Epitome of Stoic Ethics

Arius Didymus
as reported by Joannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.7.5-12.
Abstract: Epitome of Stoic Ethics is a philosophical work that is
preserved by Joannes Stobaeus (fl. 5th century CE). It is believed to
be written by Arius Didymus (fl. 1st century BCE) of Alexandria, a
Stoic philosopher and teacher of Emperor Augustus. This work
occurs in book 2, chapter 7, sections 5-12 of the Anthology of
Stobaeus, of which the first two books are referred to as Eclogues.
The Epitome of Stoic Ethics is dense and informative.
CONTENTS
⊢ 2.7.5: Goods and Evils, Virtues and Vices
⊢ 2.7.6: The Goal and Happiness
⊢ 2.7.7: Indifferent Things
⊢ 2.7.8: Acts
⊢ 2.7.9: Impulses
⊢ 2.7.10: Passions
⊢ 2.7.11: Activities of the Proper Stoic
⊢ 2.7.12: Conclusion
The beliefs of Zeno and the other Stoics about the ethical part of
philosophy.
Next I will offer a summary of their ethics, repeating the essentials of
their principal beliefs. I will begin here.
5a. Those things exist, according to Zeno, which participate in
substance. Of the things which exist, some are good, some are bad,
and some are indifferent.
These are examples of good things: intelligence, self-restraint,
justice, bravery, and everything which is a virtue or participates in
virtue.
These are examples of bad things: stupidity, lack of self-restraint,
injustice, cowardice and everything which is a vice or participates in
vice.
These are examples of indifferent things: life, death; reputation, lack
of reputation; toil, pleasure; riches, poverty; sickness, health; and
things of this sort.
5b. Of good things, some are virtues, others are not.
So intelligence, self-restraint, <justice>, bravery, <great-heartedness,
strength of mind, and power of the soul> are virtues; joy,
cheerfulness, confidence, wish, and the like are not virtues.
Of the virtues, some are types of knowledge and expertises in
certain matters, others are not.
Intelligence, self-restraint, justice, and bravery are types of
knowledge and expertises in certain matters; great-heartedness,
strength of mind, and power of the soul are neither types of
knowledge of particular matters nor expertises.
Analogously, of bad things some are vices, others are not.
So stupidity, <lack of restraint>, injustice, cowardice, small-
mindedness, and mental incapacity <and feebleness> are vices;
pain and fear and the like are not vices.
Of the vices, some are failures to understand certain matters and
failures in expertise, but others are not.
So stupidity, lack of restraint, injustice, and cowardice are failures to
understand certain matters and failures in expertise;
small-mindedness, incapacity, <and feebleness> are neither failures
to understand particular things nor failures in expertise.
5b1. Intelligence is a knowledge of what things must be done and
what must not be done and of what are neither, or a knowledge of
what are good things and what are bad and what are neither for a
naturally political creature (and they prescribe that it is to be so
understood with regard to the other virtues);
self-restraint is a knowledge of what things are worth choosing and
what are worth avoiding and what are neither;
justice is a knowledge of apportioning to each its due;
bravery is a knowledge of what things are terrible and what are not
and what are neither;
stupidity is <ignorance of> what things are good and what are bad
and what are neither, or ignorance of what things are to be done and
what not to be done and what are neither;
lack of restraint is ignorance of what things are worth choosing and
what are worth avoiding and what are neither;
<injustice is ignorance not apportioning to each its due;>
cowardice is ignorance of what things are terrible and what are not
and what are neither.
They define the other virtues and vices as well in a similar fashion,
keeping to what has been stated. More generally, they say that virtue
is a disposition of the soul in harmony with itself concerning one’s
whole life.
5b2. Of the virtues, some are primary, while others are subordinate
to the primary virtues.
There are four which are primary: intelligence, self-restraint, bravery,
and justice.
Intelligence deals with appropriate acts;
self-restraint deals with man’s impulses;
bravery deals with acts of endurance;
justice deals with the apportioning of what is due.
Of the Virtues which are subordinate to these, some are subordinate
to intelligence, others subordinate to self-restraint, others to bravery,
others to justice.
To intelligence are subordinated soundness of judgment,
circumspection, shrewdness, sensibleness, <soundness of aim>,
and ingenuity;
to self-restraint are subordinated orderliness, propriety, modesty, and
self-control;
to bravery are subordinated perseverance, intrepidness, great-
heartedness, stout-heartedness, and industriousness;
to justice are subordinated piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair
dealing.
They say, then, that soundness of judgment is a knowledge of what
sort of things to do and how to do them so we will act expediently.
Circumspection is a knowledge which marks off and summarizes
what is still in process and what is completed.
Shrewdness is a knowledge which is able to discover the appropriate
act on the spot.
Sensibleness is a knowledge <of what is worse and what is better.
Soundness of aim is a knowledge> which is able to hit the target in
each case.
Ingenuity is a knowledge which is able to discover a way out of
difficulties.
Orderliness is a knowledge of when something must be done and in
what sequence and, overall, of the order of actions.
Propriety is <a knowledge> of suitable and unsuitable motions.
Modesty is a knowledge which is able to avoid correct reproach.
Self-control is a knowledge that does not overstep the bounds of
what has come to light in accord with correct reasoning.
Perseverance is a knowledge ready to persist in what has been
correctly decided.
Intrepidness is a knowledge through which we know that we shall not
encounter anything terrible.
Great-heartedness is a knowledge acting above what occurs
naturally in both worthwhile and worthless matters.
Stout-heartedness is a knowledge belonging to a soul as it shows
itself invincible.
Industriousness is a knowledge which is able to accomplish what is
proposed, without being prevented by the toil.
Piety is a knowledge of the service of the gods.
Kindness is a knowledge which is disposed to do good.
Good fellowship is a knowledge of equality in partnership.
Fair dealing is a knowledge of how to deal with one’s neighbors
without incurring blame.
5b3. The goal of all these virtues is to live consistently with nature.
Each virtue through its individual properties enables man to achieve
this. For from nature he has initial impulses for the discovery of what
is appropriate, for the balancing of his impulses, for acts of
endurance, and for acts of apportioning. Each of the virtues, by
acting in concert and by its own particular properties, enables man to
live consistently with nature.
5b4. So they say that the above-mentioned virtues are complete
concerning life and are comprised from rules of behavior. There are
other virtues in addition to these, no longer expertises but particular
capacities, resulting from practice, such as the health of the soul, its
soundness and strength, and its beauty. For just as the health of the
body is a correct mixture of the hot, cold, dry, and wet elements in
the body, so too the health of the soul is a correct mixture of the
beliefs in the soul. And likewise, just as bodily strength is an
adequate tension in the sinews, so mental strength is adequate
tension when deciding and acting or not. And just as the beauty of
the body is a due proportion of the limbs as they stand in relation to
each other and in relation to the whole, so too the beauty of the soul
is a due proportion in reasoning and in the parts of reasoning in
relation to the whole of the soul and in relation to each other.
5b5. All the virtues which are types of knowledge and expertises
have rules of behavior in common and the same goal, as has been
stated. Because of this they are also inseparable. For he who has
one has them all and he who acts in accordance with one acts in
accordance with them all. They differ from one another in their main
functions. For the main functions of intelligence are primarily to view
and do what must be done, but secondarily to view what one needs
to apportion, <what one needs to choose, and what one needs to
endure>, in order to do unerringly what must be done. Self-restraint’s
particular main function is primarily to provide balanced impulses
and to view them, but secondarily to view those things which are
under the control of the other virtues so that one conducts oneself
unerringly in one’s impulses. Likewise bravery is primarily to endure
everything that one must, secondarily what is under the control of the
other virtues. Justice is primarily to view what is in accord with the
merit of each person, but secondarily — et cetera. For all the virtues
consider what belongs to them all and those things subordinate to
each of the other virtues. Thus Panaetius said what happens in the
case of the virtues is just as if there were one target set up for many
archers and this had on it markings different in their colors. Then
each archer would aim at hitting the target, one, however, by striking
the white marking if he could make a hit, another by striking the
black, and another by striking yet another colour marking. Just as
these above all make it their goal to hit the target, but then each
proposes its attainment in a different way, so in the same way all the
virtues make it their goal to be happy, which depends on living in
agreement with nature, but each attains this in its own way.
5b6. Diogenes says that the things which are worth choosing for
themselves are spoken about in two senses: those which are
completely worth choosing, as are those things classified in the
above-mentioned division; and all those which have in themselves a
cause for being chosen, which exists in every good thing.
5b7. They say the virtues are both plural and inseparable from one
another, and are the same as the controlling part of the soul in
substance; accordingly, then, every virtue is a body and is spoken of
as such, since the mind and soul are body. For they think that the
inborn breath in us, as it is warm, is our soul.
They also want the soul in us to be a living creature, since it lives
and has awareness. This is particularly true of the controlling part of
it, which is called mind. Hence also every virtue is a living creature
since it is the same as mind in essence. In accordance with this, they
also say that intelligence is intelligent; for it is consistent with these
things to speak in this way.
5b8. There is nothing in between virtue and vice. All men have from
nature initial impulses for virtue and they have, as it were, the logic
of iambic haif-lines according to Cleanthes: while they are
incomplete they are worthless, but once complete they are
worthwhile.
They also say that the wise man does everything in accord with all
the virtues. For every action of his is complete; hence he also lacks
none of the virtues.
5b9. So, consistent with this, they hold the belief that he also acts
sensibly and dialectically, and convivially and erotically.
For the erotic man is also spoken of in two senses: in one sense with
regard to virtue as a type of worthwhile person, in the other with
regard to vice as a reproach, as in the case of a person mad with
erotic love. <Worthwhile> erotic love is <for friendship>. The man
worthy of erotic love is spoken of in the same way as the man worthy
of friendship and not as the man worth erotically loving. So this is the
man worth loving erotically: the man who is worthy of worthwhile
erotic love.
As with the erotic virtue, they also accept the convivial virtue among
the virtues. First, dealing with what is appropriate at a drinking party,
it is a knowledge of how one needs to carry out drinking parties and
how one needs to drink in company. Then it is the knowledge of the
hunt for young men of natural ability, encouraging them toward the
things which are in accord with virtue, and, overall, a knowledge of
nobly loving. Hence they also say that the person who has good
sense will fall in love. To love by itself is merely indifferent, since it
sometimes occurs in the case of the worthless as well. But erotic
love is not an appetite nor is it directed at any worthless thing; rather
it is an inclination to forming an attachment arising from the
impression of beauty.
5b10. They say that the wise man also does everything he does well.
This is obvious: in the way that we say that the flute-player or the
lyre-player does everything well (it being understood by this, in the
first case, what is concerned with flute-piaying and, in the second,
what is concerned with lyre-playing), so in the same way the
sensible person does everything well with respect to whatever he
does, and not, by Zeus, with respect to what he does not do. For
they have thought that the belief that the wise man does everything
well is consistent with his completing everything in accord with
correct reasoning and in a fashion which is in accord with virtue,
which is the expertise which deals with life as a whole. Analogously,
the worthless man does everything he does badly and in accord with
all the vices.
5b11. They call fondness of music, fondness of literature, fondness
of horse-riding, fondness of hunting with dogs, and, overall, what are
called the everyday expertises, pursuits, but not types of knowledge,
and they admit these among the worthwhile conditions. Consistent
with this they say that only the wise man is fond of music, fond of
literature, and analogously with regard to the other pursuits. They
describe a pursuit this way: it is a path through expertise (or through
a part of an expertise) which leads to what is in accord with virtue.
5b12. They say that only the wise man is a good prophet, poet, and
orator, and capable of dialectic and literary criticism, although not in
all respects, since each of the above also needs in addition the
acquisition of particular rules. They say that the prophetic art is a
rule-based knowledge of signs from the gods or spirits which apply
to human life. They say the same about the species of the prophetic
art.
They also say that only the wise man can be a priest, while no
worthless person can be one. For the priest needs to be experienced
in the laws concerning sacrifices, prayers, purifications, foundations,
and the like. In addition to this, he needs ritual, piety, and experience
in the service of the gods, and to be inside the divine nature. Not one
of these things belongs to the worthless; hence, also all the stupid
are impious. For impiety as a vice is ignorance of the service of the
gods, while piety, as we said, is knowledge of the service of the
gods.
Likewise they say that the worthless are not holy. For holiness is
described as justice with respect to the gods. The worthless
transgress many of the just customs pertaining to the gods, on
account of which they are unholy, impure, unclean, defiled, and
barred from festive rites.
For carrying out festive rites is, they say, the mark of a civilized man,
since a festival is a time when one ought to be concerned with the
divine for the sake of honor and appropriate celebration. So the
person who carries out festive rites needs to have humbly entered
with piety into this post.
5b13. Furthermore they say that every worthless person is mad, as
he is in a state of ignorance about himself and his affairs, which is
madness. But ignorance is the opposite vice to self-restraint. And
this, when providing unstable and agitated impulses in relation to
something else, is madness. Hence they also describe madness in
this manner: as agitated ignorance.
5c. Furthermore of good things, some belong to all the intelligent at
all times, others do not. Every virtue, intelligent perception, intelligent
impulse, and the like belongs to all the intelligent and on every
occasion. Joy, cheerfulness, and intelligent walking do not belong to
all the intelligent, nor at all times. Likewise some bad things belong
to all the stupid and at all times, others not. So every vice, stupid
perception, stupid impulse, and the like belongs to all the stupid at all
times. But pain, fear, and stupid answering do not belong to all the
stupid, nor on every occasion.
5d. All good things are beneficial, useful, advantageous, profitable,
worthwhile, suitable, fine, and fitting. Conversely all bad things are
harmful, useless, disadvantageous, unprofitable, worthless,
unsuitable, shameful, and unfitting.
They say that the good is spoken of in various ways. First as having
the role of a source, which is interpreted as follows that from which
or by whose agency being benefited occurs (in this first sense it is
causative). Second, it is that in respect of which being benefited
occurs. More generally, extending to the above explanations as well,
whatever benefits. Likewise the bad too is described analogously
with the good. It is that from which or by whose agency being
harmed occurs. Then, that in respect of which being harmed occurs.
More generally than this, whatever harms.
5e. Of good things, some concern the soul, others concern
externals, while others concern neither the soul not externals.
Concerned with the soul are the virtues, the worthwhile conditions,
and, overall, the praiseworthy activities. Externals are friends,
acquaintances, and the like. Neither concerned with the soul not
externals are the worthwhile and, overall, those who have the
virtues. Likewise of bad things too, some are concerned with the
soul, others externals, and others neither concerned With the soul
nor externals. Concerned with the soul are the vices together with
base dispositions and, overall, the blameworthy activities. Externals
are enemies along with their manifestations. Neither concerned with
the soul nor externals are the worthless and all those who possess
vices.
5f. Of the good things to do with the soul, some are dispositions,
some are conditions but not dispositions, and others are neither
conditions nor dispositions. All the virtues are dispositions. but the
pursuits, such as expertise in prophecy and the like, are only
conditions and not dispositions. Neither conditions nor dispositions
are the activities in respect of the virtues, such as exercise of
intelligence and the use of self-restraint and the like. Likewise with
regard to the bad things to do with the soul, some are dispositions,
others are conditions but not dispositions, and others are neither
conditions nor dispositions. All the vices are dispositions, but
propensities, such as enviousness, taking offense, and the like, and
in addition the illnesses and frailties, such as fondness for money,
drunkenness and the like, are only conditions. Neither conditions nor
dispositions are the activities in respect of the vices, such as acting
with stupidity and acting with injustice, and things like these.
5g. Of good things, some are final, others are productive, while
others are both. Thus the intelligent man and the friend are only
productive goods; but joy, cheerfulness, confidence, and intelligent
walking are only final goods. All the virtues are both productive and
final goods, for they both help to create happiness and make it
complete, being parts of it. Analogously, of bad things, some are
productive of unhappiness, others are final, while others are both.
Thus the stupid man and the enemy are only productive evils. But
pain, fear, theft, stupid questioning, and the like <are only> final
<evils>. The vices are both productive and final evils, for they help to
create unhappiness and make it complete, being parts of it.
5h. In addition, some of the good things are worth choosing for
themselves, others are productive. So whatever things result in a
reasonable choice for the sake of nothing else are worth choosing
for themselves; but those which are preparative of something else
are spoken of in respect of their productivity.
5i. Also, everything good is worth choosing, as it is satisfying, is
prized, and is praiseworthy. But everything bad is worth avoiding. For
the good, inasmuch as it sets moving a reasonable choice, is worth
choosing. Inasmuch as it unhesitatingly results in a choice, it is
satisfying. Again, inasmuch as one would reasonably surmise with
regard to it that it is one of the things that derive from virtue, <it is
praiseworthy>.
5k. Furthermore, of good things some are in motion, while others are
in a state. In motion are things like these: joy, cheerfulness, and
intelligent association. In a state are things like these: orderly rest,
calm persistence, manly attention. Of things in a state, some are
also in a condition, such as the virtues, while some are only in a
state, such as the things named above. Not only are the virtues in a
condition but also the other expertises in a worthwhile man which
have been altered by virtue and have become unchangeable, for
they become like virtues. They say that among the good things
which are in a condition are also what are called the pursuits, such
as fondness for music, fondness for literature, fondness for
geometry, and the suchlike. For there is a selective path of the things
in these expertises which have an affinity with virtue, referring them
to the goal of life.
5l. Furthermore, of good things, some are good in themselves, while
others are good being related in a certain way to something. Good in
themselves are knowledge, acting justly, and the like. Good in
relation to something are honor, good-will, friendship, <and
harmony>.
Knowledge is an apprehension which is secure and irreversible by
reason. In a different sense knowledge is a composite of such kinds
of knowledge, such as the knowledge of particulars, which is rational
in a worthwhile person. In another sense it is a composite of expert
types of knowledge, possessing a solidness out of itself as do the
virtues. In another sense, knowledge is a condition which is
receptive of impressions and irreversible by reason — this, they say,
is something which consists in tension and capacity.
Friendship is a partnership in life. Harmony is an agreement in
beliefs concerning matters in life. Of friendships, acquaintance is
friendship of those known to one another; intimacy is the friendship
of people grown accustomed to one another; comradeship is
friendship by choice, as, for example, with those of the same age
group; hospitality is friendship with strangers. There is also a kin
friendship of kinsmen, and an erotic friendship from erotic love.
Not feeling distress and orderliness are the same as self-restraint,
good sense and brains are the same as intelligence, the skill of
sharing and the skill of giving are the same as kindness — however,
they have been named by being in a certain condition with respect to
something. It is appropriate to observe carefully this distinction with
regard to the other virtues as well.
5m. Furthermore, of good things, some are unmixed, such as
knowledge, while others are mixed, such as being fortunate with
children, a fortunate old age, and a fortunate life. Being fortunate
with children is a worthwhile usage in the case of children in accord
with nature, being fortunate in old age is a worthwhile usage in the
case of old age in accord with nature, and being fortunate in life is
defined similarly.
5n. It is always clear with regard to these goods that there will be the
same divisions of bad things as well.
5o. They also say there is a difference between what is worth
choosing and what is worth acquiring. What is worth choosing is
stimulative of an impulse which is complete in itself, <while what is
worth acquiring is what we select circumspectly>. In the same
degree as what is worth choosing differs from what is worth
acquiring, so what is worth choosing for itself differs from what is
worth acquiring for itself, and, overall, the good differs from what has
value.
6. As man is a rational mortal creature, political by nature, they also
say that every virtue which is associated with man and the happy life
is consistent with and in agreement with nature.
6a. Zeno interpreted the goal thus: To live in agreement — that is to
live according to a single line of reason and in harmony, as those
who live in conflict are unhappy. Those after him, adding further
detail, expressed it thus: To live in agreement with nature, assuming
that Zeno’s statement was insufficient as a predicate. So Cleanthes,
the first to take over the sect after him, added with nature and
interpreted it thus: The goal is living in agreement with nature.
Chrysippus, wanting to make this clearer, expressed it in this way: To
live in accord with experience of what happens naturally. Diogenes
offered this: To be circumspect in the selection and rejection of
things in accord with nature. Archedemus: To live completing
everything appropriate. But Antipater interpreted it as: To live
continually selecting what is in accordance with nature and rejecting
what is contrary to nature. And on many occasions he also used to
interpret it thus: To do everything in one’s power continually and
unerringly with regard to obtaining the things which are preferentially
in accord with nature.
6b. The goal is spoken of in three ways by the members of this sect.
The final good is spoken of as the goal in scholarly usage, when they
say agreement is the goal. They also say that the target is the goal,
such as speaking of the life which is in agreement with reference to
the associated predicate. In relation to the third meaning they say
that the last of the desired objects, to which all the others are
referred, is the goal.
6c. They think that the goal and the target are different things. For
the target is the body set forth, which they set their sights on hitting;
[but] those aiming at happiness [have as their goal the striking of this
target] because every worthwhile person is happy and every
worthless person conversely is unhappy.
6d. Of good things, some are necessary for happiness, others are
not. Necessary are all the virtues and the activities making use of
them. Not necessary are joy, cheerfulness, and the pursuits. In a
similar fashion, some bad things are necessary, as much as bad
things can be necessary, for unhappiness, others are not necessary.
Necessary are all the vices and the activities in respect of them. Not
necessary are all passions, frailties, and things similar to these.
6e. They say that happiness is the goal: everything is produced for
its sake, while it is not produced for the sake of anything else. It
consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement, and in
addition, this being the same thing, in living in accordance with
nature. Zeno defined happiness in this way: happiness is a smooth
flow of life. Cleanthes also used this definition in his treatises, as did
Chrysippus and all their followers, saying that happiness was nothing
other than the happy life, but saying that happiness was set up as
the target, while the goal was to achieve happiness, which is the
same as being happy.
So it is clear from this that living in accord with nature, living the
good life, living well are equivalent, as are also the fine and good
and virtue and what participates in virtue. And that every good thing
is fine, and likewise every shameful thing is bad. Because of this the
Stoic goal is equivalent to life in accord with virtue.
6f. They say that what is worth choosing and what must be chosen
are different. Thus worth-choosing is every <good>, but must-be-
chosen is every benefit: this is viewed in relation to possessing the
good. Hence we choose what must be chosen, such as being
intelligent, which is considered in relation to possessing intelligence.
However, we do not choose what is worth choosing, but rather we
choose to possess it.
Likewise all good things are worth maintaining and persisting in, and
the case is analogous for the other virtues, even if they have not
been given names. But all benefits must be maintained and
persisted in. The same reasoning applies to the other things which
are in accord with vice.
7. Having given an adequate account of the good and the bad, and
what is worth choosing and what is to be avoided, and about the
goal and happiness, we have thought it necessary also to give an
account of what they say about indifferents in suitable order. They
say that the things between good and bad are indifferents, saying
that the indifferent is thought of in two ways: in one way as the
neither good nor bad, and as what is neither worth choosing nor to
be avoided; in the other, as stimulative of neither impulse nor
repulsion. In accord with the latter some things are said to be utterly
indifferent, such as <having an even or odd number of hairs on one’s
head, or> pointing a finger in this direction or that, or picking up
something in the way, such as a twig or leaf. It is according to the
first sense that the things in between virtue and vice are called
indifferent by the adherents of this sect, not in view of selection and
rejection. Hence as well some things have a selective value, but
others have a rejective lack of value, as contributing nothing to the
happy life.
7a. Of indifferent things, some are in accord with nature, others
contrary to nature, while others are neither contrary to nor in accord
with nature. In accord with nature then are things like these: health,
strength, soundness of the organs of sensation, and those things
similar to these. But contrary to nature are such: sickness,
feebleness, disability and the like. Neither contrary to nor in accord
with nature are: the state of the soul and the state of the body, in
accord with which the soul is receptive of false impressions, while
the body is receptive of wounds and disabilities, and things like
these. They say that they reason about these things from the first
things in accord with and contrary to nature. For the differing and the
indifferent are among the things spoken of as being in relation to
something. Hence, they say, even if we say that bodily things and
externals are indifferent, we are saying that they are indifferent in
relation to living with dignity (in which living happily consists), but not,
by Zeus, in relation to being in accord with nature nor in relation to
impulse and repulsion.
7b. Furthermore, of indifferent things, some have more value, others
have less. Some have their value in themselves, others as
productive. And some are preferred, others dispreferred, while
others are neither. Preferred are whatever indifferent things have
much value — to the extent this exists among indifferent things.
Likewise dispreferred are whatever have much lack of value. Neither
preferred nor dispreferred are whatever have neither much <value
nor> much lack of value.
Of the preferred, some concern the soul, others the body, others
externals. Concerning the soul are such things: natural ability,
progress, memory, quickness of the mind, a condition in accord with
which people are steadfast in the case of the appropriate acts, and
all expertises that are able, for the most part, to work in partnership
for the life in accord with nature. Concerning the body, the preferred
are health, keen perception, and things like these. Of externals, the
preferred are parents, children, moderate possessions, and
acceptance by one’s fellow men.
Of the dispreferred, those concerning the soul are the opposite to the
those which have been stated. Concerning the body and externals,
they are similarly opposed to those stated concerning the body and
the preferred externals.
Neither preferred nor dispreferred concerning the soul are
impression and assent and the like. And concerning the body,
neither preferred nor dispreferred are pale or dark skin, the
brightness of the eyes, every pleasure and toil, and anything else of
this type. Of externals, neither preferred nor dispreferred are all
things for which, being cheap and bringing nothing useful, there is
overall little need deriving from themselves.
Since the soul is more in control than the body, they say that, with
respect to living in accord with nature, things concerning the soul
which are in accord with nature and preferable also have more value
than things concerning the body and externals. Thus, in relation to
virtue, natural ability of the mind surpasses the natural ability of the
body and they say that the same holds for the other things.
7c. Furthermore, they say that some of the indifferents are
stimulative of impulse, others of repulsion, others of neither impulse
nor repulsion. So whatever things we have said to be in accord with
nature are stimulative of impulse; and whatever we have said to be
contrary to nature are stimulative of repulsion. Things which are
neither are not stimulative of either impulse or repulsion, such as
having an odd or even number of hairs on the head.
7d. Of the indifferent things which are in accord with nature, some
are first things in accord with nature, others are so by participation.
First things in accord with nature are a motion or a state in accord
with generative principles, such as <soundness and> health and
perception (I’m referring to apprehension) and strength. In accord
with nature through participation are what participate in motion and
state in accordance with generative principles, such as a sound hand
and a healthy body and senses which have not been injured. The
argument follows likewise by analogy with regard to the things which
are contrary to nature.
7e. All that is in accord with nature is worth acquiring and all which is
contrary to nature is worth shunning. Some of the things in accord
with nature are worth acquiring for their own sake, others for the
sake of other things. For their own sake are those things which in a
self-referential fashion are stimulative of an impulse toward
themselves or toward the laying hold of themselves, such as health,
good perception, lack of pain, and the beauty of the body. Worth
acquring as productive are those things which by reference to
something else are stimulative of an impulse toward other things
rather than in self-referential fashion <toward themselves>, such as
wealth, reputation, and things like these. Similarly of those things
contrary to nature some are worth shunning for their own sake,
others by being productive of other things which are worth shunning
for their own sake.
7f. All the things which are in accord with nature have value and all
the things contrary to nature have lack-of-value. Value is spoken of
in three ways: its contribution and esteem in itself; the price set by
the appraiser; and the third type, which Antipater calls selective,
through which, when things allow, we rather choose these particular
things instead of those, such as health instead of sickness, life
instead of death, and riches instead of poverty. Similarly, they say
that lack of value is also spoken of in three ways, such that the
meanings are opposed to those previously stated with respect to the
three types of value.
Diogenes says contribution is a judgment of the extent to which
something is in accord with nature or the extent to which it provides
a need to nature. The prized is not spoken of as things priced to be
used, but in the way we say the man appraising things is an
appraiser. So he says such a man is the appraiser of the price.
These are the two values according to which we say that particular
things are preferred in value; they say the third is the value
according to which we say particular things have dignity and value,
which does not occur in the case of indifferents, but only in the case
of things which are worthwhile. They say that we sometimes use the
term value instead of the befitting, as is employed in the definition of
justice, whenever it is said to be a condition apportioning to each
according to its value. For it is the same as the befitting for each.
7g. Of things which have value, some have much value, others little.
Likewise of those things having lack-of-value, some have much lack-
of-value, others little. So those things which have much value are
called preferred, those which have much lack-of-value are called
dispreferred — Zeno was the first to give these nomenclatures to
things. They say that the preferred is an indifferent thing which we
select in accord with preferential reasoning. There is the same
reasoning about the dispreferred and the examples are
correspondingly similar. No good thing is a preferred, because they
have the greatest value in themselves. But the preferred, having the
second rank and value, to some extent come close to the nature of
the good. The king is not in the court of the preferred, but rather
those ranked after him. The preferred are so called, not because
they contribute some things to happiness and work in partnership
toward it, but because it is necessary to make the selection from
these things instead of the dispreferred.
8. Consistent with the account of the preferred is the topic of the
appropriate. The appropriate is defined as what is consistent in life,
which, when carried out, has a reasonable defense. The
inappropriate is defined oppositely. This extends even to the
irrational among creatures, for they also act in a particular respect
consistently with their nature. But with regard to rational creatures, it
is interpreted thus: what is consistent in life. Of appropriate acts, they
say that some are complete — these are also spoken of as right
acts. Right acts are activations in accord with virtue, such as being
intelligent and acting justly. Acts which are not such are not right acts
and they do not call them complete appropriate acts either, but
intermediates: for example, marrying, serving as an ambassador,
discussing matters, and the like.
8a. Of right acts, some are obligatory, others are not. Obligatory are
the predicative benefits, such as being intelligent and showing self-
restraint. Whatever is not such is not obligatory. Likewise there is
also the same prescription of rules regarding the inappropriate.
Every inappropriate act occurring in a rational <creature> is a wrong
act, while an appropriate act that has been made complete is a right
act. The intermediate appropriate is measured by certain indifferent
things, selected in accord with or contrary to nature, which bring
such a smooth flow that if we did not acquire them or reject them,
except in special circumstances, we would not be happy.
9. They say that what sets impulse moving is nothing other than a
spontaneously impulsive impression of what is appropriate, while in
genus impulse is a motion of the soul toward something. The
impulse which occurs in rational creatures is viewed as a species of
this, as well as that which occurs in irrational creatures (although the
impulses have not been given corresponding names). Thus desire is
not the same as rational impulse, but a species of rational impulse.
You would rightly define rational impulse, if you said it was a motion
of the mind toward something in the field of action. Opposed to this
is repulsion, a motion <of the mind away from something in the field
of action>. In a special sense they also call impulsion an impulse as
a species of practical impulse. Impulsion is a motion of the mind
toward what is going to occur. As a result, up till here, impulse is
spoken of in four ways, repulsion in two ways. When we add on the
condition which is able to impel, which they also in a particular sense
call a impulse (that from which impelling occurs), impulse is defined
in five ways.
9a. There are numerous species of practical impulse, including
these: proposal, inclination, preparation, undertaking, <choice>,
policy, wish, and willingness. They say that proposal is an indication
of completion; inclination is an impulse before an impulse;
preparation is an action before an action; undertaking is an impulse
toward something that is now in hand; choice is a wish from
comparison; policy is a choice before a choice; wish is I reasonable
desire; willingness is a voluntary wish.
9b. All impulses are assents and practical impulses also include that
which is stimulative. At the same time there are assents for things
and impulses toward something else: assents are for certain
propositions, while impulses are toward predicates, included
somehow in the propositions for which there is assent. Since in
species passion is an impulse, let’s speak next about passions.
10. They say a passion is an impulse which is excessive,
disobedient to the choosing reason or an <irrational> motion of the
soul contrary to nature (all passions belong to the controlling part of
the soul). Hence also every agitation is a passion, <and> again
<every> passion is an agitation. As passion is like this, it must be
assumed that some passions are primary and fundamental, while
others have reference to these. First in genus are these four:
appetite, fear, pain, and pleasure. Appetite and fear lead the way, the
former toward the apparently good, the other toward the apparently
evil. Pleasure and pain come after them: pleasure whenever we
obtain that for which we had an appetite or escape from that which
we feared; pain whenever we fail to get that for which we had an
appetite or encounter that which we feared. With regard to all the
passions of the soul, when they say they are opinions, opinion is
employed for feeble assumption and fresh for that which is
stimulative of an irrational contraction <or> elation.
10a. The terms irrational and contrary to nature are not used in the
usual sense, but irrational as equivalent of disobedient to reason.
For every passion is overpowering, just as when those in the grips of
passion often see that it would be useful not to do this, but carried
away by its violence, as if by some disobedient horse, are led to
doing this. As a result, often people even confess to this, uttering this
commonly repeated line:
Although I have (better) judgment, nature forces me to do this.
Here judgment means the awareness and recognition of right things.
Contrary to nature in the description of passion is taken as
something which occurs contrary to correct and natural reasoning.
All those in the grips of passion turn their backs on reason, not in the
same way as those who have been thoroughly deceived in any
matter, but in a special way. For those who have been fooled, for
example, that there are indivisible first elements, when taught that
they do not exist, abandon this judgment. But those in the grips of
passion, even if they know or have been taught that they need not
feel pain or be afraid or be involved at all in the passions of the soul,
nevertheless do not abandon them, but are led by their passions to
being governed by their tyranny.
10b. They say that appetite is a desire which is disobedient to
reason. The cause of this is forming an opinion that something good
is approaching and if that were present we would be getting away
fine, when the opinion itself has the unruly, <fresh> stimulation <that
it is really something worth desiring>. Fear is an avoidance which is
disobedient to reason, its cause being forming an opinion that
something bad is approaching, when the belief has the fresh
stimulation that it is really something worth avoiding. Pain is a
contraction of the soul which is disobedient to reason. The cause of
it is forming a fresh opinion that an evil is present, in the face of
which it is appropriate <to contract. Pleasure is an elation of the soul
disobedient to reason. The cause of it is forming a fresh opinion that
a good is present, in the face of which it is appropriate> to be elated.
Under appetite are subsumed things like these: anger and its
species (temper, rage, wrath, rancor, cases of ire, and such), violent
cases of erotic love, cravings, yearnings, cases of fondness for
pleasure, cases of fondness for wealth, cases of fondness for
esteem, and the like. Under pleasure are subsumed cases of joy at
others’ misfortunes, cases of self-gratification, cases of charlatanry,
and the like. Under fear are subsumed cases of hesitancy, cases of
anguish, astonishment, feelings of shame, commotions,
superstitions, dread, and terrors. Under pain are subsumed distress,
envy, jealousy, pity, grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance, mental pain,
and vexation.
10c. Anger is an appetite to take vengeance on a person who seems
to have acted unjustly contrary to what is fitting. Temper is anger
starting up; rage is anger boiling over; wrath is anger set aside or
stored up to mature; rancor is anger keeping watch for an
opportunity for revenge; ire is anger breaking out on the spot. Erotic
love is an inclination for forming an attachment arising from the
display of beauty; craving is an appetite in accord with erotic love for
one who is absent; yearning is an appetite for the company of an
absent friend; fondness for pleasure is an appetite for pleasures;
fondness for wealth is an appetite for wealth; fondness for esteem is
an appetite for opinion.
Joy at others’ misfortunes is pleasure at the evils suffered by others.
Self-gratification is taking pleasure in the unexpected. Charlatanry is
taking pleasure in visual deception.
Hesitancy is fear about a future activity. Anguish is fear of failure
and, in another sense, fear of defeat. Astonishment is fear arising
from an unaccustomed impression. Shame is fear of loss of
reputation. Commotion is fear together with noise urging us on.
Superstition is fear of the gods or spirits. Dread is fear of the terrible.
Terror is fear from reasoning.
Distress is pain at good occurring to others. Envy is pain at another
getting what you yourself have an appetite for, but you do not
yourself get. Envy is spoken of in another sense as well, as a
benediction of what is lacking, and, in another sense as well, as the
imitation of another as being superior to oneself. Jealousy is pain at
another also getting what you yourself had an appetite for. Pity is
pain at someone appearing to suffer harm undeservedly. Grief is
pain at a premature death. Worry is pain becoming burdensome.
Sorrow is pain which produces speechlessness. Annoyance is pain
in accordance with calculation. Mental pain is pain which burrows
into a person and takes up home there. Vexation is pain with
thrashing around.
10d. Of these passions, some display the occcasion which prompts
them, such as pity, distress, joy at others’ misfortunes, and shame.
Others show the specific type of motion, such as mental pain and
terror.
10e. A proclivity is a propensity to a passion, as a particular deed
contrary to nature, such as taking offense, irascibility, enviousness,
outbursts of rage, and the like. There are also proclivities to other
deeds contrary to nature, such as acts of theft, acts of adultery, and
acts of violence, through which they are called thieves, adulterers,
and hooligans. An illness is an opinion about an appetite which has
inclined into a condition and become ingrained, through which they
assume that things that are not worth choosing are especially worth
choosing, such as fondness for women, fondness for wine, and
fondness for money. There are also some things opposite to these
illnesses which occur by aversion, such as the hatred of women, the
hatred of wine, and the hatred of mankind. Those illnesses which
occur together with weakness are called frailties.
11a. They say that a right act is an appropriate act having in full all
its features, or as we said earlier, a complete appropriate act. A
wrong act is something done contrary to correct reason or where
some appropriate act has been omitted by a rational creature.
11b. They say that all good things are common to the worthwhile —
hence, in addition, the man who benefits any of his neighbors also
benefits himself. Concord is a knowledge of common goods. Hence
also all the worthwhile are in concord with one another, because they
are in harmony in the affairs of life. But the worthless, being in
disharmony with one another, are enemies of one another, are ready
to do harm to each other, and are at war with one another.
They say justice is by nature and not by convention. Following on
from this, it is the case that the wise man takes part in politics,
especially in such political systems as display some progress toward
being complete political systems. It is also the case that he makes
laws and educates his fellow men; furthermore, it is fitting for the
worthwhile to write down what is able to benefit those who happen
upon their writings, as is also to stoop to marriage and the raising of
children, both for his own and his country’s sake, and also to endure
for its sake, if it is moderate, toils and death. Opposed to these are
worthless things: courting the mob, being a sophist, and writing
works which are harmful to those who happen upon them, things
which would not befall the worthwhile.
11c. Friendship is spoken of in three ways: in one way, for the sake
of common benefit, according to which people are called friends —
but they say that this is not one of the good things, since according
to them nothing which is made up of separate parts is a good. What
is called friendship according to the second definition, a friendly
relationship with one’s neighbors, they say is one of the external
goods. But the friendship which pertains to oneself, in accord with
which one is a friend of one’s neighbors, they declare to be one of
the good things of the soul.
11d. Goods are common in another way. For they believe that
everyone who benefits anyone else gains an equal advantage by the
act itself, while no worthless man can either benefit someone else or
receive a benefit. For to confer a benefit is to be in accord with virtue
and to be benefited is to be moved in accord with virtue.
They say that only the worthwhile man is skilled in household
management and a good manager of his household, and, in addition,
skilled at making money. For the skill of managing a household is a
rule-based and practical condition with regard to what is useful for
the household; household management is the organization of
expenses and deeds, and the care of acquisitions and the produce
from the fields. The money-making skill is experience in the
acquisition of money from appropriate sources and a condition which
creates conduct in agreement (with nature) in the collecting,
preservation, and expenditure of money to produce affluence. Some
say that making money is an intermediate, others that it is something
civilized. But no worthless man can be a good head of his
household, nor is he able to provide for a well-managed house. Only
the worthwhile man is skilled at making money, knowing from what
sources money must be gained, and when, how, and for how long.
They also say that <the man with good sense does not forgive
anyone. For it is characteristic of the same person both to forgive>
someone and to believe that he did not do wrong through his own
fault, when all do wrong through their own evil. Accordingly it is
rightly said that he does not forgive those who are doing wrong.
They say that the good man is not tolerant, since the tolerant can be
begged off the punishment in accord with what is due, and that it is
the mark of the same man to be tolerant and to assume that the
punishments set out by law for the unjust are too harsh and to
consider that the lawmaker apportions punishments contrary to what
is due.
They say that the law is worthwhile, since it is correct reasoning,
ordering what must be done, but forbidding what must not be done.
And as the law is civilized, the law-abiding citizen <would be>
civilized too. For the man is law-abiding who is able both to follow
the law and to carry out the things ordered by it, while the man is
learned in the law who is able to interpret the law. But no worthless
man is either law-abiding or learned in the law.
11e. In addition, they say that some activations are right acts, while
others are wrong acts, while others are neither. Right acts are such
as these: to be intelligent, to show self-restraint, to act justly, to be
joyful, to be benevolent, to be cheerful, to walk around intelligently,
and everything else which is done in accord with correct reasoning.
Wrong acts include to act stupidly, to show lack of restraint, to act
unjustly, to feel pain, to be afraid, to steal, and, overall, whatever is
done contrary to correct reasoning. Neither right nor wrong acts are
such: to talk, to pose a question, to answer, to walk around, to live
abroad, and things like these. All right acts are justly performed acts,
lawfully performed acts, orderly acts, properly pursued acts,
prosperous acts, successful acts, opportune acts, and dignified acts.
However, they are not intelligent acts, but only those which derive
from intelligence are such — and the same is true in relation to the
other virtues (even if they have not been named), such as restrained
acts derived from self-restraint and just acts from justice. Wrong acts
derived from the opposing vices are unjust acts, lawless acts, and
unruly acts.
11f. They say that just as what is worth choosing and what must be
chosen differ, so too do what is worth desiring and what must be
desired, what is worth wanting and what must be wanted, and what
is worth accepting and what must be accepted. For good things are
worth choosing, being wanted, desired, <and accepted, while
benefits must be chosen, wanted, desired,> and accepted, as they
are predicates, associated with good things. They say that we
choose what must be chosen, wish for what must be wanted, and
desire what must be desired. For choices, desires, and wishes are
for predicates, as with the impulses. However, we choose, want, and
likewise desire to have good things. Hence good things are worth
choosing, worth wanting, and worth desiring. We choose to have
intelligence and self-restraint, not, by Zeus, to have being sensible
and being self-restrained, which are incorporeals and predicates.
Likewise they say that all goods are worth maintaining and worth
persisting in and that the case is analogous for the other virtues,
even if they have not been given names. All benefits must be
maintained and persisted in and so forth. Similarly they assume that
there is a difference between what is worth avoiding and what must
be avoided and what is not worth sustaining and what must be
sustained. There is the same account of other matters which are
associated with vices.
11g. They say that every fine and good man is complete because he
is lacking in no virtue. Conversely, every worthless man is
incomplete because he participates in no virtue. Hence also the
good among men always live an absolutely happy life, while the
worthless are unhappy, and the happiness <of the former> is in no
way different from the happiness of the gods. Chrysippus says that
their momentary happiness is no different from the happiness of
Zeus <and> that the happiness of Zeus is in no respect more worth
choosing, nor finer, nor more majestic than that of wise men.
It is the view of Zeno and his Stoic followers that there are two races
of men, that of the worthwhile, and that of the worthless. The race of
the worthwhile employ the virtues through all their lives, while the
race of the worthless employ the vices. Hence the worthwhile always
do right in everything on which they embark, while the worthless do
wrong. The worthwhile man, using his practical experiences with
regard to life in the things done by him, does all things well, just as
he does them sensibly, with self-restraint, and in accord with the
other virtues. The worthless man, conversely, does badly. The
worthwhile man is also great, powerful, eminent, and strong. Great
because he is able to accomplish the things which accord with his
policy and are proposed. Powerful, because he is extolled on all
sides. Eminent, because he has gained a share in the eminence
which befalls a noble and wise man. And strong, because he has
possession of the strength which befalls such a man, being invincible
and unconquerable. Consequently, he is neither compelled by
anyone nor does he compel another, neither prevented by nor
preventing anyone else, neither forced by another nor forcing
anyone else, neither lording it over others nor being lorded over,
neither doing harm to another nor suffering harm from anyone else,
neither encountering evils <nor causing anyone else to encounter
evil>, neither deceived nor deceiving another, neither subjected to
falsehood nor failing to understand nor unaware of what he is doing
nor, overall, does he assume a falsehood. He is particularly happy,
prosperous, blessed, fortunate, pious, dear to the gods, meritorious,
kingly, fit for command, political, good at managing the household
and at making money. The worthless have everything opposite to
this.
Overall, all good things belong to the worthwhile, all evils to the
worthless. It should not be thought that they are saying this: that if
particular good things exist, these belong to the worthwhile, and that
it is also the same case regarding evils. But rather they have so
many good things that there is nothing lacking for their life to be
complete <and happy>, while the other group has so many evils that
their life is incomplete and unhappy.
11h. They describe virtue by numerous terms. They say it is good,
because it leads us to the correct life; pleasing, because it is prized
unhesitatingly; highly valued, because it has unsurpassable value;
worthwhile, as being deserving of the utmost regard; praiseworthy,
because someone would reasonably praise it; beautiful, because it
naturally calls to itself those desiring it; advantageous, because it
produces the sort of things that contribute to the good life; useful,
because it is beneficial in use; worth choosing, because what can
reasonably be chosen occur as a result of it; necessary, because
when it is present it benefits and, if it is not present, it is not possible
to be benefited; profitable, for its benefits are greater than the effort
which contributes to them; self-sufficient, as it suffices for the person
who has it; free from want, because it removes any want; and
enough, because it is adequate for our usage and extends to every
need in life.
11i. The worthless participate in none of the good things, since the
good is a virtue or something which participates in virtue. The things
associated with the goods — whatever things exist which are
needed, that is, benefits — occur only to the worthwhile, just as the
things associated with the evils — that is, whatever things exist
which are not needed — occur only to the bad, as they are harmful
things. Because of this the good are all free from harm in both
respects, neither being able to harm nor to be harmed; while the
worthless are in the opposite position.
They say that true riches are a good and true poverty an evil. True
freedom is a good, true slavery an evil. Because of this they also say
that the worthwhile man is the only rich and free man, and,
conversely, the worthless man is poor, deprived of the impulses
toward being rich, and a slave because of his submissive disposition.
All goods are common to the worthwhile, all evils to the worthless.
Because of this, whoever benefits someone also is himself
benefited, and the person who harms another also harms himself. All
the worthwhile benefit one another. They are not totally friends of
one another, nor well-disposed to each other, <nor> highly prized nor
accepted by each other because they are not aware of each other
and do not live together in the same place. However, they are in
attitude well-disposed and friendly to each other, and prized and
accepted by one another. The stupid are the opposite of this.
As the law is worthwhile, as we have said (since it is correct reason
ordering what must be done and forbidding what must not be done),
they say that only the wise man is law-abiding, as he is able to do
what is ordered by the law, and that he alone is able to interpret it —
hence, he is also learned in the law. The silly are the opposite of this.
Furthermore they assign to the civilized the governing
superintendence and its species: kingship, generalship, admiralship,
and the like. In accord with this also only the worthwhile man
governs and, if he does not do this totally with respect to activity, he
governs totally with respect to his disposition. And only the
worthwhile man is obedient to command, being ready to follow the
man who governs. None of the stupid is such. For the stupid person
is neither able to govern nor to be governed, being headstrong and
unmanageable.
The person with good sense does everything well, and so
intelligently, temperately, modestly, and in orderly fashion continually
using his practical experiences with regard to life. The worthless
man, however, having no experience of the correct use, does
everything badly, acting in accord with his disposition, easily
changing his mind and in the grip of regret over every matter. Regret
is pain at things that have been done, as having been done wrongly
by oneself, a passion of the soul which creates unhappiness and is
quarrelsome. To the extent that the person in a state of regret feels
some sorrow at the occurrences, he is annoyed with himself as
having been responsible for them. Hence, every worthless person is
dishonored, neither being worthy of honor nor being held in honor.
For honor is an evaluation (as deserving) of privilege, and privilege is
the prize for benevolent virtue. So what is without any participation in
virtue is rightly spoken of as dishonored.
They also say that every worthless person is also an exile, to the
extent that he is deprived of law and befitting government in accord
with nature. For the law, as we have stated, is worthwhile, and,
likewise, so too is the city. With regard to the city being a worthwhile
thing, Cleanthes adequately posed the question in this fashion, If the
city is an arrangement for dwelling in a place and it is possible for
people who have taken refuge in this to get and suffer judgment,
then isn’t the city civilized? But it is in fact such a dwelling place. So
the city is civilized. The city is spoken of in three ways: with regard to
the dwelling place, with regard to the composite made of men, and
thirdly with regard to both of these. The city is spoken of as civilized
in respect of two definitions, in regard to the definition the composite
made of men, and, because of the reference to the inhabitants, in
regard to the definition in both respects.
11k. They also say that every worthless person is rustic. For rusticity
is a lack of experience of the customs and laws of the city to which
every worthless person is subject. He is also wild, being hostile to
the lifestyle which is in accord with the law, bestial, and a harmful
person. This same fellow is savage and despotic, inclined to do
tyrannical acts, and furthermore to do cruel, violent, and lawless acts
when he gets opportunities. He is also ungrateful, neither having an
affinity to the return of a favor nor to the bestowal of one because he
does not do anything cooperatively nor amicably nor spontaneously.
The worthless person is neither fond of discussion nor of listening,
because he has not been prepared for the reception of correct
reasoning because of his stupidity which fails from its distortion, and
because none of the worthless is inclined toward nor can incline
others to virtue. For the person who is inclined or can incline others
needs to be ready for philosophizing, and the person who is ready is
without impediment, and none of the stupid are such. For it is not the
person who eagerly listens to and makes notes of what is spoken by
the philosophers who is ready for philosophizing, but the person who
is ready to transfer the prescriptions of philosophy to his deeds and
to live in accord with them. None of the worthless are such, being
already prejudiced by the teachings of vice. For if any of the
worthless had been so inclined, he would also have turned from vice.
But no one who possesses vice is turned toward virtue, just as no
one who is sick is turned toward health. Only the wise man is
inclined to virtue and only he is able to incline others, while none of
the stupid can. For none of the stupid are able to live according to
the prescriptions <of virtue>. Nor can they be fond of discussion, but
are instead fond of talking, advancing as far as superficial chatter,
but not, in addition, strengthening the reasoning of virtue by deeds
as well.
None of the worthless are industrious. For industriousness is a
disposition able to accomplish unhesitatingly what is befitting through
toil, and none of the worthless are unhesitating with regard to toil.
Nor do any of the worthless gain virtue’s contribution in accord with
their merits, for contribution is something worthwhile, being
knowledge in accord with which we think we are acquiring something
worthwhile. None of the worthwhile things befall the worthless, so
none of the stupid gain virtue’s contribution in accord with their
merits. If any of the stupid gained virtue’s contribution in accord with
his merits, to the extent that he honored it, he would be getting rid of
vice. But every stupid person gladly lives with his vice. It is
necessary to examine, not the published accounts of these men,
which are worthless, but rather the accounts of their deeds. From
these they are convicted of being eager, not for the good and
worthwhile, but for slavish, immoderate pleasures.
It is their view that every wrong act is an impious act. For to do
something against the wish of the god is proof of impiety. As the
gods have an affinity with virtue and its deeds, but are alienated from
vice and those things which are produced by it, and as a wrong act is
an activation in accord with vice, every wrong act is revealed as
displeasing to the gods (that is, an impious act): for with every wrong
act the worthless man does something displeasing to the gods.
Furthermore, since every worthless man does whatever he does in
accord with vice, just as the worthwhile man acts in accord with
virtue, the person who has one vice has them all. Among them can
also be seen impiety, not the type of impiety which is classified in
accord with its activity, but the condition which is opposed to piety.
But what is achieved in accord with impiety is an impious act. So
every wrong act is an impious act.
Furthermore, it is their view that every stupid person is an enemy of
the gods. For enmity is disharmony and discord in matters of life, just
as friendship is harmony and concord. But the worthless are in
disharmony with the gods in matters of life. Hence, every stupid
person is an enemy of the gods. Furthermore if all believe that those
opposed to them are their enemies, and the worthless person is
hostile to the worthwhile, and god is worthwhile, then the worthless
person is an enemy of the gods.
11l. They say that all wrong acts are equal, but are not now the
same. Inasmuch as they naturally come from, as it were, one source,
that of vice, the judgment is the same in the case of every wrong act.
But, in relation to the external cause, since the intermediates vary
with regard to which the judgments are completed, wrong acts are
different in quality. You would get a clear image of what is being
explained by considering it is this way: every falsehood is equally a
falsehood, for none are more falsified than the others. So that it is
<always> night is a falsehood, just as is saying that centaurs live —
to say one is no more a falsehood than the other. (But the false is not
equally false, and also those who have been subjected to a
falsehood are not equally subjected to a falsehood.) Also to do
wrong to a greater or lesser extent is impossible, as every wrong is
produced through falsehood. Furthermore, it can’t be that a right act
cannot occur to a greater or lesser degree, but a wrong act can
occur to a greater or lesser degree: all of them are complete things.
Hence, they could not lack or have anything more than one another.
So, then, all mistaken acts are equal.
11m. Concerning natural ability and being well-bred, some of the
members of this school have been led to say that every wise man
has such qualities, while others do not. For the latter think that
people naturally suitable for virtue occur not only by nature, but also
as a result of training, and they have agreed with this proverbial
saying:
Practice over a long time turns into second nature.
They have come to the same supposition about good breeding as
well: so while natural ability is, in normal usage, a condition from
nature, or a condition from training which has an affinity with virtue,
or a condition in accordance with which people are easily able to
gain virtue, good breeding is a condition, inherited or as the result of
training, which has an affinity with virtue.
The worthwhile man, being affable, clever, encouraging, and able to
hunt for goodwill and friendship through association, is as
accommodating as possible to the mass of men, through which he is
also charming, gracious, and trustworthy, and, in addition, soothing,
keen in aim, opportune, shrewd, guileless, simple, straightforward,
and unaffected, while the worthless person is subject to all the
opposites. They say to dissemble is a mark of the worthless, since
no one who is a free man and worthwhile dissembles. Likewise with
sarcasm, which is to dissemble with a type of mockery. They accept
friendship only among the wise, since among them alone is there
concord regarding the matters of life, as concord is a knowledge of
common goods. For true friendship, not that falsely so-named,
cannot exist without trust and firmness. In the case of the worthless,
as they are unreliable and unstable and in possession of
contradictory beliefs, it is not friendship, but different ties and
attachments held together externally by their needs and opinions.
They also say that being affectionate, embracing, and loving belong
to the worthwhile alone.
Only the wise man can be a king and kingly, while none of the
worthless can be such, since kingship is an office answerable to
none, both being the office above all others and controlling all other
offices.
They also say that the worthwhile man is the best doctor of himself.
For, being careful about his personal nature, he is a close observer
of and knowledgeable about what is useful for his health.
It is not possible for a person with intelligence to get drunk. For
drunkenness encompasses the wrongful, since it is raving caused by
wine, and the worthwhile man does wrong in nothing. Hence, he
does everything in accord with virtue and the correct reasoning
derived from it.
There are three preferential types of life, the kingly, the political, and
thirdly the intellectual. Likewise there are three preferential types of
making money: the one derived from kingship, through which either
one will be king oneself or be rich with money from a monarch; the
second derived from political life, for he will take part in politics
according to preferential reasoning; and indeed he will marry and
father children, as these are consistent with his <nature> as a
rational creature who is communal and fond of fellowship. So he will
make money both from public office and from those of his friends
who are in positions of authority. But as to whether he will be a
sophist and will be rich in money through sophistry, the members of
this sect disagreed with respect to what is meant. For they agreed
that they will make money from educational activities and from time
to time accept payments from those who are fond of learning. But
there was some disagreement among them concerning what is
meant, some saying that to be a sophist is the same thing as to
share the beliefs of philosophy for payment, while others suspect
that there is something worthless in sophistry, like trading in words,
and they say that one need not make money from education from
whoever happens along, as this way of making money falls short of
the dignity of philosophy. They sometimes say that the way out from
life can be appropriate for the worthwhile in numerous ways, while
for the worthless and for those who are not going to become wise
only persistence in life is appropriate. For virtue does not constrain
the worthwhile to live nor does vice force them out, but life and death
is measured by what is appropriate and what is inappropriate.
They also say that the wise man is free from outrage. For he is
neither treated outrageously nor does he act outrageously toward
another, because outrage is injustice which makes one ashamed
and a harm. But the worthwhile man neither suffers injustice nor is
harmed (although some may deal with him unjustly and outrageously
and in this respect act unjustly). In addition, a chance injustice is not
an outrage, but only one which makes one ashamed and is
outrageous. But the person with good sense does not get involved in
these things and is in no way made ashamed, for he has the good
and the divine virtue in himself, and as a consequence he is
removed from all vice and harm.
The man with good sense will sometimes be king and associate with
a king who shows natural ability and the love of learning. For we said
it is possible to take part in government in accord with preferential
reasoning, but also not to take part if something <prevented him>
and especially if he was not going to benefit his country, but
assumed that great and difficult dangers would follow directly from
political life.
It is said that the wise man does not lie, but tells the truth in all
cases. For lying does not occur in telling a falsehood, but in telling
the falsehood in a false way and for the deception of one’s
neighbors. However they believe that he will sometimes avail himself
of the falsehood in numerous ways without assent: in accord with
generalship against the opponents, and in accord with his foresight
of what is useful, and in accord with many other types of
management of life. They say that the wise man never assumes
what is false nor does he assent at all to what cannot be
apprehended, since he neither forms an opinion nor is ignorant in
any matter. For ignorance is changeable and feeble assent. But he
assumes nothing in feeble fashion, but instead securely and firmly.
Hence, the wise man also does not form an opinion either. There are
two types of opinion: assent to what cannot be apprehended and
weak assumption. These are alien to the disposition of the wise man.
Hence, acting rashly and giving assent before apprehension is the
mark of a rash, worthless man, and does not befall the naturally
suitable and complete man, the worthwhile person. For nothing
escapes his notice, since obliviousness is a declarative assumption
of a falsehood. Consistent with this, he does not mistrust, since
mistrust is an assumption of a falsehood. But trust is civilized, since
it is a strong apprehension, confirming what is assumed. Likewise
knowledge is an apprehension irreversible by reason. Because of
this they say that the worthless man neither knows anything nor
trusts in anything. In line with this, the wise man is not defrauded,
cheated, criticized, nor does he swindle nor is he swindled by
another. For deception encompasses all these things as well as
assent to what are falsehoods in the context. None of the civilized
make a mistake about the way, or their home, or about the target —
nor do they believe that the wise man fails to see or mishears, nor,
overall, that he strikes a false note with respect to any of the organs
of sensation, and they believe that each of these (mistakes) belong
to false assents. They say that the wise man does not surmise, since
surmise is assent to what cannot be comprehended in species. Nor
do they assume that a man with good sense changes his mind, for
changing one’s mind belongs to false assent, on the grounds of
erring through haste. Nor does he change his mind in any way, nor
alter his opinion, nor is he confused. For all these things are marks
of those who waver in their beliefs, which is alien to the person with
good sense. They also say that nothing seems to be to him, in line
with what has been stated.
11n. They also believe that a person is wise without having been
aware of it at first, since he is neither desiring anything nor has he
completely arrived at any of the specific forms of wishing, because
he does not judge that what is needed is present for him. There will
be similar types of apprehension not only with respect to intelligence,
but also regarding the other expertises.
11o. As all wrong acts are equal and all right acts equal too, so the
stupid are all equally stupid, having the same, equal disposition? But
while wrong acts are equal, there are certain differences among
them, to the extent that some of them occur from a harsh and difficult
to cure disposition, while others do not.
11p. Of the worthwhile, some are more able to encourage and more
persuasive than others; furthermore, some are shrewder about
intermediates which involve changes in intensities.
11q. Only the civilized man is fortunate in his children — certainly not
everyone — for the man who is fortunate in his children, having
civilized children, needs to experience them as such! Only the
worthwhile man has a fortunate old age and a fortunate death, for a
fortunate old age is living out one’s life in accord with virtue whatever
the type of old age, and to have a fortunate death is to end one’s life
in accord with virtue whatever the type of death.
11r. Things which are healthy and things which make a person ill are
spoken of in relation to man, as are things of the nurturing type, and
the laxatives and astringents, and the like. For things which are
healthy are those which are naturally suitable for producing or
preserving health, while things which make a person ill are the
opposite to these. There is a similar reasoning about other matters.
11s. Only the worthwhile man is able to prophesy, having a
knowledge that is able to distinguish the signs from the gods or
spirits which touch on human life. As a result, the species of
prophetic art are associated with him: the skill of dream
interpretation, the skill of observing the flight of birds, the skill of
making sacrifices, and any things which may be similar to these.
They say that the worthwhile man is stern to the extent that he
neither addresses to anyone nor admits to himself speech for the
purpose of ingratiation. They say that the wise man will live like a
Cynic, which is equivalent to sticking with the Cynic lifestyle; but
certainly he will not start out on the Cynic lifestyle when he is a wise
man.
They say that erotic love is an inclination to forming an attachment
resulting from the beauty displayed by young men in their prime. As
a result the wise man is erotic and falls in love with those worthy of
erotic love — the well-bred and naturally suitable.
They also say that nothing contrary to desire, contrary to impulse,
nor contrary to his inclination occurs in the case of the worthwhile
man, because he does all such things with reservation and nothing
adverse befalls him unforeseen!
He is also gentle, gentleness being a condition through which they
are gentle about doing what is befitting in every case and not being
carried away into anger in any matter. He is also tranquil and proper,
propriety being a knowledge of suitable motions, while tranquility is
orderliness in relation to the motions in accord with nature and
persistences of the soul and body, while the opposite to this occurs
in the case of all the worthless.
Everyone who is fine and good is free from slander, being
impervious to slander; as a result, he is free from slander both in this
way and by not slandering another. For slander is a disagreement
between people, who are apparently friends, through false
reasoning. But this does not occur in the case of good men, but only
the worthless slander and are slandered by one another.
Accordingly, those who are truly friends neither slander nor are
slandered by one another, but only those who seem to be and
appear to be so.
The worthwhile man never delays, as delay is a postponement of
activity through hesitancy, and he postpones anything only when the
postponement is irreproachable. For Hesiod has stated this about
delaying:
Do not delay for the morrow or the day after,
and
The dilatory man is always wrestling with ruin,
Since delay produces an abandonment of the fitting deeds.
12. So much for these matters: Chrysippus has discussed all their
paradoxical beliefs in many different places, both in the book On
Beliefs and in the Treatise on Reason and in many other works in
particular sections. But now that I have given an adequate account
of whatever of the ethical beliefs in accord with the Stoic school of
philosophers I intended to go through in survey fashion, I will here
bring this summary to an end.