FILED 1st JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Santa Fe County
1/9/2025 11:37 AM
STATE OF NEW MEXICO KATHLEEN VIGIL CLERK OF THE COURT
COUNTY OF SANTA FE Leah D Herrera
Case assigned to Sanchez-Gagne, Maria
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Alexander R. Baldwin III, No. ________________________

D-101-CV-2025-00060

Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR:

vs. 1. VIOLATION OF RIGHTS UNDER

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Kari T. Morrissey, Mary Carmack-Altwies, 2. CONSPIRACY TO CAUSE VIOLATION OF
Andrea Reeb, Jennifer Padgett Macias, The First RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Judicial District Attorney’s Office, Alexandria 3. MALICIOUS ABUSE OF PROCESS
Hancock, Marissa Poppell, Brian Brandle, and 4. INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION OF
Santa Fe County Board of County EVIDENCE
Commissioners. 5. DEFAMATION
6. VIOLATION OF NEW MEXICO CIVIL
Defendants. RIGHTS ACT
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Alexander R. Baldwin III, through his attorneys Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

and LeBlanc Law LLC, brings this action for deprivation of rights afforded by the Constitution

and laws of the United States, malicious abuse of process, intentional spoliation of evidence,

defamation, and violation of the New Mexico Civil Rights Act, against Kari T. Morrissey, Mary

Carmack-Altwies, Andrea Reeb, Jennifer Padgett Macias, the First Judicial District Attorney’s

Office (“FJDA”), Alexandria Hancock, Marissa Poppell, Brian Brandle, the Santa Fe County

Board of County Commissioners (“Commissioners”), and the County of Santa Fe (the “County”)

(collectively, “Defendants” or “the State”), and for his Complaint alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. The highest duty of all who investigate, charge, and prosecute criminal cases in the

State of New Mexico is to fairly and impartially apply the State’s awesome powers. Criminal

prosecutions are to be guided by the search for truth and justice, not to pursue personal or political

gain or harass the innocent.

 2. For the better part of the last three years, however, Defendants repudiated these

obligations, blinded by their desire to convict Alec Baldwin for all the wrong reasons, and at any

cost, for the October 2021 accidental shooting of Halyna Hutchins. Defendants’ misconduct in

their pursuit of Baldwin, and the trial judge’s condemnation of them, has already drawn world-

wide attention. But this action is necessary to vindicate Baldwin’s rights and deter Defendants

from attempting to do this to anyone else.

3. From the moment Defendants and their agents set foot on the scene of the incident,

it should have been apparent that Baldwin had no culpability. Minutes before, a member of the

crew had handed him a prop handgun and loudly called out “cold gun” to assure Baldwin and

everyone else present that it had been inspected and contained only non-explosive dummy rounds.

But unbeknownst to Baldwin, the prop had been loaded with live rounds that looked similar to

dummy rounds. The prop fired a live round and killed Hutchins.

4. Defendants sought at every turn to scapegoat Baldwin for the acts and omissions of

others, regardless of the evidence or the law. This included Defendant Andrea Reeb, a special

prosecutor who used the prosecution of Baldwin to advance her simultaneous run for the New

Mexico Legislature. It included Defendants unlawfully charging Baldwin with an enhancement

to increase the potential sentence from 18 months to five years, even though the enhancement was

not enacted until after the incident. It included Special Prosecutor Kari Morrissey, who wanted to

teach Baldwin “a lesson” because she deemed him to be an “arrogant prick.” And it included her

extracting an indictment by manipulating the evidence she presented, and chose not to present.

5. Most notably, it included certain Defendants’ intentional concealment of

exculpatory evidence and then lying from the witness stand during trial about their coverup.

6. For First Judicial District Judge Mary Marlowe Sommer, that was the last straw.

During those two days, Judge Sommer heard testimony from SFSO crime lab technician Marissa

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Poppell and SFSO Lieutenants Brian Brandle and Alexandra Hancock about the circumstances

under which the live rounds had come into Defendants’ possession and how Defendants

intentionally chose not log them to the case file—at the insistence of Special Prosecutor

Morrissey—to keep Baldwin from knowing about them. Judge Sommer inspected the ammunition

that Defendants had failed to disclose, and instantly recognized their exculpatory significance.

That same day, Morrissey called herself to the stand and gave perjurious testimony in an attempt

to justify her misconduct.

7. Judge Sommer found that “The State’s willful withholding of this information was

intentional and deliberate…. If this conduct does not rise to the level of bad faith, it certainly

comes so near to bad faith as to show signs of scorching prejudice….” Based on those findings,

Judge Sommer concluded: “There is no way for the Court to right this wrong,” and dismissal of

the criminal case with prejudice was “the only warranted remedy.”

8. Defendants must now be held accountable for their malicious and unlawful pursuit

of Baldwin. Although no verdict in this civil case can undo the trauma the State’s threat of

conviction and incarceration has inflicted, Alec Baldwin has filed this action to hold Defendants

responsible for their appalling violations of the laws that governed their work.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

9. The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Santa Fe County, New Mexico.

10. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Article VI, Section 13 of the New

Mexico Constitution, Section 41-4-18 NMSA and Section 41-4A-3 NMSA, and 42 U.S.C.

Sections 1983 and 1988.

11. All preconditions for bringing this Complaint against each of the Defendants were

fulfilled because sufficient notice that Plaintiff may pursue litigation was submitted to the

necessary entities, including the Santa Fe County Board of County Commissioners and the Risk

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Management Division of the State of New Mexico General Services Department within the

statutory time limit for doing so, under Sections 41-4-16 and 41-4A-13, NMSA.

12. Venue in this district is proper under Section 38-3-1 NMSA, Section 41-4-18

NMSA, and Section 41-4A-3 NMSA, because the events giving rise to the causes of action herein

occurred in Santa Fe County, New Mexico, and the principal offices of Defendants’ governing

bodies are located in this County.

PARTIES

13. Plaintiff Alexander R. Baldwin III is an actor, philanthropist, and political activist.

He is a resident of the State of New York.

14. Kari T. Morrissey is an individual (suit is brought against Morrissey in both her

individual and official capacity). The office of the District Attorney for the First Judicial District

of the State of New Mexico appointed her Special Prosecutor in connection with the Rust case in

March 2023. She is a resident of the State of California.

15. Mary Carmack-Altwies is the District Attorney for the First Judicial District of the

State of New Mexico and a resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is brought against Carmack-

Altwies in both her individual and official capacity).

16. Defendant Andrea Reeb is a former District Attorney for the Ninth Judicial District

of the State of New Mexico, a member of the New Mexico House of Representatives, and a

resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is brought against Reeb in both her individual and official

capacity). She was appointed Special Prosecutor in connection with the Rust case by the office of

the District Attorney for the First Judicial District of New Mexico in August 2022, and formally

withdrew from that role in March 2023.

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 17. Defendant Jennifer Padgett Macias is an Assistant District Attorney for the First

Judicial District of the State of New Mexico and a resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is

brought against Padgett Macias in both her individual and official capacity).

18. Defendant Alexandria Hancock is a law enforcement officer employed by Santa Fe

County Sheriff’s Office and a resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is brought against Hancock

in both her individual and official capacity).

19. Defendant Marissa Poppell is a crime scene technician employed by Santa Fe

County Sheriff’s Office and a resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is brought against Poppell

in both her individual and official capacity).

20. Defendant Brian Brandle is a law enforcement officer and supervisor employed by

the Santa Fe County Sheriff’s Office and a resident of the State of New Mexico (suit is brought

against Brandle in both his individual and official capacity).

21. Defendant First Judicial District Attorney’s Office (“FJDA”) is a State entity

located in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

22. Defendant Santa Fe County Board of County Commissioners (the “County”) is a

political subdivision of the State of New Mexico, located in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Under Section

4-46-1, NMSA 1978, all suits or proceedings against a county are to be brought in the name of the

board of county commissioners of that county. At all material times, the County was a

governmental entity and a local public body as those terms are defined in Sections 41-4-3(B) and

(C) of the New Mexico Tort Claims act, as amended, and is liable for its conduct and for torts

committed by its officers for which immunity is waived under Section 41-4-12, NMSA 1978.

Under Section 4-46-1, NMSA 1978, the County is a properly named defendant to this action in

lieu of the Santa Fe County Sheriff’s Office.

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 23. At all times relevant to the causes of action asserted in this Complaint, each of the

Defendants above acted as an agent for the other Defendants and each is legally responsible to

Baldwin for the actions of the others.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

I. THE RUST PRODUCTION

24. In 2018, Baldwin began working with writer-director Joel Souza on a Western

movie titled Rust. Rust tells the story of a boy in 1880s Kansas who accidentally kills a local

rancher and is sentenced to hang. After being broken out of prison by his estranged grandfather,

an outlaw named Harland Rust, they flee to New Mexico on a dangerous journey through an

unforgiving landscape, forming a close bond along the way.

25. Throughout 2019-2021, Baldwin worked on the project with Souza and Rust’s team

of producers: Ryan Smith, Nathan Klingher, Ryan Winterstern, Matt DelPiano, and Anjul Nigam.

26. Smith, individually and through his production company, Rust Movie Productions

LLC, was primarily responsible for getting the production up and running. He and the other

producers pitched Rust to investors, secured financing, and set the budget.

27. Baldwin was also a producer, but his authority was limited to creative decisions.

Baldwin lacked the authority to hire crew members and make other non-creative decisions.

28. Smith hired Gabrielle Pickle as Line Producer, and the two of them, along with

Messrs. Winterstern and Klingher, hired the crew. Once the film was in production, Messrs. Smith,

Klingher, Winterstern, and Pickle oversaw Rust’s day-to-day operations, along with the film’s Unit

Production Manager, Row Walters.

29. The production began filming on October 6, 2021. That day, Baldwin and his

production company, El Dorado Pictures, Inc., entered into a producer agreement with Ryan Smith

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and Rust Movie Productions LLC. The Producer Agreement reflects Baldwin’s creative role and

his lack of authority on hiring and budget decisions.

30. Baldwin did not arrive on set until the second week of filming, when it was time

for him to appear on camera as Harland Rust.

31. Soon after arriving, Baldwin met with Hutchins, Rust’s cinematographer (also

known as the director of photography), and Souza. They discussed their creative vision for the

film and how to tell the story through the camera, taking advantage of the vast, quiet expanses of

New Mexico’s landscape.

32. They did not discuss safety at that meeting, and at no point did Baldwin discuss gun

safety with anyone beyond Zachry, Gutierrez-Reed, Halls, and Nicole Montoya (a props assistant).

33. While on the set, Baldwin never saw or became aware of any significant safety

issues.

II. CONTROL OVER FIREARMS ON THE RUST SET

A. Firearm Safety On Movie Sets.

34. The film industry has standards regarding the handling of firearms on set. The first

rule, with which virtually all cast and crew members are familiar, is that “live” ammunition—i.e.,

ammunition that contains explosive powder and a projectile—is never allowed on a stage or set.

35. On film sets, prop guns may be loaded with “blanks,” which contain explosive

powder but no projectile, or with “dummy rounds” (or “dummies”), which are designed to look

like real bullets, but contain no charge (i.e., they cannot detonate and are inert). Dummies are used

in close-ups where the movie audience will be able to see the lead tip of the rounds of ammunition.

Blanks have crimped ends and no projectile. The ammunition’s rim (base) or primer (the circular

inset piece of metal at the center of the base) is usually not visible from a front camera position.

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The below images show a variety of types of “dummy” ammunition. As they show, live rounds

may be indistinguishable from dummy rounds:

36. The safe use of firearms on set is the responsibility of the Property Master (or “Prop

Master”), or the Prop Master’s designee—in most cases, the Armorer. These individuals are

responsible for sourcing firearms, blanks, and dummies. They have the necessary training and

expertise to identify live versus dummy ammunition. The Prop Master for Rust was Sarah Zachry,

and the Armorer was Hannah Gutierrez-Reed. Both Zachry and Gutierrez-Reed came with strong

recommendations from the production’s ammo supplier, Seth Kenney, who had worked with them

on previous projects. Baldwin was not involved in (or even aware of) the decision to hire Zachry

or Gutierrez-Reed, and did not meet them until he arrived on set.

37. In addition to the Prop Master and Armorer, the First Assistant Director (or “First

AD”) is in charge of set safety, and is the “last line of defense” for firearm safety on set. Dave

Halls was the First AD on Rust.

38. Although industry guidance instructs that it is best to avoid pointing a firearm at

anyone, the same guidance notes that this does occur while making a movie, and explains that,

when pointing a gun at another is “absolutely necessary,” it should be done in consultation with

the Prop Master or his or her designee (i.e., Gutierrez-Reed) and the First AD (Halls).

39. At bottom, the Prop Master, Armorer, and First AD—not actors—bear

responsibility for firearm safety on the set.

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 40. “Cold gun” is a widely understood term in the film industry. It refers to a firearm

that has been inspected to confirm that it has not been loaded with any live or blank rounds (i.e., it

contains no explosives), and is therefore incapable of firing. The term “cold gun” is meant to

distinguish between a gun loaded with blanks and a gun that is empty or loaded with dummies; a

“cold gun” does not contain any live ammunition.

41. The announcement of a “cold gun” by the Armorer or First AD is meant to assure

all present that the gun has been properly checked for the absence of any ammunition, other than

“dummy” rounds, so that the cast and crew members may go about their work knowing that the

firearm is incapable of causing harm.

B. Baldwin Receives Standard Firearms Training On Rust.

42. The day after he arrived on set, Baldwin received firearm training from Rust’s

Armorer, Gutierrez-Reed. The training lasted around 90 minutes.

43. During the session, Gutierrez-Reed reminded Baldwin of gun safety measures he

had learned at substantially similar gun training throughout his career, such as putting the gun

down when “cut” is called, not to force the gun if it jams, and not to fire it when empty. Gutierrez-

Reed also reminded Baldwin that he would need to feign the prop’s recoil because blank rounds

do not generate any.

44. But Gutierrez-Reed did not instruct Baldwin that he should check the gun himself.

In fact, she told Baldwin that it was her job to check the gun—not his.

45. Baldwin followed Gutierrez-Reed’s instructions during the gun safety training and

throughout his time on the Rust set.

III. THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 21, 2021

46. On October 21, 2021, the Rust cast and crew were filming a scene in a small church

where Baldwin’s character, Harland Rust, takes cover after a shootout. The scene involves a close-

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up view of the revolver he is holding that he is required to “cock” (i.e., pull the hammer back)

before a shootout begins with shotguns “boom[ing]” and “Colts exploding.”

47. They began rehearsing the scene before lunch, with Baldwin practicing his cross-

draw for the camera. In a videorecording of the rehearsal, Souza told Baldwin to “draw” and

“point” the gun, and “whip it out” in front of the camera. After Baldwin practiced the move a few

times, someone off-camera said, “Nice!”

48. When the cast and crew broke for lunch, Gutierrez-Reed took the pistol from

Baldwin. Souza, Hutchins, and Baldwin stayed behind to discuss the “insert shot” they were

planning to film after lunch, which involved capturing a close-up of Baldwin’s cross-draw with

the camera tightly focused on the gun.

49. They understood that, to achieve this close-up, the unloaded pistol would need to

be loaded with dummies so that the pistol would not appear on screen to be unloaded.

50. At some point during or after lunch, Gutierrez-Reed loaded the pistol with what she

believed to be six dummy rounds.

51. Gutierrez-Reed then brought the pistol into the church and showed it to Halls,

telling him that she had loaded it with dummy rounds. She rotated the cylinder for Halls, who

agreed that the prop gun was safe to handle. As Halls handed the prop gun to Baldwin, Halls

announced that there was a “cold gun” on set. That meant that the prop gun had been inspected

and was incapable of firing even a blank or causing harm.

52. Meanwhile, Hutchins continued to evaluate her camera angle for the scene. In

Baldwin’s experience, the cinematographer or director of photography has significant input into

an actor’s performance, particularly as to what is (or is not) in the frame. Hutchins directed

Baldwin accordingly.

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 53. Baldwin was sitting in a church pew looking at Hutchins. He held the gun, which,

Halls had just announced was safe. Hutchins was standing camera right (to Baldwin’s left), next

to the camera operator, and looking back and forth between Baldwin and the camera operator’s

monitor. She was determining how best to angle the camera and what movements Baldwin should

make for her to capture the cocking of the gun that the script had called for.

54. Baldwin asked Hutchins what she would like him to do. He pulled the gun out

slowly and held it still before Hutchins began giving him further direction. She described how she

wanted Baldwin to place the gun. She told Baldwin to hold the gun higher, to a point where it was

directed toward her. As she gave these instructions, she was looking carefully at the monitor and

then at Baldwin, and then back again.

55. Baldwin asked Hutchins if she wanted to see him cock the gun, as the script

required. She responded yes. Baldwin tipped the gun down so that the camera would focus on his

hand’s action on the top of the gun. While performing this action, Baldwin asked Hutchins, “Am

I holding it too far down?” and “Do you see that?” Hutchins said that she could see Baldwin’s

actions.

56. As later became known, a live round discharged from the gun and struck Hutchins,

traveling through her body and striking Souza in the shoulder. Both Hutchins and Souza fell to

the ground.

57. Panic and confusion immediately ensued. No one understood what had happened.

Baldwin and others in the church were ordered to leave. The on-set medic and others rushed to

render aid to Hutchins and Souza.

58. Rust’s script supervisor, Mamie Mitchell, called 911 and told the operator that two

people had been “accidentally shot on a movie set by a prop gun.” A few seconds later, Mitchell

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can be heard saying on a recording, “This f***ing AD [Dave Halls] . . . He’s supposed to check

the guns. He’s responsible for what happens on the set.”

59. Paramedics arrived shortly and worked to stabilize Hutchins and Souza.

60. Outside the church, Baldwin and others began to speak to each other to try to piece

together what had just happened. Baldwin thought that Hutchins may have fainted or had a heart

attack. Unaware that a real bullet had struck Souza, Baldwin was confused as to why Souza was

screaming in pain.

61. As the cast and crew were gathered, still reeling from the incident, Mitchell

approached Baldwin and said, “You realize you’re not responsible for any of what happened in

there, don’t you?”

62. Hutchins was airlifted to a hospital, but succumbed to her injuries. Souza was

treated at the hospital and recovered.

IV. THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION WAS TAINTED BY THE PROSECUTORS’ MALICE

TOWARDS BALDWIN
A. Law Enforcement Responded To The Scene.

63. SFSO Officers arrived at the set less than 15 minutes after the 911 call. When they

arrived, they did not separate the witnesses, instead allowing people to mingle and talk about the

incident and speculate about what might have happened.

64. Nor did the law enforcement personnel immediately establish a perimeter around

the area, instead allowing cast and crew to move freely around. They also failed to immediately

secure the prop cart or the firearms on set, allowing crew members to continue to enter the scene

and handle (and even discard) key pieces of evidence.

65. Law enforcement did not secure the prop truck, where the property department and

armorer stored their materials, for six days, again leaving critical evidence vulnerable to

manipulation.

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 66. Law enforcement eventually spoke with those who were involved in the incident,

taking down their information.

67. SFSO Deputy Nicolas Lefleur approached Baldwin, who immediately said: “I was

the one holding the gun,” and asked, “What do you need?”

68. After changing out of his clothes and giving them to law enforcement, Baldwin

voluntarily drove himself to the SFSO station and sat for an interview with Detectives Alexandria

Hancock and Samantha Talamente. He spoke freely with Det. Hancock and Det. Talamente for

over one hour, declining their invitation to have a lawyer present. At the time, Baldwin had yet to

learn what they already knew—that Hutchins had died. They waited until the interview was over

to tell him.

69. At the conclusion of the interview, one of the detectives showed Baldwin a

photograph of the .45 caliber bullet that had just been removed from Souza’s shoulder at the

hospital. Baldwin recognized the object as a bullet, and he finally began to comprehend what had

transpired on the set. He was shocked. It was unimaginable to him that a live round could have

been present on the ranch property or on the prop truck, let alone in the gun itself—a gun declared

“cold” by the film’s head of safety.

B. The Investigators Looked Into How A Live Round Got In the Gun.

70. From the start, investigators focused on a key question: How did live ammunition

end up on a movie set, where the presence of live ammunition is, in the State’s own words,

“incomprehensible.” Law enforcement quickly recognized that it was the presence of live

ammunition—and not Baldwin’s handling of a movie prop—that transformed an everyday

rehearsal into a fatal disaster.

71. Questions about Baldwin’s handling of the firearm—e.g., whether he had cocked it

or pulled the trigger, and where he was pointing it when it went off—were treated as an

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afterthought. For example, although Baldwin consistently maintained that the gun just “went off”

and that it would have defied his normal practice to pull the trigger during a rehearsal, investigators

did not swab the trigger for DNA—because they recognized that whether Baldwin’s finger was on

the trigger was irrelevant to how live ammunition ended up on the set and who was responsible

for that.

72. Within a matter of days, however, things began to change as elected officials and

high-ranking members of law enforcement became increasingly involved in the case.

73. Amid this transition, the investigation’s lead detective stepped down and a new

detective, Alexandria Hancock, took over.

74. According to Det. Hancock, prosecutors from the FJDA were heavily involved in

SFSO’s investigation “from the beginning,” with investigative decisions being made

“collectively” by a “team” that included prosecutors.

75. Up to this point, the investigation into the source of the live round was focused on

whether the lethal round came from the crew of Rust (e.g., Gutierrez-Reed or Zachry), or whether

someone from outside of the crew (e.g., Seth Kenney) had provided it.

76. As prosecutors became more involved in the case, however, their focus shifted from

identifying the source of the live ammunition. They instead fixated on Baldwin.

77. This shift occurred even as more evidence emerged that Seth Kenney, a third-party

ammo supplier, may have been the source of the live round. And it continued despite the consistent

finding throughout the investigation that it is not an actor’s job to check for live rounds inside a

prop gun that those responsible for gun safety have cleared for use.

78. Driven by the prosecutors’ agenda, SFSO began to ignore critical evidence as to

how live ammunition ended up on the set.

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 79. For example, SFSO waited six days before executing a search warrant on the prop

truck—the vehicle where firearms and ammunition had been stored. At Gutierrez-Reed’s trial,

Det. Hancock testified that this delay occurred because SFSO “didn’t have information until later

on that this prop truck had been involved in the props department and that we would potentially

need to be looking for evidence there, which is why we didn’t conduct that search until a few days

later.”

80. That testimony was false. Within hours of the incident, Det. Hancock knew of the

importance of the prop truck, when Gutierrez-Reed told her that “[t]he guns . . . and the dummies

and everything are kept on the prop truck.” In fact, the search warrant states that Det. Hancock

“conducted an interview with Hannah Gutierrez,” who advised “on the day of the incident” that

“firearms were . . . secured inside a safe on a ‘prop truck’” and that “ammo was also kept inside

the ‘prop truck.’” Det. Hancock lied about her knowledge of the prop truck to cover up the real

reason SFSO waited six days to execute its warrant: Prosecutors were not interested in pursuing

the source of the lethal round because, if it turned out that the round came from an outside source

(such as Kenney), it would be difficult to blame Baldwin. This was confirmed by two sets of

prosecutors, both of whom sought to hold Baldwin criminally responsible for failing to supervise

crew members based on his role as a producer.

81. SFSO waited more than one month to execute a search warrant on Kenney’s

business, PDQ Arm & Prop LLC, despite learning within hours of the incident that PDQ was

Rust’s ammo supplier.

82. This delay would be troubling under any circumstances. But it was particularly

troubling here, given what Det. Hancock knew at the time. On November 1, 2021, thirty days

before conducting a search of PDQ, Det. Hancock met with Kenney at the SFSO station. During

the meeting, Kenney phoned someone named Joe Swanson to determine the whereabouts of

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several hundred live rounds that were reportedly given to Kenney that were said to match the live

rounds found on the set of Rust. When Swanson told Kenney that the rounds had been kept “loose

in an ammo can,” Kenney hung up the phone and swore repeatedly—“shit, shit, shit shit”—

because the ammo can Swanson was referring to had been sitting at PDQ all along. Once he was

done cursing, Kenney stated, “Well, [Gutierrez-Reed] didn’t do her f***ing job,” suggesting that

even if he had supplied live ammo to the set of Rust, he couldn’t be blamed for Hutchins’ death.

83. Even though Det. Hancock was present when Kenney realized that he may have

been the person who had inadvertently supplied live ammunition to the set of Rust, and watched

him curse at the realization, she indefensibly waited 30 days to search Kenney’s business. This

gave Kenney a month to dispose of any evidence linking him to the accident. When SFSO

executed the search warrant on November 30, 2021, the ammo can was empty. Conveniently,

someone had even written “empty” on the can itself.

84. SFSO also failed to pursue other leads that may have identified the source of the

live rounds, which would have weakened the State’s case against Baldwin. For example, at least

three different people told SFSO or the FJDA that persons connected to the film were firing live

ammunition at the Bonanza Creek ranch on or around the day of the accident. At least two of these

persons felt that law enforcement had brushed off their statements or not taken them seriously.

They are barely mentioned in the Sheriff’s Incident Report.

85. One person reported that, shortly after the incident, he had overheard individuals

who worked on another film, and who had come into his shop, and had been discussing how some

of the people working on Rust had been firing live ammunition to shoot cans off of posts. This

person reported this to the SFSO, but there was no follow-up.

86. “As a team” the SFSO decided not to seek fingerprint or DNA testing of live rounds

found on the set to determine who was responsible for bringing them there.

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 C. The State Destroyed The Firearm.

87. The condition of the prop gun, particularly whether it showed signs of damage or

modification on the day of the incident, was an important issue in the investigation and in any

potential prosecution. But Defendants’ investigation of this issue was calculated to hide the facts

and resulted in the intentional destruction of the gun.

88. Throughout the investigation, Baldwin repeatedly told investigators that the gun

just “went off.” Several witnesses who were inside the church also told investigators that the gun

just “went off.” At first, investigators did not seem to question the veracity of these accounts.

89. But in April 2022, six months after the incident, the SFSO asked the FBI to test the

prop gun. According to Det. Hancock, the SFSO’s purpose for doing so was to “disprove” what

Baldwin said during a televised ABC News interview (i.e., that he did not pull the trigger).

90. On April 21, 2022, FBI Special Agent Jose Cortez, at Det. Hancock’s instruction,

directed the FBI to perform an “[e]nhanced test” to determine whether the firearm would fire

without pressing the trigger. As the FBI knew, and as it told the SFSO, this testing subjects the

firearm to a substantial external impact and was all but certain to break it. Special Agent Cortez

therefore wrote that he and Det. Hancock knew “that the requested testing will alter the firearm

and it will no longer be in the same physical condition that it was seized in.”

91. Despite knowing this, no one from the prosecutor’s office or the SFSO asked that

the FBI lab document the internal components of the firearm before performing the destructive

testing. Nor did anyone alert Baldwin or the other potential defendants to the possibility that a key

item of evidence was about to be destroyed.

92. FBI Forensic examiner Bryce Ziegler conducted extremely aggressive testing on

the revolver, striking it repeatedly with a mallet, without documenting his process nor endeavoring

to hold constant the force with which he struck it. Stunningly, Ziegler has admitted that he had

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never conducted this type of testing outside of a training environment. That inexperience led to

disastrous results. Ziegler failed to disassemble the firearm or document its condition before

testing it to look for worn, altered, or otherwise defective parts. He did not even attempt to adapt

the test to the circumstances of the incident. Instead, Ziegler began beating the firearm with a

mallet until the trigger and other internal components broke.

93. This approach to testing the prop made no sense. The SFSO asked the FBI to test

whether the firearm could fire without a pull of the trigger. But no one had ever suggested that a

substantial force had struck the gun to cause it to fire, or anything else that would justify the kind

of testing that Ziegler performed. As the State’s own firearm expert later admitted, destructive

testing was not called for in this case. Instead, the State and the FBI could have conducted at least

one other more appropriate test—now impossible to perform—to determine if the prop gun had

misfired. That would have been a “push-off” test, in which pressure is manually applied to the

back of the hammer to determine if it will fall without the trigger being pulled.

94. But instead, the FBI’s Ziegler inexplicably waited until after he conducted the

destructive test before doing what he should have done first: Take the prop gun apart to examine

it for modification or damage. When he finally did so, he found signs of modification to the prop’s

internal components. Although some parts showed damage consistent with his mallet strikes, other

parts showed unrelated alterations and damage. For example, the hammer had been rounded such

that the sear would no longer stay lodged in the full-cock notch, and other notches (quarter and

half) also appear reduced in depth when compared to intact parts.

95. The State’s expert admitted these facts, describing the hammer as “peened” or

“rolled, rounded off, and [] full of very rough toolmarks.” As the State’s experts later

demonstrated, the hammer would not engage an intact sear in that condition, which would have

allowed the hammer to fall without pulling the trigger.

18
 96. The FBI’s failure to examine those components before testing or document the prop

gun’s original condition made it impossible for Baldwin to adequately reconstruct the prop gun,

creating a gap in the evidentiary record that prevented Baldwin from recreating the FBI’s tests,

conducting his own tests on a functioning firearm in its original condition, inspecting the firearm

in its original condition, evaluating the modifications and their effect before the gun was destroyed,

or otherwise subjecting the FBI’s analysis to the rigorous review necessary for a proper defense.

97. The FBI’s failure to document the firearm’s original condition before conducting

destructive testing, and the SFSO’s failure to ask for it, deprived Baldwin of critical information

that would have allowed Baldwin to test a component of the prosecution’s eventual theory and his

defense: whether the firearm was defective when the accident occurred and could have discharged

a round without the trigger being pulled.

V. THE FIRST PROSECUTION

A. Reeb Joined The Prosecution For Political Gain.

98. Even though Baldwin was not responsible for ensuring the safety of firearms or

ammunition and was told by those who were responsible that the prop gun was safe, the District

Attorney decided to criminally charge Baldwin “pretty close to the beginning” of the investigation.

99. To charge Baldwin with involuntary manslaughter under N.M.S.A. 1978 § 30-2-

3B, the State needed to believe that he had acted “without due cause or circumspection” or that he

handled or used the prop gun in a negligent manner, resulting in Hutchins’s death. The State also

needed to believe that Baldwin’s negligence, and not the negligence of another (e.g., Halls,

Guttierez-Reed, and whoever brought live rounds on set) was the significant cause of Hutchins’s

death. And, above all, even if the State did believe these things, its beliefs needed to be based on

the actual evidence in its possession.

19
 100. But the evidence in the State’s possession supported the opposite conclusion: that

Baldwin had exercised caution and that, even if he had not, Hutchins would still be alive if not for

the superseding negligence of someone other than Baldwin.

101. By June 2022, Carmack-Altwies had privately decided to appoint Andrea Reeb as

a special prosecutor to assist with prosecutions. At that time, Reeb, the former District Attorney for

New Mexico’s Ninth Judicial District, was actively campaigning for a seat in the New Mexico House

of Representatives.

102. Reeb emailed Carmack-Altwies on June 9, 2022, to assure Carmack-Altwies that

she would not disclose to the media that she had been chosen as Special Prosecutor. “At some

point though,” Reeb continued, “I’d at least like to get out there that I am assisting you … as it

might help in my campaign lol.”

103. Four days later, Carmack-Altwies, a Democrat, made a contribution to Reeb’s

Republican campaign.

104. On August 3, 2022, the District Attorney’s office announced that Reeb would join

the investigative team.

105. Reeb immediately became the point of contact for defense counsel and indicated

that she was the primary attorney reviewing the SFSO report and handling the investigation. She

interviewed witnesses, took proffers, engaged experts, and handled other important matters.

106. On August 30, 2022, Carmack-Altwies requested $635,000 from New Mexico’s

Board of Finance to pay Reeb’s salary and the hiring of other personnel for the investigation,

including hiring Heather Brewer as public information officer. The District Attorney’s Office

cited the need for a dedicated public information officer to manage inquiries from the media. The

State granted the District Attorney’s Office $317,750.

B. The State Tried the Case in the Media.

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 107. Carmack-Altwies and Reeb, like all prosecutors in New Mexico, are bound by

ethical rules in bringing and publicly commenting on criminal cases.

108. According to the ethical standards promulgated by the National District Attorneys

Association, “[t]he primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be

achieved by the representation and presentation of the truth.” N.D.A.A. Nat’l Prosecution

Standard 1-1.1, cmt. Thus, “[w]hether full-time or part-time, the position should be approached

as a career and not as a steppingstone or sideline.... No matter what other activities the prosecutor

is involved in, [her] public duties come first.” Id.

109. Moreover, “[t]he prosecutor should refrain from making extrajudicial comments

before or during trial that promote no legitimate law enforcement purpose and that serve solely to

heighten public condemnation of the accused.” Id. 2-14.2. Similarly, “[p]rior to and during a

criminal trial the prosecutor should not make any public, extrajudicial statement that has a

substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a judicial proceeding.” Id. 2-14.4.

110. “In particular, from the commencement of a criminal investigation until the

conclusion of trial, the prosecutor should not make any public, extrajudicial statements about,”

among other things, “[t]he character, reputation, or prior criminal conduct of a suspect, accused

person or prospective witness,” “[t]he performance or results of any scientific tests,” or

“[s]tatements concerning the credibility or anticipated testimony of prospective witnesses.” Id. 2-

14.4.

111. Carmack-Altwies and Reeb repeatedly violated these rules.

112. On October 26, 2021—five days after the accident—Carmack-Altwies started

giving media interviews regarding the investigation. Instead of limiting such statements to those

that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose and are necessary to inform the public of the

21
prosecutor’s action, Carmack-Altwies began characterizing the evidence (e.g., that there “were an

enormous amount of bullets on this set”).

113. Throughout the end of 2021 and first half of 2022, the FJDA repeatedly gave

nationally televised interviews and issued public statements that improperly commented on

important but contested facts in the case. For example, just seven days after the incident, Carmack-

Altwies stated on NBC News that Baldwin was “the one that pulled the trigger,” without any

objective basis to have reached that conclusion and long before any testing had been done to

determine how or why the firearm had discharged.

114. By the time Reeb joined the case in August 2022, she and Carmack-Altwies were

preparing for a full-scale media blitz in violation of their prosecutorial duties.

115. On January 18, 2023, the District Attorney’s Office announced that it would reveal

its charging decisions the following day. The announcement featured high-definition headshots

of Carmack-Altwies and Reeb, and promised that there would “be no news conference or public

appearances by [the D.A.’s] office” in connection with the decision:

22
 116. In a press release issued the following day, the State announced that it planned to

charge Baldwin with two counts of involuntary manslaughter, plus a sentencing enhancement for

the use of a firearm. The press release stated that “[t]he firearm enhancement makes the crime

punishable by a mandatory five years in jail.” The press release did not explain why Carmack-

Altwies and Reeb had chosen to announce the charges before they were actually filed.

117. Contrary to the “solemn occasion” without media appearances, Carmack-Altwies

and Reeb immediately appeared on national television programs to comment on the evidence, their

legal theories of Baldwin’s culpability, the impending charges, and Baldwin’s possible sentence.

118. Less than an hour after the District Attorney’s Office announced its decision to

charge Baldwin, Carmack-Altwies appeared on CNN and discussed Baldwin’s responsibilities as

an actor and producer and with respect to firearm safety on the Rust set. As a representative of the

State, Carmack-Altwies asserted that Baldwin “didn’t do any of the things that he was supposed

to do to make sure . . . that anyone around him was safe,” that Baldwin “should have checked that

gun, checked those projectiles,” and that, as a producer, Baldwin “had a duty to make sure the set

was safe” and “should have been aware that safety was an issue” on set. These statements were

neither true nor necessary to serve any legitimate law enforcement purpose.

119. That same day, Carmack-Altwies discussed “key pieces of evidence” with a

reporter from the Santa Fe New Mexican. And she appeared with Reeb on Fox News, stating that

“it was not a safe set” and asserting that it was Baldwin’s responsibility to ensure the set’s safety.

In the same interview, Reeb stated that a lab report had confirmed that “definitely the trigger was

pulled.” She made baseless assertions about Baldwin’s mental state, including that “Baldwin

knows everything that goes on the set,” including concerns that others had brought to

“management.” Reeb omitted that the lab report referred to testing in which the FBI broke the

firearm by hitting it repeatedly with a mallet.

23
 120. Reeb also failed to mention the “informal testing” that the District Attorney’s office

had conducted, which demonstrated that a single action revolver can discharge without the trigger

being pulled.

121. In yet another January 19, 2023 interview with NBC News, Reeb commented on

Baldwin’s guilt, stating that he “is somebody who committed a crime.” Carmack-Altwies asserted

conclusions about the evidence (e.g., “We know from the FBI report that he pulled that trigger.”).

122. The same day, Bryan Carpenter—an expert witness hired by the State who would

later perjure himself before the grand jury—appeared on Fox News to vouch for the prosecution

team as being “unbiased” and as having done an “excellent job.” The State later disclosed that

Carpenter billed the State $800 for each day of such interviews.

123. On January 21, 2023, Reeb again appeared on Fox News, where she commented on

the contents of the FBI reports and Baldwin’s prior statements, noting that “all those statements”

“would be admissible” and would be “used against” Baldwin. In these national media

appearances, she and Carmack-Altwies repeatedly stated that Baldwin was facing many years in

prison.

C. As the State Engaged in Further Misconduct, the Prosecutors Sought an

Improper Enhancement Of the Charges Against Baldwin.
124. On January 31, 2023, the State filed an Information charging Baldwin with two

alternative felony counts of involuntary manslaughter under NMSA 1978, section 30-2-3(B). The

last sentence of the second alternative count stated: “This offense shall be enhanced pursuant to

the firearm enhancement statute, §31-18-16, NMSA 1978.” The Information and accompanying

Statement of Probable Cause accused Baldwin of criminal involuntary manslaughter based on two

theories: his role “AS ACTOR and SHOOTER,” and his role “AS PRODUCER.” As an actor, the

Statement of Probable Cause faulted Baldwin for “letting the armorer leave the church against

protocol,” “not dealing with safety complaints on the set, not making sure the protocol of safety

24
meetings was occurring,” and “not using a replica firearm for the unscheduled rehearsal”—without

any objective basis to conclude that Baldwin had such authority.

125. As a “producer,” the Statement of Probable Cause asserted that Baldwin “was in a

position to manage, oversee, commence, and require safety training to industry standards” and

alleged that Baldwin “allowed, through acts or omissions, the hiring of inexperienced and

unqualified Gutierrez-Reed for this production, failed to mitigate or establish more precautions to

protect against Gutierrez-Reed’s inexperience, or failed to demand the minimum safety standards,

protocols, and requirements on set.” The State’s later disclosures demonstrate that Carpenter, who

has no legal training, played an active role in developing the State’s theory of prosecution,

including by “marking up” the Statement of Probable Cause with his edits.

126. However, as explained above, Baldwin did not oversee the day-to-day production

of the film and had no responsibility for the film’s budget or the hiring of crew members. None

of the producers who did have those responsibilities were charged.

127. On the same day that it filed the Information against Baldwin, the State announced

charges against Dave Halls, the self-described “last line of defense” who has publicly expressed

that he bears some responsibility for Hutchins’ death. The charges: negligent use of a deadly

weapon, a petty misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of six months in jail and a fine of

up to $500. Halls pleaded no contest and agreed to a suspended sentence and six months of

probation pending approval.

128. On February 7, 2023, Baldwin moved to disqualify Reeb as the Special Prosecutor

because her dual service as a member of the Legislature and a Special Prosecutor violated the

separation-of-powers provision of the New Mexico Constitution. That provision states that “no

person . . . charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of [the legislative,

25
executive, and judicial] departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the

others.”

129. On February 10, 2023, Baldwin moved to dismiss the firearm enhancement, a

statutory provision that had been enacted on May 18, 2022, after the accident. The charge violated

the U.S. Constitution’s ex post facto clause.

130. The State eventually conceded both motions, but not before Carmack-Altwies and

Reeb attacked Baldwin and his counsel in the press for filing them.

131. On February 7, 2023, immediately after Baldwin filed the disqualification motion,

the FJDA’s spokesperson told the media that Baldwin and his lawyers can “use whatever tactics

they want to distract from the fact that Halyna Hutchins died because of gross negligence and a

reckless disregard for safety on the ‘Rust’ film set.”

132. After Baldwin filed the ex post facto motion on February 10, 2023, the FJDA

spokesperson issued the following statement: “Another day, another motion from Alec Baldwin

and his attorneys in an attempt to distract from the gross negligence and complete disregard for

safety on the Rust film set that led to Halyna Hutchins’ death.” The statement said that Carmack-

Altwies and Reeb would remain focused on justice and ensuring “that everyone—even celebrities

with fancy attorneys—is held accountable under the law.”

133. On February 16, 2023, Reeb emailed Baldwin’s counsel demanding that he

withdraw the ex post facto motion and threatened sanctions for its filing. She emailed him again

shortly after stating that she hadn’t actually evaluated this issue because she was too busy serving

in the legislature, but that she would review it soon. Then, just three hours after the first email,

Reeb emailed Baldwin’s counsel admitting that she “100 percent agree[d]” that charging the

firearm enhancement violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. But when the State

filed an Amended Information without the firearm enhancement, it did not attribute the amended

26
Information to its filing of an unconstitutional charge, but to “avoid further litigious distractions

by Baldwin and his attorneys.” To make that clear, the State added gratuitously that the

prosecution’s priority is “securing justice, not securing billable hours for big-city attorneys,”

further disparaging Baldwin and his counsel for exercising Baldwin’s constitutional rights.

134. Similarly, after responding to the disqualification motion, Reeb announced that she

was stepping down from her role as special prosecutor. She issued another public statement and

characterized her choice to step down as a way to avoid questions regarding her dual roles

“cloud[ing] the real issue at hand.” Not content to leave it there, she again commented on

Baldwin’s ultimate guilt, remarking that “the best way I can ensure justice is served in this case .

. . is to step down so that the prosecution can focus on the evidence and the facts, which clearly

show a complete disregard for basic safety protocols led to the death of Halyna Hutchins.”

135. Reeb had, at this point, already accomplished her goal. She had won her election

and had assumed elected office. On March 15, 2023, she withdrew as Special Prosecutor.

136. On March 29, 2023, Carmack-Altwies also withdrew, after a hearing at which the

judge challenged Carmack-Altwies’s ability to remain alongside any special prosecutor under

NMSA 1978 section 36-1-23.1, which allows for the appointment of a special prosecutor only

when the “district attorney . . . cannot prosecute a case for ethical reasons or other good cause.”

VI. THE SECOND PROSECUTION TEAM, LED BY KARI MORRISSEY, ALSO VIOLATED
BALDWIN’S RIGHTS
A. At First, the State Dismissed the Charges Against Baldwin.

137. In March 2023, Carmack-Altwies appointed Kari Morrissey to lead the State’s

prosecutions arising from the incident on the Rust set.

138. On April 13, 2023, Baldwin’s counsel met with Morrissey and her co-appointee,

Jason Lewis, in hopes of persuading them that the State’s case against Baldwin was unjustified.

After the presentation, Morrissey agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice. She acknowledged

27
that the prior prosecution’s “producer theory” lacked merit, given that there is no such thing as

vicarious liability in criminal law.

B. When the State’s Firearm Experts Issued a Report Questioning the State’s
Theory About the Condition of the Revolver, Prosecutors Hid the Report.
139. Shortly after dismissing the charges, Morrissey retained firearm experts Lucien

Haag and Michael Haag to interpret the FBI’s findings about the prop gun and conduct further

analysis, notwithstanding the FBI’s destruction of the gun. Over a four-week period in August

2023, the Haags issued three reports on the issue. When their final report undermined the State’s

case against Baldwin, they kept him from knowing about it or seeing it until late Spring 2024.

140. In an August 2, 2023 report (the “First Haag Report”), the Haags stated that the

“fatal incident was the consequence of the hammer being manually retracted to its fully rearward

and cocked position followed, at some point, by the pull or rearward depression of the trigger.” In

other words, in the opinion of the Haags, Baldwin pulled the trigger.

141. On August 24, 2023, at the State’s request the Haags examined the firearm again.

In a supplemental report dated August 26, 2023 (the “Second Haag Report”), the Haags stated that

the revolver “functioned properly and as designed and intended by the manufacturer.”

142. But the Haags issued a third report on August 31, 2023 (the “Third Haag Report”).

The purpose of the third report was to identify the origin of “unexplained toolmarks present on the

working surface and sides of the evidence trigger/sear” and to determine whether they existed

when the gun was on the Rust set. Remarkably, the Third Haag Report undermined the conclusions

of the Haags’ earlier work. It concluded that it is “unlikely . . . that these toolmarks are the result

of the damage incurred during the FBI’s impact testing” and that they “do not appear to be original

manufacturing marks or use and abuse toolmarks based on [their] irregular orientation.”

143. Although the State promptly disclosed the First Haag Report to Baldwin, the State

failed to disclose to Baldwin both the Second Haag Report and, of particular concern, the Third

28
Haag Report until months later, and months after Morrissey had obtained a grand jury indictment

in which she had concealed the Third Haag Report from the grand jury and presented it with only

a select set of the Haags’ opinions.

C. The Trial Court Attempted to Stop Morrissey From Rigging the Grand Jury
Process Against Baldwin.
144. On October 5, 2023, Morrissey told Baldwin that she intended to present the case

to a grand jury. Shortly after, The New York Times published an article revealing that Morrissey

had conducted an interview with The Times about the case in which she improperly disclosed

details about her intention to present the case to a grand jury. The article explained the

prosecution’s view that evidence about the gun “contradicted Mr. Baldwin’s assertion that he had

not pulled the trigger,” quoting Morrissey’s statement that “[t]he forensic testing of the gun

concluded with certainty that the trigger of the gun had to have been pulled for the gun to go off.”

145. When seeking an indictment from a grand jury, a prosecuting attorney is required

to alert the grand jury to all lawful, competent, and relevant evidence that disproves or reduces a

charge or accusation or that makes an indictment unjustified and that is within the knowledge,

possession, or control of the prosecuting attorney. A target of a potential grand jury indictment is

entitled to submit a letter to the prosecuting attorney that identifies the evidence about which the

target believes the prosecuting attorney has a duty to alert the grand jury.

146. On October 25, 2023, one week after improperly announcing the grand jury date to

the public, Morrissey served a “target notice” on Baldwin that omitted the standard 48-hour

deadline for the target to provide a grand jury alert letter, even as she simultaneously acknowledged

never having seen that provision omitted before.

147. After admitting that she had “eliminated” this standard provision from the target

letter, Morrissey stated that she was nonetheless “happy to work with [Baldwin’s counsel] in this

regard and will fully consider any requests” made by Baldwin’s counsel.

29
 148. Baldwin responded that, at a minimum, he should receive the full time to submit an

alert letter that he is entitled to under New Mexico law, especially given the volume of evidence

and number of witnesses involved in the case. Baldwin stated further that the grand jury date

should be adjourned to allow the State sufficient time to “review the voluminous alert letter we

will be submitting” and to “ensure this process is done properly the first time around.”

149. Baldwin believed this to be a reasonable and fair approach, given the prosecuting

attorney’s alert obligations, the significant “volume of evidence in this case,” and the severe

“consequences of any failure to present exculpatory evidence.” Baldwin asked Morrissey if she

was “willing to discuss a reasonable schedule for this process.”

150. Although Morrissey had said that she was willing to “work with [Baldwin’s

counsel] in this regard” and discuss a schedule that was “agreeable” to Baldwin, she immediately

rejected Baldwin’s request and stated that he was not “entitled to additional time to submit requests

that certain evidence/witnesses be presented the grand jury.”

151. Morrissey also claimed that the State “intended to treat Mr. Baldwin … no

differently than similarly situated defendants in New Mexico,” even though she had just admitted

that she had never seen a target treated that way. In fact, Morrissey had already treated Baldwin

differently: On the same day that she had served the target notice on Baldwin, she served a target

notice on Gutierrez-Reed that included the 48-hour deadline, giving Gutierrez-Reed four days

more than Baldwin to submit exculpatory material.

152. On October 30, 2023, the State filed an expedited motion to shorten Baldwin’s time

to present exculpatory evidence by four days. In its motion, the State falsely represented that it

had provided Baldwin continuous access to its investigative file since April 2023, when the

previous prosecution was dismissed, and argued that, in any event, Baldwin didn’t need the full

statutory period to provide exculpatory evidence because he was already “well aware of all

30
possible directly exculpatory evidence today.” Morrissey made this representation even though a

key piece of exculpatory evidence—the Third Haag Report—had not been disclosed and would

not be disclosed for another seven months, despite having been in Morrissey’s possession since

August 2023. In addition, the State expressed concern that Baldwin would “intentionally withhold

the requested exculpatory evidence until exactly forty-eight hours prior to the grand jury to cause

the postponement of the grand jury proceeding.”

153. Baldwin explained in response to the State’s motion that the State’s position was

backwards: Baldwin was entitled to submit an alert letter up to 48 hours before the grand jury

proceeding, and all the State had to do to alleviate its self-imposed time crunch was adjourn its

unreasonably accelerated grand jury schedule. The only plausible inference to be drawn from the

State’s approach—and the fact that Gutierrez-Reed was being afforded rights that Baldwin was

being denied—is that the State wanted to make it harder for Baldwin to alert the grand jury to

relevant and exculpatory evidence.

154. In parallel with this unprecedented effort to shorten Baldwin’s time to submit an

alert letter, the State also made an unprecedented request to conduct a one-sided voir dire of the

grand jury. The purported reason for the State’s request was to control for the “significant amount

of information . . . being made available to prospective jurors” through the media. What the State’s

motion failed to acknowledge, however, is that the media environment surrounding the incident—

particularly the coverage most prejudicial to Baldwin—was primarily the result of the State’s

unethical press campaign, which had begun with Carmack-Altwies and Reeb and had continued

under Morrissey.

155. The Court denied both of the State’s motions. That, however, did not end the

Special Prosecutors’ efforts to manipulate the process.

31
 156. On November 14, 2023, 48 hours before the grand jury was scheduled to begin,

Baldwin submitted an alert letter to the State that identified several key witnesses and dozens of

documents that would disprove the charges against Baldwin or otherwise make an indictment

“unjustified.”

157. As to witnesses, the alert letter identified six persons whose testimony would be

exculpatory or favorable to Baldwin’s case and whom the State was required to make available:

Joel Souza (the director), Sarah Zachry (the prop master), Ryan Smith (the producer), Alexandria

Hancock (the lead detective), Joel Cano (the former lead detective), and Robert Shilling (the

State’s former investigator).

158. As to documents, the alert letter identified 23 documents that Baldwin contended

would disprove the charges against him or make an indictment unjustified. His proposed

documents included, among others:

a. A recording of the 911 call in which the caller, who witnessed the gun go

off, describes it as an “accident” and places blame on someone other than Baldwin.

b. Three search warrants containing numerous exculpatory statements from

key witnesses, including: (i) a statement from a cameraman, who witnessed the gun go off,

that Baldwin “had been very careful” with firearms on set, (ii) a statement that Halls told

everyone (including Baldwin) that the gun was safe to handle before it went off, (iii) a

statement from Halls that he “should have checked all of [the rounds in the gun], but

didn’t,” and (iv) a statement from Gutierrez-Reed that she “didn’t really check [the gun]

too much” before the incident.

c. A report from the New Mexico Occupational Health and Safety Bureau that

Baldwin was not part of Rust management and that his authority on set was limited to

32
 creative decisions, and excerpts from the Santa Fe Sheriff’s Office Report that contain

further exculpatory statements from key witnesses.

d. Text messages between Zachry, Gutierrez-Reed, and Kenney (the film’s

ammunition supplier) showing that Gutierrez-Reed went “target shooting” with the driver

of the prop truck before the incident and that, unbeknownst to Baldwin, she consistently

failed to follow proper safety protocols on the set and on a previous film.

e. A letter signed by many of the cast and crew disputing that the Rust set was

inherently unsafe.

f. A transcript from Halls’ proffer interview, in which he blamed himself for

the incident and stated that no member of the cast or crew could have anticipated there

would be live rounds in the firearm on the set.

159. The alert letter also requested that the State provide a specific instruction to the

grand jury that the criminal negligence standard required the prosecution to show that Baldwin

had subjective knowledge of an actual risk that the firearm placed in his hand had been loaded

with live ammunition, and that he willfully disregarded that risk when pointing the gun toward

Hutchins.

160. On November 15, 2023, the State filed an expedited motion to “preclude” nearly

all of the documents and witnesses that Baldwin had identified in his alert letter. The State also

sought to preclude Baldwin’s requested jury instruction regarding subjective knowledge, arguing

that an “instruction requiring that the target had subjective knowledge of an actual risk that the

firearm placed in his hand had been loaded with live ammunition is an unprecedented departure

from the elements of proof the law and rules require.” The State further argued that such an

instruction improperly “assumes that the factual basis of negligent act [sic] was failing to check

the firearm for live rounds.” According to the State, “whether or not [Baldwin] had subjective

33
knowledge of an actual risk that the firearm placed in his hand had been loaded with live

ammunition has nothing to do with the other ways in which the State intends to show [he]

negligently handled a firearm resulting in death.”

161. On November 15, 2023, the Court vacated and rescheduled the grand jury from

November 16, 2023, to January 18, 2024, postponing argument on the State’s motions to exclude

Baldwin’s evidence to give the Court time to review the parties’ submissions. At the hearing, the

Court also expressed deep concern about the fact that the grand jury date and other information

about the grand jury process had been disclosed to the media. The Court explained that the State’s

disclosure to the media of the grand jury date created the risk of prejudice, and that grand jurors

had, in fact, approached the clerk seeking to serve on the grand jury. In response, the Court

unequivocally and repeatedly ordered the parties not to disclose information about the grand jury

process or what happened during that day’s hearing.

162. But within one hour, the State violated the Court’s Order by disclosing details of

the hearing to the press, including the new grand jury date that the Court had instructed the parties

not to disclose. In response, Baldwin filed a sanctions and contempt motion, which prompted the

State to violate the Court’s Order again by making improper disclosures about those filings.

163. To make matters even worse, in these discussions, the State also revealed its illicit

motivations behind its prosecution of Baldwin. As reported by NBC News, “Prosecutors haven’t

said publicly what new evidence they have obtained during their months of investigation. But a

source familiar with the case said the special prosecutors have had discussions in which they said

they hope the trial will ‘humble’ Baldwin, specifically citing his run-ins with paparazzi and public

comments that weren’t about the case. The source added that the intention is for it to be a

‘teachable moment’ for Baldwin.”

34
 164. The following morning, on The Today Show, NBC News added that the Special

Prosecutors said they were also targeting Baldwin because they think he’s “arrogant.”

165. These reports reflected an extreme abuse of prosecutorial power and were

consistent with the State’s motivations from day one, when Reeb told Carmack-Altwies that

prosecuting Baldwin would help her election chances.

166. On January 11, 2024, the Court overruled most of the State’s objections to

Baldwin’s evidence and held that the grand jury must be told about nearly all of the evidence the

State had sought to exclude. The January 11 Order also rejected the State’s narrow view of what

it means to conduct a “fair and impartial” grand jury proceeding. The Court ruled that all six of

Baldwin’s proposed witnesses must be made available to the grand jury, as well as 20 out of the

21 documents that the State had sought to exclude.

D. Despite the Trial Court Rulings, and in Violation of Her Duties and New
Mexico Law, Morrissey Misled the Grand Jury.
167. Driven by disdain and the desire to “humble” an “arrogant prick” (as she would

later refer to Baldwin), Morrissey was determined to secure Baldwin’s indictment at any cost.

Morrissey knew, however, that if the grand jury heard all of the evidence—including the

documents and witnesses the Court had ordered her to make “readily available” due to their

exculpatory nature—the grand jurors would see that Baldwin had not committed a crime and the

grand jury would not return the indictment she wanted. Her solution was to mislead the grand jury

into believing a different set of facts. She accomplished this goal by knowingly: (1) eliciting false

and contradictory testimony from the State’s witnesses, (2) preventing the State’s witnesses from

saying anything favorable to Baldwin (often by cutting them off mid-sentence or redirecting them

to a different topic), (3) preventing the grand jury from seeing or hearing from the exculpatory

documents and witnesses that the Court had ordered her to make “readily available” to the grand

35
jury, and (4) concealing—from both Baldwin and the grand jury—exculpatory opinions by the

State’s own expert.

168. The State presented seven witnesses to the grand jury. Out of those seven, three

were being paid to testify, two were SFSO officers, and one was (and still is) suing Baldwin for

money. The seventh witness began publicly blaming Baldwin for Hutchins’ death within days of

the incident, even though he quit the production before the accident and was not on set when it

occurred. Of the State’s seven witnesses, only one—Ross Addiego, the one suing Baldwin for

money—was on set when the accident occurred.

169. After eleven hours of being misled and lied to by Morrissey and the State’s

witnesses, the grand jury returned an indictment. She elicited false and contradictory testimony

from each of the State’s witnesses.

1. The State Presented False and Incomplete Grand Jury Testimony

From Lead Investigator Det. Alexandria Hancock.
170. Morrissey called Det. Hancock to describe the findings of the SFSO investigation.

In violation of Morrissey’s ethical duties, she either intentionally caused Det. Hancock to give

false and misleading testimony or knew that the testimony was false and misleading but failed to

cause Det. Hancock to correct it.

171. For example, in describing her understanding of what had happened before she

arrived on the scene, Det. Hancock testified, “all I had known was that during that rehearsal, Alec

Baldwin had shot a revolver and it hit the two people inside the church.” Det. Hancock gave this

testimony even though she knew that at least six witnesses had told investigators in the immediate

aftermath of the incident that the gun just “went off.” Further, the caller who placed the October

21, 2021, 911 call to which Det. Hancock had responded made clear that the gun went off

“accidentally,” and stated that someone other than Baldwin was responsible for checking the gun.

36
Morrissey never allowed the grand jurors to hear the recording of the 911 call, despite being

ordered to make the recording “readily available” to the grand jury.

172. Likewise, Morrissey caused Det. Hancock to testify that Gutierrez-Reed “was not

allowed to stay in the church” after Baldwin was handed the gun, which another State’s witness

claimed was a violation of film safety protocols for which Baldwin was responsible. But five

weeks later, to obtain Gutierrez-Reed’s conviction, Morrissey told jurors that, before the incident,

“No one told [Gutierrez-Reed] to leave the church. No one called her out of the church.”

173. Morrissey also elicited false testimony from Det. Hancock that Morrissey would

repeatedly elicit from the State’s witnesses throughout the grand jury proceeding: That Baldwin

was required to participate in Gutierrez-Reed’s safety check of the firearm. Det. Hancock testified

to the grand jurors that “when an armorer hands that gun off, she’s supposed to do a safety check

with that actor.” But both Morrissey and Det. Hancock knew that this testimony was false. Det.

Hancock’s own report of her interview with actor Jensen Ackles—whom Morrissey has

characterized as the gold standard of firearm safety among the actors on the set of Rust—states

that “Jensen advised he does his own checks on the weapons, and tells others to as well, however

he said it’s not the actor’s job to be checking the firearm.” And at Gutierrez-Reed’s trial,

Morrissey herself told the jurors that the armorer has “no supervisor” and “is the autonomous

decision-maker with regard to gun safety.”

174. Despite knowing that Baldwin was not required to participate in the armorer’s

safety check, Morrissey repeatedly insinuated throughout Det. Hancock’s testimony that

Baldwin’s failure to check the gun was a violation of movie set safety norms—even though it was

the norm. For example:

HANCOCK: So Baldwin actually denied doing any checks with

Hannah. He said that, essentially, he entrusted her
because she was hired for that position and he
didn’t want to insult her.

37
 MORRISSEY: So did he explain to you that she would offer --
HANCOCK: Yes.
MORRISSEY: -- for him to check it?
HANCOCK: Yes.
MORRISSEY: And what would he do?
HANCOCK: He, essentially, would just say it’s fine. And he
wouldn’t do --
MORRISSEY: It’s fine?
HANCOCK: Yeah. He wouldn’t do a check himself.
MORRISSEY: Okay. And he indicated that that was because he
didn’t want to insult her?
HANCOCK: Yes.
MORRISSEY: Okay. Through your investigation, are you aware of
other actors on the movie set who were more
proactive about those safety checks?
HANCOCK: Yes.

175. Morrissey also caused Det. Hancock to testify that Gutierrez-Reed had “made

several attempts to train Baldwin with the firearms” but that Baldwin was “not receptive to any

training with her.” This testimony was false, and Morrissey knew it. A few weeks after the grand

jury proceeding, at the Gutierrez-Reed trial, Morrissey told jurors that Gutierrez-Reed did not

request more training time with Baldwin—and that the denial of Gutierrez-Reed’s requests for

additional training with other actors is “not the reason Halyna Hutchins is dead.”

176. Similarly, Morrissey caused Det. Hancock to testify that Gutierrez-Reed was

“pretty rushed during the entire time” they were filming, and she caused other witnesses to testify

that it was Baldwin who was doing the rushing. By eliciting this testimony, Morrissey convinced

grand jurors that Baldwin was responsible for rushing the armorer on the day of the incident—

which is the opposite of what Morrissey told jurors at the Gutierrez-Reed trial, just five weeks

later:

MORRISSEY: [O]n October 21st, this was simply not the case
[that Gutierrez-Reed was being rushed]. It was not the case on that

38
 day. She had three hours in the morning waiting for the camera
crew to arrive. She had every opportunity to go through that box
of dummies. Gee, it only had like 30 rounds in it. How long does
it take to pull the round out of the box, shake it, and if it doesn’t
shake, look to see if it has a hole in it, put it back in the box, and
do that to each and every one of them? How long does that
exercise take? Ten minutes, max? That’s not hard.

2. The State Presented False and Incomplete Grand Jury Testimony

From Firearms Expert Michael Haag.
177. After the State called Det. Hancock, it called Michael Haag, one of the State’s

firearms experts, to testify that the prop gun would not have fired on the day of the incident unless

Baldwin had pulled the trigger. That assertion was central to the State’s ability to obtain a grand

jury indictment.

178. Yet Morrisey allowed Haag to omit essential facts about the testing, including that

the FBI testing established that the gun did fire without a trigger pull when the firearm was fully

loaded with six rounds, as it was on the day of the incident.

179. Haag admitted that the hammer of the firearm that fired the fatal round was

“rounded” (which would make it easier to fire). Without any support, however, Haag testified that

the hammer had been broken after the incident and during the FBI testing—an impossible

conclusion to reach given that the FBI did not inspect the parts of the firearm or preserve any

evidence about its internal parts (e.g., no photographs, no videos, nothing) before it conducted its

destructive testing.

180. As the State knew, the gun was supposedly new when Kenney delivered it to the

production. Yet its internal components already showed signs of significant aging, and showed

clear signs of having been modified and filed down. Images of the firearm after the FBI testing

show filed-down hammer notches that would have made it easier to fire without pulling the

trigger—including the full-cock hammer notch at the bottom of the hammer that was completely

filed off.

39
 181. Morrisey chose not to tell the grand jury that the elimination of these notches

(which appear filed off and are inconsistent with being broken by the FBI’s testing) would have

made the gun significantly more likely to fire without a trigger pull and otherwise prone to

malfunction. Moreover, she failed to explain that the hammer showed signs of rough tool marks,

including file marks, that are consistent with manipulation. She concealed this information from

the grand jury and presented only Haag’s unfounded speculation that: (a) the damage occurred

during FBI testing (even though the FBI made no such observation, and neither Haag nor anyone

else had inspected the gun before that testing to be able to give such testimony); and (b) the gun

would have operated normally on set.

182. Stunningly, Morrissey concealed information from Baldwin and the grand jury that

directly undermined Haag’s testimony. The Third Haag Report, which Morrissey withheld from

Baldwin even after she learned that he was aware of only the First Haag Report—contradicted

Haag’s grand jury testimony that the FBI’s testing caused the markings on the gun.

183. The Third Haag Report that Morrisey kept from the grand jury and Baldwin

concludes that it is “unlikely . . . that these toolmarks are the result of the damage incurred during

the FBI’s impact testing” and that they “do not appear to be original manufacturing marks or use

and abuse toolmarks based on [their] irregular orientation.” This opinion contradicts Haag’s grand

jury testimony and is highly exculpatory. Yet Morrisey concealed it from the grand jury and from

Baldwin even though it came into her possession on August 31, 2023.

184. Morrissey’s only explanation for why she did not disclose the Third Haag Report

sooner was that she “intended to forward it for disclosure” on the day that it was received, but that

she inexplicably “did not.” But this explanation does not explain why, if her failure to disclose

the Third Haag Report was a simple oversight, she did not disclose it when she disclosed the

Second Haag Report—especially when she knew that Baldwin knew about only the First Haag

40
Report. Morrisey intentionally decided not to disclose the report to Baldwin because it undermined

her basis for the indictment and could establish reasonable doubt at trial.

185. The trial court later found that Morrissey was culpable for the State’s failure to

disclose the Third Haag Report to Baldwin

3. The State Presented False and Incomplete Grand Jury Testimony

From Bryan Carpenter.
186. The State’s next grand jury witness was Bryan Carpenter, who, like Haag, the State

paid to testify. Despite holding himself out to the public as an armorer and weapons expert,

Carpenter introduced himself to grand jurors as the “owner” of a “production studio”—essentially

claiming that he was a movie producer. That testimony was false, and Morrisey knew it.

187. Carpenter was not an experienced movie producer, let alone someone who was

qualified as an expert witness on that subject matter. His misrepresentation of these credentials

allowed him to testify well beyond his experience with credibility that he had not earned—just as

Morrissey intended. She knew that grand jurors were unlikely to be familiar with the customs and

practices of the film industry, knew that they had no way of verifying Carpenter’s claimed status

in the industry, and knew that they would credit his testimony when there was an insufficient basis

to do so.

188. Morrissey led grand jurors to believe falsely that Carpenter was an experienced

movie producer with a wealth of knowledge about the film industry in general, the roles and

responsibilities of actors and producers on a movie set, and the meaning and application of movie

set safety guidelines. Morrissey then knowingly elicited false testimony from him on all of these

subjects.

189. For example, through Morrisey’s questioning, Carpenter told the grand jury that the

safety bulletins issued by the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”) “place . . . responsibility for firearm

safety on the actor,” when in fact, SAG has made the opposite statement. In fact, the safety bulletin

41
that Carpenter purported to summarize during his grand jury testimony makes clear that the actor

has no obligation to check the gun, that the weapons handler (not the actor) is the one responsible

for checking the gun before each use, that the actor may point the gun at the camera with the

approval of the First AD (which Halls gave here), and that the armorer (Gutierrez-Reed) and First

AD (Halls) are exclusively responsible for firearm safety.

190. Just as she had done in her questioning of Det. Hancock, Morrissey questioned

Carpenter in a manner that framed Baldwin’s decision not to check the gun as an aberration, even

though both Morrissey and Carpenter both knew that this was false.

191. Morrissey would elicit the opposite testimony from Carpenter just a few weeks later

at the Gutierrez-Reed trial. There, Carpenter told jurors that it is the armorer’s responsibility “to

ferret out any possible live rounds on a movie set,” that it is not an actor’s job to perform firearm

safety checks by “taking the ammunition in and out [and] looking at it,” and that it is not a violation

of any safety protocols for an actor to decline to observe the armorer’s loading of the firearm.

After telling grand jurors that actors are responsible for the safety of their firearms, Carpenter told

jurors in the Gutierrez-Reed case that actors can check their firearms if they want to, but that such

checks “are more for a warm and fuzzy feeling for them” and that it’s “rare” for actors to participate

in safety checks.

4. The State Presented False and Incomplete Grand Jury Testimony

From Lane Luper.
192. The next witness Morrissey called before the grand jury was Lane Luper, a member

of the Rust camera crew who quit the production the day before the incident. As a result, Luper

was not present on the set on the day of the incident. Despite that and his relatively narrow role

as an assistant cameraman, before the grand jury Morrissey treated him as an expert on matters

related to film safety and asked him to answer specific questions regarding firearm safety rules

about which he had no expertise. At the same time, Morrisey did not tell the grand jury about

42
Luper’s bias against Rust and its producers: He had quit because the production would not pay for

hotel rooms for crew members who lived less than an hour away from the set.

193. Morrissey used Luper to elicit testimony regarding the safety conditions on set, for

which he claimed Baldwin was responsible as a producer. By doing so, Morrissey sought to bolster

the grand jury’s view of Baldwin’s culpability by relying on the same theory of vicarious criminal

liability that she had previously admitted was meritless and that the district court later dismissed.

5. The State Presented False and Incomplete Grand Jury Testimony

From Ross Addiego.
194. Morrissey presented testimony from just one eyewitness—a crew member named

Ross Addiego. Immediately after the accident, Addiego had approached Baldwin, shook his hand,

and asked how he was doing. Yet Morrisey did not ask Addiego about the exculpatory things he

said and did right after the accident. Nor did Morrissey let the grand jury know that Addiego was

then (and still is) suing Baldwin for money damages. Addiego thus had a direct, but undisclosed,

financial interest in seeing the grand jury indict Baldwin.

195. Even worse, Morrissey prevented him from giving any testimony that might

undermine her chances of getting the grand jury to indict Baldwin.

196. For example, Morrissey prevented grand jurors from hearing about Dave Halls,

who, despite accepting responsibility for Hutchins’ death, was barely mentioned during eleven

hours of grand jury testimony. This was no accident. On the few occasions when grand jurors

inquired about Halls, Morrisey would redirect their inquiry to a different witness or topic. And if

one of her own witnesses began discussing Halls, she would cut them off mid-sentence, as she did

with Addiego:

MORRISSEY: Now, you’ve seen this video . . . is anything about what

you’ve seen here problematic from your standpoint?
ADDIEGO: Yes.
MORRISSEY: What is it?

43
 ADDIEGO: There’s a number of things. First of all, as soon as the --
Mr. Baldwin emptied that firearm and we had to reload,
Dave Halls should’ve called cut to give everybody that
moment to safely reset. I -- it appears as though the armorer
is putting spent ammo in the same fanny pack or pouch as
live ammo -- as she’s pulling live ammo out of. Dave
Halls, the first AD, who’s in blue jeans and a black shirt, is
not—
MORRISSEY: [interrupting] And -- and keep in mind, we’re here for Mr.
Baldwin. Point -- point your -- your narrative. What -- what
is Mr. Baldwin doing in this scene . . . that was concerning
to you.

6. The State Kept the Grand Jury From Hearing Testimony from
Witnesses That Would Have Undermined an Indictment.
197. As a result of Morrissey’s diversions, the grand jury never heard from the film’s

director (Joel Souza), its producer (Ryan Smith), its first assistant director (Dave Halls), or its prop

master (Sarah Zachry), even though each of these witnesses had exculpatory testimony that would

have satisfied inquiries from the grand jury in ways that Morrissey’s paid and attenuated witnesses

could not. But rather than “facilitate” the grand jury’s interest in hearing from the witnesses that

Baldwin’s alert letter had identified and that the grand jury judge had directed Morrissey to present,

she made sure that the grand jury never heard from them. Morrissey also withheld over a dozen

exculpatory documents that were relevant to the grand jurors’ inquiries and contained specific

answers to many of their questions.

198. Indeed, Morrisey never even contacted Baldwin’s witnesses to ensure they were

available to testify to the grand jury, even though the grand jury judge had ordered her to make

Baldwin’s proposed witnesses “readily available” to testify without “scheduling disruptions.”

Although Morrissey knew that she was obligated to do this, she made sure that the grand jury

would never hear from any witness that might have anything exculpatory to say.

199. Morrissey’s omission of Halls was particularly shocking, given what Halls had told

Morrissey, under oath, just a few weeks before the grand jury was convened. In a December 12,

44
2023 deposition, which took place in connection with the State’s case against Gutierrez-Reed,

Halls was asked whether he believed that “any one person bears responsibility for what happens

to Hutchins, or was this an accident that was caused by multiple people and multiple events?” In

response, Halls listed, “in order of importance,” what he believed to be the causes of Hutchins’

death: “Certainly, the number one important factor in all this is that a live round of ammunition

ended up on a film set. Two, that the gun was not checked properly by the armorer and myself.

Three . . . the camera crew resigning left the camera crew shorthanded . . . which forced both

Halyna and Joel into the church to look at this tiny . . . onboard monitor to look at the shot and to

light the shot.” He further testified that as Hutchins was looking at the monitor, she was “telling

[Baldwin] where to . . . point the gun,” and that he “[didn’t] know if [Baldwin] knew he was

pointing it directly at her.” And that, “looking back . . . if perhaps [he] had seen all of those rounds

. . . [he] would have taken appropriate action.”

200. Morrissey saw Halls give this testimony just five weeks before the grand jury was

convened. Yet she refused to make Halls available to the grand jury. And she continued to deny

grand jurors access to Halls even after a grand juror asked: “so the bottom line is the responsibility

of making sure these guns – these bullets are not live are up to, what, David Halls and – Hannah?”

The truthful answer to that question is “yes.” But rather than ask grand jurors if they wanted to

hear from Halls (or tell them that this was an option), Morrissey told the grand jury, “We are going

to have another witness address those issues for you. We have an expert who works on movie sets,

and he’s going to answer those questions for you if that’s okay.” The witness she was referring to

was Bryan Carpenter, the State’s paid witness whose false answer to that question (blaming the

situation on Baldwin) would have been refuted by Halls, the relevant industry safety bulletin, and

multiple statements by the Screen Actors Guild.

45
 201. Notably, in her closing argument at Gutierrez-Reed’s trial, Morrissey argued to the

jury that Gutierrez-Reed “is the autonomous decision maker with regard to gun safety” and that

Gutierrez-Reed was responsible for Hutchins’ death because it was “foreseeable” that Baldwin

would not check the gun. But Morrissey concealed these facts from the grand jurors in hopes of

convincing them that there was probable cause that Baldwin had committed a crime.

202. On January 19, 2024, the grand jury returned an indictment. The indictment states

that it “is based” upon the testimony of “Alexandria Hancock, Bryan Carpenter, Lane Luper, Ross

Addiego, Michael Haag, Marissa Poppell, and Connor Rice.” The grand jury did not receive the

favorable or exculpatory testimony and documents that Morrissey had an obligation to present.

Nor was the grand jury told it had the right to review and the obligation to request this information.

203. Although the indictment on its face suggests that grand jurors found probable cause

that Alec Baldwin committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter, in reality, Morrissey

intentionally misled them to that finding.

VII. AFTER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING BALDWIN’S INDICTMENT, THE STATE VIOLATED

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS REGARDING EVIDENCE THE STATE
POSSESSED
204. New Mexico law required the State to disclose to Baldwin, among other things,

“any statement made” by “any witnesses that will provide expert testimony” if the statements are

“within the knowledge of the prosecutor.” See Rule 5-501(A)(5) NMRA. A “statement” is defined

as “any written, stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcription thereof,

which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral declaration and which is recorded

contemporaneously with the making of the oral declaration.” Rule 5-501(G) NMRA.

205. After the State obtained the new indictment, the Court issued a Scheduling Order

on February 26, 2024, setting a July 9, 2024 trial date. Witness lists and dispositive motions were

due by May 6, 2024. Pre-trial witness interviews were to be completed by June 5, 2024. The

46
Order also stated: “Following initial discovery disclosures, the parties have a continuing duty to

disclose and make available supplemental discovery within seven (7) days of the receipt of such

information.”

206. Over the next five months, the State intentionally failed to comply with these

obligations. It delayed its disclosure of important evidence for weeks and months after receiving

it, or failed to disclose it at all. It failed and refused to respond to inquiries from Baldwin’s

attorneys about evidence and the State’s disclosure obligations. Even worse, the State lied to

Baldwin and to the Court to cover up what it was doing. All of this undermined Baldwin’s right

to a fair trial, as protected by United States and New Mexico law. Defendants’ conduct was the

result of a calculated and malicious plan by the State to obtain a conviction through illicit means.

207. To that end, on May 6, 2024, the deadline to add new witnesses and barely two

months before trial, Morrissey disclosed to Baldwin’s attorneys several email communications

with the FJDA’s “expert” witness, Carpenter, concerning the case that had occurred more than one

year earlier. In one of the emails, Morrissey points Carpenter to photographs that, in her words,

show the “stark difference” between the hammer notches on the gun that Baldwin was given on

the Rust set and the notches that appear on a “brand new hammer from the exact same gun.” In

response, Carpenter stated that he “cannot see any reason that’s functionally necessary or does not

compromise the safety integrity and/or the operation of the gun.” He followed up the next day,

stating, “Though I see no reason (operationally) why that modification exists, it remains to be seen

definitively if it compromised the safety and function of the revolver and who/where/why it was

preformed [sic] in the first place.” The statements from the government’s witness undermined the

State’s contentions that the firearm functioned properly and showed no signs of modifications.

208. Morrissey retained the Haags to offer their opinions as to the condition of the gun

on the day of the accident. As noted above, the Haags ultimately issued three reports on that

47
question. Two of the reports tended to support the State’s theory of the case, but the third report

did not. The State immediately disclosed the first report, held onto the second report (while

presenting its core conclusions to the grand jury), but withheld the third report until May 23, 2024,

after Baldwin had inadvertently learned of its existence.

209. Two weeks later, on June 6, 2024, after the pretrial interview period had ended, the

State disclosed additional communications with the Haags—roughly 200 files—that showed that

the Haags had prepared the third report on their own initiative because they had felt obligated to

disclose their inconsistent findings. Morrissey gave no explanation as to why it took until June 6,

2024, for the State to disclose these materials, almost all of them dating back to 2023.

210. Morrissey’s failure to disclose expert opinions and communications related to the

condition of the prop gun was part of a much larger effort to deprive Baldwin of his right to a fair

trial.

211. On May 23, 2024, Morrissey disclosed dozens of audio recordings of interviews

that the State’s investigator, Connor Rice, had conducted over the prior year. Among them was

Rice’s 25-minute March 2024 interview of Andy Graham, a camera operator with firsthand

knowledge of conditions on the Rust set, in which, Graham states, among other things, that: (a) he

did not think that Baldwin’s behavior on set was unusual for an actor of his experience; (b) actors

do not commonly inspect prop firearms; (c) an actor should never have to worry about a gun being

handed to him loaded; and (d) he thinks individuals other than Baldwin should be held responsible

for Hutchins’ death. Despite this, the State never listed Graham on its witness list and did not

disclose the recording of his interview until after the May 6, 2024 deadline for witness disclosures.

212. Moreover, despite Baldwin’s numerous requests for text messages and other

communications from important witnesses that were in the State’s possession, he had to wait

months before the State finally disclosed them. Once they were disclosed, it was clear that the

48
State had been withholding text messages involving several key witnesses that were extremely

favorable to Baldwin’s defense.

213. The State also waited until May 14, 2024, to disclose dozens of previously

undisclosed lapel videos from SFSO that depict, among other things, SFSO’s search of PDQ. (The

videos of the search demonstrate that a proper search of PDQ was never conducted, even though

Kenney had already revealed to Det. Hancock that he may have been the source of the live bullet

that killed Hutchins.)

214. The State’s failure to disclose these materials sooner—while continuing to make

arguments that clash with the documented views of its own experts—was all the more disturbing

based on the State’s refusals to cooperate with Baldwin’s efforts to make sense of the State’s

disclosure methods. The State engaged in haphazard and careless disclosure methods, such as

uploading materials to a shared drive without notifying Baldwin what, when, or where new

materials were being uploaded. This made it impossible to determine when and what (if any) new

discovery the State had disclosed. This problem persisted for many months despite repeated

written requests from Baldwin’s attorneys that the State provide a workable method for identifying

newly disclosed materials that the State was uploading to the electronic database.

215. On April 30, 2024, following the pre-trial interview of Lucien Haag in which the

Second Haag Report was disclosed for the first time, Baldwin’s counsel sent Morrissey a detailed

email about specific files that were missing and Baldwin’s “overarching discovery concerns.” His

counsel proposed a new system of disclosure intended to eliminate gaps and confusion going

forward, noting, however, that this system “does not resolve our ongoing concern that there appear

to be materials that are not timely provided (or not provided at all) to the defense that ought to be.”

The email continued:

We note that in our last discussion [during Haag’s pre-trial interview] it appeared
that you are not familiar with the structure or content of the defense share site,

49
 though I understand from our conversation that you are now aware that the site
does not appear to mirror your own files in a way that allows you to ascertain
whether and when materials are being provided. This is a substantial concern for
the defense, in particular in light of the state’s assertions regarding what the
defense does and does not have access to. Please let us know how the State
intends to address these issues, which have now come to a head in at least two
interviews.

216. On June 5, 2024, with the above issues (and many more like them) continuing to

mount, Baldwin’s counsel requested additional time to speak with each of the Haags regarding

their second and third reports, as well as additional time with Carpenter, whose interview the State

terminated over Baldwin’s objection based on the State’s arbitrary two-hour limit. In that email,

which identified the State’s numerous continuing discovery violations, Baldwin’s counsel

requested that the State produce “[a]ny other materials subject to disclosure under Brady, Giglio,

and their progeny, including any state analogs to the same.”

217. The State responded that “as it relates to law enforcement officers,” it was “not

aware of any” such materials, and that “[i]f there is anything specific you are interested in please

say so.”

218. On June 10, 2024, Baldwin’s counsel emailed the State regarding outstanding

discovery items that had been repeatedly requested before, including: (a) confirmation that “there

are no additional emails, text messages, notes, or recordation from any prosecutor or investigator

for the prosecution of the state’s communications (including meetings or interviews) with any

witnesses or potential witness in this case that have not been produced,” (b) a report that was

prepared by its expert Paul Jordan, which Baldwin’s counsel was not aware of until Jordan

mentioned it during his pretrial interview on May 23, 2024, and which the State had yet to provide

despite agreement from Jordan and the State that they would provide it, and (c) “any material

subject to disclosure under Brady, Giglio, and their progeny, as well as for material subject to

disclosure under 5-501(A)(5)-(6) and 5-501(G) NMRA.”

50
 219. In response to Baldwin’s first request, Morrissey stated that Baldwin “[has]

received everything pursuant to 5-501 NMRA.” But as of June 10, 2024, the State had not

produced to Baldwin’s counsel a single note of a single conversation with a single witness by a

single prosecutor or investigator employed by the District Attorney’s office in the two and one-

half years since the State’s investigation had begun. It was inconceivable that Morrissey could be

asserting that no notes of any such conversations existed. But that was what she wrote.

220. As to Baldwin’s request for Jordan’s report, Morrissey stated, “I don’t know what

report you’re referring to. Please be more specific.”

221. And in response to Baldwin’s third request, Morrissey asserted—notwithstanding

all of the issues identified above—that “Brady/Giglio materials were provided to the defense on

March 28, 2023.”

222. On June 27, 2024, with the trial fast approaching, Baldwin’s counsel sought to

confirm Morrissey’s implausible assertions that she had fully complied with the State’s discovery

obligations. Baldwin’s counsel separately emailed Morrissey’s colleague Erlinda Johnson, a

former federal prosecutor who believed in the importance of following the State’s disclosure

obligations, a request to “make a specific demand for [Brady or Giglio] materials from within the

materials the government has redacted, and any and all [Brady or Giglio] information or material

about which the prosecution team is aware.”

223. Johnson responded that same morning, stating that she had “requested an

unredacted copy of the IPRA production from the DA’s office so that it may be compared to the

redacted production.” She promised that she would “review communications with state’s

witnesses which were redacted and compare to unredacted versions” and turn over unredacted

versions of any “communications [that] are within the Rule 5-501 (A)(6) & (G) requirements as

well as Giglio.” She committed to providing “a response to you by the end of next week.” Johnson

51
also stated, with respect to Giglio material, that her “understanding is that a request for Giglio

material was made of the SFCSD and a response was received and forwarded to the defense in

March 2023” and that she would “inquire of the agency if anything has changed since their March

‘23 response.”

224. Within mere hours of Johnson’s email, the State began disclosing previously

undisclosed communications involving several members of the current or former prosecution

team, proving that the State had failed to furnish those communications to the defense months ago,

could have done so with little effort, and that Morrissey had misrepresented the State’s compliance.

Between June 27 and June 29 (a Saturday), the State disclosed over 1,100 pages of documents that

it had been withholding for months and, in many cases, for more than a year. All of this material

had been subject to prompt disclosure under Rule 5-501. Indeed, Johnson expressly conceded that

these communications were required to be disclosed.

225. The State had massively violated its obligation to make these disclosures “within

10 days of waiver of arraignment” (Rule 5-501), and violated the Court’s Scheduling Order to

disclose discoverable information within seven days of receipt.

226. In Judge Sommers’ August 1, 2024 written order dismissing the case, the Court

recognized that “the State continually made late disclosures to Defendant throughout pretrial

litigation, and even in the days immediately preceding the jury trial beginning on July 9, 2024.”

The Court noted that these violations continued despite the fact that, on July 1, 2024, “the State

filed a Certificate of Compliance in which Special Prosecutor Morrissey stated that she had

‘transmitted to counsel for Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5-501, all materials and

documents in her possession enumerated in the provisions of Rule 5-501 for disclosure by the

State.’” The Court further noted the State’s representation, weeks before trial, that it had

“conducted a complete audit of its discovery disclosure files as soon as it was aware that potential

52
problems existed and has cured any discovery disclosure issues.” Simply put, Morrissey had

intentionally deprived Baldwin of evidence that was required to be disclosed under New Mexico

law and the U.S. Constitution, and she had repeatedly lied to Baldwin and the Court about the

State’s compliance.

VIII. TRIAL REVEALED THE SHOCKING DEPTHS OF THE STATE’S BAD FAITH AND
“SCORCHING” PREJUDICE
227. Motions in limine were to be argued on July 8, 2024. Jury selection was to begin

on July 9. And the first day of trial was scheduled for July 10, 2024.

228. By the time of the motion in limine hearing, Morrissey made clear that she intended

to argue that Baldwin was criminally liable for Hutchins’ death because he was a producer of the

film, even though she had previously dismissed that theory as lacking merit.

229. Yet Morrissey had already conceded that “the criminal negligence standard requires

the prosecution to show that [Baldwin] had subjective knowledge of an actual risk of danger.”

And she had also previously conceded that Baldwin had no reason to suspect the prop gun that

was given to him contained live ammunition. In securing Gutierrez-Reed’s conviction,

Morrissey’s co-prosecutor told jurors that “[t]he prospect of live ammunition landing up on a film

set is incomprehensible.” Morrissey had further argued to the jury that the crew in the church on

October 21, 2021, “believed that [Gutierrez-Reed] was going to do her job” and “believed that she

did her job” to ensure the firearm was safe. And in response to one of Baldwin’s dispositive

motions, the State conceded that he “had [no] actual knowledge of the risk that the firearm was

loaded with live ammunition.”

230. In Baldwin’s prosecution, the State’s prior admissions about his state of mind posed

a serious problem. Morrissey would have to convince jurors at Baldwin’s trial that he had willfully

disregarded the risk that his actions posed to the safety of others, even though she had already

conceded that Baldwin had no reason to believe the gun was loaded.

53
 231. Morrissey sought to overcome this burden in two ways. The first was to present

the meritless theory that Baldwin was responsible for Gutierrez-Reed’s negligence because he was

a producer.

232. At the motion in limine hearing, the Court dismissed that argument and barred the

State from referencing Baldwin’s status as a producer.

233. The dismissal of the producer theory left Morrissey’s case hanging by a thread. She

therefore sought to connect Baldwin’s state of mind to the cause of Hutchins’ death—i.e., the

existence of live ammunition on the set—by claiming that Gutierrez-Reed was the source of the

live ammunition, showing Gutierrez-Reed’s age and supposed inexperience, and arguing that

Baldwin was therefore aware of the risk that she might bring live ammunition to the set.

234. Evidence that tended to show that Gutierrez-Reed was not the source of the live

ammunition—e.g., evidence that the ammunition came from an outside source—would have

undermined Morrissey’s key basis for linking Baldwin to Hutchins’ death.

235. When that evidence emerged, Morrissey decided to bury it.

236. By at least November 1, 2021, the State was aware that a man name Troy Teske, a

retired police officer in Bullhead City, Arizona, had a cache of ammunition that could have been

the source of the live round that ultimately made its way to Rust.

237. Rather than investigate this lead independently, Det. Hancock simply accepted a

screen shot of a photograph of only four bullets that Teske had sent to Kenney. The sample

included Starline brass bullets, though they had brass primers, not nickel.

238. However, Kenney explained at the time that the manufacturer may have mixed

primers when preparing the reloads. Det. Hancock agreed, noting that “testing at least a few [of

the rounds] … would be really important.” Kenney told Teske that the ammunition was “evidence”

in the “accidental death” investigation.

54
 239. Teske hand delivered the ammunition to the SFSO on March 6, 2024. He entrusted

it to the care of Poppell, the crime scene technician who had worked on the Rust case from the first

day and who knew Kenney. She also knew of Joe Swanson, the manufacturer.

240. Among the rounds Teske provided were Starline brass casings, with nickel

primers—rounds that matched the live round that killed Hutchins, but had never been collected,

analyzed, or provided to the defense.

241. Once received, the evidence was not inventoried to the Rust case. Instead, after a

discussion between Poppell, Det. Hancock, their lieutenant, Brian Brandle, and special prosecutor

Morrissey, the ammunition was logged under a separate case number.

242. The decision to misfile the evidence was made deliberately, and jointly, between

members of law enforcement and Morrissey.

243. The State never disclosed this ammunition to the defense, never disclosed the

supplemental report recounting the importance and details about this evidence, never provided the

ammunition during the evidence viewing, and falsely certified that the State had disclosed all

relevant evidence before trial.

244. The State’s primary justifications for withholding the evidence—that there was no

indication it matched the live ammunition on set, or that it was unclear whether it was really tied

to Rust—was belied not only by the physical evidence itself but by the SFSO’s own report.

245. Yet Poppell initially testified to the opposite when Morrissey knowingly elicited

false testimony from her that the rounds did not match those from the set.

Q. And let me ask you, Ms. Poppell. The ammunition that the Good Samaritan,
Mr. Teske, the close friend of Hannah Gutierrez's dad, when he -- that
ammunition that he brought to you after her conviction, you still have it?
A. Yes.
Q. You can bring it in here and you can show it to the jury; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And they can see for themselves that it does not match the live ammunition
from the set of Rust; correct?

55
 A. Yes.
Q. And that is obvious, just when you look at it, is it not?
A. Yes.

246. That false testimony was rebutted the next day. As Judge Sommer explained:

“Corporal Hancock testified that CST Poppell gave false testimony during the second day of the

jury trial. Specifically, Corporal Hancock testified that CST Poppell’s testimony—given in front

of the jury—concerning the attributes of the collected Teske-supplied ammunition, when

compared to the attributes of the live ammunition collected from the set of Rust, was false.”

247. The State’s cover up crumbled at trial. The State knew that the rounds matched—

the three matching rounds were the first ones logged in the hidden report, described as having the

three features key to matching the live rounds from Rust—.45 caliber, Starline brass, silver primer.

248. When Judge Sommer questioned Poppell the next day, she was forced to admit as

much:

JUDGE SOMMER: All right. Let me ask it a different way. Do you recognize any
of these types of bullets to have been gathered on the Hannah Gutierrez -- on the
Rust set?
THE WITNESS: The Starline Brass with silver primer are similar to what was
collected on the set.

249. There was no doubt that Teske—a witness known to the SFSO from the Rust

investigation—had made clear that the evidence he was providing to them was from the same

batch of ammunition as the round that killed Hutchins. As the undisclosed SFSO report stated,

56
 250. Even in light of these explicit and detailed explanations, the State still tried to cover

its tracks. It argued first that the evidence had been logged separately because it was not collected

at the set. Then it argued that this occurred because the evidence was not collected by SFSO

officers independently. And finally, the State claimed it was not logged to the Rust case because

Teske had supposedly not returned the State’s phone calls (notwithstanding his repeated offers to

give a statement when he provided the ammunition, and his detailed account of its origin, that were

captured on an SFSO lapel video played at trial).

251. Morrissey doubled down. She offered increasingly inconsistent explanations for

the failure to disclose the existence of the ammunition to Baldwin. For example, she initially

argued that the rounds would have been relevant if they had matched the rounds on Rust. But then

she argued that they could not have been relevant unless they had been shown to have left the state

of Arizona.

252. Morrissey further tried to minimize and sanitize the State’s actions, attempting to

justify the State’s failure to allow the defense to view the ammunition by saying “I had never seen

it, and I didn’t realize that it wasn’t under the same case number because I’m not a law enforcement

officer, and I don’t work at the Sheriff’s department.” However, as the Court noted, “this

testimony conflicts with that of Corporal Hancock, who testified that SFSO agents and Special

Prosecutor Morrissey decided to separately file this evidence apart from the evidence of the Rust

investigation.”

253. There can be no doubt as to what happened here. The State first deliberately

ignored this exculpatory evidence and then, when unable to ignore it further, buried the

exculpatory evidence. The State never disclosed this evidence to Baldwin, notwithstanding the

repeated discovery demands, evidence viewings, and representations by the State that it had

complied with its obligations.

57
 254. After extensive testimony from Det. Hancock, Poppell, Det. Brandle, and

Morrissey herself, the Court concluded as follows: “The State’s willful withholding of this

information was intentional and deliberate. If this conduct does not rise to the level of bad faith, it

certainly comes so near to bad faith as to show signs of scorching prejudice.” The Court further

concluded, “Given the State’s egregious discovery violations constituting misconduct and the false

testimony elicited during trial, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy.”

255. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Baldwin has lost significant

compensation and suffered significant damages.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Conspiracy to Cause Malicious Prosecution and Deprivation of Civil Rights)

Against All Defendants

256. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

257. Defendants, while acting under the color of law, conspired to procure a groundless

indictment against Baldwin and to maliciously bring about or advance Baldwin’s trial and

conviction, thus violating Baldwin’s constitutional rights by their improper use of the criminal

process.

258. Defendants’ conduct included, but was not limited to, the following acts in

furtherance of their conspiracy:

a. Defendants Carmack-Altwies, Padgett Macias, and other members of the

FJDA directed law enforcement to de-prioritize the investigation into the source of live

ammunition on the Rust set and into the key suspects related to that inquiry, and to focus

instead on obtaining witness statements and evidence that prosecutors could use to

manufacture probable cause to charge Baldwin with a crime.

58
 b. With the explicit motive of “disproving” what Baldwin said during a

televised ABC News interview (i.e., that he did not pull the trigger), Defendants Hancock

and Poppell requested, ordered, and approved destructive testing on the firearm without

documenting the firearm’s internal components before its destruction, knowing that it

would prevent Baldwin from examining the state of the firearm as it existed on the day of

the incident.

c. Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb charged Baldwin with a firearm

enhancement that was legally barred under the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States

Constitution, and for which there could be no probable cause.

d. Because of: (i) Defendant Reeb’s simultaneous role in the state legislature,

and (ii) Defendant Carmack-Altwies’s statutory inability to prosecute Baldwin alongside a

special prosecutor under section 36-1-23.1 NMSA, Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb

lacked constitutional and statutory authority to charge Baldwin with any offense.

e. Defendant Carmack-Altwies appointed Defendant Morrissey as special

prosecutor with the understanding that she would advance Baldwin’s malicious

prosecution and continued to contribute FJDA resources to Baldwin’s prosecution in

violation of section 36-1-23.1 NMSA.

f. At the request of Defendant Morrissey and in furtherance of Morrissey’s

malicious objectives, Defendant Hancock presented false, distorted, misleading, and

perjurious testimony to the Grand Jury to procure a criminal indictment in the absence of

probable cause.

g. Defendant Morrissey knowingly failed to disclose exculpatory information

that she had received from the State’s expert witnesses (including but not limited to the

Third Haag Report) to deprive the grand jury of information that undermined the case

59
 against Baldwin, or in the alternative, administered policies and practices with respect to

the disclosure of evidence that she knew were inadequate to fulfill her constitutional duties

to Baldwin.

h. Defendants , Morrissey, Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle, and, on the basis

of information and belief, Defendant Carmack-Altwies, intentionally caused and/or agreed

to cause exculpatory evidence not to be inventoried to the Rust case file but, instead, to be

inventoried by creating a new case number and inventorying the evidence to that new case

number, and failed to disclose that evidence to Baldwin, or to make it available for his

inspection, despite knowing that the evidence was related to the Rust case and his defense

of the charges against him.

259. Each of the overt acts described above was made in furtherance of Defendants’

conspiracy to deprive Baldwin of his civil rights, and throughout the acts described above

Defendants acted in concert pursuant to an agreement, meeting of the minds, or general

conspiratorial objective.

260. In carrying out their conspiracy, Defendants were driven by ill motives and to

accomplish illegitimate ends, including to harass or “humble” Baldwin, to promote their political

agendas (in the case of Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb), or to further their own personal

agendas or professional ambitions (in the case of Defendants Carmack-Altwies, Reeb, Padget

Macias, Morrissey, Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle).

261. Defendants’ actions violated the constitutional rights guaranteed to Baldwin by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and/or the laws of the United States.

262. The immunity typically afforded to prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial role

does not apply to the above actions undertaken by Defendants Carmack-Altwies, Reeb, and

Padgett Macias, including because they were performed in an administrative or investigative

60
capacity beyond the prosecutorial function, before any determination of probable cause was made,

outside of any statutory authority or judicial forum, and/or pursuant to an invalid appointment.

263. The immunity typically afforded to prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial role

does not apply to the above actions undertaken by Defendant Morrissey, including because they

were performed in an administrative or investigative capacity beyond the prosecutorial function,

outside of any statutory authority or judicial forum, and/or in connection with factual testimony

given by Morrissey.

264. Defendants’ actions were not undertaken in good-faith and were in violation of

clearly established law.

265. Defendants’ actions were unnecessary, unreasonable, unlawful, and unjustified.

266. On July 31, 2024, the trial court dismissed with prejudice all charges against

Baldwin on the grounds that Defendants’ “egregious discovery violations,” “suppressed

evidence,” and “false testimony” deprived Baldwin of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

267. The grounds for the trial court’s dismissal of the charges against Baldwin are

indicative of Baldwin’s innocence.

268. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unreasonable and unlawful

actions, Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment in an amount to be determined at trial.

269. Because Defendants’ actions were motivated by evil motive or intent and involved

a reckless or callous indifference to Baldwin’s federally protected rights, an award of punitive

damages is appropriate to the fullest extent permitted by law.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Suppression of Evidence and Deprivation of Civil Rights)

61
 Against Defendants Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle

270. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

271. Defendants Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle, while acting under the color of law,

violated Baldwin’s constitutional rights by intentionally causing and/or agreeing to cause

exculpatory evidence not to be inventoried to the Rust case file but, instead, to be inventoried by

creating a new case number and inventorying the evidence to that new case number, and failed to

disclose that evidence to Baldwin, or to make it available for his inspection, despite knowing that

the evidence was related to the Rust case and his defense of the charges against him.

272. Defendants’ actions violated the constitutional rights guaranteed to Baldwin by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

273. Defendants’ actions were not undertaken in good-faith and were in violation of

clearly established law.

274. Defendants’ actions were unnecessary, unreasonable, unlawful, and unjustified.

275. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unreasonable and unlawful

actions, Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment.

276. Because Defendants’ actions were motivated by evil motive or intent and involved

a reckless or callous indifference to Baldwin’s federally protected rights, an award of punitive

damages is appropriate to the fullest extent permitted by law.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Malicious Abuse of Process

Against Defendants Hancock, Poppell, Brandle, and the County

277. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

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 278. Defendants Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle, while acting within the scope of their

duties, used the judicial process in a manner that was improper, with a primary motive to

accomplish an illegitimate end, through conduct that includes but is not limited to the following:

a. They de-prioritized the investigation into the source of live ammunition on

the Rust set and into the key suspects related to that inquiry, and focused instead on

obtaining witness statements and evidence that prosecutors could use to manufacture

probable cause to charge Baldwin with a crime.

b. With the explicit motive of “disproving” what Baldwin said during a

televised ABC News interview (i.e., that he did not pull the trigger), Defendants Hancock

and Poppell requested, ordered, and approved destructive testing on the firearm without

documenting the firearm’s internal components before its destruction, knowing that it

would prevent Baldwin from examining the state of the firearm as it existed on the day of

the incident.

c. Defendant Hancock presented false, distorted, misleading, and perjurious

testimony to the Grand Jury to procure a criminal indictment in the absence of probable

cause.

d. Defendants Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle intentionally caused and/or

agreed to cause exculpatory evidence not to be inventoried to the Rust case file but, instead,

to be inventoried by creating a new case number and inventorying the evidence to that new

case number, and failed to disclose that evidence to Baldwin, or to make it available for his

inspection, despite knowing that the evidence was directly related to the Rust case and his

defense of the charges against him.

279. At all times Defendants Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle were acting in the capacity

of agents, servants, or employees of Commissioners and the County of Santa Fe.

63
 280. Under section 41-4-12 NMSA, the immunity granted by section 41-4-4(A) does not

apply to liability for personal injury resulting from malicious abuse of process or the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States

or New Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their

duties.

281. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unreasonable and unlawful

actions, Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Intentional Spoliation of Evidence

Against Defendants Hancock, Poppell, Commissioners, and the County

282. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

283. Defendants Hancock and Poppell, while acting under color of law and with the

explicit motive of “disproving” what Baldwin said during a televised ABC News interview (i.e.,

that he did not pull the trigger), requested, ordered, and/or approved destructive testing on the

firearm that killed Hutchins without documenting the firearm’s internal components before its

destruction.

284. Defendants Hancock and Poppell knew that performing the destructive testing and

failing to document the internal components of the firearm would prevent Baldwin from examining

the state of the firearm as it existed on the day of the incident.

285. The destructive testing and Defendants’ failure to document the internal

components of the firearm did, in fact, prevent Baldwin from examining the state of the firearm,

64
as it existed on the day of the incident, therefore undermining Baldwin’s ability to prove his

defense.

286. At all times Defendants Hancock and Poppell were acting in the capacity of agents,

servants, or employees of Commissioners and the County of Santa Fe.

287. Under section 41-4-12 NMSA, the immunity granted by section 41-4-4(A) does not

apply to liability for personal injury resulting from intentional spoliation of evidence or the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States or New Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the

scope of their duties.

288. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unreasonable and unlawful

actions, Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Defamation Per Se

Against Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb

289. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

290. Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb made false and defamatory statements of

fact concerning Baldwin and, to the extent any of their statements can be considered matters of

opinion, such statements implied the existence of defamatory facts, as described below.

291. False and defamatory statements by Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb

include, without limitation, the following:

a. On January 19, 2023, Defendant Carmack-Altwies appeared on CNN and

discussed “key pieces of evidence” with a reporter from the Santa Fe New Mexican.

65
During the program, Carmack-Altwies asserted that Baldwin “had a duty to make sure the

set was safe” and he “should have checked that gun, checked those projectiles,” falsely

implying that Baldwin was responsible for Halyna Hutchins’ death.

b. On January 19, 2023, Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb appeared on

Jeanine Pirro’s program on Fox News, stating that “it was not a safe set” and asserting that

it was Baldwin’s responsibility to ensure the set’s safety, again falsely implying that

Baldwin was responsible for Halyna Hutchins’ death. Defendant Carmack-Altwies also

falsely accused Baldwin of deleting information from his phone, which she knew was false

at the time. In the same interview, Defendant Reeb stated that a lab report confirmed that

“definitely the trigger was pulled,” while omitting that the same lab report referred to

testing in which the FBI broke the firearm at issue by hitting it repeatedly with a rawhide

mallet—without first inspecting or documenting the condition of the firearm—thereby

preventing Baldwin from inspecting the condition of the firearm when it discharged or

conducting any of his own testing. Defendant Reeb also omitted the “informal testing”

that Defendant Carmack-Altwies had conducted in February 2022, which demonstrated

that Baldwin’s claim not to have pulled the trigger was plausible.

c. In an interview with NBC News on January 19, 2023, Defendant Reeb

commented on Baldwin’s ultimate guilt, stating that he “is somebody who committed a

crime.” Defendant Carmack-Altwies repeated factual conclusions about the evidence,

e.g., that “we know . . . from the FBI lab report” that “he pulled the trigger.”

d. In these national media appearances, Defendants Carmack-Altwies and

Reeb repeatedly stated that Baldwin was facing many years in prison even though, if

convicted on the charges, the maximum sentence was 18 months, implying greater criminal

culpability and a more severe criminal act on Baldwin’s part.

66
 e. The day before charging Baldwin with two alternative felony counts of

involuntary manslaughter under Section 30-2-3(B) NMSA, the Defendant Carmack-

Altwies’s office posted on Facebook: “The evidence and the facts speak for themselves.”

f. On February 7, 2023, immediately after Baldwin filed a motion to

disqualify Defendant Reeb because her appointment violated separation of powers

principles, a spokesperson for Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb told the news media

that Baldwin and his lawyers can “use whatever tactics they want to distract from the fact

that Halyna Hutchins died because of gross negligence and a reckless disregard for safety

on the ‘Rust’ film set.” These statements—made in connection with Baldwin’s legal

filing—carried the unmistakable implication that Hutchins died because of Baldwin’s

criminal negligence.

g. On February 10, 2023, immediately after Baldwin filed a motion regarding

an unconstitutional charge that was filed against him, a spokesperson for Defendants

Carmack-Altwies and Reeb issued the following statement to the media: “Another day,

another motion from Alec Baldwin and his attorneys in an attempt to distract from the gross

negligence and complete disregard for safety on the Rust film set that led to Halyna

Hutchins’ death.” The statement further claimed that Defendants Carmack-Altwies and

Reeb would remain focused on justice and ensuring “that everyone—even celebrities with

fancy attorneys—is held accountable under the law.” These statements—made in

connection with Baldwin’s legal filing—carried the unmistakable implication that

Hutchins died because of Baldwin’s criminal negligence.

h. On February 20, 2023, after conceding that they had erroneously charged

Baldwin with a sentencing enhancement that violated the ex post facto clause of the United

States Constitution, Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb made a public announcement.

67
 Instead of acknowledging the impropriety of what they had done, or that they had filed an

unconstitutional charge, they stated that they were withdrawing the enhancement to “avoid

further litigious distractions by Baldwin and his attorneys”; the District Attorney’s Office

told the media that the prosecution’s priority is “securing justice, not securing billable

hours for big-city attorneys.” These statements carried the unmistakable implication that

the sentencing enhancement—which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years

in prison—had been properly filed against Baldwin even though Defendant Reeb had

privately conceded to Baldwin’s attorney that she “100 percent agree[d]” that charging the

firearm enhancement violated Baldwin’s rights under the ex post facto clause of the United

States Constitution.

i. On March 14, 2023, Defendant Reeb announced that she was stepping down

as Special Prosecutor. But rather than acknowledge that her appointment had violated the

U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of separation of powers, Reeb issued a public statement that

“the best way I can ensure justice is served in this case . . . is to step down so that the

prosecution can focus on the evidence and the facts, which clearly show a complete

disregard for basic safety protocols led to the death of Halyna Hutchins.” These

statements—made in connection with Baldwin’s case—carried the unmistakable

implication that Hutchins died because of Baldwin’s criminal misconduct.

292. The above statements were false when made, and Defendants Carmack-Altwies and

Reeb made them knowing that they were false, or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.

293. The false and defamatory statements carry the unmistakable message that Baldwin

committed a serious crime—i.e., that he negligently or recklessly caused the death of another

human. The false and defamatory statements also relate to Baldwin’s trade or profession, because

they carry the unmistakable implication that Baldwin disregards safety protocols on film sets and

68
was “grossly negligent” to a criminal degree. Based on the foregoing, the false and defamatory

statements above constitute defamation per se. If they were not defamatory per se, they were

defamatory per quod.

294. The immunity typically afforded to prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial role

does not apply to the above actions and statements made by Defendants Carmack-Altwies and

Reeb to the news media, because they were made beyond the scope of their statutory authority and

prosecutorial function and outside of any judicial forum.

295. As a direct and proximate result of the false and defamatory statements above,

Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

For Violation of the New Mexico Civil Rights Act

(Deprivation of Civil Rights in Violation of N.M. Const. art. II, §§ 4, 18, and 19)

Against FJDA, Commissioners, and the County

296. Plaintiff Baldwin incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.

297. Defendants, through the acts and omissions of persons acting on their behalf,

deprived Baldwin of his rights under Article II, sections 4 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.

298. Defendants’ conduct included but was not limited to the following acts:

a. With the explicit motive of “disproving” what Baldwin said during a

televised ABC News interview (i.e., that he did not pull the trigger), Defendants Hancock

and Poppell requested, ordered, and approved destructive testing on the firearm without

documenting the firearm’s internal components before its destruction, knowing that it

would prevent Baldwin from examining the state of the firearm as it existed on the day of

the incident.

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 b. Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb charged Baldwin with a firearm

enhancement that was legally barred under the Ex Post Facto clause of the New Mexico

Constitution, and for which there could be no probable cause.

c. At the request of Defendant Morrissey and in furtherance of Morrissey’s

malicious objectives, Defendant Hancock presented false, distorted, misleading, and

perjurious testimony to the Grand Jury to procure a criminal indictment in the absence of

probable cause.

d. Defendant Morrissey knowingly failed to disclose exculpatory information

that she had received from the State’s expert witnesses (including but not limited to the

Third Haag Report) to deprive the grand jury of information that undermined the case

against Baldwin, or in the alternative, administered policies and practices with respect to

the disclosure of evidence that she knew were inadequate to fulfill her constitutional duties

to Baldwin.

e. Defendants Morrissey, Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle, and, on the basis of

information and belief, Defendant Carmack-Altwies, intentionally caused and/or agreed to

cause exculpatory evidence not to be inventoried to the Rust case file but, instead, to be

inventoried by creating a new case number and inventorying the evidence to that new case

number, and failed to disclose that evidence to Baldwin, or to make it available for his

inspection, despite knowing that the evidence was directly related to the Rust case and his

defense of the charges against him.

299. Each of the overt acts described above was made in furtherance of Defendants’

conspiracy to deprive Baldwin of his civil rights, and throughout the acts described above

Defendants acted in concert pursuant to an agreement, meeting of the minds, or general

conspiratorial objective.

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 300. In carrying out their conspiracy, Defendants were driven by ill motives and to

accomplish illegitimate ends, including to harass or “humble” Baldwin, to promote their political

agendas (in the case of Defendants Carmack-Altwies and Reeb), or to further their own personal

agendas or professional ambitions (in the case of Defendants Carmack-Altwies, Reeb, Padget

Macias, Morrissey, Hancock, Poppell, and Brandle).

301. Defendants’ actions violated the constitutional rights guaranteed to Baldwin by

Article II, sections 4, 18, and 19 of the New Mexico Constitution.

302. Defendants’ actions were not undertaken in good-faith and were in violation of

clearly established law.

303. Defendants’ actions were unnecessary, unreasonable, unlawful, and unjustified.

304. Under section 41-4A-3 NMSA, the immunity granted by section 41-4A-4 does not

apply to liability for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured pursuant to

the bill of rights of the constitution of New Mexico” caused by “a public body or person acting on

behalf of, under color of or within the course and scope of the authority of a public body.”

305. The immunity typically afforded to prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial role

does not apply to the above actions undertaken by Defendants Carmack-Altwies, Reeb, and

Padgett Macias, including because they were performed in an administrative or investigative

capacity beyond the prosecutorial function, before any determination of probable cause was made,

outside of any statutory authority or judicial forum, and/or pursuant to an invalid appointment.

306. The immunity typically afforded to prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial role

does not apply to the above actions undertaken by Defendant Morrissey, including because they

were performed in an administrative or investigative capacity beyond the prosecutorial function,

outside of any statutory authority or judicial forum, and/or in connection with factual testimony

given by Morrissey.

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 307. On July 31, 2024, the trial court dismissed with prejudice all charges against

Baldwin on the grounds that Defendants’ “egregious discovery violations,” “suppressed

evidence,” and “false testimony” deprived Baldwin of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

308. The grounds for the trial court’s dismissal of the charges against Baldwin are

indicative of Baldwin’s innocence.

309. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unreasonable and unlawful

actions, Baldwin has suffered and continues to suffer substantial past and future damages, both

compensatory and general, including, but not limited to, legal expenses, loss of income, severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, and embarrassment in an amount to be determined at trial.

310. Because Defendants’ actions were motivated by evil motive or intent and involved

a reckless or callous indifference to Baldwin’s constitutionally protected rights, an award of

punitive damages is appropriate to the fullest extent permitted by law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants as follows:

a. Awarding general and/or compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at

trial for all injuries suffered as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing;

b. Awarding punitive damages;

c. Awarding prejudgment interest at the maximum legal rate;

d. Awarding the costs of suit as incurred in this action and attorneys’ fees; and

e. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Baldwin demands a trial by jury.

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Date: January 9, 2025 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP

By: /s/ Luke Nikas

Luke Nikas (pro hac vice pending)

Robert M. Schwartz (pro hac vice Alex Spiro (pro hac vice pending)
pending) 295 Fifth Avenue, 9th Floor
865 S. Figueroa Street, 10th Floor New York, NY 10016
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Tel: 212-849-7000
Tel: (213) 443-3000 lukenikas@quinnemanuel.com
robertschwartz@quinnemanuel.com alexspiro@quinnemanuel.com

By: /s/ Heather M. LeBlanc

Sara Clark (pro hac vice pending)
700 Louisiana St., Ste. 3900 LEBLANC LAW LLC
Houston, TX 77002 Heather M. LeBlanc
Tel: 713-221-7000 823 Gold Ave. SW
saraclark@quinnemanuel.com Albuquerque, NM 87102
Tel: 505-331-7222
heather@leblanclawnm.law

Attorneys for Plaintiff Alec Baldwin

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