EN BANC

[G.R. No. 254001. July 11, 2023.]

BAYYO ASSOCIATION, INC. and ANSELMO D. PERWEG, in his

capacity as PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY ARTHUR P. TUGADE, SECRETARY CARLOS S.
DOMINGUEZ, SECRETARY WENDEL ELIOT AVISADO, and ATTY.
MARTIN B. DELGRA, respondents.

DECISION

SINGH, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed by Bayyo Association, Inc. (Bayyo) and Anselmo D. Perweg
(Perweg), in his capacity as President of Bayyo (collectively, the petitioners), which
seeks to nullify paragraph 5.2 of Department Order (DO) No. 2017-011, 2 dated June
19, 2017, issued by the Department of Transportation (DOTr), for being an invalid
delegation of legislative power and for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. HTcADC

The Facts
On June 19, 2017, the DOTr issued DO No. 2017-011, otherwise known as the
"Public Utility Vehicle Modernization Program" (PUVMP), pursuant to the national
government policy to authorize and promote safe, reliable, efficient, and environment-
friendly Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs), as ordained in Executive Order (EO) No. 125, 3
as amended by EO No. 125-A, 4 and EO No. 202. 5
DO No. 2017-011 sets out new vehicle specifications, franchise issue
procedures, and practices for all PUVs, which include public utility buses (PUBs), mini-
buses, public utility jeepneys (PUJs), utility vehicle (UV) express services, Filcab
services, school services, taxi services, transportation network vehicle services
(TNVS), tourist transport services, and shuttle services.
At the core of the present controversy is paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011,
which reads:
5.2 Modernization of Public Transport Services
To modernize existing transport services, brand new and environmentally-
friendly units shall be promoted and be given priority in the allocation of
CPCs and deployment, based on route categories.
Relative thereto, the following requirements shall be adopted;
5.2.1 Environmentally-friendly units are vehicles that use an electric
drive and/or a combustion engine that complies with Euro IV or
better emission standards as prescribed by the DENR to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, toxic fumes, particulate matter, and
other forms of air pollution;
5.2.2 The LTFRB shall issue a Memorandum Circular to provide for
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 modernization program for all PUVs, establishing the age limit of
each classification based on the year of the oldest major
component (i.e., chassis and engine/motor) of the vehicle and not
the initial year of registration or the year of importation; and
5.2.3 Refurbished and/or rebuilt vehicles shall pass the type approval
system test and issued a Certificate of Compliance with Emission
Standards (CCES) as a condition to initial registration by the LTO
and to the roadworthiness test of the LTO-Motor Vehicle Inspection
System for renewal of registration. Refurbished and/or rebuilt
PUBs, even with new engines or motors, shall not be allowed to
substitute for phased-out units. (Emphasis in the original)
Bayyo, representing itself as an association consisting of 430 jeepney operators
and drivers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
operating in various routes in Metro Manila, now comes before the Court to have
paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 declared unconstitutional.
The Arguments of the Petitioners
Procedural Matters
The petitioners maintain that they have the requisite legal standing to file the
Petition as citizens and taxpayers who will allegedly be denied their fundamental rights
by reason of the implementation of DO No. 2017-011. Bayyo also asserts its standing
as a legitimate association of jeepney operators and drivers operating in different parts
of Metro Manila, whose members have suffered and continue to suffer the brunt of the
said administrative issuance. 6
Nonetheless, the petitioners invoke the relaxation of the rule on standing, as the
issues at hand are of transcendental importance with far-reaching implications. They
aver that DO No. 2017-011 has serious repercussions on the country's transport
industry concerning the health, safety, and well-being of jeepney drivers and operators
and the commuting public. 7
The petitioners further insist on the justiciability of the issues in this case,
claiming that DO No. 2017-011 palpably contravenes the Constitution. They reason that
dismissing the case would diminish the Court into a reactive branch of the government,
contrary to the framers' vision of a proactive judiciary which is vigilant in its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. 8
Substantive Issues
The petitioners argue that DO No. 2017-011 is an invalid delegation of legislative
power. They claim that there is nothing under EO No. 125, as amended by EO No. 125-
A, and EO No. 202 which serves as basis for empowering the DOTr to direct and
compel PUJ drivers and operators to modernize their PUJs. 9
Further, the petitioners contend that paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.
According to the petitioners, the said provision entails the phaseout and
replacement of old PUVs with brand new and environment-friendly units and, while sub-
paragraph 5.2.3 of DO No. 2017-11 expressly allows refurbishment and/or rebuilding of
PUVs, the same will allegedly not apply to PUJs. To support this claim, the petitioners
rely on the news article published by the Business Mirror, wherein DOTr Assistant
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 Secretary Mark Richmond de Leon (ASEC de Leon) was quoted as saying that the
PUVMP envisions a "holistic rehabilitation" and not merely refurbishment and/or
rebuilding of PUVs. 10
Thus, the petitioners posit that the phaseout policy for the traditional PUJs is
discriminatory, as it unnecessarily distinguishes between the traditional PUJs, on the
one hand, and other PUVs, such as PUBs or UV Express, on the other. Among other
things, they consider this policy as not germane to DO No. 2017-011's declared
purpose of making all PUVs environment-friendly for the health, safety, and well-being
of the commuting public. CAIHTE

It is also the petitioners' position that DO No. 2017-011 is confiscatory since

paragraph 5.2 compels PUJ drivers and operators to replace their units with
environment-friendly units with government subsidy of a mere P80,000.00 (increased to
P130,000.00), but leaves them for seven years to pay the purchase price of the new
unit valued at P2.1 million, inclusive of interest. They claim that this is tantamount to
confiscation in as much as there is a glaring disproportion between the value of the
phased out jeepney and the value of the equity advanced by the government, which is a
pittance. Further, the arrangement will force the drivers and operators to perpetual
indebtedness and servitude to make ends meet. 11
In this regard, the petitioners further claim that paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011
is violative of their right to earn a living and to pursue a lawful calling and profession.
Considering that the replacement of their jeepneys will unnecessarily expose them to
the quagmire of indebtedness, the petitioners claim that drivers and operators of PUJs
will be forced out of their chosen calling and profession and will be deprived of their
source of livelihood. 12
Finally, the petitioners claim that DO No. 2017-011 violates the "Filipino First"
Policy since most, if not all, of the brand-new modern PUJs approved by the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board have been sourced from foreign
manufacturers or suppliers. They allege that the respondents have failed or refused to
tap local manufacturers or re-builders which can supply or refurbish compliant PUJs at
a more affordable price. 13
The Arguments of the Respondents
Procedural Matters
The respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for violation of the
rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to present a purely legal question before the
Court. They point out that the petitioners' factual submissions are without evidentiary
support, which could have been remedied had they adhered to the aforementioned rule.
14

While the respondents admit that the rule on hierarchy of courts is not inflexible
and admits of some exceptions, none of these exists in this case. The respondents
contend that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the Petition involves a
constitutional issue of "transcendental importance," which is prejudicial to the well-being
of thousands of drivers and operators. 15
The respondents likewise asseverate that the Petition failed to satisfy the
requisites for judicial review. They allege that the Petition does not present actual facts
from which the Court can conclude that paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 is
unconstitutional, and there is no showing that the petitioners are in actual or immediate
danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the issuance's enforcement. Thus, the
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 petitioners are not entitled to the relief they are seeking. 16
Substantive Issues
Regardless of the above procedural infirmities, the respondents maintain that the
Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Contrary to the petitioners' claim, the respondents aver that DO No. 2017-011 is
not an invalid delegation of legislative power, as it was issued pursuant to EO No. 125
and EO No. 202. They maintain that the mandate and objectives of the DOTr under EO
No. 125 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide limitations in the
DOTr's power to formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines. 17
The respondents likewise assert that DO No. 2017-011 does not violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution because it requires all covered PUVs, without any
distinction, to meet the required standards in the PUVMP. They also emphasize that
paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 does not prohibit the refurbishment or rebuilding of
PUJs, as there is nothing in the text of the provision that supports the contrary claim of
the petitioners. 18
Anent the petitioners' assertion that DO No. 2017-011 is confiscatory as it
requires PUJ operators and drivers to give up their traditional PUJs and provides them
with a measly subsidy, the respondents discredit the same and contend that the
average scrap value of the traditional PUJs is less than the subsidy. They add that the
rate of return of the brand new modern PUJs is relatively higher than that of the
traditional PUJs. 19
The respondents also dispute the petitioners' contention that DO No. 2017-011
violates their rights against involuntary servitude, to pursue a lawful profession and
calling, and to earn a living. While they admit that PUJ operators and drivers have a
right to earn a living, such right is not absolute considering that their source of livelihood
is public transportation, which by its nature is subject to government regulation. 20
Lastly, the respondents belie the petitioners' claim that DO No. 2017-011 violates
the "Filipino First" Policy, claiming that the choice of manufacturers and assemblers is
open to both local and foreign entities and involves an accreditation process to verify
compliance with technical specifications. They attest that as of August 15, 2021, there
are 42 accredited manufacturers and assemblers, of which 12 have manufacturing sites
in the country and are employing local personnel. 21
The Issues
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, the issues for the Court's resolution are
summarized, as follows:
(1) Is the Petition procedurally infirm?
(2) Is paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 unconstitutional?
The Ruling of the Court
The Petition is dismissed for being procedurally infirm.
A petition for certiorari and
prohibition is a proper remedy to raise
constitutional questions
The petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional paragraph 5.2 of DO No.
2017-011, and for this purpose, they availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
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 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. aScITE

The Court's power of judicial review is anchored on Section 1, Article VIII, of the
Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." 22
It has long been settled that under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, any act of
any branch or instrumentality of the government involving the exercise of discretion on
the part of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. 23
Simply put, courts may correct, undo, or enjoin an act of a governmental
instrumentality through certiorari or prohibition upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and when delineations of authority
were exceeded. 24
I n Araullo v. Aquino III , 25 the Court clarified that the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to assail the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the executive and all other issuances
implementing the DAP. The Court ruled:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized
by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right
and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not
at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly
brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
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 executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of
checks and balances. 26
The foregoing pronouncement was echoed in Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v.
De Lima, 27 where the Court, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, passed upon
the constitutionality of the implementing rules issued by the DOJ to the statutory
amendments on the computation of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act
(RA) No. 10592. 28
In DENR Employees Union v. Abad , 29 the Court likewise held that a petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to determine
whether the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing Budget Circular No. 2011-5. It stressed that its judicial
power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution is broad enough to include the
determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government even in their exercise of legislative and quasi-legislative functions.
I n Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Biazon , 30 the Court declared
that the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court was properly invoked via a petition
f o r certiorari, prohibition, and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to
challenge the administrative issuances of the Department of Finance and the Bureau of
Customs relating to policies on the payment of overtime work rendered by personnel of
the Bureau of Customs.
Thus, it is settled that if any governmental branch or instrumentality is shown to
have gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and has
overstepped the delimitations of its powers, courts may "set right, undo, or restrain"
such act by way of certiorari and prohibition. 31
In line with the Court's consistent ruling, the petitioners correctly availed of the
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in
assailing the constitutionality of paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011.
The petitioners lack legal standing
Notwithstanding the propriety of the legal vehicle employed, the Court cannot
exercise its power of judicial review, even under its expanded jurisdiction, when the
requisites for the exercise thereof are not satisfied. 32 The prevailing rule in
constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, i.e., (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 33 DETACa

The Court finds that the petitioners do not possess the requisite legal standing to
file this suit.
The requirement of locus standi pertains to a party's personal and substantial
interest in the case arising from the direct injury they sustained, or will sustain, as a
result of the challenged governmental action. 34 "Interest" in this context means material
interest, and not mere incidental interest. 35
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 Concomitantly, the question in standing is whether the parties have alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 36 Thus, as a general rule, a
party is not permitted to raise a matter in which he or she has no personal interest. 37
In this jurisdiction, the Court has recognized the third-party standing of an
association to sue on behalf of its members. In Executive Secretary v. Court of
Appeals, 38 the Court discussed:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with
that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent
was organized x x x to act as the representative of any individual, company,
entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry,
and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes
embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the
rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical x x x. The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its
individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices
and the redress of their grievances. 39
It bears emphasis, however, that while an association is endowed with standing
to institute actions on behalf of its members, it must establish who their members are,
and that it has been duly authorized by its members to represent them or sue on their
behalf. 40
In assailing paragraph 5 of DO No. 2017-011, Bayyo principally invokes its
standing as a legitimate association of jeepney operators and drivers in the different
parts of Metro Manila. It asserts that DO No. 2017-011 violates the rights of its members
to pursue a lawful profession and calling and to earn a living.
At the outset, Bayyo did not submit any proof to support its claim that it is a
legitimate association of PUJ operators and drivers. While it attached a Certificate of
Registration issued by the SEC, the same merely proves its registration as an
association, but does not establish that its members are indeed PUJ operators and
drivers. Accordingly, due to the absence of Bayyo's Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws or any other competent proof, the Court cannot ascertain its legal standing as an
association of PUJ operators and drivers.
Even if such were not the case, Bayyo still failed to establish who its members
are and that it has been duly authorized by said members to institute the Petition.
I n The Provincial Bus Operators Assn. of the Phils. v. DOLE (Provincial Bus
Operators), 41 the Court clarified that it is insufficient to simply allege that the
petitioners therein are associations that represent their members. The associations
must establish who their members are and that their members authorized them to sue
on their behalf:
As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have standing to
bring this suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their members
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 are and if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. While
alleging that they are composed of public utility bus operators who will be
directly injured by the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof,
such as board resolutions of their alleged members or their own articles
of incorporation authorizing them to act as their members'
representatives in suits involving their members' individual rights. 42
(Emphasis supplied)
I n Private Hospitals Association v. Medialdea , 43 the Court echoed the
pronouncement in Provincial Bus Operators, and held that the association cannot
benefit from third-party standing for failing to prove that it was authorized by the
members to institute the case. It ruled that while the association successfully identified
its members, being the sole national organization of purely privately owned clinics,
hospitals, or other health facilities in the Philippines, it nonetheless failed to
demonstrate that ample authority had been extended to it by its members to file the
action.
Similarly, in Alliance of Non-Life Insurance Workers of the Philippines v.
Mendoza, 44 the Court dismissed the case for failure of the petitioners therein to
establish standing as associations suing on behalf of their members. The Court noted
that while the petitioners presented their respective Certificates of Incorporation, there
was no showing that they were authorized to represent their members in the protection
of their insurance business. They likewise failed to present proof that their members will
be directly injured by the enactment of the assailed administrative issuance. HEITAD

Thus, it is evident from the foregoing pronouncements of the Court that to invoke
third-party standing, an association must establish the identity of its members and
present proof of its authority to bring the suit for and on their behalf.
While Bayyo submitted a Secretary's Certificate, the same only proves the
authority of its President to file the Petition on behalf of the association, not its
members. The same is insufficient to establish that Bayyo or its President, Perweg,
were specifically authorized by the members to institute the present action.
As regards Perweg, he likewise cannot invoke standing as a citizen and taxpayer
to file the Petition.
When suing as a concerned citizen, it must be established that one has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. 45 Further the person complaining must allege
that he or she has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he or
she is lawfully entitled or that he or she is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 46
Here, Perweg's invocation of standing as a citizen deserves no credence, as it
was not established that he is either a PUJ operator or driver. Hence, he does not stand
to suffer any real and apparent injury or threat attributable to the implementation of DO
No. 2017-011 so as to demonstrate standing as a citizen.
As for taxpayers' suits, these are predicated on an allegation that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. 47
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 In Mamba v. Lara, 48 the Court discussed the requirements of a taxpayer's suit:
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must
show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a
law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is
directly affected by the alleged act. 49 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, a taxpayer's suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the
direct correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in
contravention of law or the Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. 50
Here, the petitioners cannot invoke standing as taxpayers considering that
paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
More glaringly, a closer examination of the Petition reveals that there is no allegation of
any illegal expenditure of public funds. Thus, the case cannot qualify as a taxpayer's
suit.
The petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts
The respondents correctly point out that the Petition was filed in violation of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, "recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court." Thus, a
petition must first be brought before the lowest court with jurisdiction and then appealed
until it reaches this Court. This concurrent jurisdiction does not give the party discretion
on where to file a petition, as non-compliance with this requirement is a ground for
dismissal. 51 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule on
hierarchy of courts.
I n The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC , 52 the Court enumerated instances
where direct resort to the Court is allowed: (a) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the
issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) in cases of first impression; (d)
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Supreme Court; (e) the time
element or exigency in certain situations; (f) the filed petition reviews an act of a
constitutional organ; (g) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law; (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
In this case, the petitioners assert that direct resort to the Court is justified, as the
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 case involves constitutional issues of transcendental importance affecting the rights of
jeepney drivers and operators to pursue a lawful calling and profession and the right to
earn a living. They likewise allege that paragraph 5.2 of DO No. 2017-011 is
confiscatory and discriminatory. aDSIHc

The foregoing assertions fail to impress.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Court is
allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land. 53
I n Gios-Samar v. DOTC , 54 the Court clarified that allegation of "special and
important reasons" as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, applies only to
cases with purely legal issues:
Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be a
matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative given (1) the structure of
our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due process.
First. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels of
courts in the country as they are established under the Constitution and by law,
their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one another, and how
these different levels of court interact with one another. It determines the
venues of appeals and the appropriate forum for the Issuance of extraordinary
writs.
xxx xxx xxx
Second. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts also
proceeds from considerations of due process. While the term "due process of
law" evades exact and concrete definition, this Court, in one of its earliest
decisions, referred to it as a law which hears before it condemns which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It means that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection
of the general rules which govern society. Under the present Rules of Court,
which governs our judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of parties
are settled through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of
ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact: As
earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in the first instance. By
directly filing a case before the Court, litigants necessarily deprive themselves
of the opportunity to completely pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their
right to due process is effectively undermined by their own doing. 55
Thus, the decisive factor is not the invocation of special and important reasons,
but the nature of the question raised in the petition. Notably, in a long line of cases
where exceptions to the hierarchy of courts were allowed, there were clear factual
parameters, enabling this Court to resolve the cases without needing further information
and clarifying disputed facts. 56
I n Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and
Freeport Authority, 57 the Court emphasized that transcendental importance is not an
exception to justiciability and the facts constituting the violation must first be complete,
undisputed and established before the trial courts, which are equipped to receive and
assess evidence:
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 This Court is not a trier of facts. Whether in its original or appellate
jurisdiction, this Court is not equipped to receive and weigh evidence in the first
instance. When litigants bypass the hierarchy of courts, the facts they
claim before this Court are incomplete and disputed.
Bypassing the judicial hierarchy requires more than just raising
issues of transcendental importance. Without first resolving the factual
disputes, it will remain unclear if there was a direct injury, or if there was factual
concreteness and adversariness to enable this Court to determine the parties'
rights and obligations. Transcendental importance is no excuse for not
meeting the demands of justiciability. 58 (Emphasis supplied; citation
omitted)
Similarly, in Pangilinan v. Cayetano , 59 the Court explained that a party invoking
transcendental importance must clearly show why the Court must exercise its power of
judicial review, including the facts constituting the actual case or controversy in
question:
Transcendental importance is often invoked in instances when the
petitioners fail to establish standing in accordance with customary
requirements. However, its general invocation cannot negate the requirement of
locus standi. Facts must be undisputed, only legal issues must be present, and
proper and sufficient justifications why this Court should not simply stay its
hand must be clear. 60
Thus, without clear and specific allegations of facts, the Court cannot rule on the
rights and obligations of the parties. The invocation of an exception to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts does not do away with a petition's infirmities. This is more apparent
in petitions which require resolution of factual issues that are indispensable for the
cases' proper disposition, 61 such as in this case.
Here, the petitioners argue that the assailed DO No. 2017-011 is confiscatory,
discriminatory, and violative of the rights of jeepney drivers and operators, as it
allegedly compels PUJ operators and drivers to modernize their PUJs by phasing out
their old units, in exchange for brand new and environment friendly units, with prices
ranging from P1.6 Million to P2.1 Million. As a result, the PUJ operators will be forced to
incur unnecessary debts to acquire new units. This will allegedly exclude drivers and
operators of public jeepneys from their chosen calling and profession and deprive them
of their source of livelihood.
As can be readily seen from the foregoing averments, the issues raised by the
petitioners are not purely legal.
The determination of whether DO No. 2017-011 is confiscatory, anti-poor, and
deprives PUJ operators and drivers of their source of livelihood, as well as the
purported financial impact of the modernization program on PUJ operators and drivers,
including, among others, the cost of modernizing jeepneys, the loans and debts that will
be obtained by PUJ operators and drivers to purchase the units, and the alleged losses
in the daily income that will be sustained by the PUJ operators and drivers as a result of
the implementation of DO No. 2017-011, are all factual questions which entail the
reception and evaluation of evidence. ATICcS

The Court cannot simply rely on the bare and unsubstantiated allegations of the
petitioners as to the supposed adverse effects of the assailed DO No. 2017-011 on the
livelihood of PUJ operators and drivers. These factual issues should have been first
brought before the proper trial courts or the Court of Appeals, both of which are
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 specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
As a matter of fact, in Evangelista v. DOTr , 62 the Court dismissed outright the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by an association of PUJ drivers and
operators also questioning the constitutionality of DO No. 2017-011, for violation of the
doctrine of hierarchy of Courts. The Court pronounced therein that although the
petitioners alleged, inter alia, that DO No. 2017-011 is anti-poor, oppressive, untimely,
and a restraint in trade, these asseverations do not automatically excuse the parties
from the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
It is well to remember that the Court is not a trier of facts. Whether in its original
or appellate jurisdiction, this Court is not equipped to receive and weigh evidence in the
first instance. When litigants bypass the hierarchy of courts, the facts they claim before
the Court are incomplete and disputed. Bypassing the judicial hierarchy requires more
than just raising issues of transcendental importance. Without first resolving the factual
disputes, it will remain unclear if there was a direct injury, or if there was factual
concreteness and adversariness to enable this Court to determine the parties' rights
and obligations. Transcendental importance is no excuse for not meeting the demands
of justiciability. 63
In view of the petitioners' lack of legal standing and their disregard of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts, the Court will not delve into the merits of the substantive
arguments raised.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M.V.
Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J.Y. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez and Kho, Jr., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring.

Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur. The Petition must be dismissed outright for lack of justiciability. This
Court must exercise restraint on matters without actual justiciable controversy and await
the proper pleading to rule on the merits of the case.
I
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution vests this Court "original
jurisdiction over . . . petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus." Notwithstanding the propriety of the procedural vehicle employed, the
presence of all justiciability requisites determines whether this Court must exercise its
power of judicial review, even under its expanded jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction is a court's competence "to hear, try and decide a case." It is
granted by law and requires courts to examine the remedies sought and issues
raised by the parties, the subject matter of the controversy, and the processes
employed by the parties in relation to laws granting competence. Once this
Court determines that the procedural vehicle employed by the parties raises
issues on matters within its legal competence, it may then decide whether to
adjudicate the constitutional issues brought before it.

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 Jurisdiction alone will not require this Court to pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute. As held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
power of judicial review remains subject to this Court's discretion in resolving
actual controversies:
[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties
in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what
is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after f[u]ll opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation[.]
Thus, as a rule, this Court only passes upon the constitutionality of a
statute if it is "directly and necessarily involved in [a] justiciable controversy and
is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
This justiciability requirement is "intertwined with the principle of
separation of powers." It cautions the judiciary against unnecessary intrusion on
matters committed to the other branches of the government. 1 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
The following essential requisites of justiciability must be present for this Court to
exercise its power of judicial review of a law or an executive act: "first, there must be an
actual case or controversy; second, petitioners must possess locus standi; third, the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself." 2
Of utmost importance among the justiciability requirements is the actual case or
controversy requirement embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 3
The rationale for such requisite has been explained as early as the case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission: 4 ETHIDa

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
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 judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the government. 5
An actual case or controversy exists when: (a) there are actual facts to enable
courts to intelligently adjudicate the issues; or (2) there is a clear and convincing
showing of a contrariety of legal rights. 6
There is an actual case or controversy when there is real conflict of rights or
duties arising from actual facts, properly established in court through evidence or
judicial notice, and not merely based on speculation or imagination:
Without the necessary findings of facts, this court is left to speculate
leaving justices to grapple within the limitations of their own life experiences.
This provides too much leeway for the imposition of political standpoints or
personal predilections of the majority of this court. This is not what the
Constitution contemplates. Rigor in determining whether controversies brought
before us are justiciable avoids the counter majoritarian difficulties attributed to
the judiciary.
Without the existence and proper proof of actual facts, any review of the
statute or its implementing rules will be theoretical and abstract. Courts are not
structured to predict facts, acts or events that will still happen. Unlike the
legislature, we do not determine policy. We read law only when we are
convinced that there is enough proof of the real acts or events that raise
conflicts of legal rights or duties. Unlike the executive, our participation comes
in after the law has been implemented. Verily, we also do not determine how
laws are to be implemented.
The existence of a law or its implementing orders or a budget for its
implementation is far from the requirement that there are acts or events where
concrete rights or duties arise. The existence of rules do not substitute for real
facts. 7
In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor
and Employment, 8 this Court ruled that the existence of actual facts must be clearly
demonstrated for the courts to determine whether there has been a breach of
constitutional text. 9 In the same case, this Court found no actual controversy despite
petitioners' allegation that Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 are unconstitutional, because the allegations were founded on speculation
and unsupported by actual facts.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council , 10
this Court also did not rule on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372, or the
Human Security Act of 2007, since according to the Court, petitioners' allegations of
abuse must be based on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies. 11
Similarly, this Court, in Republic v. Roque, et al. , 12 dismissed the constitutional
challenge on the provisions of the Human Security Act of 2007 for failure of the parties
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some
direct injury because of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of the said law. 13
Nevertheless, despite absence of actual facts, an actual case or controversy can
still exist when there is a clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of legal rights. 14
As explained in Calleja v. Executive Secretary: 15
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 An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. The issues
presented must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse interests. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-
legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. All
these are in line with the well-settled rule that this Court does not issue advisory
opinions, nor does it resolve mere academic questions, abstract quandaries,
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mental exercises, no matter how
challenging or interesting they may be. Instead, case law requires that there is
ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts. 16
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The party asserting a contrariety of legal rights must show that the only possible
way to interpret the assailed provision will lead to a breach of right or declaration of the
provision's unconstitutionality:
Thus, in asserting a contrariety of legal rights, merely alleging an
incongruence of rights between the parties is not enough. The party availing of
the remedy must demonstrate that the law is so contrary to their rights that
there is no interpretation other than that there is a factual breach of rights. No
demonstrable contrariety of legal rights exists when there are possible ways to
interpret the provision of a statute, regulation, or ordinance that will save its
constitutionality. In other words, the party must show that the only possible way
to interpret the provision is one that is unconstitutional. Moreover, the party
must show that the case cannot be legally settled until the constitutional issue
is resolved, that is, that it is the very lis mota of the case, and therefore, ripe for
adjudication. 17 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Belgica v. Ochoa , 18 this Court found the existence of a justiciable controversy
due to the parties' apparent antagonistic positions on the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system. 19 TIADCc

I n Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City , 20 the Court

likewise found that there exists an actual justiciable controversy considering the evident
opposing legal claims of the parties, specifically whether the curfew ordinances violate
constitutional rights and the law. 21
I n Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry , 22 the
Court found a clear presence of contrariety of legal rights between respondent
Department of Trade and Industry and petitioner, when the latter maintained that
provision on profiteering is void for vagueness, and the former claimed otherwise.
Constitutional challenges based on either the existence of actual facts showing
breach or a demonstrable contrariety of legal rights are considered as "as applied"
challenges. 23 However, despite lack of these premises for an "as applied" challenge, a
party may still challenge a provision's constitutionality through a facial challenge.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice 24 distinguished facial challenge from an "as
applied" challenge, as follows:
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his
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 constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground — absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a
"facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale
for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may
simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. 25 (Citations
omitted)
An "as applied" challenge "considers only extant facts affecting real litigant" 26
while a facial challenge involves "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities." 27
A facial challenge is considered as a narrow exception to the general rule that
there must be an actual case or controversy before the court exercises judicial review:
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from
the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 28
(Citation omitted)
T h u s , Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell 29 laid down the exceptional
circumstances when a facial review of the law may be allowed, considering the looming
threat of constitutional rights violation on these cases:
The first situation involves a statute that flagrantly violates the right to
freedom of expression and its cognate rights. Freedom of expression is the
cornerstone of a democratic government and occupies the highest rank in the
hierarchy of civil liberties. Section 4 of the Constitution states, "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances." Consequently, a facial challenge is permitted in cases
involving freedom of expression and its concomitant rights to prevent prior
restrictions on free speech or overly broad language that has a chilling effect on
free speech.
I n Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, this Court explained:
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted.
xxx xxx xxx
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 The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.
As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights. (Citations omitted)
The second scenario permits judicial review in the absence of actual
facts when a violation of fundamental rights is so grievous or imminent that
judicial restraint would lead to serious violations of fundamental rights. In these
instances, the violation of rights must be so egregious and pervasive that
almost any citizen could raise the issue. In Parcon-Song v. Parcon , this Court
held:
There are exceptions, namely: (a) when a facial review of
the statute is allowed, as in cases of actual or clearly imminent
violation of the sovereign rights to free expression and its cognate
rights; or (b) when there is a clear and convincing showing that a
fundamental constitutional right has been actually violated in the
application of a statute, which are of transcendental interest. The
violation must be so demonstrably and urgently egregious that it
outweighs a reasonable policy of deference in such specific
instance. The facts constituting that violation must either be
uncontested or established on trial. The basis for ruling on the
constitutional issue must also be clearly alleged and traversed by
the parties. Otherwise, this Court will not take cognizance of the
constitutional issue, let alone rule on it[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The third instance in which judicial review is appropriate despite the
absence of actual facts is when a Constitutional provision invokes emergency
or urgent measures. By its very nature, emergency or urgent measures are
temporary thus allowing it to avoid judicial review even if its capable of
repetition. This contemplates situations in which waiting for an actual dispute or
injury to occur may result in irreversible damage or harm to an individual.
However, with the risk that the relevant measure would be repealed or
rendered obsolete, the filing of a lawsuit or seeking judicial recourse would be
futile. In such a situation, this Court may determine the applicable doctrine
regarding the provision. This may be applied, but is not limited to, challenges
regarding the suspension of habeas corpus, the declaration of martial law, and
the exercise of emergency powers. 30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) cSEDTC

Here, according to petitioner, issuing and implementing Department Order No.

2017-011 "deprived and continuously deprives thousands of drivers and operators of
public utility jeepneys, including [its] members . . . of their right to due process and equal
protection particularly the right to earn a living and to pursue lawful profession and
calling." 31 Petitioner claims that Department Order No. 2017-011 is "discriminatory and
confiscatory to drivers and operators of traditional jeepneys" 32 and "exceeded on its
purpose and objective of regulation, and hence, an invalid delegation of legislative
power." Petitioner supported their claims with statements from Senator Grace Poe and
other transport groups, citing news articles. 33 It is well-settled that news articles are
hearsay evidence and without any evidentiary value, "unless offered for a purpose other
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 than proving the truth of the matter asserted." 34 Thus, petitioner's claims are bare
allegations of violation of constitutional rights unsupported by actual facts of breach
from which this Court may conclude that Department Order No. 2017-011 actually
deprived petitioner's members of their constitutional rights. To emphasize, there is no
act yet committed by respondent showing any breach of legal right and there is not
even an act of enforcement or sanction against it.
Petitioner anchors it claims on the statement of Transportation Assistant
Secretary Mark Richmond de Leon in a news article 35 that refurbishment and rebuilding
of PUJs will not be allowed, and that operators and drivers must replace their jeepneys
with a new one, despite producing unnecessary debts. 36 However, as aptly pointed out
by respondent, paragraph 5.2.3 of Department Order No. 2017-011 allows
refurbishment and/or rebuilding of PUJs, as the prohibition expressly pertains to PUBs:
5.2.3 Refurbished and/or rebuilt vehicles shall pass the type approval
system test and issued a Certificate of Compliance with Emission Standards
(CCES) as a condition to initial registration by the LTO and to the
roadworthiness test of the LTO-Motor Vehicle Inspection System for renewal of
registration. Refurbished and/or rebuilt PUBs, even with new engines or motors,
shall not be allowed to substitute for phased-out units. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner plainly misread the provision being assailed and supported such
interpretation of a news article, which is, as mentioned, without any probative value.
Accordingly, petitioner failed to demonstrate that Department Order No. 2017-011 is so
contrary to their rights that there is no other interpretation than that there is a factual
breach of their rights or that the provision is unconstitutional.
There being no facts of actual breach or demonstrable contrariety of legal rights
from which this Court could conclude that Department Order No. 2017-011 is
unconstitutional, this case presents no actual case or controversy.
Still, petitioner assails Department Order No. 2017-011 through a facial challenge
because of its alleged "blatant disregard of jeepney drivers and operators' constitutional
right to due process and equal protection particularly the right to pursue lawful
profession and calling and to earn a living, and for being discriminatory and
confiscatory." 38 However, besides alleging that a facial challenge is no longer confined
to speech, petitioner did not elaborate more. Petitioner failed to allege and substantiate
the exceptional circumstance, which will merit a facial review of Department Order No.
2017-011.
II
Not only is the Petition not justiciable for failing to present an actual case or
controversy, but also, petitioner does not possess the requisite legal standing to file it.
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest
in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 39 Interest means "material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest" 40 and a present substantial interest, not a "mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." 41 Direct injury would mean
that a party bringing the case has personal stake in its outcome, and thus, assures "that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 42 The rationale for legal
standing or locus standi has been explained:
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 The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual
case and controversy are both "built on the principle of separation of powers,
sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial
branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government." In
addition, economic reasons justify the rule. Thus:
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the
standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is
economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources,
the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our
people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their
doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly
overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves
ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that
clearly confronts our judiciary today. 43 (Citations omitted)
As a rule, a party can raise constitutional challenge of a law or executive act,
upon showing of: (1) personal suffering of some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury, which is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury, which is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. 44 AIDSTE

Despite lack of direct injury, the rule on legal standing has been relaxed for the
"non-traditional suitors" such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters, or legislators,
being a matter of procedure:
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4.) F o r legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. 45
In White Light Corp., et al. v. City of Manila , 46 this Court allowed a party to file a
case on behalf of another, or the third-party standing rule, upon satisfying the following
criteria: "the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving [them] a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must
have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect [their] own interests." 47
I n White Light where the third-party standing rule was first applied, this Court
allowed petitioners hotel and motel operators to represent their clients in assailing the
City of Manila's Ordinance as violative of their clients' right to privacy, freedom of
movement, and equal protection of the laws. This Court considered that petitioners'
interests were injured by the Ordinance, their reliance on the "patronage of their
customers for their continued viability" appeared to be threatened by the enforcement of
the Ordinance, and the relative silence of such special interest groups may be
construed as hindrance for customers to bring suit.
Associations have likewise been able to file petitions on behalf of its members
when "the results of the case will affect their vital interest." 48 This Court has been
liberal in granting standing to associations or corporations in behalf of their members,
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 upon consideration of certain factors:
The associations in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., and The Executive
Secretary were allowed to sue on behalf of their members because they
sufficiently established who their members were, that their members authorized
the associations to sue on their behalf, and that the members would be directly
injured by the challenged governmental acts.
The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or
corporations whose members are those who suffer direct and substantial injury
depends on a few factors.
In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore,
there should also be a clear and convincing demonstration of special reasons
why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue.
Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing
demonstration that the representation of the association is more efficient for the
petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more efficient for this Court
to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the association
should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves rather than as a
class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a number of the
members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit of all
the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of
the class to which they belong.
In some circumstances similar to those inWhite Light, the third parties
represented by the petitioner would have special and legitimate reasons why
they may not bring the action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons
in the White Light case to bring the action themselves — i.e., the amount they
would pay for the lease of the motels — will be too small compared with the
cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever among the patrons files
the case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial
number of interested parties without recovering their costs. This is the free rider
problem in economics. It is a negative externality which operates as a
disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right. SDAaTC

In addition to an actual controversy, special reasons to represent, and

disincentives for the injured party to bring the suit themselves, there must be a
showing of the transcendent nature of the right involved.
Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a grounded level
of urgency can be transcendent. For instance, in The Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the
association was allowed to file on behalf of its members considering the
importance of the issue involved, i.e., the constitutionality of agrarian reform
measures, specifically, of then newly enacted Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. 49 (Citations omitted)
In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Health, 50 this Court considered petitioner a real party-in-interest who can prosecute the
case in behalf of its members, since its Amended Articles of Incorporation authorize it to
represent the entire industry:
[T]he association is formed "to represent directly or through approved
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 representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the
general public." Thus, as an organization, petitioner definitely has an interest in
fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to take
the appropriate course of action to bring to the attention of government
agencies and the courts any grievance suffered by its members which are
directly affected by the RIRR. Petitioner, which is mandated by its Amended
Articles of Incorporation to represent the entire industry, would be remiss in its
duties if it fails to act on governmental action that would affect any of its industry
members, no matter how few or numerous they are. Hence, petitioner, whose
legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a real
party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the
present action. 51
I n Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals , 52 the Court found the Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. to have standing, on behalf of its member
recruitment agencies, to file the petition assailing the constitutionality of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it proved its authority to sue on
behalf of its members through board resolutions of its individual members. The Court
further held that an association "is but the medium through which its individual members
seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their
grievances." 53
On the other hand, in National Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc, et al. v. Board of
Investments, 54 this Court held that petitioners have no third-party standing to represent
their members in the case, because petitioners organizations failed to show that they
suffered or stood to suffer from private respondent's registration as a new producer and
their members were hindered from personally asserting their own interests.
In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor
and Employment, 55 this Court held that petitioner association failed to establish its
authority to file the petition for its members, through either board resolutions or articles
of incorporation:
As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have standing to
bring this suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their members are
and if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. While alleging that
they are composed of public utility bus operators who will be directly injured by
the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof, such as board resolutions
of their alleged members or their own articles of incorporation authorizing them
to act as their members' representatives in suits involving their members'
individual rights.
Some of the petitioners here are not even persons or entities authorized
by law or by the Rules allowed to file a suit in court. As intervenor MMDA
sufficiently demonstrated, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of
the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City
Bus Operators Association, Inc. had their certificates of incorporation revoked
by the Securities and Exchange Commission for failure to submit the required
general information sheets and financial statements for the years 1996 to 2003.
With their certificates of incorporation revoked, petitioners Provincial Bus
Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators
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 Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. have no
corporate existence. They have no capacity to exercise any corporate power,
specifically, the power to sue in their respective corporate names. AaCTcI

Again, the reasons cited — the "far-reaching consequences" and "wide

area of coverage and extent of effect" of Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 — are reasons not transcendent
considering that most administrative issuances of the national government are
of wide coverage. These reasons are not special reasons for this Court to brush
aside the requirement of legal standing. 56 (Citations omitted)
In IDEALS, Inc. v. Senate of the Philippines , 57 the Court found that petitioners
FairTrade and AIWA lacked legal standing to file the petition since they failed to show
why none of their members could institute the action to protect their interests. The Court
emphasized the need for association to show "special reasons why the truly injured
parties may not be able to sue" before they may be allowed to sue on behalf of their
members. 58
Here, petitioner principally invokes its standing as a legitimate association of
jeepney operators and drivers in the different parts of Metro Manila. It asserts that
Department Order No. 2017-011 violates the rights of its members to pursue a lawful
profession and calling and to earn a living.
I find that petitioner does not have the required standing to file the Petition, since
it was unable to sufficiently establish who their members are, its authority from its
members to file this case through board resolutions or through its articles of
incorporation, and that its members were hindered from personally asserting their own
interests. Petitioner only submitted its Certification from the Securities and Exchange
Commission 59 of its registration as an organization and its Secretary's Certificate
stating that petitioner's Board of Directors authorized its president to file the present
petition. Thus, there is lack of competent evidence to establish who petitioner's
members are, whether they were indeed legitimate PUJ operators and drivers injured or
may be injured by the Department Order No. 2017-011, and whether they authorize
petitioner to file the petition, in their behalf.
Contrary to its claim, petitioner likewise failed to establish its standing to assail
the provision as a citizen or taxpayer, considering that as mentioned, it did not establish
that its members are PUJ operators or drivers, who may allegedly personally suffer any
injury or threat attributable to the implementation of the assailed provision, or that there
is illegal expenditure of public funds involved. As held in Pangilinan v. Cayetano , 60 a
general invocation of citizen's or a taxpayer's rights is insufficient:
[P]ersons invoking their rights as citizens must satisfy the following requisites to
file a suit: (1) they must have "personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government"; (2) "the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action"; and (3) "the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action."
In G.R. Nos. 239483 and 240954, what petitioners assail is an act of the
President, in the exercise of his executive power. They failed to show the actual
or imminent injury that they sustained as a result of the President's withdrawal
from the Rome Statute. Again, "whether a suit is public or private, the parties
must have 'a present substantial interest' not a 'mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.'"
Similarly, petitioners have no standing as taxpayers. In cases involving
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 expenditure of public funds, also known as a taxpayer's suit, "there must be a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional[.]"
Petitioners here failed to show any illegal expenditure of public funds. To
allow these petitioners who suffer no injury to invoke this Court's discretion
would be to allow everyone to come to courts on the flimsiest of grounds.
Parties must possess their own right to the relief sought, and a general
invocation of citizen's or a taxpayer's rights is insufficient. This Court must not
indiscriminately open its doors to every person urging it to take cognizance of a
case where they have no demonstrable injury. This may ultimately render this
Court ineffective to dispense justice as cases clog its docket. 61 (Citations
omitted)
To claim standing as a taxpayer, a party must allege illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional, and for concerned citizens, it
must be shown that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early. 62 A mere allegation that the issue is of transcendental importance is not
enough, and the following factors determine whether its importance is established: "the
character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest to bring the suit." 63 Here, none of these factors have been raised
and substantiated. Petitioner merely alleges that the assailed provision presents issues
with far-reaching implications to society. 64 However, "[t]ranscendental interest is not a
talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law." 65 More so,
transcendental importance is not an excuse for non-compliance with the essential
requisites of justiciability. acEHCD

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 3-32.

2. Omnibus Guidelines on the Planning and Identification of Public Road Transportation
Services and Franchise Issuance.
3. Entitled "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSE," approved on January 30, 1987.
4. Entitled "AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 125, ENTITLED "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEFINING ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on April 13,
1987.
5. Entitled "CREATING THE LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD," approved on June 19, 1987.

6. Rollo, p. 11.

7. Id. at 12-13.

8. Id. at 11-12.

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 9. Id. at 14-16.

10. Id. at 20-21.

11. Id. at 21-22.

12. Id. at 23-27.

13. Id. at 27-29.

14. Id. at 81-88, Comment.

15. Id.

16. Id. at 88-98.

17. Id. at 98-103.

18. Id. at 103-118.

19. Id. at 118-120.

20. Id. at 120-123.

21. Id. at 123-124.

22. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Education, 841 Phil. 724, 784 (2018).

23. Agcaoili, Jr. v. Fariñas, 835 Phil. 405, 435 (2018); Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,
757 Phil. 534, 544 (2015); Jardaleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460, 491 (2014), citing Araullo
v. Aquino, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014).

24. Anti-Trapo Movement of the Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R. No. 231540,
June 27, 2022.

25. Supra note 23.

26. Id. at 531.

27. 854 Phil. 675 (2019).

28. Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE," approved on
May 29, 2013.
29. G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021.
30. G.R. No. 205836, July 12, 2022.

31. COURAGE v. Abad, G.R. No. 200418, November 10, 2020.

32. Private Hospitals Association v. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747, 781 (2018).

33. Province of Camarines Sur v. COA, G.R. No. 227926, March 10, 2020, 935 SCRA 126,
146, citing Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, 815
Phil. 1067, 1089-1090 (2017).
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 34. KMP v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, G.R. No. 198688, November
24, 2020.

35. Id.

36. Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 802 (2003).

37. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021.

38. 473 Phil. 27 (2004).

39. Id. at 50-51.

40. The Provincial Bus Operators Assn. of the Phils. v. DOLE, 836 Phil. 205 (2018).

41. Id.

42. Id. at 257.

43. Supra note 32.

44. G.R. No. 206159, August 26, 2020.

45. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, 489 Phil. 710, 718 (2005).

46. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Education, supra note 22, at 787.

47. Id. at 788.

48. 623 Phil. 63 (2009).

49. Id. at 76-77.

50. Roy III v. Herbosa, 800 Phil. 459 (2016), citing Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v.
Romulo, supra note 45 at 719.

51. Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432, March
23, 2021; KMP v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, supra note 34.
52. 751 Phil. 301 (2015).

53. Gios-Samar v. DOTC, 849 Phil. 120 (2019).

54. Id. at 131-132.

55. Id. at 178-182.

56. KMP v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, supra note 34.

57. Id.

58. Id.
59. G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021.

60. Id.

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 61. KMP v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, supra note 34.
62. G.R. No. 244614, December 9, 2020.

63. KMP v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, supra note 34.
LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. Lagman v. Ochoa, Jr., 888 Phil. 434, 469-471 (2020) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

2. Id. at 470-471. (Citations omitted)

3. Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 679 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales,En
Banc].

4. 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

5. Id. at 158-159.

6. Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 203353,
February 14, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

7. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, 732 Phil. 1, 562 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza,
En Banc].

8. 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

9. Id. at 280.

10. 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales,En Banc].

11. Id. at 483.

12. 718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

13. Id. at 305.

14. Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 203353,
February 14, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

15. G.R. Nos. 252578, et al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang,En Banc].

16. Id.

17. Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 209216, February 21, 2023 [Per J. Leonen,
En Banc].

18. 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

19. Id. at 520.

20. 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

21. Id. at 1091.

22. G.R. No. 203353, February 14, 2023 [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].
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 23. Id.

24. 727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

25. Id. at 121-122.

26. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,
489 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

27. Id.

28. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 355 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo,En Banc].

29. G.R. No. 209216, February 21, 2023 [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

30. Id.

31. Rollo, p. 9.

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. Lagman v. Medialdea, 812 Phil. 179, 312 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo,En Banc].

35. Rollo, p. 7.

36. Id.

37. Ponencia, p. 3.

38. Rollo, p. 12.

39. Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 531 (2019) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

40. Id. at 531.

41. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 250 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

42. Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 532 (2019) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

43. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 249-250 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

44. Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747, 784
(2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

45. Funa v. Commission on Audit, 686 Phil. 571, 586 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,En Banc].

46. 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga,En Banc].

47. Id. at 456.

48. Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747, 798
(2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].
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 49. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 255-257 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

50. 561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

51. Id. at 396.

52. 473 Phil. 27 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

53. Id. at 51.

54. 875 Phil. 172 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

55. 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

56. Id. at 257-258.

57. G.R. Nos. 184635 & 185366, June 13, 2023 [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

58. Id., citing Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor
and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 256 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

59. Rollo, p. 34.

60. G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

61. Id.

62. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 251 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

63. Paguia v. Office of the President, 635 Phil. 568, 572 (2010) [Per J. Carpio,En Banc].

64. Rollo, p. 13.

65. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 257 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

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