Michael Hand
University of Birmingham, School of Education, Faculty Member
- Michael Hand is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Birmingham. He is editor of the IMPACT pamp... moreMichael Hand is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Birmingham. He is editor of the IMPACT pamphlet series and the Bloomsbury Philosophy of Education book series. His latest book is A Theory of Moral Education (Routledge, 2018).edit
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Sharon Lamb, Sam Gable and Doret de Ruyter have recently argued that sex education in schools should promote a more demanding standard for morally permissible sex than consent. On their view, pupils should be taught that morally... more
Sharon Lamb, Sam Gable and Doret de Ruyter have recently argued that sex education in schools should promote a more demanding standard for morally permissible sex than consent. On their view, pupils should be taught that morally permissible sex is not only consensual but also mutual, where mutuality requires participants in sex to ‘try to know what is knowable’ about each other. I argue here that, while Lamb et al. are right about the insufficiency of consent, the case for mutuality as a standard of moral permissibility cannot be sustained. Mutuality fares better as a standard of moral desirability, but even in this weaker form, it is too controversial to promote in schools.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Michael Gove recently proposed that the Independent School Standards require schools to ‘actively promote’ British values. But in what sense are democracy, liberty, respect, tolerance and the rule of law supposed to be British? The answer... more
Michael Gove recently proposed that the Independent School Standards require schools to ‘actively promote’ British values. But in what sense are democracy, liberty, respect, tolerance and the rule of law supposed to be British? The answer is a hope on the government’s part that schools might be able to strengthen allegiance to liberal democratic values by tying it up with national identity. Michael Hand argues that this strategy risks putting these values on a precarious footing, given the vicissitudes of national sentiment. Moreover, since many children may not think of themselves as British, they may well draw the inference that these values are not for them.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore... more
In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore the similarities and differences between our theories. In the first part of the essay, I outline what Hirst calls the ‘sophisticated view of education’, which I wholeheartedly endorse, and highlight his attention to the noncognitive as well as the cognitive aspects of morality. In the second part, I explain how Hirst’s transcendental justification of morality differs from my contractarian justification, and trace the implications of this difference for our respective accounts of moral education.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (RE) currently enjoys the status of a compulsory curriculum subject in state schools in England and Wales.1 There is, at present, a broad consensus among policy-makers on two distinct justifications for compulsory RE:... more
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (RE) currently enjoys the status of a compulsory curriculum subject in state schools in England and Wales.1 There is, at present, a broad consensus among policy-makers on two distinct justifications for compulsory RE: (i) that an understanding of religious individuals and communities better equips pupils for life in a multicultural society; and (ii) that the study of religion is morally educative. The authors of the present paper agree that neither of these justifications is adequate. In his contribution to a recent volume on the school curriculum2, Hand sets out an alternative rationale for the study of religion in schools, which he calls the possibility-of-truth case (Hand, 2003). The following dialogue explores the adequacy of Hand's argument.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Analyses of the ordinary concept of intelligence are few and far between in philosophical literature. Such analyses as there have been in recent years are heavily influenced by Ryle's suggestion that to act intelligently is to act... more
Analyses of the ordinary concept of intelligence are few and far between in philosophical literature. Such analyses as there have been in recent years are heavily influenced by Ryle's suggestion that to act intelligently is to act well or competently in a particular domain. Here I show that there are serious problems with Ryle's account and try to offer a more adequate analysis. I argue that to be intelligent is to have an aptitude for theory-intensive activities . I go on to explain why I think the ordinary concept of intelligence is a useful one for those professionally involved in the practice of education.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Foreword by Professor Richard Pring 1. A philosophical problem 2. Understanding a form of knowledge 3. Is there a religious form of knowledge? 4. The meaning of religious propositions 5. Mental and material propositions 6. Conclusion... more
Foreword by Professor Richard Pring 1. A philosophical problem 2. Understanding a form of knowledge 3. Is there a religious form of knowledge? 4. The meaning of religious propositions 5. Mental and material propositions 6. Conclusion Bibliography.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The question of the necessity of school punishment was raised, but not satisfactorily answered, in an exchange some time ago between John Wilson and James Marshall. Wilson argued that social interaction in schools must be governed by... more
The question of the necessity of school punishment was raised, but not satisfactorily answered, in an exchange some time ago between John Wilson and James Marshall. Wilson argued that social interaction in schools must be governed by rules and that rules only exist if violations of them are normally punished. Marshall objected that there are some rules whose existence plainly does not depend on punishment of violations. Here I revisit and try to resolve the disagreement between Wilson and Marshall. I contend that, while it is not true of rules per se that they must be backed by punishment, there is an important subset of rules that do require this backing, and that subset includes at least some of the rules governing social interaction in schools.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Should philosophy be a compulsory subject in schools? I take it as read that philosophy has general educational value: like other academic disciplines, it cultivates a range of intellectual virtues in those who study it. But that may not... more
Should philosophy be a compulsory subject in schools? I take it as read that philosophy has general educational value: like other academic disciplines, it cultivates a range of intellectual virtues in those who study it. But that may not be a good enough reason to add it to the roster of established school subjects. The claim I defend in this article is that philosophy also has distinctive educational value: there are philosophical problems that feature prominently and pressingly in ordinary human lives and that all children should be equipped by their education to tackle. Among these are the problems of justifying subscription to moral, political and religious standards. The significance of these problems for everyone is sufficient to warrant the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
John White and John Tillson have both raised objections to the theory of moral education I have recently advanced. Here I reply to their objections and offer some critical remarks on the alternative accounts of moral education they propose.
Research Interests:
'The analytical philosophy of spiritual education', wrote David Carr in the pages of this journal in 1995, 'is still in a state of relative infancy and there is urgent need for some basic conceptual geography in... more
'The analytical philosophy of spiritual education', wrote David Carr in the pages of this journal in 1995, 'is still in a state of relative infancy and there is urgent need for some basic conceptual geography in the field.' In a series of substantial and thought-provoking papers over the ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
It is widely held that personal autonomy is a quality of character at which educators ought to aim. In this paper I argue that those who hold this view are misguided. I identify two ordinary senses of autonomy, and a range of technical... more
It is widely held that personal autonomy is a quality of character at which educators ought to aim. In this paper I argue that those who hold this view are misguided. I identify two ordinary senses of autonomy, and a range of technical senses currently popular with philosophers, ...
Research Interests:
Moral education takes many forms, so it is well to begin by delineating the form I propose to discuss. I shall be concerned here with approaches to the teaching of morality that aim to be cognitive, directive and rational. Moral education... more
Moral education takes many forms, so it is well to begin by delineating the form I propose to discuss. I shall be concerned here with approaches to the teaching of morality that aim to be cognitive, directive and rational. Moral education is cognitive when it attends principally to children's moral beliefs, commitments, judgments and decisions, as distinct from their moral feelings, sentiments, habits and dispositions. Such education focuses on what children believe to be morally right or wrong, good or bad, obligatory, desirable, objectionable or impermissible, on why they hold those beliefs and on how they apply them in practice. Its subject matter is the spectrum of moral claims, from statements of general principle ('killing people is wrong') to verdicts on particular cases ('for Hamlet to have killed Claudius at prayer would have been wrong'), from thin affirmations of duty ('one ought to keep one's promises') to thick assertions about the good l...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Philosophers of education disagree on how the question of the moral status of homosexual acts should be tackled in the classroom. Some argue that the question should be taught as a controversial issue, that we should present rival moral... more
Philosophers of education disagree on how the question of the moral status of homosexual acts should be tackled in the classroom. Some argue that the question should be taught as a controversial issue, that we should present rival moral positions as even-handedly as possible; others ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Education
Geoffrey Short, Harvey Siegel and Douglas Groothuis have, in previous issues, advanced a number of objections to my recent paper (Vol. 1(1)) arguing for the abolition of faith schools. Here I attempt to answer their criticisms.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper is a re-examination of the argument that faith schools ought to be abolished on the grounds that they are indoctrinatory. The premises of this argument are (1) that faith schools teach for belief in religious propositions, (2)... more
This paper is a re-examination of the argument that faith schools ought to be abolished on the grounds that they are indoctrinatory. The premises of this argument are (1) that faith schools teach for belief in religious propositions, (2) that no religious proposition is known to be true, and (3) that teaching for belief in not-known-to-be-true propositions is indoctrinatory. I argue that the first two premises are true, but the third, as it stands, is false. However, the flaws in the third premise are relatively minor and the argument against faith schools can be reformulated to take account of them.
Research Interests:
Is Religious Education Possible?: A Philosophical Investigation tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the... more
Is Religious Education Possible?: A Philosophical Investigation tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the claim that religion constitutes an autonomous language-game or form of knowledge. Defenders of this claim argue that religion cannot be understood from the outside: it is impossible to impart religious understanding unless one is also prepared to impart religious belief.
Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.
Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.
Research Interests:
Children must be taught morality. They must be taught to recognise the authority of moral standards and to understand what makes them authoritative. But there’s a problem: the content and justification of morality are matters of... more
Children must be taught morality. They must be taught to recognise the authority of moral standards and to understand what makes them authoritative. But there’s a problem: the content and justification of morality are matters of reasonable disagreement among reasonable people. This makes it hard to see how educators can secure children’s commitment to moral standards without indoctrinating them.
In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand tackles this problem head on. He sets out to show that moral education can and should be fully rational. It is true that many moral standards and justificatory theories are controversial, and educators have an obligation to teach these nondirectively, with the aim of enabling children to form their own considered views. But reasonable moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some basic moral standards are robustly justified, and these should be taught directively, with the aim of bringing children to recognise and understand their authority.
This is an original and important contribution to the philosophy of moral education and lays a new theoretical foundation for the urgent practical task of teaching right from wrong.
In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand tackles this problem head on. He sets out to show that moral education can and should be fully rational. It is true that many moral standards and justificatory theories are controversial, and educators have an obligation to teach these nondirectively, with the aim of enabling children to form their own considered views. But reasonable moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some basic moral standards are robustly justified, and these should be taught directively, with the aim of bringing children to recognise and understand their authority.
This is an original and important contribution to the philosophy of moral education and lays a new theoretical foundation for the urgent practical task of teaching right from wrong.