How Social Media Platforms Influence Political Awareness

Among U.S. College Students: A Mixed-Methods Study

of Platform Design, Misinformation, and Civic Behavior

Zachary T. Hodgen

Department of Political Science, Virginia Commonwealth University

POLI 320: Research Methods

​ ​ ​ ​ Dr. Andrea C. Simonelli

April 20, 2025

This mixed-methods study investigates how social media platforms influence political

awareness among U.S. college students, with particular attention to how platform-specific design

choices mediate the relationship between information exposure and civic behavior. I’m

combining quantitative survey data from 300 students at three types of institutions with

qualitative data from 30 students in focus groups and a content analysis of 300 posts they’ve

shared. The research is structured around three central questions: First, how do algorithms on

platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and X shape political knowledge formation? Second, what

patterns exist between online engagement and real-world participation? And third, how

frequently and in what form do students encounter misinformation, and how do they respond to

it?

To measure political knowledge, I’m using a modified Political Knowledge Index

(PKI-15) that assesses understanding of constitutional rights, congressional leadership, and key

current events. The qualitative side leans on discourse analysis frameworks that help identify

how algorithmic features like TikTok’s For You Page or Instagram’s Stories shape what students

prioritize. My early hypothesis is that different platform affordances produce distinct

vulnerabilities to misinformation, with more visual platforms leading to higher emotional

engagement but less scrutiny.

This design intentionally considers institutional diversity by using stratified sampling to

include students from a large public R1 university, a small private liberal arts college, and a

community college. This allows me to capture a broader range of online behaviors and baseline

civic literacy. Ultimately, the findings aim to inform both higher education institutions
developing digital literacy curricula and platforms considering reforms around civic integrity

tools. What I’m contributing is not just another look at screen time and politics, but a more

precise mapping of how digital architecture reshapes student engagement with democracy—and

what that means for the future of civic education.

Introduction

Over the last decade, the way young people engage with politics has fundamentally

changed. Gone are the days when students learned about current events solely through lectures or

newspaper articles. Instead, today’s college students navigate political landscapes shaped by

algorithms, likes, and the visual grammar of social media. As someone who has worked closely

with student leaders and spent countless hours analyzing how campus communities organize,

I’ve seen firsthand how political action now often begins with a share or a story—not a flyer or a

speech. But I’ve also seen confusion, polarization, and misinformation flourish in those same

spaces.

This research design grew out of three recurring tensions I noticed in conversations and

organizing spaces on campus. First, many students are more mobilized than ever, but they often

distrust the very institutions they’re trying to change. Second, their political language is

fluent—they know the hashtags, the slogans—but their factual understanding doesn’t always

match. And third, while they show up for national issues, they often disengage from local and

institutional politics that directly affect their lives. I kept wondering: what is it about these

platforms that encourages some types of political engagement and discourages others?

That’s where this study begins. Using Carolyn Forestiere’s framework for analyzing

political behavior, I’m structuring this around three dimensions: cognitive (what students know

and how they learn it), behavioral (what they do with that knowledge), and epistemic (how they
evaluate truth and misinformation). Each of these elements is filtered through the digital

environments where students now spend so much of their time. By looking at TikTok, Instagram,

and X separately, I can evaluate how different kinds of content delivery—from auto-play videos

to curated feeds—influence political awareness and action in different ways.

The goal isn’t to vilify or glorify these platforms. Instead, I want to map how they work

on a micro level, how they affect students’ perceptions, and how that shapes their broader

political worldview. The theoretical significance of this research lies in its effort to bring

agenda-setting theory into conversation with contemporary digital behavior studies, particularly

through the idea of "liquid gatekeeping" (Chadwick, 2017), where control over information flow

is decentralized, fluid, and deeply personal.

Practically, the findings should help three groups. First, university leaders working to

teach digital literacy in meaningful ways. Second, social media companies that are under

pressure to improve their civic integrity tools. And third, student organizations that are trying to

organize their peers more effectively and responsibly. By focusing on college students, this study

centers a group whose political behavior is both impactful and under-researched—one that could

shape elections, push institutions, and redefine democratic norms. My hope is that by

understanding how this group thinks, shares, and acts politically online, we can better support

their ability to think critically and engage constructively offline.

Literature Review

Theoretical Foundations

My work draws from three main theoretical traditions: agenda-setting theory, connective

action theory, and misinformation studies. McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) agenda-setting theory

laid the foundation for understanding how media influences public attention. In traditional
media, editors selected the stories that mattered. In today’s social media environment, the

gatekeeping role has shifted—and become more fragmented. Vargo et al. (2018) build on this

idea by describing social media as a system of "tertiary gatekeeping," where algorithms and user

behaviors co-create information ecosystems.

To understand how political action takes place in these systems, I turn to Bennett and

Segerberg (2013), whose concept of connective action helps explain the rise of decentralized,

networked mobilization. Unlike traditional collective action, which requires strong

organizational structures, connective action allows people to engage through personal expression

and digital participation. This is especially relevant for students, whose activism often looks like

retweets, stories, or mutual aid posts rather than formal group membership.

Finally, to understand how misinformation spreads and sticks, I incorporate Wardle and

Derakhshan’s (2017) typology of misinformation, as well as Pennycook et al.’s (2018) work on

the “illusory truth effect,” which shows how repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in

them. These models help me interpret how misinformation circulates in student networks and

how it influences perceptions of political truth.

Key Debates

There’s active debate around whether social media increases or decreases political

knowledge. Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2016) found that students who used social media to seek news

tended to be better informed. But his later work (2019) warns of the "news-finds-me" perception,

where users feel informed simply because information appears in their feed. This passive

consumption can lead to overconfidence and lower fact retention.

When it comes to exposure to diverse views, studies also diverge. Dubois and Blank

(2018) found that Twitter users often encounter opposing perspectives. But Haque et al. (2022)
argue that TikTok’s algorithm produces “interest-based filter bubbles” that are less ideologically

diverse. Instagram, according to Vaccari and Chadwick (2020), leans more toward visual,

emotionally resonant content than issue-based analysis, making it a unique case for studying

affective responses.

Tufekci (2017) introduces the idea of "snackable activism," describing how students

engage with social causes in short, digestible forms that don’t always translate into sustained

action. Meanwhile, Mihailidis and Viotty (2017) emphasize how peer-to-peer sharing often

replaces traditional journalism as a primary news source among young adults.

Empirical Gaps

Several gaps guide my study’s direction. First, many researchers still treat social media as

a monolith. Valeriani and Vaccari (2018), for instance, assess political learning across platforms

without analyzing affordances specific to TikTok, Instagram, or X. I argue that this lumping

misses key differences in how content is encountered and shared.

Second, most political communication research still focuses on national events. Guess et

al. (2019) examine misinformation in the context of presidential elections, but little work has

been done on campus-based issue engagement or how students translate digital action into

institutional change.

Methodological Innovations

My approach draws on Prior and Bou-Hamad’s (2021) call for multimodal methods in

social media research. In addition to surveys and focus groups, I plan to analyze political posts

using:

●​ Eye-tracking heatmaps to assess which content elements draw attention (Wojdynski et al.,

2020)
 ●​ Network analysis to map who shares what and where

●​ Fact-checking experiments to test how students respond to labeled vs. unlabeled

misinformation

This triangulation lets me not only describe behavior but also test how different variables (e.g.,

emotional language, source credibility) influence student decisions in real time.

Methodology

To answer the questions driving this study, I’m using a sequential explanatory mixed-methods

approach with three parts:

1.​ Baseline Survey: A 15-minute online questionnaire distributed to 300 students across

three institutions, assessing:

○​ Political knowledge (15-item factual quiz, pilot tested)

○​ Platform usage (using the Social Media Political Participation Scale)

○​ Misinformation susceptibility (adapted from Pennycook’s Cognitive Reflection

Test)

2.​ Content Analysis: I’ll analyze 300 political posts shared by student participants (100 from

TikTok, 100 from Instagram, and 100 from X), coding them for:

○​ Source credibility (using Media Bias/Fact Check)

○​ Emotional valence (via LIWC-22)

○​ Presence of verification tools (e.g., embedded links or labels)

3.​ Focus Groups: I’ll conduct six sessions with five students each, using a stimulated recall

method. Participants will look at examples from their actual feeds and describe what they

thought, felt, and did in response.

Sampling Strategy
To ensure diversity, I’m using three-stage stratified sampling:

●​ Stage 1: Select three schools: a public R1 university, a private liberal arts college, and a

community college

●​ Stage 2: Use registrar email lists (N=15,000 total) to randomly recruit 100 students per

site

●​ Stage 3: Use quota sampling to ensure political affiliation and engagement level

diversity; focus group participants will be recruited through a survey opt-in

Analytical Framework

Quantitative data will be analyzed using hierarchical linear modeling to account for

institutional context. I’ll also use propensity score matching to compare behavior across

platforms.

For qualitative data, I’ll use a grounded theory approach for focus group transcripts and

multimodal discourse analysis for the post content.

Ethical Protocols

Data will be anonymized using triple-ID encryption. Participants will receive a debriefing

packet with nonpartisan fact-checking resources. For content reuse, I’m using a dynamic consent

model, where participants can decide what level of sharing they’re comfortable with.

Appendices

Appendix A: Survey Instrument

Section 1 - Platform Usage Q3: When encountering political content on TikTok, how often do

you: a) Check the creator’s credentials b) Read comments before sharing c) Verify through

external sources? (5-point Likert scale: Never to Always)

a) 1st b) 2nd c) 4th d) 10th

Section 3 - Misinformation Exposure Q12: Have you encountered content containing these

claims in the past month? a) ‘The 2020 election was stolen’ b) ‘COVID-19 vaccines contain

microchips’ c) ‘Climate change is a hoax’ (Yes/No/Unsure)

Appendix B: Coding Framework Content Analysis Codebook

Variable 1.1: Source credibility (1=Verified fact-checker to 5=Unverified account)

Variable 2.3: Emotional appeal type (Fear/Outrage/Hope/Solidarity)

Variable 3.5: Fact-checking presence (Direct link/Embedded comment/None)

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