Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

PISTON CHAIRMAN MODESTO T.

FLORANDA, et. al.,
Petitioners, G.R. No. 270750

-versus- For: Certiorari and

Prohibition with Urgent
DEPARTMENT OF Application for a
TRANSPORTATION, and the Temporary Restraining
LAND TRANSPORTATION Order and/or Preliminary
FRANCHISING AND Injunction
REGULATORY BOARD,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

REPLY with REITERATIVE MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE

OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PETITIONERS, through counsel and unto this Honorable Court,

most respectfully state that:

1. Respondents’ Comment to the Petition dismally failed to

address the substantive and main question: what is the role of
consolidation of franchises in the scheme to “modernize” public
transportation.

2. On January 8, 2024, the same date that the Comment was

filed, Respondent Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (“LTFRB”) issued Board Resolution No. 002, Series of 2024
extending the authority to operate of all unconsolidated units of public
utility vehicles until January 31, 2024, saying that it was still finalizing
the routes subject to the conditions set forth in prior circulars.
Respondent LTFRB indirectly admits that it has failed to complete the
requisites set under its own LTFRB Memorandum Circular Nos. 2023-
051 1 and 2023-052, 2 i.e. the preparation of the list of routes with

1Petitioners’ Annex “G” to the Petition

2Petitioners’ Annex “A” to the Extremely Urgent Motion filed on December 28,
2023
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

approved local transport plans and with percentage consolidation. A

copy of the circular is attached to this pleading as ANNEX “A”.

3. Respondents oppose the Petition on procedural and

substantial grounds. Their major contentions are that the Petition failed
to:
a. follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
b. failed to satisfy the requisites for judicial review;
c. failed to satisfy the minimum legal requisites for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction

and that the issuances were:

d. issued with delegated legislative authority;

e. valid exercises of police power;
f. do not violate due process, equal protection, and the
right against unreasonable seizures;
g. do not violate petitioners’ right to association; and
h. do not violate petitioners’ right to gainful livelihood.

4. Petitioners respectfully disagree and posit that

respondents’ submissions and subsequent issuances actually support
the Petition and the Extremely Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.

DISCUSSION

I.

THE PETITION SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIES

WITH PROCEDURAL REQUISITES

There are exceptional and

compelling basis for the direct
petition before the Honorable
Court
----------------------------------------------

5. The direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition should be
allowed in the instant case because of exceptional and compelling
reasons therefor, which have been clearly and specifically set out in
the petition.3

3 Lasam v. PNB, G.R. No. 207433, December 5, 2018

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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

6. The assailed issuances relate to the grant of franchises, in

the form of Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN), for public transport routes
and services by the executive department.

7. Collectively, this affects the mobility of persons nationwide,

having far-reaching economic and policy implications. Both petitioners
and respondents have utterly underscored that the case involves
national policy on public transportation, affecting the rights and welfare
of petitioners who are jeepney drivers and operators, as well as
petitioners who are commuters.

8. It is worthy to emphasize that jeepneys, at approximately

200,000 units nationwide, are the most dominant form of public
transport, accounting for around 40% of all motorized person trips in
the Philippines, or an estimated 40 million person trips/day.4

9. In terms of financing, the amount estimated necessary to

fully implement the Public Utility Vehicle Modernization Program
(PUVMP) could be at most Php740 billion in public funds. Bulk of the
amount will go towards the replacement of the traditional jeepney
model; thus the colloquial reference to the “jeepney phase-out”
program. According to studies: for Metro Manila alone, about Php
11.68 billion is needed for the 73,000 traditional jeepneys to be
replaced. To replace 300,000 traditional jeepneys nationwide,
financing will amount from Php 540 billion to Php 750 billion. 5
According to Senator Grace Poe, chairperson of the Senate committee
on public services: to subsidize the modernization of around 300,000
PUV units, the government will need at least Php63 billion, which is not
in the 2024 budget.6

10. In general, public transportation policy has massive and

immediate impact on the public. In paragraph 24 of the Comment,
Respondents themselves have noted for the record that “the current
traffic situation in Metro Manila translates to societal costs of roughly
USD 20 billion annually (around 7.4% of the country's GDP) or USD
51 million per day due to lost working hours, additional fuel
consumption, health costs caused by air pollution, and loss of
investment opportunities.”7

4 “Transforming Public Transport in the Philippines, The Jeepney+ NAMA of the

Philippine Government”, Respondents’ Annex “D” to the Comment.
5 Mendoza, Teodoro, “Addressing the ‘blind side’ of the government’s jeepney

“modernization” program, University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and

Development Studies Discussion Paper 2021-02. Available at:
https://cids.up.edu.ph/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/UP-CIDS-Discussion-Paper-
2021-02.pdf, last accessed on January 17, 2024.
6 https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2023/1212_poe1.asp
7 Comment, page 13. Citing Annex “D” to the Comment.
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

11. The Court has entertained petitions directly filed before it:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when
the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous
exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.8

12. At risk of belaboring the discussion in the Petition,

Petitioners reiterate that the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of
the courts set forth in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission of
Elections,9 echoed in the case of Maza v. Hon. Turla,10 are present
in this case.

13. First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government.

14. In the case at bar, the prime constitutionality issue is that

the assailed issuances of respondents insist upon forced
“cooperativization” which violate the petitioners’ constitutional and
statutory rights to freedom of association under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and the Philippine Cooperative Code.

15. A second exception is when the issues involved are of

transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity
of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity
for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of
procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.

16. Transcendental importance is a judicial construct that has

two variants: the first, which states that courts may decide a case even
though the person who instituted it has no standing if the issues raised
are of transcendental importance;11 and the second, which states that
when the case raises serious legal questions involved and their impact
on public interest, courts may raise a person’s standing. In the case at
bar, petitioners are clearly persons of standing to file suit, and the
issues are of great public interest and impact.

8 Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

9 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
10 G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
11 Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. L-2044, August 26, 1949.
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

17. Third, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by

this court. In Drilon v. Lim12, this court held that: “... it will be prudent
for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better
determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with
the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.”

18. Fourth, exigencies in this situation would qualify as an

exception for direct resort to this court. The franchises of jeepney and
UV operators who have yet to consolidate would have been revoked
by December 31, 2023, if not for the extension granted until January
31, 2024. As it is, respondents appear to be clueless about the actual
state of consolidation of PUVs. Respondents have not made any
announcement whatsoever as to the number of PUVs that will be
affected by the implementation of the policy, merely saying to media
that 70% of PUVs have consolidated, but that “the final and official
numbers of consolidated PUVs are still being processed”.13

19. Fifth, the filed petition reviews the act of executive offices.
Sixth, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, with the announcement of President Ferdinand
Marcos Jr. no less that the revocation of jeepney franchises should be
done by the end of 2023. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the
course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this
court.

20. Seventh, the petition includes questions that are “dictated

by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded
by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities.” In the past, questions similar to these
which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts
involving modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status and
existence of a public office. This case involves issues of the same
nature.

21. The Supreme Court has “full discretionary powers to take

cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for
certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or
if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition.”14
12 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
13 Cabato, Luisa. LTFRB: Over 70% of PUVs consolidated under modernization
program, Inquirer.net, January 5, 2024. Available at:
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1884450/ltfrb-over-70-of-puvs-consolidated-in-
modernization-program, last accessed on January 17, 2024.
14 Maza, supra.
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

22. The Court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or

further reiterating – in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusions of bench or bar – existing precedents. This Court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order to ensure that it truly
performs its role.

23. In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the

Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect
of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such
doctrine.15

There is actual case and

controversy that gives way to
judicial review
----------------------------------------------

24. Petitioners have plenty demonstrated that there is an

actual case and controversy in the Petition filed that requires the
Court’s exercise of judicial review.

25. Respondents claim that “there are no actual facts that

would show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents and
from whence this Honorable Court can infer that the assailed D.O. and
LTFRB Issuances are unconstitutional” is utterly false and misleading.

26. Paragraph 30 of the Petition states that the implementation

of D.O. No. 2017-011 and the subsequent LTFRB issuances have
“already cut down, if not totally eliminated the issuance of new
franchises or extension of existing franchises beyond the imposed
period” . The aforementioned adverse effects to the socio-economic
rights of the Petitioners, showing the grave abuse of discretion by
respondents, are clearly demonstrated and are well-established in the
subsequent portions of the Petition, specifically in the Statement of
Relevant Facts, to wit:

a. Paragraph 43 states that: “The mandatory consolidation

measure under this program forces individual franchise-
holders and operators of PUVs to surrender the franchises
previously granted to them and to “consolidate” by forming or
joining cooperatives or corporations, which entities would then
apply for new franchises to operate “modern” PUVs.”

b. Paragraph 44 states that: “No legislation was passed to

support the so-called PUV “modernization” program or its

15 Maza, supra.
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

various facets including mandatory consolidation, nor has

there been any amendment to Republic Act No. 9520 or the
Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, Article 4(1) of which
provides that cooperatives are voluntary organizations.”

c. Paragraph 57 states that: “On December 12, 2023, President

Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. publicly declared that there would be
no further extension of the deadline for consolidation of
PUVs”.

d. Paragraph 58 states that: “Finally, on December 14, 2023, the

LTFRB approved MC 2023-051 (Allowing Operations of
Consolidated Transport Service Entities in All Routes with
Filed Application for Consolidation on or before 31 December
2023). The said circular provides that only consolidated
entities and individual operators that have filed applications
for consolidation as of December 31, 2023 may continue to
operate, the PAs issued to them being for another year or until
December 31, 2024. On the other hand, the PAs for individual
operators in routes without consolidated entities are deemed
revoked effected January 1, 2024, and the PUV units covered
thereby “shall not be confirmed for purposes of registration as
public utility vehicles.”

e. Paragraph 59 states that: “The aforementioned DOTr order

and LTFRB circulars are aimed at and have the effect of
forcing individual operators of PUVs to form or join
consolidated entities at the risk of having their franchises and
PAs revoked, thereby, preventing them from operating
beyond December 31, 2023.”

f. Paragraph 60 states that: “Data from the DOTr revealed that,

as of November 30, 2023, only around 84,809 PUJ units (57%
of total units) and 12,508 UVE units (65%) nationwide are
consolidated through membership in a cooperative or
corporation. Conversely, around 64,639 PUJ units (43%) and
6,756 UVE units (35%) are not consolidated. In the National
Capital Region, the percentage of consolidated units is even
lower, at only 10,973 PUJ units (26%) and 2,947 UVE units
(34%) consolidated.”

g. Paragraph 61 states that : “These figures, according to the

IBON Foundation, would mean that around 140,000 drivers
and operators nationwide, along with their families, would be
economically displaced as a result of the enforcement of the
mandatory consolidation measure under the government’s
PUV “modernization” program. The petitioners are among
those who stand to be directly and negatively affected by the
Reply with Reiterative Motion 8
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

enforcement of the mandatory consolidation measure under

the assailed administrative issuances.”

27. Respondents did not dispute these facts in their

Comment.

28. Respondent’s position that this is a political question is

misplaced as well. The political question doctrine has been limited by
the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 16 the Supreme Court emphasized that only truly
political questions are beyond judicial review. The questions before this
Honorable Court are not truly political in nature as it affects
constitutional and statutory and involve legal issues.

29. In determining what a truly political question is, this Court

held that: “In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
(Emphasis supplied)”

30. The rule-making powers of DOTr and LTFRB are not

limitless and remain subject to the Constitution. In this case, the
issuance of DOTr DO No. 2017-011 and the subsequent LTFRB
issuances as enumerated in the Petition, in relation to the
aforementioned paragraphs above, infringe upon the rights of the
Petitioners and the prerogatives of the Legislative, as more extensively
discussed in the Petition and herein Reply.

31. The assailed executive issuances cannot be left purely to

the purview of DOTr and LTFRB as its continuous implementation has
a direct and tremendous effect on the Petitioners and the general
public. As quoted above, without judicial intervention, the jeepney
modernization program would economically displace 140,000 drivers
and operators nationwide and will inevitably affect the commuting
Filipinos. This clearly shows a justiciable controversy and thus within
the prerogative of this Honorable Court for the exercise of its powers
of judicial review.

16 G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

The issue of constitutionality is

the lis mota of the instant case
----------------------------------------------

32. Further, the issue of constitutionality is indeed the lis mota

of the instant case.

33. Respondents argue that the Petition does not carry the
issue of constitutionality because it “does not require a determination
of constitutionality as the same may be settled by simply looking into
Executive Order No. (E.O.) 125 dated 30 January 1987, 71 E.O. No.
202 dated 19 June 1987,72 E.O. No. 292 dated 25 July 198773
(Administrative Code), and C.A. No. 146, as amended by R.A. No.
11659”.

34. However, as sufficiently discussed herein, the assailed

issuances infringe upon fundamental freedoms and legislative
prerogatives, beyond Constitutional limitations to rule-making powers
of the Executive Department.

35. The Supreme Court has clarified the limitations of the rule-
making powers of the Executive Department in ABAKADA Guro
Partylist v. Hon. Purisima17 – to quote: “what is left for the executive
branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates
rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).”

36. The Petitioners maintain that DOTr D.O. No. 2017-01118

and the subsequent LTFRB issuances as enumerated in the Petition
went beyond the limits of supplementary or contingent rule-making and
has derogated on its duties by usurping legislative powers.

37. The issues raised in the Petition cannot be resolved by

“simply looking into” the enabling laws of DOTr and LTFRB since the
essence of the whole petition is whether the assailed issuances were
issued within Constitutional limitations.

38. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 19 the Court held that:

“(a)ccordingly, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the
existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is
inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the
injurious effects of the order complained of”.

17 G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

18 Petitioners’ Annex “A” to the Petition
19 G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

39. Thus, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application
of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, as when the merit of a party's cause is
apparent and outweighs consideration of noncompliance with certain
formal requirements. Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of
procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes v. Padilla,20 viz.

In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of

reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist
a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements
for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of
procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor
or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.[28]

II.

CONTRARY TO THE CLAIM OF THE

RESPONDENTS, THE INSTANT PETITION
ASSERT CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

a. The assailed department order and circulars

constitute a usurpation of legislative prerogative;

b. The assailed department order and circulars

violate the due process, equal protection clauses in
the Constitution, and the right against unreasonable
seizures;

c. The assailed department order and circulars

violate petitioners’ right to freedom of association;

d. The assailed department order and circulars

violate petitioners’ right to gainful livelihood; and

e. The assailed department order and circulars

constitute invalid exercise of police power.

20 G.R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005

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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

The assailed department order

and circulars constitute a
usurpation of legislative
prerogative
----------------------------------------------

40. Respondents’ primary claim that it has delegated authority

is in Republic v. Basa,21 which recognized delegated legislative power
of the same public parties to issue rules and regulations anent public
transportation, as well as to issue, amend, revise, suspend, and cancel
certificate of public convenience (CPCs) and certificates of public
convenience and necessity (CPCNs).

41. The Basa case involved a new penalty scheme for

violations committed by motor vehicles plying the roads of Metro
Manila. The Honorable Court therein upheld the authority of the DOTr
and LTFRB to place reasonable restrictions in the form of higher fees
and stricter penalties upon the operation of motor vehicles.

42. Alas, that case is not on all fours with the case at bar. In
this case, it is not contested that the LTFRB was given the power to
issue, amend, revise, suspend, or even cancel CPCs or CPCNs
provided to motorized vehicles.

43. What is assailed in this case is, more precisely, the

requirement to join a cooperative as a requisite to securing a CPC.

44. It is more akin to the case of Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor

Center v. Hon. Garcia, Jr.22, where the Court ruled that the authority
given to the herein respondent LTFRB to the provincial bus operators
to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare was
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. The Court further ruled, as follows:

“A further delegation of such power would indeed

constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.
The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to
change and increase their fares at will would result not only
to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This
would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares every hour, every day,
every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or
whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.”

21 G.R. Nos. 206486, 212604, 212682, and 212800, August 16, 2022
22 G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

45. To reiterate, the LTFRB is not authorized to force jeepney

operators to join a cooperative or consolidate their PUJs, or prescribe
mechanism for the operation of such. It is an onerous and capricious
requirement that bears no reasonable relation to the purposes of the
regulation.

46. In its MC 2018-008, 23 the LTFRB “encouraged and

required the consolidation of operators and the establishment of bigger
coordinated fleets of PUVs”. The creation of cooperatives incur
additional expenses through franchise consolidation fees required by
the Office of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). These fees amount to Php
300,000 for their consolidation, plus an additional charge of Php
20,000 per modern jeepney unit.

47. Cooperatives must also acquire their own garage, and the
lease contract submitted as part of franchise requirements.
Cooperatives should locate and purchase this garage independently.
The process of finding and buying a garage is arduous, without any
form of assistance from the government. Moreover, non-circular routes
must secure garages at both ends of the route. The garages should
have the following: a maintenance bay, a check-up bay, refueling and/
or clearing bays, restrooms, and a waiting and resting area.24

48. According to the Omnibus Franchising Guidelines of the

PUVMP, cooperatives are necessary for jeepney drivers and operators
to qualify them for loan programs to help with costs of modernizing
units. The cooperative or corporations under the PUVMP are required
to have a minimum number of modern jeepneys operating on a
particular route. Only then can they be qualified or awarded a franchise
by the LTFRB to access the loans.

49. But in fact, the requirement to consolidate is not to improve

the situation for both the jeepney operators and drivers, nor the
commuters. In the report Jeepney+ Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Action (NAMA), 25 the stated aim of consolidation is to attain a
manageable number of public transport service
providers/companies. This means, in Metro Manila, the existing
jeepney fleet will be replaced with new, higher capacity and more
efficient vehicles and fleets reduced to 22%, and potentially up to

23 Petitioners’ Annex “B” to the Petition

24 Dimalanta, Rafael, Jan Marvi Atienza and Edrich Samonte, Putting Transport
Workers and Commuters First: The Route to Just Transition in Public Transport
Modernization, UP CIDS policy brief 2023-01, March 2023. Available at:
https://cids.up.edu.ph/download/putting-transport-workers-commuters-first-route-
transition-public-transport-modernization/, last accessed on January 17, 2024.
25 Respondents’ Annex “D” to the Comment
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

36%, depending on the selection criteria such as demand per route,

physical space, accepted headway.

50. This 22% reduction means the replacement of about

42,000 jeepneys (78%) while the jeepney fleet would be reduced by
about 11,000 units (22%) by 2026, or up to 36% reduction of the
vehicle fleet in the long-term.

51. The purpose of modernization, as it would appear, is

to marginalize. If the goal is to make transport less reliant on private
cars, to lower carbon emissions, or use modern Euro 4 transport, these
can be achieve without consolidation and its corresponding penalty of
cancellation of franchises.

52. Genuine cooperativization does not take the form of

forcible membership or deprivation of property. In the recent House of
Representatives transportation panel hearing, jeepney driver Philip
Borata testified as to his travails as a member of a PUV cooperative,
bemoaning that he was charged with 38 counts of carnapping after
joining a cooperative and being unable to pay amortizations.26

53. Government must respect the transport workers’ right to

freedom of association and right to organize. In contrast to the
cooperative model mandated in the OFG and PUVMP, which requires
drivers and small operators to relinquish their individual franchises
through the consolidation requirement when forming or joining
cooperatives, a truly cooperative model allows for independent control
by each operator over their individual franchises.

The assailed department order

and circulars violate the due
process, equal protection
clauses in the Constitution, and
the right against unreasonable
seizures
----------------------------------------------

54. In paragraph 104 of their Comment, the Respondents

acknowledge that to prevent a violation of the due process clause, the
government action must be reasonably necessary to promote public
interest.

26https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/893751/jeepney-drivers-
woes-continue-with-puv-modernization/story/
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

55. In Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission27,

the Court held that due process is a requirement for the validity of any
governmental action amounting to deprivation of liberty or property. It
is a restraint on state action not only in terms of what it amounts to but
how it is accomplished. Its range thus covers both the ends sought to
be achieved by officialdom as well as the means for their realization.

56. Based on the foregoing, the governmental action must be

reasonably necessary in order to achieve the desired end. There
should be no arbitrariness and unfairness.

57. In this case, the Respondents harped on the need for the
reformation of the public transportation industry in the country by citing
different studies. In particular, the Respondents cited the Jeepney+
NAMA which is aimed to “establish a modern, sustainable, and climate-
friendly road-based public transport system”.

58. In paragraph 12 of their Comment, the Respondents

explained that at the core of the Jeepney+ NAMA approach are the
twin workstreams of consolidation and modernization. Consolidation,
under the Jeepney+ NAMA approach, is “a phased approach towards
lowering the number of public transport vehicles and franchises and
consolidated currently dispersed jeepney and bus operations under a
limited number of corporately managed fleets servicing consolidated
transit routes.” Modernization, on the other hand, “refers to the
replacement of old polluting and- - inefficient jeepneys with cleaner and
more efficient vehicles ... which will not only address emissions but
also safety, accessibility and other operational concerns.”

59. In paragraph 21 of their Comment, the Respondents

alleged that according to Jeepney+ NAMA, the fragmented transport
system led to dangerous and congested traffic situations and inefficient
supply of low-quality transport service. The Respondents added that in
Metro Manila alone, over 43,000 jeepney franchise and over 830 bus
franchises have been issued on more than 900 routes, making the
public transport market practically unmanageable for the government.

60. Notably, the Respondents merely stated that to achieve its

goal of improving the country’s public transport system, there is a need
for consolidation of operators. There was neither a justification nor a
sufficient explanation as to how exactly the requirement of
consolidation can improve the country’s traffic situation or reduce
carbon emissions. At best, the essence of this aspect of the PUVMP is
merely conjectural.

27 G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000

Reply with Reiterative Motion 15
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

61. On the contrary, the reduction of public utility vehicles

plying their routes due to the mandatory requirement of consolidation
will bring more harm than good. Ultimately, the commuting public will
have to shoulder the increased costs of the modernized jeepneys and
the corresponding higher costs of running and maintaining these newer
models. For this reason, the public transport system will not improve,
it will inevitably collapse.

62. While the Petitioners agree that the reduction of traffic

congestion is a matter of public concern, the means employed by the
Respondents for the accomplishment of this purpose is unreasonable,
confiscatory and oppressive. The revocation of the individual
operators’ franchise due to their failure to consolidate runs afoul to the
plain dictates of justice and results to sheer oppression. The
Respondents could have adopted less intrusive measures that would
not entail the revocation of the franchises of thousands of individual
operators, which will necessarily deprive them of their property and
right to gainful employment and livelihood.

63. In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner,

28
Inc. , two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and
load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was
given the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal.
Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed,
maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the
sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The ordinances were challenged before the Court for being
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted
an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property,
and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

64. Citing the Court’s rulings in the cases of De la Cruz v.

Paras29 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals30, the Court held that the
assailed ordinances were characterized by overbreadth, as they went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in
the city. And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand
Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to
fees, rentals and charges.

65. Following the Court’s ruling in Lucena, the Court held in

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
31
Transportation Co., Inc, the Court did not find any reasonable
necessity in prohibiting the existence of provincial bus terminals along
28 G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005
29 G.R. No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983
30 G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988
31 G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007
Reply with Reiterative Motion 16
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of

Metro Manila to ease traffic congestion in metropolis. The Court held:

On the contrary, the elimination of respondents' bus

terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common
parking areas, a case of transference from one site to
another.

Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation

of “colorum” buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila
and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up
points, as respondents suggest, might even be more
effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict
enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions
from major thoroughfares.

66. Respondents argue that jurisprudence consistently holds

that (1) additional requirements may be imposed for the issuance of
CPC, and there can be no violation of due process when a franchise is
cancelled for non-compliance with the new requirement; and (2) a CPC
does not vest property rights to its holder to conduct business along
the route covered it.

67. Thus, the respondents argue that the requirement of

consolidation through a cooperative or corporation for the continued
grant of a franchise is a valid requirement that may be imposed by the
government for the grant of a CPC. The respondents thus concluded
that the non-compliance therewith ipso facto allows the cancellation of
a franchise – without violating due process.

68. While the Court previously held that a CPC does not confer
a property right, the Court clarified in the case of Cogeo-Cubao
Operators and Drivers Association v. Court of Appeals,32 that the
same is only true when interest of the State is involved. However, with
respect to other persons and other public utilities, a certificate of
public convenience as property, which represents the right and
authority to operate its facilities for public service, cannot be
taken or interfered with without due process of law.

69. Due to the consolidation requirement, the individual

operators are compelled to surrender their individual franchises to a
juridical entity lest lose the right to operate their PUVs. Thus, the CPC
in this case is validly considered as property which cannot be revoked
without due process of law.

32 G.R. No. 100727, March 18, 1992

Reply with Reiterative Motion 17
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

70. Further, the revocation of the individual operators’

franchises without affording them the opportunity to be heard violates
the right to procedural due process.

71. In Casimiro v. Tandog33, the Court explained the essence

of procedural due process, viz:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the

basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case
at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To
be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

72. While the law gives the Respondent LTFRB ample power
and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of
public convenience issued to an operator, the Court clarified that it may
be done only as long as there is evidence to support its action34.

73. In this case, the Respondents, in revoking the franchises

of the individual operators due to their failure to consolidate is a wanton
disregard of the individual operators’ rights. Further, instead of taking
into consideration the welfare and interest of the public in the exercise
of its power to issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel CPCs, the
actions of the Respondents caused great inconvenience, confusion
and additional costs to the commuting public instead.

74. Respondents likewise claim that there is no violation of the

equal protection clause because according to them there is no truth in
petitioners’ claim that jeepneys are being singled out inasmuch as the
modernization program affects all modes of public transportation.

75. Oddly however, the Respondents in defending the assailed

department order and circulars, cited different studies specifically
directed to jeepneys.

76. In paragraph 7 of their Comment, the Respondents stated

that:

The JICA study recognized that one of the biggest

problems in road-based public transport is the safety and

33 G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

34 LTFRB v. G.V. Florida Transport, G.R. No. 213088, June 28, 2017
Reply with Reiterative Motion 18
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

high GHG emissions of jeepneys. Thus, there is a need

to modernize jeepneys, to improve the operation and
management of jeepney fleets, and to shift to low GHG
emission vehicles.

77. Further, the Respondents cited in detail the Jeepney+

NAMA, which is a study again directed to jeepneys.

78. In paragraph 24 of their Comment, Respondents also

stated:

Accounting for 34% of energy-related GHG emissions, the

transport industry is also noted as the largest source of air
pollution in the Philippines, with jeepneys accounting for
approximately 40% of all vehicle trips, making them the
biggest contributor of GHG emissions in the transport
sector and a dominating force in the daily life In the
Philippines.

79. Based on the foregoing, it is already apparent that the

Respondents targeted jeepneys in its PUVMP. As previously
mentioned in the filed Petition, the petitioners would like to reiterate
that Jeepneys are not a class of its own. Jeepneys account for only 2%
of the total number of registered vehicles in the country, thus it is
unreasonable, to single out jeepneys for the traffic congestion, road
accidents, air pollution and carbon emissions in the country.

80. Thus, for being purposely discriminatory, the assailed

department order and circulars must be voided for violation of the equal
protection clause.

The assailed department order

and circulars violate the
petitioners’ right to freedom of
association
----------------------------------------------

81. Petitioners reiterate that the assailed Department Order

No. 2017-11 and LTFRB Circulars , particularly, Circular Nos. 2018-
008 and 2019-066, infringe Petitioners’ constitutional right to
association as well as violate the State’s commitments under the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention on the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.
Reply with Reiterative Motion 19
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

82. Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.

83. The Philippines has also ratified both key International

Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions: the Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.
98) in December 1953. These conventions provide that Freedom of
Association and the right to Collective Bargaining are fundamental
rights for workers and employers to freely establish and join
organizations of their own choosing, without fear of reprisal. Freedom
of association and right to collective bargaining are fundamental rights
in the workplace and important elements of democracy contributing to
sustainable economic and social development. Decent work, inclusive
growth and governance – where strong workers and employers
organizations exist – are important ingredients to development that
benefits the greatest number of people.

84. In People v. Ferrer35, the Court explained the importance

of the constitutionally granted freedom of association, viz:

Freedom of expression and freedom of association are so

fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a
“preferred position” in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise
must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil.
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

85. Thus, while the State, through the exercise of police power,
may prescribe proscriptions against the freedom of association, the
same must of course be reasonable and legitimate and must be
predicated on the existence of a substantive evil to be addressed.

86. In this case, the loss of one’s means of livelihood upon

one’s failure or refusal to form or join an association is an abridgment
of this right that cannot be justified by the exercise of police power.
This argument comes with more force especially when considered that
the exercise of police power through the issuance of this mandatory
requirement does not serve its avowed purpose. To recall in this
connection, police power is exercised to promote or protect the general
welfare and not to suppress it.

35 G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972

Reply with Reiterative Motion 20
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

87. In contravention of the above-cited provisions, LTFRB MC

No. 2018-008 36 compels individual franchise holders to consolidate
into a single juridical entity (i.e. cooperative or corporation, and in a
later issuance, joint ventures) for the operation of public land
transportation services in order to continue operating.

88. It must also be noted that according to Section III(c) of MC

No. 2020-084, 37 even those individual operators who joined a
cooperative and are already included in an application for consolidation
and have submitted their respective affidavit of conformity are not
allowed to withdraw their membership/inclusion without the approval of
the OTC. This does not only violate the individual operators’ freedom
not to join an association, it also restricts their freedom to cease their
membership in an existing association.

89. To repeat, the department order and the LTFRB circulars

are violative of the fundamental right to associate because the freedom
or voluntariness to join or not to join is rendered illusory as individual
franchise holders are literally coerced to comply with the requirement
of consolidation for the continued grant of franchise.

90. Petitioners recognize that the right to freedom of

association admits reasonable restrictions. In this case, however, the
restriction is not only unreasonable, prohibitive and confiscatory and
violative of one’s right to association, it is also not aligned with the
National Transport Policy as stated in the NEDA Board Resolution No.
5 dated September 12, 2017 cited in the Comment. The prescribed
consolidation does not have any logical, practical nor necessary role
in the stated policies and principles of road public transport - one that
is envisioned to be reliable, safe, accessible, environmentally friendly,
dependable, efficient, and comfortable.

91. The Comment filed by the Respondent miserably failed to

explain what exactly is the rationale behind the consolidation portion of
the public transport modernization program. It also failed to answer the
question as to what role it plays in reducing reliance to private vehicles
by the riding public and to road public transport being reliable, safe,
accessible, environmentally friendly, dependable, efficient and
comfortable.

92. In fact, the studies and commitments cited by the

Respondent in its Comment makes no mention of the designed
consolidation. For indeed, how will a mandatory requirement to
incorporate or form a cooperative address the “fractured” or
“fragmented” transport system?

36 Petitioners’ Annex “B” to the Petition

37 Petitioners’ Annex “D” to the Petition
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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

93. Petitioners support the need to improve and modernize

public transport system in the country; however, the means to achieve
this purpose should not be at the expense of their right to livelihood
and association.

94. Lastly, the logistical, practical, financial and legal

challenges of incorporation and cooperative formation must also be
highlighted. To cite a few:

a. The government is requiring jeepney drivers, most of whom

are not familiar with the concept of juridical entities and their
legal intricacies, if without at least 15 units, to group together
and form a corporation or a cooperative;
b. These drivers and operators like the petitioners have to be
acquainted with and will likely need assistance in running
these juridical entities particularly in the preparation and
submission of reports before various government agencies;
c. They also have to elect their leaders and even advisers;
d. There will be additional costs and fees in setting up and
maintaining their cooperative or corporation;
e. They will have to address internal squabbles or
disagreements that are expected to arise along the way,
perhaps concerning the distribution of profits, maintenance
of jeepneys, or of sustaining operations, to cite a few.

The assailed department order

and circulars violate the
petitioners’ right to gainful
employment and livelihood
----------------------------------------------

95. The assailed D.O. No. 2017-011 and LTFRB Issuances

violate Petitioners’ right to gainful employment and livelihood.

96. Respondents hinged their claim that government has

regulatory power to property rights and to right to gainful employment
in paragraphs 132 and 133 of the Comment, to quote:

“The operation of PUVs, being common carriers, is imbued

with public interest. As such, if drivers/operators voluntarily
place their property in public service, they cannot complain
when said properties are subjected to the regulatory
powers of the state….Indeed, the operation of PUVs does
not only involve private property or gainful employment or
livelihood, but the greater interest of the public in terms of
safety and environmental protection. Thus, the assailed
D.O. No. 2017-011 and LTFRB Issuances do not deprive
Reply with Reiterative Motion 22
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

petitioners of their right to gainful employment and

livelihood, but merely regulate said rights by providing
reasonable requirements to secure the comfort and safety
of many.”

97. Petitioners reiterate that the D.O. No. 2017-011 and

LTFRB Issuances violate the Constitutional protection of the right to
gainful employment and livelihood.

98. The questioned department order and issuances require

the forming of and membership in cooperatives or corporations. These
corporations and cooperatives are then made to bear the high cost of
a modern e-jeepney estimated at PhP 2.8 million each or 1,767.7%
higher than the cost needed for a traditional jeepney (Php150,000 to
Php250,000). Government subsidy comes at a measly sum of only
P160,000, or 5.7% of the total cost of the modern e-jeepney.

99. Moreover, LTFRB MC 2021-02138 specifically provides the

following:

“After the lapse of the Provisional Authority or after a new

operator have been selected to operate along the route,
the individual operators affected must file a Petition for
Dropping of unit signifying therein of their intent to subject
the authorized unit for scrapping after determination by the
LTO that said unit is no longer fit even for private use.
Failure to drop the unit shall cause the Board to cancel
motu proprio the CPC of the individual operator.”

100. To reiterate, this will result to surrendering of jeepney units

by the operators and drivers which is tantamount to a confiscation of
their property and deprivation of their main source of livelihood. For
failure to consolidate into juridical entities, the individual operators’
provisional authorities will be revoked, thereby prohibiting them from
being registered and operated as public utility vehicles.

101. All these will lead to significant job losses and a

consequent increase in poverty rate. Even the Commission of Human
Rights issued a statement of caution last January 12, 2024, viz:

“While we believe that modernisation and development are

legitimate government goals, they must be pursued without
violating fundamental human rights. In the context of
PUVMP, it is necessary to avoid actions that may impose
an undue burden on the public. This includes avoiding
financial difficulties for small transportation operators and

38 Petitioners’ Annex “E” to the Petition

Reply with Reiterative Motion 23
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

protecting the livelihoods of the numerous drivers involved.

The potential consequences, such as pushing these
drivers and their families into poverty, highlight the need for
a balanced and considerate approach in implementing
modernisation efforts to ensure they align with wider
societal welfare.”

The assailed department order

and circulars constitute invalid
exercise of police power
----------------------------------------------

102. The Respondents argue that the assailed department

order and issuances are valid government measures issued within the
scope of the State’s police power because their motivating factor is the
interest of the public in general.

103. As cited by the Respondents in their Comment: “Expansive

and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force
without limits." "It has to be exercised within bounds — lawful
ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, require
its exercise, and that the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being
unduly oppressive upon individuals.”39

104. Otherwise stated, a valid exercise of police power requires

the concurrence of lawful subject and lawful means.

105. While there may be a lawful subject in the implementation

of the PUVMP, the means adopted by the Respondents in achieving
this purpose are unreasonable and unduly oppressive, thereby failing
to pass the second test of “lawful means” for the valid exercise of police
power.

106. The Respondents failed to show that there is an imperious

public necessity to justify the need to compel individual operators to
consolidate, nor were they able to show the nexus between the
requirement of consolidation and the improvements of the country’s
public transportation system.

107. Lacking a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful means,

the subject department order and issuances must be struck down for
being an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due
process clause.

39 Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Reply with Reiterative Motion 24
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

III.

THE PETITION SUFFICIENTLY SATISFIED

THE REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER(TRO) AND/OR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The petition established the

need for the issuance of a TRO
and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction
----------------------------------------------

108. The issuance of TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction

is necessary to prevent grave, irreparable, and widespread injury
not only to the individual operators and jeepney drivers, but to
the public in general.

109. Petitioners reiterate the need for a TRO as discussed in its

Extremely Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed on December 28,
2023.

110. Additionally, Petitioners plead that the status quo be

preserved. Under Rule 58, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The purpose of a
writ of preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear
and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent
necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.

111. Sec. 3 of the said Rule provides for the grounds of its
issuance, namely:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and

the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either
for a limited period or perpetually;
Reply with Reiterative Motion 25
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of

the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

112. In DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation,40

the requisites of preliminary injunction may be summarized as follows:

(a) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right,

that is a right in esse;
(b) There is material and substantive invasion of such right;
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant; and
(d) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

113. The first and foremost requisite in the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction under Rule 58 is the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right. A right in esse is a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected, one clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as to a matter of law.

114. Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule

relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. An
irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree
of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which product hurt,
inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture,
and not by accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive
to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which
it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar
quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the
owner of the loss thereof.

115. In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need
not substantiate his or her claim with complete and conclusive
evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required to
give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction
pending the decision of the case on the merits. Prima facie evidence
is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good and

40 G.R. No. 182944, November 09, 2016

Reply with Reiterative Motion 26
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

sufficient on its face to establish a fact constituting a party’s claim or

defense.

116. In Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, 41 the Court

further elaborated on the proof required for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as follows:

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must

further establish that he or she has a present and
unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against
which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is
a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right
and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.
Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a
preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right
is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a

preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the
plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The plaintiffs
are only required to show that they have an ostensible right
to the final relief prayed for in their complaint. A writ of
preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or
incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a
sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of
justification for a preliminary injunction pending the
decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of
the principal action which has yet to be decided.

117. All things considered, it is submitted that given the extreme

urgency and in order that petitioners may not suffer grave, irreparable,
and widespread injuries, it is respectfully moved that the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the implementation of the assailed administrative issuances be issued
in order to protect the substantive rights and interests of the Petitioners
while the case is pending before the Honorable Court.

118. In this case, the elements for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction are present in this case.

119. First, the Petitioners have clear and unmistakable rights to

be protected, namely, freedom of association, due process, equal
protection of laws, protection against unreasonable seizures, and to

41 G.R. No. 167434, February 19, 2007

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PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

gainful employment and livelihood. Verily, the following provisions of

the Constitution and law which guarantees the rights of the Petitioners
at the case at hand are clear and unmistakable and hence, must be
prevented:

On Freedom of Association

Article III, Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution:

“The right of the people, including those employed in the public

and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.”

Art. 3 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines:

“A cooperative is an autonomous and duly registered association

of persons, with a common bond of interest, who have voluntarily
joined together to achieved their social, economic, and cultural
needs and aspirations by making equitable contributions to the
capital required, patronizing their products and services and
accepting a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking
in accordance with universally accepted cooperative principles.”
On due process, equal protection of laws, and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution:

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.”

Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution:

“The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of

measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,

use, and disposition of property and its increments.”

On right to gainful employment and livelihood

Art. II, Sec. 9 of the 1987 Constitution:

“The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
Reply with Reiterative Motion 28
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

the people from poverty through politics that provide adequate

social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved quality of life for all”

120. Second, there is material and substantial invasion with the

revocation of franchises of unconsolidated PUVs. Petitioners who are
public commuters are especially disadvantaged with the reduction of
available PUVs – affordable options – on the road. In this case, the
aforementioned issuances were committed with grave abuse of
discretion for being violative of the previously mentioned clear and
unmistakable constitutional rights of the Petitioners.

121. In the case at bar, it is submitted that the aforementioned

policies which revoke the franchises of individual operators pursuant
to the mandatory consolidation measure, or otherwise colloquially
known as the jeepney phase-out are overly broad and infringe on the
constitutional freedom of association, oppressive, overreaching and
confiscatory in nature thereby violating the right to due process, equal
protection of laws, and the right against unreasonable seizures, are an
invalid exercise of police power, and are violative of the right to gainful
employment and livelihood..

122. Further: potestas delegata non delegari potest, i.e., what

has been delegated cannot be delegated. There is usurpation of
legislative prerogative. The PUVMP was not created by law, but
through the administrative issuances of the DOTr and the LTFRB.
Nowhere in the law authorizes the LTFRB nor the DOTr to force
jeepney operators to join a cooperative or consolidate their PUJs, or
prescribe mechanism for the operation of such.

123. It is respectfully submitted that the subject department

orders and circulars were issued in grave abuse of discretion in excess
of or beyond the Respondents’ authority and jurisdiction. The assailed
orders and issuances do not confer legislative power upon the
Respondents. The authority only conferred upon them under the law is
to promulgate rules and regulations not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy as validly
delegated to them. Under Executive Order No. 202, dated June 19,
1987 which created respondent LTFRB, Section 5 of which provides
for the powers and functions respondent, through its Board, may
exercise, to wit:

a. To prescribe and regulate routes of service, economically

viable capacities and zones or areas of operation of public
land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles in
accordance with the public land transportation development
plans and programs approved by the Department of
Reply with Reiterative Motion 29
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

Transportation and Communications (now Department of

Transportation);

b. To issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel Certificates of

Public Convenience or permits authorizing the operation of
public land transportation services provided by motorized
vehicles, and to prescribe the appropriate terms and
conditions therefor;

c. To determine, prescribe and approve and periodically review

and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges,
relative to the operation of public land transportation services
provided by motorized vehicles;

d. To issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether

prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has
jurisdiction, and in which cases the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court shall apply;

e. To punish for contempt of the Board, both direct and indirect,

in accordance with the pertinent provisions of, and the
penalties prescribed by, the Rules of Court;

f. To issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and summon

witnesses to appear in any proceedings of the Board, to
administer oaths and affirmations;

g. To conduct investigations and hearings of complaints for

violation of the public service laws on land transportation and
of the Board's rules and regulations, orders, decisions and/or
rulings and to impose fines and/or penalties for such
violations;

h. To review motu proprio the decisions/actions of the Regional

Franchising and Regulatory Office herein created;

i. To promulgate rules and regulations governing proceedings

before the Board and the Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Office: Provided, That except with respect to
paragraphs d, e, f and g hereof, the rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in the courts of laws should not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of said rules that
the Board and the Regional Franchising and Regulatory
Offices shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
facts in its case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law and procedures, all in the interest of due
process;
Reply with Reiterative Motion 30
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

j. To fix, impose and collect, and periodically review and adjust,

reasonable fees and other related charges for services
rendered;
k. To formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce
rules and regulations on land transportation public utilities,
standards of measurements and/or design, and rules and
regulations requiring operators of any public land
transportation service to equip, install and provide in their
utilities and in their stations such devices, equipment facilities
and operating procedures and techniques as may promote
safety, protection, comfort and convenience to persons and
property in their charges as well as the safety of persons and
property within their areas of operations;

l. To coordinate and cooperate with other government agencies

and entities concerned with any aspect involving public land
transportation services with the end in view of effecting
continuing improvement of such services; and

m. To perform such other functions and duties as may be

provided by law, or as may be necessary, or proper or
incidental to the purposes and objectives of this Executive
Order.”

124. As can be gleaned over the provisions, said Order only

delegates to the Respondent LTFRB to promulgate rules and
regulations involving land transportation, in view of public interest, in
which the exercise of the same is an administrative function which
does not fall under the scope of exercising legislative powers. Said
exercise of the powers granted to Respondent LTFRB depends on the
discretion of some government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
However, the exercise of discretionary acts is not tantamount to law
making. Thus, it is argued that through the assailed orders and
issuances by the respondent LTFRB, there is a valid encroachment of
police power on its end which is ultimately in excess of the authority
and jurisdiction conferred to it under Executive Order No. 202.

125. Third, there is an urgent need on the part of not only the
Petitioners, but of thousands like them who are subject to the
aforementioned issuances, for the writ to be issued so as to prevent
grave, irreparable, and widespread injuries on the part of thousands of
operators, drivers, and commuters alike. In the case at bar, it is
respectfully submitted that Petitioners will be deprived of their right to
operate public utility vehicles without the opportunity to be heard,
thereby violating their property rights. As a result thereof, immediate
consequences as to the deprivation of said right will not only be faced
by Petitioners alone, but also people of like situation in the transport
Reply with Reiterative Motion 31
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

sector, the families of the thousands of operators, and the vast

multitudes of commuters in this country who rely on public
transportation such as jeepney to get by each and every day.

126. Road public transport is a vital public service. Thus, it is

important for PUVMP to set performance indicators in terms of the user
experience (comfort, safety, convenience, etc.) rather than just the
program inputs delivered (e.g., new vehicles financed, number of
vehicles registered with cooperatives or corporations). The crucial
results or outcomes have to do with the program’s impact on
commuters: how many people are served by public transportation; how
long they have to wait to catch their ride; their total travel time; how
much they have to pay; and the safety and convenience of their travel
mode. Both input and outcome indicators should be measured and
reported.

127. In a study, there are over nine million registered vehicles in

the Philippines and of the total, jeepneys comprise only over 250,000,
or two percent (2%) of the total registered vehicles in the Philippines.
Of the total jeepneys, around a quarter operate in Metro Manila.
Further, a traditional jeepney costs around P150,000 to P250,000
while a modern e-jeepney would force drivers and operators to cough
up as much as P2.8 million, a 1,766.7% increase in cost. Stated
otherwise, the modern e-jeepney is 1,766.7% more expensive than the
traditional jeepney and as such, iniquitous, unconscionable, exorbitant
and excessive on the parts of jeepney drivers. However, as to the
subsidy provided to jeepney drivers, only P160,000, or 5.7% of the total
cost of the modern e-jeepney, will be provided to our drivers. It is
estimated that if a jeepney driver who earns around P2,000 a day, then
if they should upgrade to modern jeepneys, they would need to earn at
least P3,500 a day to pay off their debt. As such, the fear is more
apparent that the modernization program would lead to a jeepney
phase-out of units which would require drivers to buy new and
modernized e-jeepneys which they cannot afford.

128. As of writing, latest figures provided by the respondent

LTFRB show that in the National Capital Region (NCR), only 21,55 or
51.34% of jeepneys were able to consolidate before the deadline.
Similarly, only 1,400 of 59.33% of UV Express vehicles were
consolidated. Nationwide, the consolidation figures stand at 111,581
units (73.96%) for jeepneys and 15,844 (82.03%) units for UV Express.
In sum, however, tens of thousands of public utility vehicles (PUVs)
have failed to consolidate and are at risk of losing their right to operate
for their failure to consolidate.

129. It is to be noted that since the deadline for jeepney drivers

to consolidate into cooperatives by December 31, 2023 was extended
only until January 31, 2024, this means that by February 1, 2024, tens
Reply with Reiterative Motion 32
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

of thousands of public utility vehicles would be off the road for their
failure to consolidate. By reason of failure to consolidate, the
respondent LTFRB will be authorized to serve jeepney operators who
failed to consolidate show cause orders, but their franchises would
remain revoked.

130. Hence, through the aforementioned administrative orders

and issuances, it would give the respondent LTFRB unbridled
discretion and authority to enforce the PUV modernization program
clearly to the prejudice of the transport sector at large. On its face,
there is no showing that the aforementioned measures by the
Respondents represent the least restrictive means available. Such
approach, however, appears to be the most coercive and drastic
measure taken and one that is unduly oppressive not only to jeepney
drivers and operators, but by extension, to their families and the
commuting public at large. Clearly, there is no standard by which the
amount of actual and possible damages to be faced economically by
drivers, operators, and commuters can be measured with reasonable
accuracy and as such, cannot be easily quantified. It is reiterated that
within the context of an injunctive writ, damages are considered
irreparable when "there is no standard by which their amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy.

131. Damage to be faced not only by Petitioners but by the

transport sector and the commuting public at large would be grave,
irreparable, and widespread.

132. Fourth and finally, no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate

remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In the realm
of issuing injunctive reliefs, urgent necessity is present when there is
an immediate threat to the status quo. As it stands, the use of jeepneys
has been the traditional way of transportation in the country so much
so that it has become part of one’s daily life in the country. If tens of
thousands of jeepneys were to be phased out just for failing to
consolidate, then thousands more in the transport sector and the
commuting public at large would be affected by this shift brought about
by the challenged orders and issuances. This would threaten the status
quo as to one’s daily commuting life and in turn, would gravely impact
the country as a whole. While there are other existing modes of public
transportation available, the use of jeepneys have remained not only
the most common, but also the most convenient for the commuting
public.

133. Indeed, unless a preliminary injunction is issued by this

Honorable Court, the petitioners and hundreds of thousands more like
them in the transport sector would lose their livelihoods, which in turn
would affect not only their families economically, but to the commuting
public in general.
Reply with Reiterative Motion 33
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

134. Hence, the assailed orders and issuances ultimately

infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the
people. As enlightened in the case of Calalang v. Williams,42:

“Social justice is ‘neither communism, nor despotism, nor

atomism, nor anarchy,’ but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.

135. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the

recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”

136. Given the urgency of the resulting repercussions brought

about by the assailed orders and issuances on the part of the transport
sector and the general public, it is but social justice to temporarily
enjoin the assailed orders and issuances considering the best interests
of the public at large. Given the factual conditions and circumstances
faced by the people affected by said assailed order and issuances, it
is only apt that the Court, through a writ of preliminary injunction, in the
meantime restrict said assailed orders and issuances while the
determination of the case on the merits ensues, in consideration of the
fact that said writ is only provisional in nature and merely ancillary to
the main action brought before this Honorable Court, i.e., the
constitutionality of the assailed orders and issuances.

137. In summary, Petitioners and the public at large have a clear

and unmistakable right that must be protected against a material and
substantial invasion by Respondents. It is respectfully submitted that

42 070 Phil 726; G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Reply with Reiterative Motion 34
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

Petitioners were able to clearly show prima facie evidence that they
are entitled to the issuance of an injunctive relief for having complied
with the requirements set forth under the Rules. Hence, pending the
final determination of the issues in the main case of whether or not the
PUV modernization program infringes on petitioners’ above-discussed
substantive rights, it is prudent to preserve the status quo.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered and in the higher interest of

justice and equity, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:

1. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR A WRIT OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION be immediately issued restraining
respondents, and all persons acting under their authority, from
enforcing or implementing the following:

a. DOTr Department Order No. 2017-011 (Re: Omnibus

Guidelines on the Planning and Identification of Public
Road Transportation Services and Franchise Issuance);

b. LTFRB Memorandum Circular 2018-008 (Consolidation of

Franchise Holders in Compliance with Department Order
No. 2017-011, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Franchising Guidelines (OFG);

c. LTFRB MC 2019-066 (Simplified Process for Applications

for Consolidation of Individual and Existing Franchise
Holders in Compliance with the PUVMP and the
Department Order No. 2017-011 (OFG));

d. LTFRB MC 2020-084 (Extension of Time to File

Application for Consolidation Pursuant to Industry
Consolidation of PUVMP);

e. LTFRB MC 2021-021 (Guidelines for the Issuance of

Provisional Authority to Units of Individual Operators with
Pending Application for Consolidation and those that
Failed to File an Application for Consolidation Pursuant to
the Omnibus Franchising Guidelines (OFG) and the
Procedure in the Qualification and Selection of Applicants);

f. LTFRB MC 2023-047 (Guidelines for the Acceptance of

Application for Consolidation); and

g. LTFRB MC 2023-051 (Allowing Operations of

Consolidated Transport Services Entities in All Routes with
Reply with Reiterative Motion 35
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

Filed Applications for Consolidation on or before 31

December 2023).

h. LTFRB MC 2023-52 (Guidelines on the Implementation of

the Public Utility Vehicle Modernization Program(PUVMP)
after 31 December 2023 Deadline for Filing the Application
for Consolidation)

2. After proper proceedings, the said department order and

circulars be declared NULL AND VOID.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise
prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

January 18, 2024, Quezon City for Manila.

NERI JAVIER COLMENARES

Counsel for Petitioners
Roll of Attorneys No. 43060
IBP Lifetime Member No. 010437
PTR No. 5670744; 01/19/2024; Quezon City
MCLE Compliance No. VII-0030380; valid until 04/14/2025
c/o BAYAN MUNA HEADQUARTERS
Block 25 Lot 34 Gabriela Silang St.
New Capitol Estates I, Batasan Hills Quezon City
Tel No: (02) 87350191
Email address: bayanmuna1999@gmail.com

CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE

Counsel for Petitioners
Roll of Attorneys No. 39571
IBP Lifetime Member No. 19408
PTR No. 4658011; 05/12/2023; Quezon City
MCLE Exemption No. VIII – LegD002290
Klima Center, Manila Observatory
Ateneo de Manila University Campus,
Katipunan Avenue, QC 1101
Email address: atty.kaloi.zarate@gmail.com

and
Reply with Reiterative Motion 37
PISTON chairperson Floranda v. DOTr

EXPLANATION OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

Due to lack of time and available personnel the foregoing Reply

with Reiterative Motion is served upon the parties primarily by
electronic mail. This explanation is given pursuant to Rule 13, Section
11 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In consonance with the Rules, petitioners heretofore consent to

service by electronic mail through counsel Neri Javier Colmenares at
bayanmuna1999@gmail.com, counsel Carlos Isagani T. Zarate at
atty.kaloi.zarate@gmail.com, and co-counsel NUPL-National Capital
Region (NUPL-NCR) at nuplncr@yahoo.com.

MAE DIANE M. AZORES