Chapter 4: Kuhn and Feyerabend

Prof. dr. Frank van der Velde

Table of Contents

4.1 KUHN AND THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 2

4.2 CONCEPTS INTRODUCED BY KUHN 3

4.3 NORMAL SCIENCE ACCORDING TO KUHN 5

4.4 CRISIS AND SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 6

4.4.1 PARADIGM SHIFT: ARISTOTLE-PTOLEMY VERSUS COPERNICUS-GALILEO 7
4.4.2 INCOMMENSURABILITY OF PARADIGMS ACCORDING TO KUHN 9

4.5 FEYERABEND AND METHODOLOGICAL ANARCHISM 11

4.5.1 ARISTOTLE-PTOLEMY VERSUS COPERNICUS-GALILEO: FEYERABEND’S VIEW 12
4.5.2 FEYERABEND’S RELATIVISM 15

INFORMATION BOX 4.1: INVENTION OF THE TELESCOPE 17

REFERENCES 17

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4.1 Kuhn and the structure of scientific revolutions
In 1962, the American physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996)
published his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [5.1]. This book had a
major impact. It argued that the commonly accepted view of Logical Positivism (LP)
about science, discussed in chapter 2, was wrong.

Of course, Popper made a similar claim, as we have seen in

chapter 3. But Kuhn provided another kind of argument.
Instead of showing that LP was wrong because it, for example,
used the wrong kind of logic, he argued that the history of
science showed that even the most advanced sciences had not
developed in the way as described by LP (or Popper).

The view of Kuhn entails a shift in focus. Both LP and Popper

addressed science from a context of justification. This entails
that they described how science should operate so that it could
justify the knowledge it produced. In other words, both LP and
Popper operated in a normative manner, aiming to formulate
the rules that science should follow.

For both of them, these rules consisted of the use of observation and logic. The
difference between them concerned the kind of logic that should be used. But
neither LP nor Popper were interested in the way scientists actually operated, or the
kind of mistakes that had been made in the past.

Yet, this was the focus of Kuhn. He was not interested in the question of how science
should operate. Instead, his focus was the context of discovery. He aimed to describe
and explain how science and scientific theories had actually developed in history,
and how they had been influenced by the developments in the societies in which
they operated. In other words, his approach of science was not normative or
prescriptive. Instead, it was descriptive, based on what scientists actually do, instead
of what they are supposed to do.

In his book, Kuhn analyzed periods in which a science had changed fundamentally.
He called these periods scientific revolutions and wanted to show how they emerged
and developed, and what that tells us about the nature of science. He analyzed a
number of examples, but one stands out. It is the development of astronomy, as
found in the view on the structure and nature of the solar system and the universe.

Indeed, astronomy is one of the oldest sciences, with a history of more than 2500
years. Also, as we have seen in [5.2], the change in the views on the structure and
nature of the solar system and the universe, developed around 1600, had a major
impact on the development of mechanicism, which replaced the medieval view on
science and society. So, we will use the example of the solar system and the universe
as well in this chapter.

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In his analysis, Kuhn introduced a whole set of new concepts to describe science and
the way scientists work. We will address these in the next sections.

4.2 Concepts introduced by Kuhn

The most important concept induced by Kuhn is that of the paradigm. We will
discuss and illustrated what that means in this chapter. But for now, the best way to
describe it is to say that a science (any science) operates under a given paradigm
that determines the basic ideas that are accepted in this science and the set the rules
of how it should operate.

Consider again the example of the study of Benveniste discussed in chapter 3. He

argued that a substance could retain a causal effect even though there is not a single
particle (atom, molecule) of that substance present. However, the editorial comment
to his article in Nature noted: "There is no physical basis for such an activity"
(section 3.2).

This quote illustrates the paradigm of natural science. This paradigm entails that a
substance can have an effect (any effect) only when at least one particle of that
substance is present, because the effects of a substance derive from its particles.

A crucial aspect of Kuhn's notion of a paradigm is that it is so pervasive and

overwhelming that any given science can work only with one paradigm. Indeed, a
paradigm defines what a 'real' science is.

Other concepts that Kuhn introduces are: pre-science, normal science, puzzles,
anomalies, crisis, scientific revolution, and paradigm shift (through a Gestalt
switch). To understand what they mean we will begin with the development of a
science from the very first beginning.

When a science starts it is in the stage that Kuhn calls pre-science. As the word
indicates, this means that the science is not yet a real science, or what Kuhn calls a
normal science. The difference is the role of the paradigm. A normal science is
governed (even defined) by a single paradigm, as noted above. According to Kuhn,
this has to be the case, because the paradigm governs all aspects of a science, from
the topic it studies and the methods it uses up to the training of new professionals.

In the pre-science stage, there is no fixed paradigm yet. Instead, it is under

development, and several paradigms exist side-by-side. This generates uncertainty,
with a methodological struggle and (often vigorous) debate about basic principles.
Kuhn gives the example of optics before the revolution of Newton. But we can also
look at psychology.

In the course History of Psychology, we discussed the emergence of psychology as a

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science at the end of the 19th century. However, there were fundamentally different
views on what psychology is about (its topic) and how it should proceed (its
method).

Wundt and Titchener argued that psychology should study the elements of
consciousness (topic) using the method of introspection. About the same time,
Freud developed his view on psychology in which the topic is the role of the
unconscious, using the method of psychoanalysis. Then, Watson argued that
psychology should study only behavior and the way it is learned (topic), using
experiments based on conditioning (method). Gestalt psychology again differed
from each of these.

This confusion about topic and method is characteristic of a pre-science. As long as

it lasts, there is no normal science according to Kuhn. This will end only with the
development of the defining paradigm. On the basis of this view, Kuhn would argue
that psychology, or social sciences in general, do not have an established paradigm
yet, so they are still pre-sciences.

The development of a paradigm marks the transition to normal science. The

paradigm gives a generally accepted view on what a science is about and how it
should operate. Indeed, as we will see with the example of the solar system, it gives
a generally accepted view on what the world (universe) is like.

The paradigm gives the theoretical and practical rules for doing research. In this
way, it functions as a reference frame for theories, methods, techniques, vocabulary,
conventions, organizations, etc. that are associated with a scientific community.

This entails that a paradigm also has a sociological side. It governs how young
scientists are trained to do good (= successful) research (= normal science). And it
defines what 'successful' means: to publish articles, to attain grants, and to get job
positions.

In chapter 1, we already discussed the role of 'peers' in reviewing an article for

publication. These 'peers' are the people who already made a career in (that)
science (hence, work according to its paradigm). Similarly, these people also
determine who obtains grants and who will obtain job positions. So, it is clear that
'success' depends on working within the rules set by the paradigm

The 'special treatment' that Benveniste got when he published his article in Nature
is an example. The referees (reviewers) of the article did not believe it, which would
normally have resulted in a rejection of the article. But because of his standing in the
'normal science' up to then (see Information Box 3.1) he was given the benefit of the
doubt, but with the explicit demand of a replication (which normally does not occur
when you publish an article).

When a paradigm is settled, a science reaches the stage of the normal science. The

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next section outlines what that is about.

4.3 Normal science according to Kuhn

Normal science concerns all operations of a science on a daily basis. It operates
under the guidance of its established paradigm, and it represents the way scientists
actually work, and should work, both theoretically and practically.

Notice that the word 'should' as used here describes an effect of the paradigm. It is
not a demand imposed by Kuhn. He does not impose demands on science (in
contrast to LP and Popper). Instead, he aims to describe only how it operates.

Because the paradigm is now settled, normal science is involved in what Kuhn calls
puzzle-solving. The outline for an answer to any puzzle (question) is already
available (given by the paradigm), but the specific puzzles still need to be solved.

Puzzles can concern experimental problems, which (often) require developing new
instruments (a new telescope in astronomy, a better MRI in medical science or
psychology). They can also consist of theoretical problems, but not paradigm itself
because that is fixed.

An example of a puzzle for the infection model is to find the specific pathogen (e.g.,
the specific virus) that causes a specific infection disease. Sometimes that puzzle is
solved quickly (as with the discovery of the corona virus). Sometimes, it can take
years (as with the discovery of HIV, which causes aids).

However, some puzzles cannot be solved, even after years of trying. Kuhn refers to a
puzzle of this kind as an anomaly. This word is derived from the Greek phrase 'a-
nomos’, which means something like 'not according to law'. In this case, the 'law' is
the paradigm. So, an anomaly defies the paradigm.

However, an anomaly is (initially) not seen as a falsification of the paradigm, but just
as a 'difficult' puzzle or as a failure on the part of scientists themselves. Sometimes
the puzzle is solved later (e.g., the orbit of Uranus in Newtonian paradigm, see
chapter 3), sometimes it is not (the orbit of Mercury in the Newtonian paradigm, see
chapter 5).

In chapter 5, we will also discuss an example of an anomaly in the infection model. It

consists of an infectious disease for which a 'normal' pathogen (bacterium, virus,
parasite) could not be found. Moreover, all of the methods that would eliminate
these pathogens (e.g., heating, radiation) failed for this disease.

We can illustrate puzzles and anomalies in psychology as well. Watson assumed that
all behavior is based on classical conditioning. This means that all behavior is based
on learned responses based on natural reflexes. A puzzle here is to find the original

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natural reflex. In section 5.5.1 of [5.3] we described how Watson and Rayner solved
this puzzle for the fear emotion (the little Albert case).

An anomaly for classical conditioning is the emergence of new behavior that is not
based on a natural reflex. Skinner aimed to solve this anomaly by introducing
operant conditioning, which allows the development of new behavior based on
reward (reinforcement). As discussed in section 5.5.4 in [5.3], an anomaly for
operant conditioning is the emergence of new behavior that is not based on
reinforcement, but seems to occur 'spontaneously'.

This anomaly could not easily be solved by introducing yet another form of
conditioning. Instead, the problems that it caused contributed to the demise of
behaviorism as the dominant view in psychology, to be replaced by cognitive
psychology.

This is an example of what unresolved anomalies can do. In some cases they develop
into a scientific crisis, which eventually leads to a whole new paradigm in which the
science (and its worldview) is changed completely, as described in the next section.

4.4 Crisis and scientific revolution

Anomalies always occur, but they can develop into a scientific crisis when an
anomaly goes against the foundations of the paradigm. For example, Newton's law of
gravitation could not explain the deviation of the orbit of Mercury (see chapter 5).
So, this is a fundamental anomaly that goes against the paradigm of Newton’s
physics (later solved by Einstein).

A crisis can also arise when there are too many anomalies, or when anomalies are
related to important social or economic problems. For example, at the end of the
Middle Ages new and better charts of the night sky where needed for navigating the
oceans. These were provided by the new paradigm of mechanistic science and the
new view on the solar system it produced.

The emergence of a crisis in science generates a period of

uncertainty in the scientific field (and sometimes even beyond),
and results in foundational discussions about the nature of the
science and metaphysical discussions about the nature of the
topic the science deals with (including its worldview).

Eventually, these discussions initiate a scientific revolution, from

which a new paradigm emerges. Kuhn compares the emergence
of a new paradigm with a Gestalt switch. As with a Gestalts, you
do not gradually change from one structure (paradigm) to
another. Instead, you either see (accept) one of the structures
(paradigms) or the other, and the change between them is instantaneous.

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The Gestalt switch (paradigm shift caused by a scientific revolution) produces a new
paradigm that has a different worldview and in which different 'facts' and different
questions and methods are relevant, compared to the previous paradigm.

One of the most profound examples is the paradigm shift from the medieval view on
science and the world (universe) to that of mechanicism that developed around
1600. We discussed that briefly in [5.2]. The next section illustrates this paradigm
shift with the different views on the universe (solar system) that each of the
paradigms has. The view of Aristotle-Ptolemy is the medieval paradigm. The view of
Copernicus-Galileo is the paradigm of mechanicism.

4.4.1 Paradigm shift: Aristotle-Ptolemy versus Copernicus-Galileo

The worldview of Aristotle-Ptolemy is illustrated in the Figure 1. The Earth is at the
center of the universe and all heavily bodies, the Sun included, move in orbits
around the Earth. The lowest orbit is that of the Moon (lunar orbit).

Moreover, the universe consists of two

fundamentally different domains. The
first domain is everything below the
lunar orbit (so, basically the Earth and
the atmosphere).

Everything in this domain is imperfect

and perishable, because everything is
made of the four elements (earth, water,
fire and air) and their combinations
change constantly.

The second domain is the domain of the

heavens (from the lunar orbit
upwards). This domain is perfect and
imperishable. Perfection is found in the
orbits of the heavily bodies, which are
perfectly circular, and in the heavenly
bodies themselves, which are perfect spheres (circles and spheres were seen as the
most perfect mathematical forms, because they had no end or beginning).

The heavens were imperishable because they were made of only one element, the
fifth element (or 'essence'), known as 'ether'. The Latin phrase for that is 'quinta
essentia' (fifth essence), which we still use in the word 'quintessential'.

In contrast, in the worldview of Copernicus-Galileo, the universe consists of one

domain only, and the Sun is at the center. The Earth is just another planet and it
orbits around the Sun in one year.

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The fundamental difference between these views can be illustrated again with the
quotes of Sizzi and Kepler, presented in [5.2], and repeated (in an extended version)
here. The astronomer Francesco Sizzi advocated the view of Aristotle-Ptolemy.
When Galileo observed that Jupiter has moons (which orbit around Jupiter and not
around the Earth), he responded in the following manner:

There are seven windows in the head, two nostrils, two ears, two eyes and
a mouth; so in the heavens there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious,
two luminaries, and Mercury alone undecided and indifferent. From which
and many other similar phenomena of nature, such as the seven metals,
etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of
planets is necessarily seven (...).
Moreover, the satellites are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can
have no influence on the earth and therefore would be useless and
therefore do not exist.

This quote (from 1611) describes a picture of the universe that is completely
different from the mechanistic view of today. For example, it refers to the number
seven, which was seen as a 'perfect' number. So, in the perfect heavens there can
only be seven planets (the Sun, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn).
Here, a 'planet' is a heavenly body that is not a fixed star. Indeed, the fixed stars just
occupied one sphere in heaven, as can be seen in Figure 1. Also, Sizzi refers to the
'moods' that planets can have, as if they have a personality.

In contrast, the quote from Kepler describes the mechanistic worldview that
resulted from the change in paradigm from Aristotle-Ptolemy to Copernicus-Galileo:

My aim is to show that the heavenly machine is not a kind of divine, live
being, but a kind of clockwork (…) in as far as nearly all the manifold motions
are caused by a most simple, magnetic, and material force, just as all
motions of the clock are caused by a simple weight.

Here, the world and the universe are one domain that consists of dead objects that
move in a mechanistic way.

So, why did the change from Aristotle-Ptolemy to Copernicus-Galileo occur? There
were anomalies in the view of Aristotle-Ptolemy. For example, the existence of
comets, which are heavenly bodies that come and go (hence, seem to be perishable,
and do not move in circular orbits). But there were also anomalies in the view of
Copernicus-Galileo. That is, they were initially seen as such.

For example, the Moon does orbit the Earth. Also, Mars and Venus are always of the
same size (as seen with naked eye). This should not be the case if the Earth moves
around the Sun as well (resulting in varying distances between the Earth and Mars
or Venus, which would have to change their size in a varying manner).

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The scientific revolution started when Galileo used (and introduced) the recently
invented telescope (see Information Box 4.1) as an instrument to observe the
heavens. Before that, observations were done with the naked eye only. Indeed, as we
see in Sizzi's quote, he claims that anything that cannot be seen with the naked eye
does not exist.

With his telescope, Galileo made a number of discoveries:

• Jupiter has moons that orbit around Jupiter and not around the Earth. This
falsifies the idea that all heavenly bodies orbit around the Earth.
• The Moon has mountains and valleys. So it is not a perfect sphere.
• Mars and Venus do change in apparent size.
• Venus has phases, like the moon. This shows that the Sun shines upon it from
different sides, which is impossible with Aristotle-Ptolemy.

Of course, people like Sizzi objected to the use of the telescope. But, eventually, it
became clear that the telescope has a practical use as well. For example, merchants
could see which ships approached the harbor from further away, which allowed
them to make more money (compared to someone who did not have this
advantage). Soldiers had a better overview over the battlefield, which they could use
to their advantage as well.

Over time, these (testable!) uses of the telescope made the observations with it
trustworthy. This, in turn, strengthened the claims made by Galileo (which could
also be replicated by other people). All of this resulted in the replacement of the
Aristotle-Ptolemy paradigm with that of Copernicus-Galileo. This new paradigm
introduced a new way of observing, accepting 'new' observable ‘facts’.

Given the story outlined above, one might think that the paradigm of Copernicus-
Galileo replaced that of Aristotle-Ptolemy because it is 'better'. However, that is not
the view of Kuhn, as we will see in the next section.

4.4.2 Incommensurability of paradigms according to Kuhn

To see how different the paradigms of Aristotle-Ptolemy and Copernicus-Galileo are,
we will compare them on their worldviews and views on science.

I. Worldview:
• Aristotle: Nature is alive. Natural science concerns changes in quality, as
reflected in the title of one of his books 'On coming-to-be and passing-away'.
This book describes nature in terms transformations due to ‘natural powers’,
like growing from a fruit to a tree. This also applies to motion: freely moving
objects move to their 'natural place’, which is their goal.
• Galileo: Nature is lifeless, consisting of dead matter. Motion is not a goal that
an object has (objects have no goals). Instead, it consists only of changes in
quantity (speed, position). Moreover, an object’s motion is constant, unless it
is changed by something else (a force). This is known as Law of Inertia.

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II. View of science: different way of observing and different facts.
• Aristotle: Only direct observation through the senses (‘naked eye’) is reliable.
The senses observe the truth. So, we ‘see’ that a heavy object falls to its
natural place. We 'see' that the Sun rises in the morning (i.e., we 'see' that it
moves).
• Galileo: Also observations with instruments (e.g., telescope) can be used. This
is even better, because our senses can deceive us (as he illustrates with
‘thought-experiments’). For example, the Law of Inertia states that the
motion of an object is constant, unless it is changed through an external
force. This does not correspond with our everyday experience, because we
cannot 'see' these forces. Or, we may 'see' that the Sun and stars move along
the sky, but that is the effect of the rotation of the Earth.

According to Kuhn, these paradigms are so different that a comparison between

them is meaningless. He formulates this as a generic characteristic of paradigms:
paradigms cannot be compared. Or, as he phrases it, paradigms are
incommensurable.

The main reason is that any comparison between paradigms is itself based on a
paradigm. Clearly, the proponents of the Copernicus-Galileo paradigm will claim
that it is better than the Aristotle-Ptolemy paradigm. But that claim is not based on
any objective measure. Instead, it simply follows from the fact that they have chosen
the Copernicus-Galileo paradigm over that of Aristotle-Ptolemy.

Here, we see again that a paradigm in the view of Kuhn is all encompassing. In
covers all aspects of science, including its topic, its basic worldview, the method it
uses, the way scientists can be successful and are trained, and the arguments and
measures it produces to show that it it 'better' than the paradigm it replaced.

To compare paradigms objectively, one would have to have an objective measure.

That is, a measure that is not dictated by one of the paradigms involved. But that is
not possible, because that would entail that there are issues that are not covered by
a paradigm, which is not the case.

Or, conversely, the measure would have to come from a paradigm that transcends
the paradigms that are compared. But then, that paradigm is the ruling paradigm. It
is clear that this does not solve the problem of incommensurability, because now the
transcending paradigm selects itself as the best.

So, there are no a-historical criteria (measures) with which one could compare
paradigms. Here, 'a-historical' refers to a measure that would hold for all times
(past, present and future). But, as we have seen, such a measure belongs to a
paradigm that simply selects itself as the best in the time period in which it
dominates.

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In other words, there is no 'universal method' for science, that applies to all sciences
in all times, as LP and Popper claimed. The consequence of this seems to be that one
cannot claim that science gets 'better' over time. So, there is no incremental (step-
by-step) truth finding, and no progress in science, as claimed in particular by LP.

This view is known as relativism. Later, this view was weakened by Kuhn. But it was
radicalized by Feyerabend, as we will see in the next sections.

4.5 Feyerabend and methodological anarchism

The American philosopher Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) radicalized the views of
Kuhn into a form of ‘methodological anarchism’ in his book “Against Method” in
1975 [5.4]. He argued that there is no ‘decontextualized’ rationality or foundation
that would justify a method for science.

To see what this means, we have to look again at LP and Popper. They used logic
(confirmation versus falsification) and observation to formulate and justify a
method that would separate science from pseudoscience (the demarcation
criterion). This method would work for all sciences in all times and under any
circumstances.

The reason for this claim is that the method is based on

rational arguments, and the logic it uses is also rational. The
general idea of rationality is that it holds (remains the same)
for any given circumstance (e.g., in any given environment, or
in any given time period in history). So, for instance, the
theorems of Euclid (see History of Psychology) hold regardless
of where or when you study them.

This is what the notion ‘decontextualized’ means. That is,

rationality holds and is the same regardless of the context (e.g.,
as given by a specific environment or a specific time period in
history) in which it is used. This is what Feyerabend denies. According to him,
rationality also depends on the circumstance (e.g., time period) in which it is used.

It is not difficult to see that this is an extension (or radicalization) of Kuhn’s idea of a
paradigm. We already noted that a paradigm, according to Kuhn, dominates
everything in science. So, why would it not also dominate what is seen as ‘rational’?
Feyerabend claims that this is indeed the case.

But this means that LP and Popper were wrong in thinking that they could describe
a method for science that applies regardless of context (which indeed was their
aim).

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According to Feyerabend, it is not only wrong to think that such a method exists. It
is also very negative, in that such a methodological ‘law-and-order’ would impede
science. Therefore, according to Feyerabend, there is only one ‘rule’ for science:
“Anything goes”. That is, there is no demarcation between ‘science’ and
’pseudoscience’.

This is a complete radicalization of Kuhn’s relativism. Science flourishes due to wild

ideas and does not differ from ideology and myth. Feyerabend even argues for a
‘separation of science and state’, just as there is a separation of religion and state.
The state should not intervene in how science works, which also means that it
should not be involved in (e.g., set standards for) the education of scientists.

The arguments of Feyerabend are based in particular on his reanalysis of the

transition from Aristotle-Ptolemy to Copernicus-Galileo. In the way as it was
described by Kuhn, there still seems to be an element of rationality involved in this
transition. But this is a misinterpretation, according to Feyerabend, as we will see in
the next section.

4.5.1 Aristotle-Ptolemy versus Copernicus-Galileo: Feyerabend’s view

In the year he died (1543), Copernicus published his book in which he claimed that
the Sun, and not the Earth, is at the center of the universe. He arrived at this
conclusion because of discrepancies in the model of Aristotle-Ptolemy. In particular,
Aristotle claimed that all heavenly bodies move in perfects circles. But observations
of the planets show that this is not the case. For example, viewed from the Earth, the
planet Mars sometimes even moves backwards.

Ptolemy 'solved' this problem by adding more complex (circular) motions to the
circular main orbits of planets. But Copernicus argued that these problems could be
solved by assuming that the planets move around the Sun in circular orbits. Later, in
1610, Kepler showed that these orbits are not even circles but ellipses.

Around 1610, Galileo Galilei also

began to defend the view that the
Sun is at the center of the universe
(also based on his observations with
the recently invented telescope, as
outlined above). This brought him
in conflict with the Catholic Church,
which resulted in his trail and
conviction in 1633.

So, 90 years had passed between the

publication of Copernicus' book and
Galileo's trail. Why did it take so
long for Copernicus' idea to be defended? This is not just because the church did not
accept it. It is also because there were too many problems with it from a scientific

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point of view.

We have seen that there were arguments against Copernicus' idea, such as the initial
observation (with the naked eye) that Venus and Mars always have the same size.
But next to these 'heavenly' arguments, there were also and foremost 'earthly'
arguments against Copernicus-Galileo.

What seems very much in favor of Aristotle-Ptolemy is the fact that the Sun is visible
during the day and disappears in the night. This 24-hour period of day and night is
easy to explain if the Sun orbits around the earth.

But when the Earth orbits the Sun, which takes a whole year, this is much harder to
explain. In fact, it could be explained only by assuming that the Earth also rotates
around its own axis in 24 hours. However, this seems an unnecessary complication.
Moreover, it leads to 'absurd' consequences. That is, it does not coincide with
'common sense'.

This 'common sense' runs as follows: If the Earth rotates around its axis in 24 hours,
then every object on Earth would experience that speed. The magnitude of this
speed depends on where you are (at the equator it is more than 1600 km/h, here
about 1000 km/h), but it is so high that we would have to experience it. For
example, by the wind that would blow everything away (here, the assumption was
the Earth would move but the atmosphere not).

Also, you would have to observe it in the 'tower test', illustrated in Figure 2. In this
test, a heavy ball is dropped from the top of a tower (Figure 2, left). If the Earth
rotated around its axis to the left, the ground would have moved in the time that the
ball falls downwards. So, the ball would hit the ground away from the base of the
tower (Figure 2, middle panel). But that is not what is observed (Figure 2, right
panel): the ball falls near the base of the tower.

For the proponents of Aristotle-Ptolemy, the outcome of the tower test showed that
the claim that the Earth rotates around its axis is not correct. In modern terms, this
test gives a falsification of Copernicus-Galileo in their view.

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The tower test (the argument on which it was based) was a major problem for the
idea of Copernicus, and a main reason of why it was rejected. Finally, Galileo could
solve this problem. He did so by his formation of the Law of Inertia. This law states
that we do not experience a motion, unless the motion changes. For example, you
only notice the motion of a car or train when it speeds up or slows down. You do not
notice the motion when it is constant.

The Law of Inertia is illustrated in Figure 3. Here, the motion is in the direction of
the arrow. In Figure 3 (left), the force (gravitation) acts in the same direction as the
motion, so the ball will move faster. In Figure 3 (middle), the force acts in the
opposite direction of the motion, so the ball will move slower. In Figure 3 (right),
there is no force in the horizontal direction, so the ball remains still. With this law,
Galileo could explain why a ball (or any object) falling down from the top of the mast
of a constantly moving ship does not fall forward or backward relative to the base of
the mast.

With the Law of Inertia, Galileo could now also answer the problem of the tower
test. If the ball falls, there is no force working in the horizontal direction (as with the
constantly moving ship). Thus, the distance between the tower (or mast) and the
ball remains the same, because motion changes only when a force works in the
direction of the motion, as illustrated in Figure 3. The same holds for the
atmosphere, so it moves in the same way as the Earth (hence, we do not experience
any wind due to the rotation of the Earth).

In the end, Galileo won the debate (despite his conviction in the trial of 1633). For
Feyerabend, the question is why. For LP, that was clear [5.6, p. 145, italics added]:

It was not so much the observations and experiments which

Galilei made that caused the break with tradition as his attitude to
them. For him, the facts based on them were taken as facts, and
not related to some preconceived idea. The facts of observation
might, or might not, fit into an acknowledged scheme of the
universe, but the important thing, in Galilei’s opinion, was to
accept the facts and build the theory to fit them.

So, according to LP, Galileo was just considering the facts, and ignored any
preconceived idea, unlike his opponents. But Feyerabend noticed that this is not the

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view that Galileo himself had, as can be seen in this quote from Galileo [5.7, p. 328,
italics added]:

I can never sufficiently admire the outstanding acumen of those

who have taken hold of the opinion that the Earth moves and
accept it as true: they have, through sheer force of intellect done
such violence to their own senses as to prefer what reason told
them over that which sensible experience plainly showed them to
the contrary.

Hence, Galileo acknowledged that he did not base his ideas on sensory experience
('facts') only. Instead, he followed his intellectual conviction, indeed even against
what the senses would tell him (for example, that the Sun rises in the morning and
seems to move along the sky the whole day, until it sets in the evening).

So, according to Feyerabend, Galileo did not win by some method as prescribed by a
philosophy of science, such as LP (e.g., do measurements and derive theories on the
basis of them).

Instead, in Feyerabend’s view, Galileo won the debate in another way [5.4, p. 141]:

Galilei prevails because of his style and his clever techniques of

persuation, because he writes in Italian rather than in Latin, and
because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed
to the old ideas and the standard of learning connected to them.

That is, according to Feyerabend, Galilei 'resorts to propaganda and trickery’. And in
order to justify the use of telescope (to argue that the size variations of Mars and
Venus are true) Galileo in fact uses a tautology (e.g., he uses the telescope to show
that sizes are different, and then argues that this shows that the telescope works).

4.5.2 Feyerabend’s relativism

Based on his analysis of Galileo's work (and other cases), Feyerabend reaches the
following conclusions:

• Arguments from methodology do not establish the excellence of science.

• There is not a single rule, however plausible and however firmly grounded in
logic and general philosophy that is not violated at some time or other.
• There is no ‘scientific method’. Every project, every theory, every procedure
has to be judged on its own merits and by standards adapted to the processes
with which it deals.
• Theories are fully incommensurable.

So, it seems that we have a complete form of relativism, or as Feyerabend called it

'anything goes'.

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Later, he seems to modify this view into a less radical version [5.5, p. 82-83]:

Philosophical relativism is the doctrine that all traditions, theories,

ideas are equally true or equally false or, in an even more radical
formulation, that any distribution of truth values over traditions is
acceptable. This form of relativism is nowhere defended in the
present book. (...)
It is not asserted, for example, that Aristotle is as good as
Einstein; it is asserted and argued that ‘Aristotle is true’ is a
judgement that presupposes a certain tradition; it is a relational
judgement that may change when the underlying tradition is
changed. (...)
There are standards, but they come from the research process
itself, not from abstract views of rationality.

So, even Feyerabend does not claim that "Aristotle is as good as Einstein". In other
words, even in his view, science has made progress. But how can we account for that
progress? What is the measure we could use?

In the next chapter, we will discuss the views of Lakatos. He believed he had an
answer to these questions, with his idea of the Research Programme.

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 Note: The material in each Information Box does NOT belong to the material
that is required for the exam. It is 'read only' material. However, it is strongly
advised to read the material, because it provides background information on
the persons or themes presented.

Information Box 4.1: Invention of the telescope

The telescope first saw the light of day in Middelburg
"The telescope has had a major influence on the development of science and the
world view of people since the 17th century. In 1608 a patent application was
submitted by Johannes (Hans) Lipperhey, a resident of Middelburg (Zeeland), for a
‘certain instrument for seeing in the distance’. Lipperhey demonstrated his
invention for Prince Maurits in The Hague. In spite of the great interest in his
invention, he was refused a patent because the instrument was said to be already
known to others. Another Middelburg resident, Sacharias Jansen, and Jacob Metius
of Alkmaar also laid claim to the invention. The principle of the ‘Dutch telescope’
was thus too easy to copy for a patent to be granted. This became evident a year
later, because in 1609 Galileo Galilei was the first person to focus his self-built
telescope on the star-filled sky. The rest is history…."
(www.inventionofthetelescope.eu)

References
[5.1] Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of
Chicago Press (1970: second edition, enlarged).

[5.2] F. van der Velde, Chapter 1. Course History of Psychology.

[5.3] F. van der Velde, Chapter 5. Course History of Psychology.

[5.4] Paul K. Feyerabend (1975). Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchistic

Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left Books.

[5.5] Paul K. Feyerabend (1978). Science in a Free Society. London: New Left Books.

[5.6] Anthony, H. D. (1948). Science and its Background. London: Macmillan.

[5.7] Galileo (1967). Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Words Systems, trans. S.
Drake. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

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