Biden and China: Challenges and Opportunities

By Michael Klare and Joseph Gerson

As the Biden administration takes office, it will face many challenges of both a domestic and
foreign nature. Few, however, will prove as daunting as U.S. relations with China. If the new
administration proceeds along the path laid out by its predecessor, the U.S. and China will be
entrapped in a new Cold War, with grievous and far-reaching consequences for both countries;
if, however, Biden seeks to avoid that outcome and find common ground with Beijing on such
key issues as climate change, global economic growth, and world health, he will have to shift
course and forge a working relationship with Chinese leaders that promises benefits of peace and
prosperity to China, the US and the world. This, in turn, will require addressing many areas of
contention – trade, Taiwan, human rights, the South China Sea, and so on – that lead to
escalating violence at any time. Overcoming these perils while securing Beijing’s cooperation in
other areas will, therefore, prove among the most demanding tasks facing the new
administration.

There should be no doubt about the magnitude of the stakes involved. The United States and
China possess the world’s two leading economies and two largest and best-equipped military
forces. Should they slide into a new Cold War, the economies of both would be profoundly
affected, with a high risk of global disjunction and economic slowdown. More worrisome still, a
Cold War would lead to increased levels of tension and suspicion, increasing the risk that a
military clash or incident would erupt into a major regional conflagration, or even a nuclear war.

Given these stakes, it is essential to assess the obstacles to improved U.S.-Chinese relations and
also to identify strategies for reducing tensions and cooperating in areas of mutual concern, such
as climate change, global economic stability, and nuclear nonproliferation.

Obstacles to Improved Relations:

The challenges facing the Biden administration in managing U.S.-China relations largely derive
from three key sets of problems: systemic and geographic, the roles of particular leaders, and
specific points of contention.

Systemic and Geographic Factors:

Many of the strains in U.S.-Chinese relations stem from the simple fact that China is a rising
power with ambitions to play a larger role on the world stage while the United States seeks to
retain its status as the world’s paramount power. This is a classic dilemma in international
politics: as a nation gains in wealth and power, it typically seeks greater sway over neighboring
lands and areas further distant; this, in turn, threatens the strategic interests of the dominant
power or powers of the time, which often seek to impede the rise of the newly assertive state. As
Harvard professor Graham Allison has pointed out, this process often leads to war, as when
Germany’s rise in the early 20th century led to not one but two world wars. But even when it does
not result in violent conflict, the emergence of a major world power generates enormous strains
in world affairs and inevitably leads to friction between the paramount world leader and its
preeminent challenger.[1]

That Chinese leaders seek a larger role for Beijing in regional and world affairs is not in
question, nor is the fact that American elites, who welcomed China’s expanded role in world
affairs from the Nixon to the Clinton administrations, are now equally determined to prevent
China from achieving its grand ambitions. During the anniversary of his fifth year in power as
president and party leader, Xi Jinping delivered a major speech in which he outlined his, and the
nation’s ambitions. “The Chinese nation…has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong,” he
told the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress on Oct. 18, 2017. Xi then articulated
the Party’s historic mission to “realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.” By 2035, he
said, China will have completed its military modernization and become a “global leader in
innovation”; by 2049, it will have achieved the repossession of Taiwan and become a “strong
country” with “world-class forces.”[2]
For the Chinese people, who long suffered from the immiserating consequences of corrupt
governments and imperialism and emerged destitute from World War II and the subsequent civil
war, Xi’s vision of national “rejuvenation” undoubtedly holds great appeal. For foreign policy
elites in Washington, however, it is viewed with dread and alarm. Even while praising the PRC
for lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, American leaders often castigate the
Chinese leadership for promoting expansionist notions in Asia that, it is argued, will inevitably
lead to instability and conflict. Fueling this concern is the perception that America’s power is
declining relative to that of China – a trend, it is claimed, that could inspire overconfident
Chinese leaders to engage in aggressive behaviors and so provoke a war with the United States.

A perfect expression of this narrative is a June 2020 essay in Foreign Affairs by Michèle A.
Flournoy, a former Undersecretary of Defense who many thought would be Biden’s choice for
Secretary of Defense. “For the past two decades, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been
growing in size, capability, and confidence,” she wrote. “At the same time, the credibility of U.S.
deterrence has been declining. The more confident China’s leaders are in their own capabilities
and the more they doubt the capabilities and resolve of the United States, the greater the chance
of miscalculation – a breakdown in deterrence that could bring direct conflict between two
nuclear powers.” The only way to avoid such a conflict, she continued, was to rebuild U.S.
forces in the Pacific region and so bolster deterrence to Chinese assertiveness.[3]

This clash in national objectives – to achieve global power status on one side and to impede
those ambitions on the other – would prove challenging under the best of circumstances. But
compounding these inescapable systemic factors are the legacies of geography and history: U.S.
and Chinese forces presently face each other along a series of potential battle zones in the
western Pacific, stretching from the Korean Peninsula and Japan in the north to the waters
around Taiwan and thence to the South China Sea. For the United States, these areas represent its
forward defense line in Asia – a stance it has attempted to fortify since the turn of the previous
century, when the Philippines came under U.S. control at the end of the Spanish American War.
That war, and the permanent U.S. regional presence that followed, was driven in large part by an
elite perception that America’s westward expansion did not end at the nation’s Pacific shore but
extended across that ocean to the very shores of Asia. In consonance with this outlook, the
United States has long retained military bases throughout the region, including in Japan,
Okinawa, South Korea, and the islands of Micronesia.[4] For the Chinese, however, America’s
military dominance of this area – essentially, China’s maritime front door – has become
intolerable. If China is to attain its status as a world-class power, it must secure control of its
offshore waters, and this requires pushing the U.S. defense line back from the far western Pacific
to a line closer to the ocean’s middle – a reversal considered intolerable to U.S. elites. Hence, we
have a systemic dilemma for which there is no easy solution.[5]

Leadership Roles:

As important as are all of the factors discussed above, so, too, are the roles played by particular
leaders on both sides who have steered Sino-American relations in recent years. During the
Obama era, relations between the two countries largely remained cordial, with trade, technology,
investment and educational exchange ties robust, although Washington came to view China with
increasing suspicion. In 2011, Obama announced his “pivot to Asia,” a strategy intended to
diminish the Pentagon’s focus on Middle Eastern conflicts and devote more resources to
offsetting China’s growing presence in Southeast Asia.[6] Nevertheless, Obama worked closely
with Xi Jinping to secure international support for the Paris Climate Agreement of December
2015. After that, however, U.S.-Chinese relations turned increasingly bitter, reaching a peak with
aggressive anti-China policies implemented during the final months of the Trump administration.

Although President Trump periodically spoke of his warm friendship with Xi, he embraced
policies that were bound to alienate the Chinese leadership and corrode the U.S.-Chinese
relationship. These included, most of all, the multibillion-dollar tariffs imposed on Chinese
imports and the war waged by Trump on Huawei, China’s lead telecommunications company.
Not only did Trump block Huawei’s access to advanced computer chips needed for its advanced
fifth generation (5G) wireless services,[7] but also brought criminal charges against the firm for
technology theft and requested the arrest in Canada of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng
Wanzhou, the daughter of the company’s founder, and her extradition to the United States to face
prosecution in the case.[8] All of this will loom over the Biden administration as it moves to
revive relations with Beijing.
If the legacy of former President Trump will prove an obstacle to improved relations, so, too will
that of his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo. Unlike the president, whose differences with Beijing
were largely driven by the economic concerns of his core supporters, Pompeo highlighted the
ideological divide between the U.S. and China and used his position to counter Beijing from
every angle possible. In the most elaborate expression of his views, a speech delivered at the
Richard Nixon Presidential Library in July 2020, Pompeo asserted that “securing our freedoms
from the Chinese Communist Party is the mission of our time.” To prevail in this mighty
struggle, he asserted, it will not be enough for the United States to bolster its own forces in Indo-
Pacific region, but it must also establish a new alliance system, comparable to NATO, to contain
China and block its rise.[9] As part of this effort, Pompeo boosted the so-called “Quad,” a
cooperative military arrangement encompassing the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan and aimed
at China. He also issued an edict on the South China Sea that essentially empowers U.S.
warships to come to the aid of any vessel from a bordering state that comes under attack from
Chinese ships[11] – a measure that provoked sharp condemnation from Beijing and will surely
cause problems for the Biden administration.

Finally, on the American side, there is the critical role played by former Secretary of Defense
Jim Mattis in transforming U.S. military strategy from one focused on counterterrorism in the
Middle East to one emphasizing full-scale combat with China and Russia. Unlike Pompeo,
Mattis was not driven by ideologically driven hatred of Beijing but rather by a belief that China
(and to lesser extent Russia) pose the greatest long-term threat to American military supremacy
and so must be designated as the principal target of U.S. military planning. This outlook was
enshrined in the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy of February 2018 and continues to govern
U.S. military thinking today. Because China has been forced to respond to the U.S. military
buildup by engaging in what amounts to a new arms race, the Biden administration will face an
especially charged environment when negotiating with Beijing over military and strategic
matters.

On the Chinese side, it is hard to overestimate the role of President Xi Jinping. Not only does Xi
control the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the country’s ruling political formation, but also, as
president, the state apparatus and the military. When he first assumed leadership of the CCP, in
2012, many analysts in both China and the United States viewed him as an agent for reform,
intent on liberalizing the economy. As time went on however, Xi proved to be more interested in
reinvigorating the CCP (largely by purging members accused of corruption and suppressing all
challenges to Party monopoly on power) and concentrating ever more economic power in
Beijing; those who questioned Xi’s approach were arrested and jailed on trumped-up charges of
one sort or another.[12] By 2018, when the National People’s Congress convened in Beijing for
its annual meeting, Xi’s domination of state and party was so overwhelming that the country’s
Constitution was amended to eliminate term limits on the presidency, allowing him to remain in
office indefinitely.[13]

Xi’s authoritarian bent will prove especially challenging for the Biden administration as he
appears to be the principal agent behind many of the policies that are likely to prove stumbling
blocks for U.S. policymakers. For example, many Western analysts believe that he is the driving
force behind both the suppression of the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang and the pro-
democracy movement in Hong Kong.[14] Now that China has emerged from the coronavirus
with the world’s fastest growing economy, moreover, he is likely to prove more self-confident
than ever. Dealing with Xi will, then, prove one of the most demanding foreign policy challenges
facing the Biden administration.

Specific Points of Contention:

In its relations with China, the Biden administration will have to deal with a number of divisive
issues that have come to define Sino-American relations. Prominent among these are the status
of Taiwan, military friction in the South China Sea, China’s ongoing military modernization,
trade and technology, and the human rights situation in China. Sino-American relations are also
entangled with China’s (often contentious) ties with its neighbors, including Japan, South Korea,
and the Philippines. Each of these issues poses enormous problems of their own, and will require
deft handling by the Biden team.
Taiwan: Chinese leaders have consistently expressed the hope that Taiwan, which they view as a
renegade province, will reunite with the mainland in a peaceful manner, but have repeatedly
declared that they are prepared to invade and occupy the island if the Taiwanese declare their
independence. American officials have long acknowledged that both Taiwan and the mainland
are part of “One China,” but they have never spelled out the nature of this arrangement and have
regularly hinted that they would intervene if China tried to settle the matter through the use of
force; it has also helped enable the Taiwanese to resist Chinese pressures by providing them with
considerable military assistance and other forms of support.[15] In recent years, pro-
independence forces in Taiwan have acquired greater political stature, producing increased
friction with Beijing. The Trump administration enflamed these tensions even further by
increasing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and bestowing greater diplomatic recognition of the
island’s government, for example by sending high-ranking U.S. officials there.[16] The Biden
administration must therefore decide whether to scale back U.S. assistance to Taiwan or to
proceed along the provocative course initiated by the Trump administration, thereby risking a
major crisis and possible conflict.

The South China Sea: For the United States, the South China Sea represents the far western
edge of its strategic defense zone and the location of several key allies, including Indonesia and
the Philippines; for China, which borders on the sea, it constitutes the innermost line of its
defense, akin to the Caribbean Sea for the United States. In recent years, China has sought to
bolster its southern defenses by enlarging some of the islets and atolls it has claimed in the South
China Sea and establishing military facilities there – actions considered illegitimate by the U.S.
government and the International Court of Arbitration. To counter China’s growing presence in
the area, the U.S. Navy regularly conducts “freedom of navigation operations” (FRONOPs) in
waters adjacent to those militarized islands.[17] As noted, Secretary Pompeo also promised U.S.
support – including military backing – for other countries that border the sea and have laid
claims to exploit its resources. The Biden administration will therefore have to choose whether to
continue relying on military means to influence China in the South China Sea or to seek other
means of interaction.
China’s Ongoing Military Modernization: Although significant in numbers, China’s military –
the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA – has long lacked modern weaponry, especially advanced
ships, warplanes, and missiles. In recent years, however, Beijing has invested substantial funds in
the modernization of the PLA, which is beginning to catch up with the U.S. military in some
areas, such as cyberwar and ballistic missiles, and has acquired many modern vessels with which
to contest U.S. and Japanese dominance of the western Pacific.[18] While there is considerable
debate as to the degree to which Chinese forces have narrowed the air and naval technological
gap with their American counterparts, few would argue that the PLA now represents a
formidable opponent, especially in cyberspace and in areas adjoining the mainland. The United
States has responded to this challenge by expanding its military presence in the western Pacific
and by increasing spending on high-tech weapons intended for a war with China, thus fueling a
dangerous new arms race. This has proved a costly and provocative course, and so the Biden
administration, which simultaneously faces major fiscal issues, will have to decide whether to
continue down this path – eliciting further military moves from China – or to find ways of
moderating this arms competition.

Trade and Technology: Ever since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, trade
between the United States and China has grown enormously, with U.S. imports of Chinese goods
rising from $102 billion per year 2001 to $539 billion in 2018 (when trade with China reached its
peak).[19] Over these years, Chinese manufacturers became ever more adept at producing high-
tech products, such as electronics, computers, and automobile parts, and exporting them
worldwide, their largest market being the United States. This, in turn, prompted many American
manufacturers to move their assembly lines to China in search of low-wage and efficient
production, generating increased unemployment – and widespread discontent – in certain parts of
the United States. Donald Trump took advantage of this discontent to win election in 2016 and,
once in office, he sought to reverse the process by imposing substantial tariffs on Chinese
imports.[20] Ignoring corporate interests in transferring major industries to China, Trump
claimed that China’s technological progress was largely made possible by the theft of American
technology. He proceeded to block access to U.S. computer chips by leading Chinese firms,
including the telecommunications giant Huawei, before extending the policy to other Chinese-
owned firms. These moves have contributed significantly to the deterioration in U.S.-China
economic, trade, and political relations, leaving the Biden administration to decide whether to
retain the Trump-era tariffs and restrictions or to loosen some in a bid to improve relations.[21]

Human Rights in China: China’s treatment of its ethnic and religious minorities, particularly
the Tibetans, has long been a matter of concern for human rights organizations, and the topic has
grown in importance as information about the suppression of the Muslim Uighur population of
the Xinjiang region has become more widely known. Articles in the international press about the
incarceration of a million or more Uighurs in what amounts to concentration camps and the
systemic suppression of Islam and Uighur culture has provoked widespread anger in Washington
and led to Congressional attempts to impose penalties on China for these practices.[22] The
applications of a new Chinese National Security Law to Hong Kong, and the subsequent
crackdown on pro-democracy activists and politicians, has also provoked widespread outrage.
Many of Biden’s close associates, and the president himself, have long voiced strong support for
human rights and civil liberties – issues they will inevitably raise with their Chinese
interlocutors, creating significant obstacles to improved relations that will have to be overcome if
the two countries are to make progress on a variety of other issues.

Biden’s Options in Dealing with China

Prior to his Inauguration, Joe Biden said surprisingly little about what he has in mind for U.S.
relations with China, but what he did say suggests some ambivalence about his top priorities
when dealing with Beijing. While he has spoken of seeking Beijing’s cooperation on such issues
as climate change, world health, and nuclear nonproliferation, he has condemned China’s trade
and human rights practices and promised to “get tough” with China over these issues. Nowhere
has he explained how he aims to reconcile these clashing objectives, or how to prevent a US-
China clash from paving the way to war.

In the most explicit expression of his views on foreign policy, contained in an article in the
March/April 2020 issue of Foreign Affairs, Biden indicated that relations with China will be
viewed in the context of his principal foreign policy objectives: rehabilitating U.S. ties with
NATO and its other alliance partners; combatting authoritarianism and promoting human rights
abroad; advancing America’s economic interests; and overcoming such global challenges as
climate change and nuclear proliferation. China, of course, figures in all of these, but as one
factor among many – not as a problem area of its own.[23]

The one topic on which Biden addresses China at any length is trade and technology. It is in this
area, he claimed, that “the United States does need to get tough with China.” If Beijing continues
to behave as it has in the past, “it will keep robbing the United States and American companies
of their technology and intellectual property [and] will also keep using subsidies to give its state-
owned enterprises an unfair advantage.” The most effective approach to meet that challenge, he
wrote, “is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors
and human rights violations” – and to do so “even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues
where our interests converge, such as climate change, nonproliferation, and global health
security.”

On those latter issues, Biden wrote hopefully, if briefly, about the potential for cooperation. In
addressing the threat of North Korea, he spoke of building a “sustained, coordinated campaign
with our allies and others, including China, to advance our shared objective of a denuclearized
North Korea.” He also declared his intent to work with China and other countries in reducing
global carbon emissions, but berated Beijing for its continued reliance on coal at home and large
investments in new coal plants abroad.

Aside from his Foreign Affairs article, the clearest indication of Biden’s approach to U.S.-China
relations come from his selection of senior officials in the new administration. In many cases, he
has chosen people with ties to the Obama administration who supported the “pivot to Asia” or
have otherwise indicated an aggressive stance toward Beijing. His pick for Secretary of State,
Antony Blinken, was a deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration and in 2017
partnered with Michèle Flournoy in founding WestExec Advisors, a secretive consulting firm
with many high-powered clients.[24] Flournoy, as noted earlier, advocates a tough stance
towards China, and it appears that Blinken does so as well. In his confirmation hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 19, 2021, he credited the Trump administration
with adopting a more aggressive approach to China and reiterated its condemnation of Beijing
for its harsh treatment of the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities.[25] Avril Haines, Biden’s
nominee for Director of National Intelligence, also worked with Blinken at WestExec Advisors
and, like him, promised to take a hard line on China. “China is a challenge to our security, to our
prosperity, to our values across a range of issues and I do support an aggressive stance,” she told
the Senate Intelligence Committee on the same day.[26] Also suggestive is Biden’s choice to be
the top Asia expert at the National Security Council, Kurt Campbell, another former official in
the Obama administration. Like Flournoy considered a “hawk” on China, Campbell is widely
credited as the architect of Obama’s “pivot to Asia.”[27]

So far as can be determined, then, Biden would like to have it both ways: be able to cooperate
with China in areas that matter a lot to him, like climate change, world health, and
nonproliferation, while also pursuing a more hawkish stance toward Beijing, including by
maintaining pressure on Chinese forces in the South China Sea, maintaining the harsh Trump
trade and technology policies, and undertaking attacks on China’s human rights policies,
especially in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. But this is a doomed, myopic strategy. As indicated
above, the systemic and geographic factors dividing China and the United States are too vast and
powerful to be treated in this contradictory, ambivalent fashion. Any attempt to “get tough” on
China with respect to multiple critical issues in the U.S.-China relationship will undoubtedly
provoke resistance from Chinese leaders and thwart efforts to gain their cooperation on issues of
concern to Biden. If he is to secure their help in any of these areas, he must adopt a
comprehensive China policy, one that incorporates both cooperative and antagonistic measures in
a balanced fashion with the aim of maximizing progress in all key areas.

For a Biden policy on China to prove effective, it must proceed from a recognition of the
systemic factors that divide the two countries and an understanding of the ways in which the
policies of both the Trump and Xi administrations have widened that gulf. Ultimately, Biden
must choose whether to embrace the Trumpian view that China is a large and growing menace
that must be resisted on every front, or to treat it as another great power with which the United
States has successfully maintained cooperative economic and geopolitical relations in the past
and with which it can co-exist and cooperate with in a broad range of areas, even while
navigating difficult and contentious issues. If Biden chooses the former, any hope of securing
Beijing’s cooperation on climate change, nonproliferation, health security, and other core
concerns will evaporate and the U.S. and China will move ever closer to a Cold War stance with
an ever-increasing risk of actual conflict; if he chooses the latter, we can expect tough battles on
many divisive issues but can hope that serious, workmanlike negotiations will lead to peaceful,
mutually acceptable outcomes.

Recommendations:

As a matter of fundamental policy, we urge the Biden administration to declare that war – hot or
cold – between the United States and China is not inevitable and that it is possible for our two
countries to live in peace and interdependence as we have for much of the last half century –
competing and quarreling in certain arenas, but cooperating in others. This means committing to
the principle that when differences arise – as they surely will – solutions should be sought
through negotiations and compromise, not military posturing or unilateral edicts which can result
in dangerous incidents and ultimately lead to armed conflict.

In line with this overriding principle, we recommend that President Biden send a team of senior
diplomats and officials to Beijing for high-level talks with their Chinese counterparts to identify
major issues of concern to both nations, and that this be followed by an early visit to China by
President Biden himself (and/or one to Washington by Xi Jinping) to adopt an agenda for serious
negotiations on these issues. Working groups composed of experienced diplomats, military
officers, scientists, CEOs, and others should then be established in each problem area – trade,
technology, climate change, the South China Sea, and so on – and be charged with the task of
developing peaceful, mutually acceptable solutions for consideration by senior government
officials, including the two presidents.

While this process is under way, we urge both sides to undertake a variety of tension-reducing
and conflict-avoidance measures. These could include, for example, the cessation of U.S.
freedom of navigation operations (FRONOPs) in waters of the South China Sea claimed by
China and other nations, and the cessation of Chinese air and naval maneuvers in the air and
maritime space claimed by Taiwan. Both sides should also scale back their provocative military
exercises in the East and South China Seas. We also encourage a robust schedule of U.S.-China
military-to-military (“mil-to-mil”) conversations on other measures intended to avoid unintended
or accidental conflict in highly contested areas.

Finally, we recognize that many of the issues that divide the United States and China also
involve other states or entities, such as Taiwan, Japan, and the nations of the South China Sea.
Where appropriate, we call on the Biden administration to facilitate three-way and multilateral
talks – possible under the auspices of ASEAN – with these other actors aimed at devising
peaceful outcomes to the issues in dispute. Again, we urge all parties involved to undertake
tension-reducing and conflict avoidance measures wherever possible.

References
1. See Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).
2. As cited in Andrew Erickson, “Make China Great Again” Xi’s Truly Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks, October
30, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/make-china-great-again-xis-truly-grand-strategy/.
3. Michèle A. Flournoy, “How to Prevent a War in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, posted June 18, 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war-asia
4. See Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002).
5. See John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, April 2006, pp. 160-62.
6. See “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Canberra, Australia, Nov. 17, 2011,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
7. Cecilia Kang and David E. Sanger, “Huawei Is a Target as Trump Moves to Ban Foreign Telecom Gear,” New
York Times, May 15, 2019, Web, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/huawei-ban-trump.html.
8. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Alan Rappeport, “Huawei C.F.O. Is Arrested in Canada for Extradition to the U.S.,”
New York Times, Web, Dec. 5, 2018.
9. “Event Recap: Secretary Pompeo at the Nixon Library,” Richard Nixon Foundation, July 29, 2020,
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2020/07/event-recap-secretary-pompeo-nixon-library-2/.
10. See Anthony Kuhn, “Pompeo Rails Against China at ‘Quad’ Meeting with Foreign Ministers in Tokyo,” NPR,
Oct. 6, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/10/06/920683263/pompeo-rails-against-china-at-quad-meeting-with-
foreign-ministers-in-tokyo.
11. Edward Wong and Michael Crowley, “U.S. Says Most of China’s Claims in South China Sea Are Illegal,” New
York Times, July 13, 2020, Web, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-pompeo.html.
11. DoS, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Statement by Secretary of State Michael R.
Pompeo, July 13, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/.
12. See James Fallows, “China’s Great Leap Backwards,” The Atlantic, December 2016, pp. 58-65,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/.
13. Emily Rauhala, “Xi cleared to rule indefinitely as China officially scraps term limits,” Washington Post, March
11, 2018, Web, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-approves-plan-to-abolish-presidential-term-limits-
clearing-way-for-xi-to-stay-on/2018/03/11/973c7ab2-24f0-11e8-a589-763893265565_story.html.
14. See Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized
Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, Nov. 16, 2019, Web,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html. See also Keith
Bradsher, Austin Ramzy, and Tiffany May, “China Moves to Tighten Its Control of Hong Kong,” New York Times,
May 21, 2020, Web, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/asia/hong-kong-china.html.
15. Susan V. Lawrence and Wayne M. Morrison, Taiwan: Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report R44996 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, October 30, 2017).
16. See, for example, Amy Qin, “U.S. Official Visits Taiwan, and China Warns of
Consequences,” New York Times, Web, Sept. 17, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/us-official-taiwan-china.html
17. For background, see CRS, “U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and
Issues for Congress,” CRS Report R42784, updated December 29, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. See
also DoS, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea.”
18. For details on the Chinese military buildup, see U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020 (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2020), and prior editions.
19. U.S. Census Bureau, “Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with China,” accessed on January 18, 2021,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
20. Dorcas Wong and Alexander Chipman Koty, “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline,” China Briefing, updated
Aug. 25, 2020, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/.
21. See Jeffrey Kucik, “Biden faces tough, necessary trade policy decisions in 2021,” The Hill, Dec. 31, 2020,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/532245-bidens-faces-tough-necessary-trade-policy-decisions-in-2021.
22. See Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” and Edward Wong, “Lawmakers Push Trump to Act
Against China on Uighur Detention,” New York Times, Nov. 14, 2013, Web,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/asia/congress-uighurs-china-detention.html.
23. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.
24. Bryan Bender and Theodoric Meyer, “The secretive consulting firm that’s become Biden’s Cabinet in waiting,”
Politico, Nov. 23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/23/westexec-advisors-biden-cabinet-440072.
25. Ibid.
26. Julian E. Barnes, Lara Jakes, and Jennifer Steinhauer, “In Confirmation Hearings, Biden Aides Indicate Tough
Approach on China,” New York Times, Jan. 19, 2021, Web, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/avril-
haines-antony-blinken-lloyd-austin.html.
27. Jesse Johnson, “Architect of U.S. pivot picked to be Biden's ‘Asia czar,’” Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/14/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/kurt-campbell-asia-
czar/.