance of the Indonesian state, resulting in a condition of ‘patronage democracy’. Decentralisation together with the symbiotic relationships that can exist between patronage and development assistance have contributed to this. The willingness of factions at the centre to make concessions to competing interests to protect the bases of their own predation (political stability, a unitary state and economic growth); the pervasiveness, inventiveness and tenacity of patronage networks; the politically constrained reach of central anti-corruption institutions; the weight of factional, donor and contractor self-interest; the relative ease with which real intentions can be masked and politically correct appearances can be maintained; and the strength and convenience of (mistaken) neo-institutionalist convictions concerning the efficacy of technocratic reform alone all make it unlikely that patronage will be subjected in the medium term to any greater threats than it has been in the past. It is perhaps still too early to tell whether the patterns of patronage competition are moving the state towards a genuinely representative form of democracy or whether they are dragging it down into the danger zone of governance and economic stagnation. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ABSTRACT It is argued that conditions for social justice in developing countries are deficient under both state capitalism (“democracy”) and neopatrimonialism. Development assistance is similarly constrained, but it also has shortcomings in relation to “democracy” promotion. Political economy analyses can provide authentic insights into how poor people negotiate for public goods, but such interactions seem unlikely to yield sustainable social justice for most citizens. The assessment calls for a reconfiguration of power relations and a more egalitarian distribution of public goods within and between countries, which is what most people are predisposed to want and are entitled to expect and enjoy.

... MENPAN Kementerian Pemberdayaan Aparatur Negara [Ministry of Administrative Reform] MoH Ministry of Health MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs (which became the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy (MoHARA) in 2000, but reverted to Ministry of Home Affairs in ...

ABSTRACT This article explores the relationship between policy transfer through time and the quest for political legitimacy in developing countries. It is concerned with instances where contemporary figures reach back a long way in history in the search for items that can be used to legitimate present or future political arrangements. The first part of the article broadly classifies the various ways in which time has been used, but acknowledges the relative neglect of the temporal dimension in policy transfer studies. However, in the process of the search for political legitimation in developing countries, there has been a regular use of policy transfer through time. This is explored in a detailed case study of President Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. From this case study, a four-stage sequence of policy transfer through time is constructed.Related Articles Holbig, Heike, and Bruce Gilley. 2010. “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China.” Politics & Policy 38 (3): 395–422. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00241.x/abstract Case, William. 2010. “Political Legitimacy in Malaysia: Historical Roots and Contemporary Deficits.” Politics & Policy 38 (3): 497–522. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00245.x/abstract Kane, John, Hui-Chieh Loy, and Haig Patapan. 2010. “Introduction to the Special Issue: The Search for Legitimacy in Asia.” Politics & Policy 38 (3): 381–394. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00240.x/abstract Related Media Bartley, Kim, and Donnacha Ó Briain. 2002 “The Revolution will not be Televised – Chavez: Inside the Coup.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Id--ZFtjR5c BBC News Channel Our World. 2011. “Oil, Politics and Hugo Chavez.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJ1DUkxy8Bk Este artículo analiza la relación entre la transferencia de políticas a través del tiempo y la búsqueda de legitimidad política en países en vías de desarrollo. Nos enfocamos en casos donde figuras contemporáneas hacen referencias históricas que puedan ser usadas para legitimizar acuerdos políticos presentes o futuros. La primera parte de este artículo categoriza de manera general las formas en las que las referencias históricas han sido usadas, pero reconoce el caso omiso que se ha hecho a la dimensión temporal en los estudios de transferencia de políticas. Sin embargo, durante el proceso de búsqueda de legitimidad en los países en vías de desarrollo se observa un uso recurrente de la transferencia de políticas a través del tiempo. Esto es explorado a detalle usando como caso de estudio la revolución bolivariana del ex-presidente Hugo Chavez en Venezuela. A partir de este caso de estudio se construye una secuencia de cuatro etapas de tranferencia de políticas en el tiempo.

ABSTRACT One-stop service shops (OSSs) for government services delivery have become a popular and flexible mode of administrative decentralization for delivering government services of various types throughout the world. Using an analytical framework derived from decentralization, this article examines their introduction in Mongolia paying particular attention to politics, political economy and governance. The Mongolian OSSs have been justified mainly on managerial and governance grounds and are viewed by government as a most successful public administration reform. This article reviews these rationales in the course of tracing the history of the introduction of OSSs into Mongolia. The reform is also located in the political economy of Mongolia using problem tree analysis to evaluate its relevance to the country's leading development issues. Further problem tree analysis is applied to one of these issues, service delivery. The OSS experiment is also examined through the lens of political analysis paying particular attention to the policy making and policy implementation. The overall picture is one of both success and failure; success in terms of establishing OSSs across Mongolia but failure in terms of the lack of change to bureaucratic processes and the centralization of the State.