What kind of world order will this

T he Age of bring? Contrary to what more alarmist

W H O W ILL RUN THE W O RLD?

voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S.-

Uneasy Peace Chinese world will not be a world on
the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in
large part because China’s ambitions for
Chinese Power in a the coming years are much narrower
Divided World than many in the Western foreign policy
establishment tend to assume. Rather
Yan Xuetong than unseating the United States as the
world’s premier superpower, Chinese
n early October 2018, U.S. Vice foreign policy in the coming decade will
President Mike Pence delivered a largely focus on maintaining the condi­
searing speech at a Washington think tions necessary for the country’s contin­
tank, enumerating a long list of reproaches ued economic growth—a focus that will
against China. From territorial disputes in likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear
the South China Sea to alleged Chinese of open confrontation with the United
meddling in U.S. elections, Pence accused States or its primary allies. Instead, the
Beijing of breaking international norms coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy
and acting against American interests. The peace between the two superpowers. Both
tone was unusually blunt—blunt enough sides will build up their militaries but
for some to interpret it as a harbinger of remain careful to manage tensions before
a new Cold War between China and the they boil over into outright conflict. And
United States. rather than vie for global supremacy
Such historical analogies are as through opposing alliances, Beijing and
popular as they are misleading, but the Washington will largely carry out their
comparison contains a kernel of truth: competition in the economic and techno­
the post-Cold War interregnum of U.S. logical realms. At the same time, U.S.-
hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the
return, with China playing the role of the end of sustained multilateralism outside
junior superpower. The transition will strictly economic realms, as the combi­
be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, nation of nationalist populism in the West
affair, as China’s rise sets the country on and China’s commitment to national
a collision course with the United States sovereignty will leave little space for the
over a number of clashing interests. But kind of political integration and norm
as Washington slowly retreats from some setting that was once the hallmark of
of its diplomatic and military engage­ liberal internationalism.
ments abroad, Beijing has no clear plan
for filling this leadership vacuum and WHAT CHINA WANTS
shaping new international norms from China’s growing influence on the world
the ground up. stage has as much to do with the United
States’ abdication of its global leadership
YAN X U E T O N G is D istinguished Professor and
Dean o f the In s titu te of Inte rn atio na l Relations under President Donald Trump as with
at Tsinghua University. China’s own economic rise. In material

40 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 The Age o f Uneasy Peace

Dreaming o f a new world order: X i at a news conference in Mexico City, July 2018

terms, the gap between the two coun­ accords and institutions. In 2018 alone,
tries has not narrowed by much in it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
recent years: since 2015, China’s gdp Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran,
growth has slowed to less than seven and the un Human Rights Council.
percent a year, and recent estimates put It is still unclear if this retrenchment
U.S. growth above the three percent is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived
mark. In the same period, the value of aberration from the norm—or a new
the renminbi has decreased by about ten U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could
percent against the U.S. dollar, under­ outlive Trump’s tenure. But the global
cutting China’s import capacity and its fallout of Trumpism has already pushed
currency’s global strength. W hat has some countries toward China in ways that
changed a great deal, however, is the would have seemed inconceivable a few
expectation that the United States will years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister
continue to promote—through diplo­ Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed
macy and, if necessary, military power— Japan’s relations with China, from barely
an international order built for the most hidden hostility to cooperation, during a
part around liberal internationalist prin­ state visit to Beijing in October 2018,
ciples. Under Trump, the country has when China and Japan signed over 50
EDGARD GARRIDO / REUTERS

broken with this tradition, questioning agreements on economic cooperation.

the value of free trade and embracing a Meanwhile, structural factors keep
virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The widening the gap between the two global
Trump administration is modernizing front-runners, China and the United
the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to States, and the rest of the world. Already,
strong-arm friends and foes alike, and the two countries’ military spending
withdrawing from several international dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S.

January /February 2019 41

Yan Xuetong

defense budget may reach $800 billion, related to the initiative, and this number
and the Chinese one may exceed $300 is set to increase in the coming years. At
billion, whereas no other global power its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese
will spend more than $80 billion on its Communist Party went so far as to
forces. The question, then, is not whether enshrine a commitment to the initiative
a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come in its constitution—a signal that the
to be but what this order will look like. party views the infrastructure project as
At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a more than a regular foreign policy. China
liberal economic order built on free trade. is also willing to further open its domes­
China’s economic transformation over tic markets to foreign goods in exchange
the past decades from an agricultural for greater access abroad. Just in time for
society to a major global powerhouse— a major trade fair in Shanghai in November
and the world’s second-largest economy— 2018—designed to showcase the country’s
was built on exports. The country has potential as a destination for foreign
slowly worked its way up the value goods—China lowered its general tariff
chain, its exports beginning to compete from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.
with those of highly advanced econo­ Given this enthusiasm for the global
mies. Now as then, these exports are the economy, the image of a revisionist
lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they China that has gained traction in many
ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the Western capitals is misleading. Beijing
jobs they create are a vital engine of relies on a global network of trade ties,
domestic social stability. There is no so it is loath to court direct confronta­
indication that this will change in the tion with the United States. Chinese
coming decade. Even amid escalating leaders fear—not without reason—that
trade tensions between Beijing and such a confrontation might cut off its
Washington, China’s overall export access to U.S. markets and lead U.S.
volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. allies to band together against China
tariffs may sting, but they will neither rather than stay neutral, stripping it of
change Beijing’s fundamental incentives important economic partnerships and
nor portend a general turn away from valuable diplomatic connections. As a
global free trade on its part. result, caution, not assertiveness or
Quite to the contrary: because China’s aggressiveness, will be the order of the
exports are vital to its economic and day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the
political success, one should expect coming years. Even as it continues to
Beijing to double down on its attempts to modernize and expand its military,
gain and maintain access to foreign China will carefully avoid pressing
markets. This strategic impetus is at the issues that might lead to war with the
heart of the much-touted Belt and Road United States, such as those related to
Initiative, through which China hopes to the South China Sea, cybersecurity,
develop a vast network of land and sea and the weaponization of space.
routes that will connect its export hubs
to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, NEW RULES?
some 70 countries and organizations had Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope
signed contracts with China for projects to be on par with their counterparts in

42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Washington, they worry about the strate­
gic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese
order. American leaders balk at the idea
of relinquishing their position at the top FOREIGN
of the global food chain and will likely
go to great lengths to avoid having to AFFAIRS
accommodate China. Officials in Beijing,
in no hurry to become the sole object of
Washington’s apprehension and scorn,
would much rather see a multipolar
world in which other challenges—and
challengers—force the United States
to cooperate with China.
In fact, the United States’ own rise
in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries provides something of a model
for how the coming power transition may
take place. Because the United Kingdom,
the world’s undisputed hegemon at the We don't break
time, was preoccupied with fending off a
challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it the news;
did not bother much to contain the rise
of a much bigger rival across the pond. w e break it down.
China is hoping for a similar dynamic
now, and recent history suggests it Educate your employees and
could indeed play out. In the early customers about the most
months of George W. Bush’s presi­ pressing global issues of today
dency, for instance, relations between with a Foreign Affairs Foreign
Beijing and Washington were souring Policy Briefing. Bring us to
over regional disputes in the South
your office or event space to
China Sea, reaching a boiling point
when a Chinese air force pilot died in provide expert perspective on
a midair collision with a U.S. surveil­ the forces shaping your world
lance plane in April 2001. Following and your business.
the 9/11 attacks a few months later,
however, Washington came to see
China as a useful strategic partner in
For inquiries about events
its global fight against terrorism, and
relations improved significantly over at your organization,
the rest of Bush’s two terms. please contact us at
Today, unfortunately, the list of events@foreignaffairs.com
common threats that could force the
two countries to cooperate is short.
After 17 years of counterterrorism

43
Yan Xuetong

campaigns, the sense of urgency that tional law. In recent years, some have
once surrounded the issue has faded. interpreted public statements by
Climate change is just as unlikely to Chinese leaders in support of global­
make the list of top threats anytime ization as a sign that Beijing seeks to
soon. The most plausible scenario is fashion itself as the global liberal order’s
that a new global economic crisis in new custodian, yet such sweeping inter­
the coming years will push U.S. and pretations are wishful thinking: China is
Chinese leaders to shelve their disagree­ merely signaling its support for a liberal
ments for a moment to avoid economic economic order, not for ever-increasing
calamity—but this, too, remains a political integration. Beijing remains
hypothetical. fearful of outside interference, particu­
To make matters worse, some points larly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan,
of potential conflict are here to s ta y - Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters
chief among them Taiwan. Relations of press freedom and online regulations.
between Beijing and Taipei, already As a result, it views national sovereignty,
tense, have taken a turn for the worse rather than international responsibili­
in recent years. Taiwan’s current govern­ ties and norms, as the fundamental
ment, elected in 2016, has questioned the principle on which the international
notion that mainland China and Taiwan order should rest. Even as a new super­
form a single country, also known as the power in the coming decade, China will
“one China” principle. A future govern­ therefore pursue a less interventionist
ment in Taipei might well push for de jure foreign policy than the United States
independence. Yet a Taiwanese indepen­ did at the apex of its power. Consider
dence referendum likely constitutes a the case of Afghanistan: even though it
redline for Beijing and may prompt it to is an open secret that the United States
take military action. If the United States expects the Chinese military to shoul­
were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s der some of the burden of maintaining
aid, a military intervention by Beijing stability there after U.S. troops leave
could easily spiral into a full-fledged the country, the Chinese government
U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, has shown no interest in this idea.
Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwan­ Increased Chinese clout may also
ese independence aspirations in the bud bring attempts to promote a vision of
by political and economic means. As a world order that draws on ancient
result, it is likely to continue lobbying Chinese philosophical traditions and
third countries to cut off their diplo­ theories of statecraft. One term in
matic ties with Taipei, an approach it particular has been making the rounds
has already taken with several Latin in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane au­
American countries. thority.” The word represents a view of
Cautious or not, China set somewhat China as an enlightened, benevolent
different emphases in its approach to hegemon whose power and legitimacy
norms that undergird the international derive from its ability to fulfill other
order. In particular, a more powerful countries’ security and economic needs—
China will push for a stronger empha­ in exchange for their acquiescence to
sis on national sovereignty in interna­ Chinese leadership.

44 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 The Age of Uneasy Peace

BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE no signs of abating. Across the globe,

Given the long shadow of nuclear escala­ secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks
tion, the risk of a direct war between will continue to occur, the latter espe­
China and the United States will remain cially if competition between China and
minimal, even as military, technological, the United States reduces their coopera­
and economic competition between them tion on counterterrorism measures.
intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build In the economic realm, export-driven
ever more effective antimissile shields economies, such as China, Germany,
are unlikely to change this, since neither and Japan, will ensure the survival of a
China nor the United States can improve global liberal trade regime built on
its antimissile systems to the point of free-trade agreements and member­
making the country completely impervi­ ship in the World Trade Organization-
ous to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, no matter what path the United States
the United States’ withdrawal from the takes. On other matters of global gover­
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces nance, however, cooperation is likely to
Treaty will encourage both sides to build stall. Even if a future U.S. administra­
up their nuclear forces and improve tion led a renewed push toward multilat­
their second-strike capabilities, ensuring eralism and international norm setting,
that neither side will be confident it China’s status as a junior superpower
can launch a nuclear attack on the other would make it difficult for the United
without suffering a devastating retalia­ States to sustain the strong leadership
tion. The threat of nuclear war will also that has traditionally spurred such
keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear­ initiatives in the past. Differences in
armed powers, such as India, from ideology and clashing security interests
escalating into outright war. will prevent Beijing and Washington
Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled from leading jointly, but neither will
out, nor can military skirmishes among have enough economic or military clout
lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to lead on its own. To the extent that
to become more frequent, as the two multilateral initiatives persist in such a
superpowers’ restraint may embolden world, they will be limited to either
some smaller states to resolve local side’s respective sphere of influence.
conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, China’s emphasis on national sover­
may not shy away from war as it tries to eignty, together with Western societies’
regain its superpower status and maintain turn away from globalism, will deal an
its influence in eastern Europe and the additional blow to multilateralism. The
Middle East. Faced with calls to reform European Union is already fraying, and
the un Security Council, fraying powers a number of European countries have
such as France and the United Kingdom reintroduced border controls. In the
may seek to buttress their claim to coming decade, similar developments
permanent membership in the council will come to pass in other domains. As
through military interventions abroad. technological innovation becomes the
In the Middle East, meanwhile, the primary source of wealth, countries
struggle for regional dominance among will become ever more protective of
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows their intellectual property. Many

January /February 2019 45

Yan Xuetong

countries are also tightening control of in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time,
capital flows as they brace for a global these states still maintain close trade
economic slump in the near future. and investment relations with China,
And as concerns over immigration and and several of them have sided with
unemployment threaten to undermine Beijing in trying to reform the World
Western governments’ legitimacy, more Trade Organization.
and more countries will increase visa This two-track strategy shows just
restrictions for foreign workers. how far down the road to bipolarity the
Unlike the order that prevailed world has already advanced. And the
during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.- fundamental driver of this process—
Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, the raw economic and military clout on
issue-specific alliances rather than which American and, increasingly,
rigid opposing blocs divided along clear Chinese dominance rests—will further
ideological lines. Since the immediate cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status
risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly as the two global heavyweights in the
small, neither side appears willing to coming decade. Whether or not the
build or maintain an extensive—and United States recovers from its Trumpian
expensive—network of alliances. China fever and leads a renewed push for global
still avoids forming explicit alliances, and liberalism is, ultimately, of little conse­
the United States regularly complains quence to the outcome: opposed in their
about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither strategic interests but evenly matched in
side is currently able to offer a grand their power, China and the United States
narrative or global vision appealing to will be unable to challenge each other
large majorities at home, let alone to a directly and settle the struggle for
large number of states. supremacy definitively. As during the
For some time to come, then, U.S.- Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads
Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideo­ will prevent proxy conflicts from easily
logically driven, existential conflict over escalating into a direct confrontation
the fundamental nature of the global between the two superpowers. More
order; rather, it will be a competition important still, China’s leadership is
over consumer markets and technologi­ acutely aware of the benefits its country
cal advantages, playing out in disputes derives from the status quo, for now—it
about the norms and rules governing is chief among the conditions for China’s
trade, investment, employment, exchange continued economic and soft-power
rates, and intellectual property. And expansion—and will avoid putting these
rather than form clearly defined military- benefits on the line anytime soon, unless
economic blocs, most states will adopt a China’s core interests are in the balance.
two-track foreign policy, siding with the Chinese leaders will therefore work hard
United States on some issues and China to avoid setting off alarm bells in already
on others. Western allies, for instance, jittery Western capitals, and their foreign
are still closely aligned with the United policy in the coming years will reflect
States on traditional security matters this objective. Expect recurring tensions
inside nato , and Australia, India, and and fierce competition, yes, but not a
Japan have supported the U.S. strategy descent into global chaos.®

46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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